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Abstract 
In Thailand. environmental problems, including air and water pollution, have been 
intensifying over the last fcw decades. The problems stem from the country's single 
minded pursuit of economic growth by means of industrialisation. As the 
environmental consequcnces of industrialisat ion becam e more severe, so gradually, 
were cnvironmental laws enacted to mitigate the probl ems. The first laws proved 
almost wholly ineffective but more was hoped from the landmark environmental law 
refonllS of 1992 (referred in this thesis as the 'big bang' refonl1S). Thesc refonl1S 
introduced a number of innovative measu res, including the polluter-pays principle, 
economic incentives, public participation, and strict civil li abil ity. However, these 
laws too have had very little positive impact 
Part One of this thesi s examines the refoll11ed laws and asks why they havc been so 
ineffectivc. It locates many of the failings within particular aspects of Thai politics 
and culture. These include particular aspects of the Thai political system which served 
to emasulate both the laws themselves and the capability for their enforcement, and 
distinctive aspects of Thai culture including respect for authority, the cu lture of 
comprom isc, the culture of gratitude, regulatory capture and cOITuption. 
Against this background, Parts Two and Thrce of the thesis argue that a new strategy 
for environmental protection is required, and in particular, a new approach to 
environmental regulation (broadly defincd). But what type of regulation is best suited 
to Thailand's uniquc circumstances? Focussing on air and water pollution (two of 
Thailand's most serious problems) and drawing from the litcrature on developed and 
developing countries and from the writer's own empirical work, the answer is 
provided in two stages. The first examines instnllnents which might be devcloped at 
domestic level, the second , at intemational initi atives. 
From a domestic perspective, the thesis argues that there will be melit in developing 
particular measures incorporating environmental education and training, disclosure of 
environmental infonnation, economic instruments, self-regulation, and command and 
control regulation. From an intemational perspective, the thesis focu ses on the 
lV 
pat1icular roles of international soft law, the roles and leverage provided by a range of 
international and regional institutions (and in pm1icular environmental conditions 
imposed by World Bank loans and, implementation of the good governance principle 
mandated by the IMF) and implementation of environmental management systems 
under ISO 14001. 
Throughout, it is argued that that it is inappropriate to simply take "off the shelf' 
theories and solutions which may have worked in developed countries such as the 
USA, Canada, the UK or Australia. While these theories may provide some insights 
and some may indeed prove useful in Thailand, nevel1heless Thai culture, society and 
politics, are quite distinctive. It will only be by designing solutions appropriate to the 
Thai context, that effective regulation and positive environmental outcomes, are likely 
to be achieved. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
l. The Research Context and Aims 
Environmental problems pose a major till'eat to the well-being of the people of 
Thai land. These problems are complex and diffuse and include air, water, and noise 
pollution, the generation and inappropriate disposal of hazardous waste and 
deforestation. These problems have been intensifYing over the last few decades, not 
least because Thailand's emphasis on achieving development and economic growth has 
led to a systematic neglect of the envirorunental effects of such industrialisation. 
Envirorunental protection has been an explicit concem of the Thai govemment since at 
least 1975, when the first attempt was made to create a system of envirorunental 
regulation. Nevertheless, these laws have proved to be largely ineffective in ensuring 
environmental protection. Indeed, the situation has progressively deteriorated. 
A significant change to this situation appeared to take place in 1992, when Mr Anand 
Panyarachun, the first prime minister to take an active interest in environmental issues, 
initiated an extensive selies of environmental law refomls (refelTed to here as the 'big 
bang ' reform). The most important piece of legislation to emerge from this initi ative 
was the 1992 Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality 
Act. This landmark envirorunental law reform introduced a number of innovative 
measures, including the polluter pays principle, community 'rights to know' , and 
incentive measures similar to those used in many developed countries. 
The 1992 law refoml was based to a large extent on principles and legal doctrines which 
had been developed and applied in legislation in advanced industIialised countIies, 
especially the United States. But there is a serious danger in taking 'off the peg' , 
instruments and institutions that have worked well in one culture and set of economic 
circumstances, and applying them uncritically to another. Arguably, what works well in 
one country and context may not do so in another, and the failure to recognise this , and 
modifY the regulatory strategy to local circumstances, may result in regulatory and 
implementation failure . And yet there has been almost no debate or awareness within 
Thailand. or indeed outside, about the serious risks of regulatory cloning fi'om 
developed to developing countries. 
It was this concern with the severity of Thailand's environmental problems, and this 
in sight concerning the inappropriateness of the means by which it is dealing with them, 
which shape this thesis. At the most basic level , my research questions are: does the 
'big bang' refornl yield satisfactory results in Thailand? If the answer is no, what are 
thc causes of rcgulatory failure? And to what extent do these relate to the 
inappropriateness in the Thai context of the regulatory st rategy adopted? In particular, 
how important are Thai culture and the social and economic circumstances of the 
country, to shaping appropriate environmental and regulatory strategies? 
To the extent that the current approach seems seriously ill-advised, by what strategies 
and by what tools might one create a more appropriate and effective means of dealing 
with Thailand's chronic environmental problems? In particular, this thesis proposes a 
set of policy instruments and legal principles which can more efficiently refonn 
environmental regulation in Thailand. Since environmental issues transcend national 
boundaries, and environmental law encompasses both national law and international 
law, the suggested policy instruments and legal principles are presented through an 
examination of environmental policy at both national and international levels. 
Thus the thesis provides both a critique of the regulatory status quo and an agenda for 
refornl, infonned by the need to match instruments and institutions to Thailand's 
particular cultural, social and economic circumstances. 
To examine these issues, it is necessary not only to analyse the relevant legislation, but 
to explore a broader set of questions relating to the relationship between law and 
society. On the one hand, the whole purpose of law refonn is to change social 
behaviour. In this sense, law is to some extent separate fi'om society as a tool to change 
behaviour. On the other hand, the law must in some important way connect with the 
lived experience of the society which it attempts to govern. If there is no such 
connection. then law could be seen as so far removed from society as to be ilTelevant. If 
this should occur, then law refornl will not be successful, even if it is comprehensive 
and detailed. 
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Wl1ile this thesis does not attempt to provide a detailed examination of the complex 
issue of the relationship between law and society, it does examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the 1992 environmental law refonn within the context of Thai histolY 
and Thai culture. Seen from a broader perspective, this study attempts to examine how a 
developing country such as Thailand, which is intent on achieving rapid development, 
addresses, and can address, the environmental problems generated by this emphasis on 
economic growth. 
II. Focus and Methodology of the Study 
Thailand confronts a wide range of environmental problems. Two of the most serious 
arc industrial air and water pollution, and it is these which are the subject matter of this 
thesis. This focus made it possible to study two major environmental problems in some 
depth, rather than attempting a broader, but more superficial examination of the many 
envirolUnental problems affecting Thailand. 
The study was conducted by using two major approaches: desktop research drawing 
tl'om the available literature in the area, and empirical study based on fieldwork 
interviews. With regard to the fonner , the thesis draws substantially on books, articles, 
research papers, and proceedings of conferences from within the social sciences 
generally. The need to move beyond legal texts to this broader literature was essential 
because the effectiveness of law reform can only be understood through a wider 
examination of the social context in which this ref 01111 is taking place. As a result, while 
this thesis focuses on legal materials , it attempts to adopt the more inter-disciplinary 
approach the subject matter requires. Thus the materials examined include 
environmental law, ecology, economics, history and sociology. 
Wl1ile the available literature relating to the experience of developed countIies is quite 
large, in contrast, the literature which seeks to apply this wisdom and to modify it to suit 
thc circumstances of developing countries, is very modest indeed. It is not just that there 
is little relevant literature relating to Thailand specifically, but the literature relating to 
these issues as they apply to Asia generally is also very limited. Only the World Bank, 
only very recently, has made any concerted attempt to engage with the very different 
strategic environmental solutions necessitated by the very different social, economic 
anel cultural contexts of developing countries. So to a substantial extent, it was 
necessary to tread new ground, with very little preliminary infol111ation, when 
addressing the environmental challenge in Thailand. 
For my empirical study, I interviewed as many as 44 people whose activities are related 
to the environmental situation in Thailand. These include parliamentarians, goverrunent 
officials, academics, NGOs representatives, business people and community 
representatives. These interviews were conducted with the idea of identifying the major 
environmental problems facing Thailand, and assessing the attitudes and approaches of 
people who are concel11ed with environmental issues from a wide variety of 
perspectives, so that I could better identifY areas of agreement and divergence. In 
addition, the interviewees were able to provide me with expert, first-hand infonnation 
about the problems of creating an effective system of envirorunental regulation. 
While a Westel11er accustomed to travelling across (for example) Washington DC with 
relative ease, might have sought to conduct a more ambitious number of interviews, the 
practicalities of interviewing in Bangkok are very different. In a city where chronic 
traffic congestion makes the joul11ey from one side to the other extremely onerous, time 
consuming and unpredictable, the number of field interviews one can plan to conduct in 
a day is a fraction of those possible in a major Western city. Those with any experience 
of travelling in major Asian cities, whether Bangkok, Manila or Jakal1a, will know first-
hand, just what a challenge this can be. 
Nevertheless, despite time and budgetary constraints, interviews were conducted with a 
very substantial number of the major decision-makers and other persons involved and 
the sample was quite representative. Only three respondents declined to be interviewed. 
The interviews themselves were based on personal knowledge of who the key 
individuals were, supplemented by 'snowball' sampling where necessary. 
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IJ I. Plan of the Thesis 
A.Part One 
Pan One of the thesis provides a brief discussion on the evolution of envirorullental law 
in Thailand, including its strengths and wcaknesses and the economic, social and 
cultural reasons which account for its ultimate failure. 
Chapter 2 begins by dealing with thc historical background of environmental law in 
Thailand. It discusses the evolution of environmental law from 1975 responding both to 
the looming environmental disaster precipitated by water pollution from thc sugar 
industry, and to intemational pressures, including the Stockholm Dcclaration in 1972. 
The chapter traces the development of the basic doctrines and principles within such a 
law, and its failure to stcm the growth of yet more severe environmental problems. This 
provides a background to examine the "big bang" environmental law ref 01111 which 
took place in 1992 . The chapter explains the new legal doctrines and regulatory 
tcchniques introduced in the 1992 cnviroru11ental law reform and shows how that refonn 
provided for a number of irulOvative measures to create an effective and comprehensive 
environmental regulatory system. These measures include the recognition of the role of 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community lights to know, the pollutcr payss 
principle. strict civil liability. and inccntive measures. 
Chapters 3-5 deal mainly with the aftennath of the ' big bang' refonn. Chapter 3 offers 
an outline of the results of the refoml and examines the current situation of air and water 
pollution in Thailand. By focusing on p3liicular case studies. it provides us with 
disturbing findings. [t suggests that especially in major cities like Bangkok. such 
pollution has not only become worse, but has generated very serious health problems 
for those who are substantially exposed to pollution. The chapter offers four case 
studies of both air and water pollution to demonstrate how the environmental condition 
in the country has been gctting worse. These case studies also provide some insight into 
the reasons for the environmental detelioration and for the failure of the 'big bang' 
reforms. 
These issues are explored more systcmatically in Chapter 4, which seeks to explain why 
the problems of air and water pollution in Thailand are still pervas ive despite the 
numerous innovati ve measures introduced in the ' big bang' refOJ1l1. The chapter 
examines a number of factors responsible for environmental regulatory failure in 
Thailand: these range from ambiguities and impreci sion in the law, to weaknesses in the 
institutions responsible for admini stering and enforcing the laws, and to more general 
social factors. While some of these factors are the same as those found in many other 
countries such as the lack of political will , and ability of finns to comply with 
regulation, others are unique in the context of Thailand as they arc associated with 
social setting of the country. These are culture and cOITuption. 
In relation to Thai culture, the chapter shows that a number of aspects of Thai culture 
have become impediments to regul atory success. These traits include: the sense of 
obligation arising from a feeling of gratitude; power-orientation ; excessive love of 
freedom; and a beli ef in the rule ofkaJ1l1a. 
The problem of corruption is so pervas ive in a developing country like Thailand, and 
cOITuption is so clUcial in hampering the success of regul ation that this issue is given 
separate consideration in Chapter 5. This chapter di scusses how corlUption disrupts 
regul ation in many countJies, and in Thailand particularl y. Of more importance, it also 
investigates how corruption takes place and develops in Thailand, and how the country 
has reacted to thi s situation. Not least, it examines how cOlTuption seriously 
undermines environmental regulation in Thailand. 
B. Pal·t Two 
Parts Two and Three contain the core of the thesis. Recognising both the failure of the 
ex ist ing approaches and their cultural and economic causes, these p3Iis seek to develop 
and design a very di ffe rent approach to environmental regulation, broadly defined: one 
whi ch is much more suited to , and which takes acco unt of, Thailand' s particular 
economic and cultural circumstances. Part Two (Chapter 6) attempts to achi eve thi s 
goal of proposing appropriate policy instruments from a domestic perspective, Part 
Three (Chapter 7) does so from an international perspect ive. 
Part Two (Chapter 6) suggests fi ve approaches to improving environmental protection 
in Thailand. These are environmental education; disclosure of environmental 
information ; economic instlUments; self-regulation ; and command and control 
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regulation. In proposing these approaches, the chapter draws upon previous discussions 
regarding the cultural, economic and political factors which affect environmental 
regulation in Thailand. 
The anal ysis in the earlier chapters suggests that environmental law refOllTI cannot be 
studied in isolation. Thus, the first approach examined in Chapter 6 focuses on the 
crucial question of environmental education. Environmental law ref o llTI , it is argued, 
will be far more likely to succeed if the general public understands and accepts the 
importance of a sound enviroruTIent, and the ways in which the law seeks to ensure this. 
This issue is especially impOitant in Thailand which has. for several decades, 
emphasised the impol1ant of rapid industrialisation. Environmental education is 
especially impoltant because the enforcement of environmental laws, as the discussion 
of the 1992 refol1TI suggests, is in many ways dependent on a knowledgeable public 
which can, for example, recognise and report environmental damage. Thus the chapter 
discusses the history of environmental education in Thailand, cUlTent effOits to provide 
such education to all panies involved in environmental protection, such as the public, 
environmental regulators, and the business community; and ways to further the cause 
of environmental education. In addition, it discusses the broader question of how 
education might contribute towards changing Thai attitudes regarding patronage and 
kalllla, for example, which impede the emergence of a civic culture which would 
respect and seek to protect community interests. 
The second approach focuses on the disclosure of environmental information. In broad 
tellllS, the more infollTIation disclosed by the govelllment relating to environmental 
perfOllTIanee and the environmental effect of industry activities, the better the prospects 
of effective enforcement and third party intervention. This approach. which is relatively 
new in Thailand, adopts a model of enforcement which is broader, more pluralistic and 
more far-reaching than model s of enforcemcnt which rely on a p3lticular set of 
regulators to ensure enforcement. 
The disclosure system aims to infollTI the general public; and hence the particular 
people who may be most affected by particular fOIlTIS of pollution, of the sources and 
impacts of pollution. Thus the traditional model of enforcement, as perfollTIed by a 
specific set of regulators through the imposition of legal sanctions, may be extended in 
two ways. First, the disclosure system enables the public to participate more extensively 
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in enforcement. Secondly, enforcement may be achieved, not only by legal sanctions, 
but by repol1ing and assessing the environmental perfonnance of businesses in ways 
which affect their reputations as respected members of the community, and further, may 
also affect the financial prospects of the business. The chapter discusses the possible 
uses of di sclosure requirements imposed on the govenunent and industry. Disclosure, 
furthennore, can be required by law or else a voluntary action in which businesses may 
choose to engage. The question of environmental disclosure is part of a larger campaign 
that is cUlTently taking place in Thailand to enhance transparency and accountability in 
government as a whole. Once again, therefore, this approach is examined in the broader 
context of political and social developments within Thailand as a wholc. 
The third approach focuses on the use of different economic instruments to f1lI1her 
environmental protection. These include pollution charge and tax systems, the 
establishment of a system of clearly defined propeliy rights, the use of tradable 
emission pell11its and the provision of subsidies to reduce environmentally hannful 
behaviour. The chapter discusses the extent to which these instruments have been 
adopted in Thailand, and the problems associated with their effective incorporation into 
the Thai regulatory system, given the specific economic, political and social conditions 
prcvailing in Thailand. 
The next approach examined is sel f-regulation. This regulatory technique has emerged 
relatively recently. It involves, broadly, governments providing fi1l11S, or associations 
which have proved themselves to be responsible, with the authority to regulate 
themselves. While this system has a number of advantages when operating in its ideal 
form, it is st ill a new regulatory technique for many developing countlies and the 
discussion concell1ing the chances of its success is necessarily specul ative. 
Finally, the chapter examines traditional command and control regulation techniques. 
This analysis takes the fonn of a reconsideration of these techniques in the li ght of the 
earlier di scussion of the problems connected with them. ImpOliantly, it considers 
command and control techniques not in isolation, but as one technique amongst others, 
and as one which is likely to be most successful when used in combination with the 
other, more innovative techniques discussed in the chapter. 
c. Part Three 
While Part II (Chapter 6) focuses on factors operating at the national level, Part III 
(Chapter 7) argues that intelllational pressures could playa crucial role in helping 
address the environmental situation in Thailand. Environmental problems transcend 
national boundaries. As a result, in the last three decades there have been intensive 
effOli s by the international community to develop a system of international 
envirorUllental law which would address the intensifying problem of global 
environmental degradation. Thi s chapter discusses the sources of internat ional 
envirorunental law, including the principles embodied in the Stockholm Declaration and 
Agenda 2 1. It al so examines international instituti ons such as the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) which has recentl y come up with ISO 14000, 
the intelllational environmental standard that must be followed by compani es intent on 
creating better environment management systems that would lead to improved 
envirorunental perfonnance. This chapter examines these internationally articulated 
principles and standards, and the ways in wh ich they could be applied in the Thai 
context to achieve better environmental standards. 
Environmental protection at the international level cannot be examined in isolation fi'om 
other areas of international law which affect environmental performance. Organisat ions 
such as the WTO are developing the connection between intelllati onal trade and the 
envirorullent. Furthennore, important intelllational financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and the lntelllational Monetary Fund are examining carefully the 
relationship between development and the environment. Consequentl y, these 
inst itutions are bringing environmental concerns within the scope of their activities, 
even though such concerns do not traditionall y fall within their scope. All these 
developments are changing the character of environmental regulation at the 
intelllational level , and this chapter examines ways in which these developments may be 
used to fU!iher the cause of environmental protection in Thailand. 
It should also be noted that organisations such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) can have a profound influence on domestic policy making, as 
countries which rely on these institutions for financial assistance must comply with the 
conditions attached by the institutions when they grant thc loans. These may include 
conditions relating to environmental protecti on. In addition, the World Bank and the 
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IMF are increasingly recognising that good governance is essential to ensure successful 
and sustainable development. Thus, in promoting transparency and accountability in 
government, together with the enhancement of the rule of law and the elimination of 
cOITuption, these institutions may assist in creating the political and social conditions 
that are also vital, as discussed earli er, for the creation of an effective environmental 
system. 
These intemational insti tutions are not neutral , and their actions may sometimes have a 
hannful effect on the Thai people. Nevertheless, it is possible that the activities of these 
institutions, and the existence of intemational standards, can provide local actors 
concemed with environmental refonn with a means of seeking remedies at the 
intemational, rather than purely local levels. As thi s chapter suggests, all the 
international pressures mentioned above have a strong potential to help revitali se Thai 
environmental regulation in addition to the domestic approaches discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
O. Conclusion 
Chapter 8 concludes the main arguments of the thesis by summari sing the hi story of 
envirorunental regulation in Thailand ; the emergence of the 'big bang' reforms; the 
aftennath of the refonns, and the causes of the failure of the refonns di scussed in 
Chapters 1 through 5. It also sums up the measures proposed in Chapters 6 and 7 to 
revitalise the effectiveness of the refonned regulation, and demonstrating how the 
success of such measures is likely to be substantially enhanced if they are implemented 
together in complementary combinations. 
It also emphasises that the environment transcends both disciplines and boundari es and 
that environmental reform must be considered in the context of social, political, cultural 
and economic factors. Thus, environmental protection requires not on ly the 
formulation of a comprehensive and well thought out legal framework, but a number of 
other refom1s which must occur at the social level. Thus, for example, education is 
crucial in supporting the system as a whole. And good governance and the elimination 
of corruption are essential , not only for the creation of a better political system overall, 
but for environmental protection in particular. 
10 
Equally, Chapter 8 emphasises that traditional ideas of enforcement and compliance 
must be extended to include innovative techniques such as self regulation. The 
regulatory system, furthenTIore , must be sensi ti ve to the needs of those parties most 
affected by regulatory schemes. It should provide opportunities for their participation at 
all levels, including standard sett ing, monitoring, reporting and enforcem ent. 
Finally, this thesi s suggests that environmental protection will only be effective if action 
is taken at a number of different levels which all complement each other. The absence 
of one element from the combination may fatally undermine the project as a whole. 
Developing etTective environmental solutions, or designing appropriate environmental 
strategies and form s of regulation, will not be easy. On the contrary, the pervasiveness 
of environmental problems in Thailand, coupled with the deep-seated nature of some of 
Thailand's cu ltural and economic problems, means that improving the envi ronmental 
situation in Thailand by means of regulation is a major challenge. Nevertheless, it is 
hoped that the analysis, and the proposa ls for refollll offered in this thesis wi ll at least 
make a contribution to that 1110st important of social goals. 
II 
Chapter 2 
The 'Big Bang' and Before: 
A Histol'Y of Envit-onmental Regulation in Thailand 
This chapter provides a very bri ef survey of the early environmental regulation in 
Thailand fo llowed by a more detailed description of the major environmental law 
l-efonn: the 'big bang' of 1992. Such a description is necessary as a precursor to the 
later analysis of the limitations of those reforms (Chapter 3) and of the serious cultural 
impediments to their success (Chapters 4 and 5) . Only after completing this preliminary 
analysis arc we in a position to embark upon the main sections of the thesis: an 
explorat ion of how best to redesign environmental regulation to achieve its social policy 
goals, taking into account Thailand's particular environmental law and cultural context. 
I. The early yeaJ's 
Laws and regulations invol vi ng environmental protection have existed in Thailand for 
nearly a centuryI For example, the Canal Maintenance Act, which prohibits any person 
from throwing trash, dust or waste into canal s or connected waterways, was enacted in 
1902. Another example is the 1913 Navigation in the Thai TerritOlY ACI, which 
prohibits any person fi'om dumping stones, wastes, oil or chemicals into the rivers. 
canals, swamps, reservoirs, lakes, or seas. 
However, not until the 1970s did Thailand introduce the first comprehensive law 
dealing with envirorunental issues directly: the Enhancemenl and Conservation of the 
National Environmental Quality Act, which was passed in 1975 2 
What was the driving force for an emergence of the first comprehensive environmental 
regulation in Thailand? Back in the I 960s, the country began the process of becoming 
one of the Newly Industrialised Countries (N ICs) thus attempting to transfonn its 
I See the Uniled Nalions. Tmnsllalional COlpomtion and Envirolll1len/(J1 Management in Selecred Asian 
and Pacific Developing COllnrries, ESCAP/UNTCT Pub licalion Series B. No. 13. Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. at 204. 
, Eugene Clark and Suwit Laohasiriwong , ' Thail and's Quesl for Sustainabl e Development', The 
A usrraliall JOII/'l701 ofNaillml Resources Lall' and PoliCY, Vol. 3 No. I, 1996, al 68. 
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economic base from agriculture to industry3 As part of this process, Thailand in 1961 
instituted the first Social and Economic Development Plan (1961-1966) to serve as a 
policy framework for the country ' s development4 Not surprisingly, the plan 
emphasised expansion of manufacture as a core mechanism to boost the country 's 
economic development. Economic growth continued to be the focal point of the next 
several plans5 However, extensive industrial development also brought with it 
environmental problems. including air and water pollution. 
By the time of the third Social and Economic Development Plan (1972-1 976), the 
environmental situation in Thailand had become critical, owing to extensive industrial 
development without appropriate planning. But it was a specific event (against the 
backdrop of increasing general awareness of the severity o f the environmental probl em) 
which precipitated the promulgation of the first comprehensive environmental 
regulation. A number of sugarcane refinery plants along the Mae Kl ong river, one of the 
major waterways in the western pal1 of Thailand, di scharged large quantiti es of 
untreated wastewater into the li ver. The pollution caused severe deterioration to the 
ri ver ' s ecosystem, as well as the death of tens of thousands of fish6 So great was the 
pollution, and so visibl e and damaging its impact, that those who suffered from its 
effects , al ong with environmental acti vists , pressured the Thai government to take a 
more acti ve role in addressing the degradation of natural resources and the 
environment. ) 
Studies suggest that the other dri ving force for the enactment of the first comprehensive 
environmental law in Thailand came from intemational pressures. In response to the 
growing global environmental threat, the United Nations held the Co nference on the 
Human En vironment at Stockholm in 1972. Imp011antl y. p311icipating countries adopted 
the Declarati on of the Conference of Human Environment (better known as the 
.1 Theodore Panayotou, 'C limale Change Negotiations From the Perspecti ve of Newly Industri al ization 
Countries: The Case of Thailand' . Hww/rd JOllmal of World Alii/irs, Summer 1992, at 117. 
4 Dalmongsak Chindakul. 'City Development and the Extension of Prosperity to the Provinces'. Stale of 
the Thai Environll1entl995, at 294. 
5 Amnat Wongbandit. 'Thai Environmental Law and th e Protecti on of Global Environm ent ', A Paper 
Presented at the Seventh General Assembl y and Conference Workshop, ASEAN Law Associati on. 199 5, 
at62. 
6 Sunee Mall ikamarl. Environmental Lall ' Enforcement , 1998, at 8-9. 
7 John Baker. Formation, Mail1lenance, and Operation of Environmental NGOs in Thailand. Ph D thesis. 
Northemlilinois University, 1995, at 160- 1. 
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Stockholm Declaration), urging every country to ensure that any activities undertaken 
wi thin its territory would not cause damaging consequences to other countries. 8 
In response to both the domestic and international pressures mentioned above, Thailand 
passed the Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act 
in 1975 (hereinafter the 1975 Enhancement Act)9 Perhaps surpri singly, the 1975 Act 
dealt very little with tackling environmental problems directly. Rather. it merely 
focused on institutional ising government bodies. 
To explain why thi s situation occurred, it is necessary to note that before the emergence 
of thel975 Enhancement Act, there was no government agency directly invol ved in 
dea ling with environmcntal issues. Surprisingly, it was the National Economic and 
Social Devclopment Board (NESDB) whose top pliority was to oversee the Social and 
Economic Dcvelopment Plans, which focu sed on economic growth by mcans of 
industrial manufacture as discussed above, who gave advice to the governm ent in tcnns 
of environmental issues.' o 
Realising the urgency of setting up a govel11ment body whose prime responsibility was 
to improve Thailand's environmental situati on, the government enacted the 1975 
Enhancement Act although it was not ready to introduce any legal provisions which 
could help protect the environment. " For thi s reason, it set up the National 
Environment Board (NEB), and authorised the Board to render advice to other 
govenmlent agencies in relation to environmental issues. The Act also founded the 
Office of the National Environment Board (ONEB) as the governm ent body responsible 
for providing administrative support to the Board. '2 
But as these institutional mechani sms in themselves did not substantially alleviate the 
environmental problems (which indeed continued to increase), the Act was amended in 
1978 and 1979. Yet the problems of natural resources and envirorullental degradation 
, Report on the U.N. Conference on the Human Environm ent. Stockholm. 1972, U.NDoc. 
A CONF48 14 Riv . 1. cited in Alan E. Boy le ' Environment and Development '. 77lird World Legal 
Studies, 1993. a t 96-7. 
o Eugene Clark aJ1d Suwit Laohasiriwong, . 'Thailand 's Quest for Susta inable Deve lop ment ', at 68. 
See also Sunee Mallikamarl , El1virolll11elllal La\\' En/orce1llent. 1998. a t 8-9. 
10 Panat Tasneeyanond. 'The 1992 Enhancement of the National Environmental Qua li ty Act' . 
Chulalongkom Ellvirol1111e11lal Law Journal. January 1995, at 83. 
II Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
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became worse despite these amendments of the Act. How did this happen? To provide 
a clear answer, it is imp0l1ant to examine the amendments in each year respectively. 
Although the 1978 amendment introduced some innovati ve measures adopted fi'om 
industrialised countries (including the establishment of environmental quality standards; 
the introduction of legal procedures for bringing Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EtA) into play in the case of particular projects or activities; and empowering the prime 
minister to make an absolute order to any relevant persons or agencies to resolve any 
emergency problems related to the environment) 13 problems arose at the stage of 
implementation. This was because the role of the NEB was still limited to an advisory 
agency as discussed above, thus lacking legal binding powers. 14 As a result, the 
standards issued by the NEB were often opposed by implementing agencies. For 
example, the Royal Police Department did not enforce the standards on carbon 
monoxide, while the Ministry of Interior did not enforce the standards on community 
wastewater. 15 
As for the 1979 amendment, it should be noted that thi s amendment merel y dealt wi th 
the transfer of the ONEB from the Office of the Prime Minister to the Mini stry of 
Science, Technology, and Energy. Obviously, such transfer was not sufficient to help 
improve the environmental situation. 16 
Unsurpri singly, the absence of effective environmental regulations caused a seri es of 
circumstances and events, including a fatal flood in the southern part of the country and 
pressures from NGOs, which in turn led to pressure for government action to tackle 
environmental problems more seri ously. As Mr Panat Tasneeyanond, the main drafter 
of the 1992 Enhancement Act, suggested in my fieldwork interview: 
The reason why the 1975 Enhancement ACI was reformed was beCause the government 
was not sat isfi ed with environmental situation at the time. Thi s was in part because 
there was a huge and immediate flood in the southern pm1 of the countlY in 1988 as a 
resul t of deforestat ion. Many people were killed and properties were damaged. As a 
result of this fatal incident, many NGOs put a lot of pressures on the governmcnt to 
improve the ailing situation." 
1.1 Ibid , at 83-5. 
14 Am nat Wongbanclit. 'Thai EnvirolUnental Law and the Pro tection of G lobal Environment ' . al 65. 
15 Panat Tasneeyanond. 'The 1992 Enhancement of the National Environmental Quality ACI '. at 83-4. 
16 Ibid al88 
17 The 'interview took place on 5 JanuaIY 1997 . 
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However, it was not until 1992 that an opportunity for further ref 01111 arose. As we shall 
see later in this thesi s, lack of political will has been one of the major obstacles to 
regulatory success in Thailand. It is necessary to understand that before 1992, the 
majority of incumbent politicians still plioritiscd industrialisation as a means to make 
Thailand become one of the NICs, thus causing the issue ofref0ll11 to be neglected. 
But how was the refonn successful in 1992, given the lack of political will? Ironi cally, 
the ' big bang' refonll did not occur through a political channel. Rather, it was indebted 
(0 a coup d'etat. In 1991, many cOlTuption scandals involving members of the 
govell1111ent of the late General Chatichai Choonhavan led to the coup d 'eta/ undertaken 
by the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC), members of which were high-ranking 
military. The NPKC then appointed Mr Anand Panyarachoon, a diplomat-tull1ed-
businessman , as the prime minister. 
In environmental tenlls , Thailand was fortunate at the time as prime minister Anand 
was very keen on environmental issues. 18 He therefore did not hesitate to translate the 
desire for rcfonll which had existed for many years into action, by fully supporting the 
refonll. Yet the Anand government did not initially intend to replace the 1975 
Enhancemellt Act with the 1992 Ellhancemel1l Act. Rather, it contemplated the 
improvement of the former. However, the govell1ment found that it was more complex 
to amend the existing law than to enact a new one, and it eventually promulgated the 
1992 Enhancemel1l Act, which superseded the 1975 one. 19 
It is also necessary to understand that the 1992 environmental law refonn was not 
limited to the Enhancement Act only. Indeed, the Anand govenUllent simultaneously 
revamped many other laws related to the environment. These included the 1992 Factol), 
Act, the 1992 Public Health Act, and the 1992 Maintenance of Public Cleanliness Act. 20 
I' Douglas Tookey. 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Leaming Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Pol icy', The Georgetolt'll international 
Environmental Law Review. Vo!.1 I. 1999. at 314. 
19 Panat Tasneeyanond, 'The 1992 Enhancement of the National Environmental Quality Act', at87. 
20 See Sunee Mallikamarl. Environmental LaIV Enforcement, 1998, at 13. 
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II. The 'Big Bang' Refol'm of 1992 
The 1992 RefonTIs were substantial and involved a myriad of innovative measures 
which, taken together, have earned the title of the ' big bang' reforms. The various 
aspects of these refonTIs, which f0l111 the basis of Thai environmental law today, are 
examined in more detail in the remainder of this chapter. 
A. Institutional reorganisation 
To maximise the government 's performance in addressing a complex issue like 
environmental problems, the Office of the National Environment Board (ONEB), a unit 
within the Mini stry of Science, Technology and Energy, was upgraded to the Office of 
Environmental Policy and Planning. Also impoliantly, as environmental issues moved 
higher on the government's agenda, the main tasks of the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Energy, which had previously been limited to science and technology 
matters , were expanded to those related to the environment. Accordingly the name of 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy was changed to the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE)21 
Simultaneously, two new depmiments tailored to deal with environmental issues were 
also established within MOSTE: the Pollution Control Depmiment, and the Depmiment 
of EnvirolUl1entai Quality Promotion 22 Among these three environmental issues-related 
agencies, the Office of the Environmental Policy and Planning focuses on natural 
resources and environmental management, and urban planning; the Pollution Control 
Department mainly deal s with air, water, and noi se quality, and hazardous substances 
and waste management; and the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion 
largely deals with public education and environmental research and training. 23 
The 1992 Enhancement Act has upgraded the NEB to sub-cabinet status. It now consists 
of the Prime Minister as the Chairn1an, the deputy Prime Minister designated by the 
'I Kasem Snidvongs. 'Shaping Public Policy on Ihe Environmenl'. TEl Quarter!,' Environment Journal, 
Yol.3 No. I, Janualy·March 1995, at 42. 
" Ibid. 
" Douglas Tookey, 'Soulheast Asian EnvirolUl1enlalism at its Crossroads: Leaming Lessons from 
Thailand's Ecleclic Approach 10 Environmental Law and Policy', at 311-2. 
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Prime Minister as the first Vice-Chainnan; the Minister of Science, Technology and 
Environment as the second Vice-Chainnan ; and as members ex officio , the Ministers of 
Defence, Finance, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Transp0l1 and Communications, 
Intetior, Education, Public Health, and Industry, the Secretary-General of the Board of 
Investment; and the Director of the Bureau of Budget. Al so, not more than eight persons 
qualified in environmental matters are members. Among these, no less than half must be 
representati ves ti'Oln the private sector. The last member of the board is the Pennanent 
Secretary of the Mini stry of Science, Technology and Environment24 The NEB is now 
equipped with powerful authority to ensure the efficiency of the 1992 Enhancement Act, 
including the power to prescribe environmental quality standards, to approve 
enviromnental quality management plans, and to announce the pollution control areas25 
Given that the NEB members are high-ranking officials from vari ous govcrnment 
agcncies, including the Prime Minister as the Chairman, there is good reason to believe 
that environmental problems in Thailand will now recei ve high attention from the 
agencies concemed. As the late Mr Athorn Supapodok, the fonn er NEB ' s Secretary-
General, put it in the interview with Thammasat Law Journal: 
Thammasal Law Journal: We assume that having the Prime Minister as the Chairman 
of the NEB (under the 1992 Enhancement Act) is for the long-term interest , as the 
enfo rccment will be more effccti ve. 
Mr Athorn: Probably, and the Board members might not be absent from the meetings 
because they feel considerate to the Prime M ini ster26 
Further di scussion as to whether the presence of the Prime Mini ster as the NEB's 
Chaimlan helps revitali se the 1992 Enhancement Act will be provided in the next 
chapters. 
" Panat Tasneeyanond, 'S ummary of th e evolution and essences of the 1992 Enhancement and 
Conservation of the National Environmental Quali ty Act', A pamphlet. year of publication unknown. at S. 
" Douglas Tookey, 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Learning Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy ' . at 31 4. 
'6 Thammasat Law Joull1al 's Board of Editors, 'Special Interview with Mr Atholl1 Supapodok, Secretary-
General to the National Environment Board ' , Thammasat Lml'Jolirnal, Vol. 21 No.2, June 1991. a1 163. 
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B. The role of NGOs and the right to know 
Studies show that environmental NGOs made their debut in Thailand in the 1950s when 
a group of poachers-turned-conscrvationists fonned the Association for the 
Conservation of Wildlife (ACW), the first Thai conservation group.27 However, it was 
not until 1992 that environmental NGOs were tornlally recognised under the law. Such 
recognition is not limited to local NGOs but also applies to overseas organisations. This 
is evident from the 1992 Enhancement Act which allows any NGO holding the status of 
a juri stic person under the Thai or foreign law, and whose activities are directly 
involved in environmental protection or natural resource conservation, to apply for 
registration as an NGO for environmental protection and natural 
conservation. 28 
resource 
What benefits do NGOs get from registration? The 1992 Enhancement Act grants a 
registered NGO certain privileges, including the right to receive assistance and support 
on some activities from the government. These acti vities include study or research with 
regard to protection of the environment or conservation of natural resources; and any 
projects or activities aiming at helping people in particular areas29 
A regi stered NGO is also entitled to nominate candidates to be appointed as members 
on the National Environment Board. Currently, there are four NGO representati ves 
appointed as members apart from those who are drawn from eleven incumbent 
politicians, four pemlanent government officials, and four representatives fTom the 
private sector other than envirorullental NGOs30 
NGOs and public pressure is one of the key factors in galvanising the government to 
protect the environment, as the examples cited earlier demonstrate. But what guarantees 
the continuation and efficiency of NGO and public involvement? Recognising the 
importance of empowering the public through infonnation disclosure, the 1992 
Enhancement Act allows an individual to have the right to access any data and 
27 John Baker, Formation. Maintenance. and Operation of Environl1li'l1ta/ NGOs in Thailand. A Ph 0 
th esis, Nonhe111 Illin ois University, 1995. at 138-41. 
28 See the 1992 Enhancement Act, Section 7. 
29 Douglas Tookey, 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Leallling Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach 10 Environmental Law and Policy ', at 314. 
10 See the 1992 Enhancement Act, Section 12. 
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information in relation to environmental promotion and conservation from the 
govcrnment}]. 
Indeed, legislation givi ng the public access to environmental infonnation is not new. 
Rather, it has been in place in many countries for a number of years. Such legislation is 
commonly referred to as "community right to know" (CRTK) 32 Although the laws 
related to community right to know apply to both the disclosure of environmental 
information from the government to the public, and that from industry to the public, the 
1992 Enhancemellt Act allows the public to access to such infoll11ation directly from the 
government only. For this reason, the public can access environmental infotmation 
from industry through goVetTU11ent, as industry is required to provide the intolmation to 
thc government. For cxample, the Act requires the owner or possessor of the point 
source of pollution equipped with a polluted air system, wastewater treatment system, 
or waste disposal system to provide a report showing the functioning outcome of the 
system, as well as to submit it to the local authorities where the point source is located 
at least once a month 33 
But how can the public have access to the information related to industry 's 
environmental performance from the Thai government') So far, the government has 
used the disclosure of such infonn at ion as a supplementary tool to help regulatory 
enforcement. For example, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) now 
releases inforn1ation as to non-compli ance of polluting fil111S to the media. In such 
disclosure all details of each fi 1111 , as well as its environmental performance, are 
publiclyexposed34 
As pub li c participation and NGO invo lvement in particular, are gaining momentum in 
environmental protection, the right to know is indi spensable in providing relevant and 
up-to-date infonnation so the public can take part in environmental cases. However, 
such entitlement does not apply to any secrets pet1aining to national security, or secrets 
pertaining to pcrsonal privacy, property rights or rights in trade or activities of any 
person which are duly protected by law35 
31 See Ihe 1992 Enhancement Act, Seclion 6. 
-'2 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental PoliCl·, 1998. al 
63-5. 
33 See Ihe 1992 Enhancement Act, Section 80. 
H Poona Antaseeda, 'Cily to ac t against plams dumping waste into canals', Bangkok Post. 17 June 1997. 
35 Ibid. 
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C. Pollutel' Pays Pdnciple 
The polluter pays principle made its debut at the intemational level under the 
recommendation of the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD took the conventional economic view that pollution 
arising from human activities should be treated as an externality, and suggested to its 
members that a polluter should bear the costs for the pollution prevention and control 
measures introduced by their government agencies36 That is, forcing enterprises to bear 
the costs of the pollution that they cause rather than ' cxternalising' (passing on) those 
costs to others. and the environment at large, would give enterpri ses the appropriate 
incentives to prevent pollution. 
The polluter pays principle was first introduced in Thai land in the 1992 Enhancel1lenl 
ACI. 37 In particular, as regards air pollution, the Act requires an owner or possessor 
whose point source of pollution falls into the category stated in the Government Gazette 
to instal or bring into operation an on-site facility for air pollution control, equipment or 
oth er instruments as detennined by the pollution control official , in order to control , 
di spose, reduce or eliminate pollutants which may affect the air quality3S 
As regards water pollution, the reformed Act mandates the owner or possessor whose 
point source of pollution falls into the categOlies stated in the Go\,ernment Gazette to 
construct, instal , or bring into operation an on-site facility for wastewater treatment as 
detern1ined by the pollution control official 39 In any pollution control area, or any area 
where a central wastewater system has been provided by the government, the owner or 
possessor whose point source of pollution falls into specified categories, is required to 
send the wastewater emanating f1'om hi s or her business operation to be treated by such 
central wastewater system. In doing so, Ihe owner 0 ,. possesso,. musl pay Ihe specified 
sen'ice/ees. -1 0 
", David Hunter. Ju lia Sommer and Scott Vaughan. Concepts and Principles 0/ Inlernational 
Environmental LOll': An lntrOc!l/ction. UNE P. 199~. at 32. 
)7 Kanung Luechai. 'The New Environm ental Law'. Chl/lalongkorn Environmental Lall' JOl/mal. January 
1995 . at 20-1. 
)8 See the 1992 Enhancement Act. Section 68 . 
J9 See the 1992 Enhancemel1l Act, Sec ti on 70. 
40 See the 1992 Enhancement ACI. Section 71. 
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D. Strict Civil Liability 
Strict civil liability was introduced in the 1992 Enhallcement Act as one of the methods 
tailored to improve environmental quality. Before the ' big bang' refOI1l1, Thailand used 
conventional civil li abi lity under tOl1 law to provide compensation stemming from 
environmental hann. Studies however suggest that it was a complex and demanding 
task to prove that the plaintiffs injury was directly caused by the defendant's aetion.41 
The conventional civil liability under the to!1 law was therefore superseded by the strict 
civi l liability to enhance the effectiveness of compensation claims in enviromllental 
42 
cases. 
Under the shict liability regime, the defendant is liable for all injuries caused by his/her 
action, even without showing negligence. In other words, the plaintiff merely has to 
prove that it was the defendant who conducted the damaging action, regardless of 
his/her intention or negligence. If the court is convinced of such a proof, it will award 
compensation to the plaintiff43 This approach makes it considerably easier for the 
plaintiff to succeed and in so doing, holds out the promise of providing an additional 
Illechanism to facilitate environmental protection. 
E. Incentive Measnres 
The law refolln in 1992 introduced a number of incenti ve measures to help the newly 
reformed law work effectively44 First, the owner or possessor of any point source of 
pollution who is required by law to instal an on-site facility for treatment of polluted air 
or wastewater is entitled to apply for goveI1lment assistance regarding import duties on 
imported machinery, equipment, tool s, or any material s which are necessary but not 
available in Thailand. Also, the owner or possessor may seek peI1l1ission to bring 
41 Donald Dewees. ' Ton Law and the Deterrence of Environmental Pollution ', in T. 1-1. Tietenberg (cd). 
{nnovotion in Environmental Polic, ·. 1992. at 151. See also Chatchom Akapin , Enforcement and 
Compliance Priorities. a presentation given to the Bangkok Conference, Envirollmental Priorities in 
Southeast Asian Nations, organised by Stand ing Committee on EnvirolUnental Law. American Bar 
Association. This presentation was later published in Sarah McCaffrey and Elissa Lichtenstein (eds), 
Environmental Priorilies ill Southeast Asian Notions. 1997_ at 136. 
" Sunee Mallikamarl, Environmental L({ll ' Enforcement. 1996, at 102. 
" Ibid. For the exact meaning of strict liability. Steven H. Gifis defines it as "Liabi lity without fault. 
Often in ton law, one who engages in an activity that has an inherent risk of injury is liable for all injuries 
proximately caused by his or her enterpri se, even wi thout a showing of negligence". See Steven H. Gifis, 
1991 , Loll' Dictiol1arr (Third Edition), at 468 for more details. 
44 Chatchom Akapin. 'Law Enforcement: An Issue to be Improved for the Thai Environmental 
Protection', Dul/apalw, 1996. at 96. 
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foreign experts into the country to instal, controL or operate the facility providing such 
an cxpet1 is not available in Thailand, and request income tax exemption for the foreign 
experts."5 
The second incenti ve is the creation of an environmental fund for tackling 
environmental problems which require a substantial amount of financi al resources:6 It 
shou ld be noted that this fund is not totally generated from the government budget. 
Rather. it derives from various sources, including the fuel oil fund, service fees and 
fines collected under this Act. The purposes of thi s fund include to grant a loan to any 
person who is required by law to instal an on-site facility for treatment of polluted air 
and wastewater generated by hi s or her activities, and to grant a loan to a local 
administration or state enterprise to acquire air pollution and wastewater treatment 
systems.47 
The third incentive is stipulated in the 1992 Mainlenollce of Public Cleanlilless Act. 
This incentive is aimed at hamessing public power to help strengthen the efficiency of 
enforcement. Under thi s Act, an individual who has witnessed any action criminalised 
under this legislation is allowed to report to the government authority. In the event that 
the offender is ordered to pay a fine, the individual who has made the report will be 
awarded half the amount of the fine. 48 
Like the polluter pays principle, incentive measures under the 'big bang' reform were 
adopted from other countries both at international and domestic levels. As Mr Panat 
Tasneeyanond, the prime drafter of the 1992 EnhallCelllenl Act put it: 
The incentive measures were also promulgated in this Act (the 1992 Enhancement Act). 
We adopted this idea from the StockJlolm Declaration and the Japanese Envirorunental 
Law49 
45 See the 1992 Enhancement Act. Section 9-1. 
46 Phaichitr Uathavikul , ' Managing the Environment', Thailand: King Bhumibol Adulmdej. the Golden 
Jubilee 1946-1996.1997, at217. 
47 See the 1992 Enhancem ent Act, Sections 22. 23. 
4S See Section 48 , and 51 of the 1992 Maintenance of Public and Cleanliness Act. See also Sunee 
Mallikamarl. Environmental Lmv Enforcement. 1998, at 77. 
49 The interview was conducted on 5 January 1997. 
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F. Designation of Pollution Control Area 
The 1992 Enhancement Act empowers the NEB to designate an area, thc pollution in 
which tends to become hannful to the public health or to cause adverse effects to the 
environment, as a pollution control area 50 
How does designation as a pollution control area help improve the environment? Under 
the rcfonned Act. a local authority in charge of an area which has been designated as a 
pollution control area has to submit an action plan for the reduction and eradication of 
pollution to the Provincial Governor. The plan must provide detail s about pollution, 
including its sources, sizes and categories of polluti on sources, magnitude of pollution 
hazard, as well as suggestions for pollution abatement. The Provincial Governor will 
then incorporate such an action plan into the environmental quality management plan at 
the provincial level as required by law in order to decentrali se environmental planning 
to local govenUllent agencies, detail s of which are di scussed below51 
G. Decentralisation of Environmental Planning 
The refornl also aimcd at allocating power to local authoriti es with regard to 
environmental planning52 To achieve this goal, the 1992 Enhancement Act requires the 
Provincial Governor whose locality is designated as a pollution control area to 
f0l111ulate an action pl an for environmental quality management, and then submit the 
plan to the NEB for approval 53 Thi s is to allow loca l authorities to have a say about 
environmental planning in their areas54 
50 Amnat Wongbandit , 'Thai Environmental Law and the Protection of Global Environment' ,at 68-9. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Paul Clements-Hunt. 'Thail and's Status as an Emerging Environmental Market: A Comparative 
Analysis of Six Asian Countries ' , A Paper Presented at the Conference: lnduslIY & Environment, 29 May 
1995. at Queen Si rikit National Convention Centre, Bangkok. 
51 See the 1992 Ellhol1cemenr Act, Sections 35-38. 
54 Kasem Snidvongs. 'Shap ing Public Policy on the Environment' at 42. See also the 1992 Ellhol1cemel1l 
Act, Section 37. 
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Chapter 3 
The Aftermath of the 'Big Bang' Reform: 
A Story of Failure 
Although a number of innovative measures have been introduced in the refonn of Thai 
envirorllllcntal regulation discussed in the previous chapter, a central question remains: 
has the rcform delivered improved environmental outcomes? To find the answer, we 
examine the CUtTent environmental Slalus quo in Thailand as it relates to air and water 
pollution, the central concerns of thi s thesis. We begin with an overview of thc severity 
of air and water pollution problems in Thailand in the years subsequent to the 'big bang' 
refonn. We then provide a number of case studies of air and water pollution, which 
illustrate much more graphically the nature and the severity of the problems that remain 
despite the ' big bang '. 
I. Overview of the situation 
According to the Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliances (TERRA), one 
of the prominent environmental NGOs in Thailand. the most setious pollution problems 
in the country are from water pollution in ri vers, waterways and coastal ecosystems, 
followed by air and noise pollution. I 
We start our investigation by exploring the situation of air pollution. At present, the 
problem of air pollution in Thailand is still critical.2 In Bangkok , the maj or point 
sources of air pollution are vehicles and building constructions] Recentl y, studies 
conducted by the Pollution Control Department (PCD) found that slllall particles, which 
I Douglas Tookey, ' Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Learning Lessons from 
Thailand's Ec lecti c Approach to Environmental Law and Po licy' The Georgetoll'n [ntenwtional 
Environmental Lellr Review Vo1.ll. 1999.at 310. 
, Aphaluck Bhatiasevi. 'Po llution critica l in Bangkok'. Bangkok Post. 2S October 1996. 
) Interview with Dr Supat Wangwongwattana, director of the PCD's Ai r Quality Management Division 
on 27 December 1996. 
2S 
were smaller than 10 microns, arc particularly hazardous to health and in seven out of 
nine major cities exceeded the standard ." This problem is even worse in Bangkok. 
where it was found that the small pat1icles were 2.6 times the maximum allowable limit. 
The studies also found that the concentration of suspended particulate matters (SPM) in 
Bangkok was at almost 3.5 times the pennissible level 5 FUl1hennore, carbon monoxide 
in the capital city has increased constantly, and almost reached the pemlissible limit6 
As a result of the excessive amount of pollution in Bangkok, it was ranked in the top 
Ii fteen most polluted cit ies in the world 7 Recently, research conducted by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) revealed that the air quality in Bangkok was extremely 
critical. Thc Queen of Thailand suggested to Mr Banham Silpa-archa, the fonner Prime 
Minister of Thailand: 
The expet1s of the World Heal th Organization lold me that their research on 
environmental situation. particularly air pollution in Bangkok had found that the air 
quality in Bangkok was not at the safety level. As a consequence, they suggested the 
youth below 12 years of age not to travel to Thailand because their immunity were very 
low. I hereby urge the government to solve this problem seriously. quickly, and 
constantly8 
Not surprisingly, this situation has caused advcrse effects to those who in their daily life 
are exposed to the polluted air of Bangkok, such as the traffic police. A shocking 
finding from the survey conducted by the Police Hospital is that 43 per cent of the 
traffic pol icc receiving medical chcckups suffered from respiratory problems and 
hearing defccts9 Most importantly, air pollution can lead to fatal consequences, for 
example from lung cancer as a consequence of directing traffic on the busiest streets in 
Bangkok. 10 
4 Environmelllal Research Institute. Chulalongkorn University (ERIC). 'New Dimension for 
Environmental Management wit h Economic Instruments' , A paper subm itted to the New Dimension for 
EnvirOIU11ental Management with Economic Instruments seminar held 011 28 May 1998, at Environmental 
Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University. at 2-1. 
5 Phaichitr Ualhavikul, 'Managing the Environment'. 7'lwiland: King Bhul1/ibol AdlliJ'adej The Coldell 
Jubilee 1946-1996, 1997, a1215. 
" Ibid. 
7 John Baker. FOl"lnalion, Mainlenance, and Operation o( Environl1lellwl NCOs in Thailand, Ph D thesis. 
Departmenl of"Poli tical Science, Nonhel1l Illinois University, 1995, al 154-5. 
s Ilouse of Senate's Environmental Committee, Report on the Management ()( POiillliol1, Natllral 
Resources alld Ihe Envirollmellt for PraClical lo](ectivcness: Case Stile!,' 7: Problem (!( Dust ill Bangkok 
and Suburball Areas. 1997. al 27. 
9 Ibid, al 155-6. 
10 'l3angkok police officer losing toughest battle', The Nation, 15 July 1999. 
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While traffic and construction are rcsponsible for air pollution in Bangkok, industry is 
thc major source of air pollution in the province generally. This docs not necessaril y 
mcan that industry in Bangkok itscl f has perfonned well in environmental management. 
Rather, it is simply that the Thai government does not cUlTentl y allow new factories, 
cspecially those equipped with chimneys, to be locatcd in Bangkok Metropolitan . I I 
Across the province gcncrally, evidence shows that air pollution emanating fi'om 
industry consistently causes damaging consequences to peopl e in thc vici nity of 
industrial plants. For example. many res idents, including students and teachers in the 
schoo ls near quarries and rock-grinding factories in Saraburi provincc suffer from 
rcspiratory problems. including silicosis. and other kinds of lung di scase. '2 
Water quality too, has seriously deteri orated in all major ri vers and natura l waterways of 
Thailand, according to a series of studiesU Intercstingly, a recent study on watcr 
qua lity in the lower Chao Phraya River, the main rivcr of the country, conducted by the 
Harbour Depm1ment. found that although garbage has decreased dramatically. watcr 
quality in the ri ver remains poor as the average dissolved oxygen is less than one 
milli gram per litre, below the standard of two milligram s per litre. ' 4 
Watcr pollution generated from chcmical industry has posed a particul arl y serious threat 
to Thailand's envi ronment. According to Professor Pi amsak Manasveta. director of the 
Aquatic Resources Research Institute, Chulalongkorn Uni versity: 
In the sea. pollutants are generated from both households and industry. especially factories 
which use chemicals in their manufacturing process. These factori es sometimes discharge 
untreated wastewater containing chem icals and heavy metals into seawaters in the Gulf 
of Thailand. We will soon have the fi shery problem as our fi sh arc dying [rom high 
II ImelTie\\' with Mr Vira Mavichak. deputy Director-General. the Department of Industrial Work on 26 
Decem ber 1996. 
" Anjira Assavanonda, 'Quarry dust damages you ng lungs '. Bangkok POSI, 22 June 1998. 
1.1 Office o f Environmemal Po licy and Planning, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, 
Repon on Envirol1l11el1lCl! Silualion1995-!996. 1997, at I IS. 
14 'No improvement in ri ver water quality'. Bangkok Pas!. 28 June 1998. 
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concentration of heavy metals in the seawaters.15 
II. Selected cases of air and water poUution 
To provide a deeper in sight as to how effective the ' big bang' has been, it is essential to 
investigatc the state of air and water pollution in Tllailand since the 1992 reform of 
cnvironmental regulation, as well as how the stakeholders concerned have reacted. To 
do so, we explore some case studies. With regard to the issue of air pollution, we will 
discuss the industrial pollution at Mab Ta Phut, one of the government industrial estates, 
and the air pollution generated from the government's power plant. As for water 
pollution, the cases of Phoenix Pulp and Paper. and the Klity Mine will be discussed. 
A. Ail' Pollution 
I. Mab Ta Phut case 
Many studcnts and teachers in Mab Ta Phut Pan Phittayakan Schod 6, located near an 
industrial site of thc Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT)1 7, and nearby 
communities, have been suffering from the stench emitted by the industrial estate for 
years. In June 1997, two students were admitted to the local hospital because the high 
content of toxic substances in their blood caused headache and stomach ache. 18 
According to the Ministry of Public Health' s investigation, the patients suffered from 
chemicals wh ich had been invol ved in the manufactuting process of the factories in the 
industtial estate since 1996. 19 The agency also revealed that the ambient inspection 
made in March 1997 found that there was 13.75 ppm. of su lphur dioxide in a period of 
fifteen minutes while only 0.3 ppm. of the substance is allowed in ambience in a period 
15 The interview was conducted on 9 JanualY 1997. 
1(, Mab Ta Phut is a district of Rayong where one of lEA T's sites is located. 
17 lEA T was established in 1972 under a plan to boost industrial business. Its main task is to promote 
industrial business. To achie\e this goal. it has 10 persuade manufacturers to locate their plants in lEA T's 
sites where many facil ities such as central water treatment systems. electricity. and water. are prO\ ided to 
support their business. Each site contains many industrial plants. Among these, Mab Ta Phut site. which 
is located in Rayong. serves as a base for heavy indusuy. including petrochemical plants. 
IS Phanompolll Chomchuen. 'Toxic Gas Problem must be dealt with as soon as possible'. Bangkok Post. 
28 June 1997. 
10 It was disclosed by Mr Sarote lemwaranand. a teacher in the school mentioned above. that after the 
complaints . IEAT simply sent its officials 10 inspect the polluting factories. but no action was taken to 
solve the problem. For more detail, see Phanomporn Chomchuen. Ibid. 
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of one hour under the announcement of the National Environmental Board2o 
Interestingly also, the inspectors from the Ministry of Public Health smelt the stench 
during their investigation 21 
After the incident, all 982 students and 40 teachers were moved to share facilities with 
Rayong Witthayakhom II school , which was 10 kilometres away. However, they were 
forced to move back to the same old schoo l by the lack of sufficient educational 
facilities 22 Interestingly, the problem of stench has recuned. A nurse hired by the 
I EAT to be stationed at the school, disclosed that there were around 70 students visiting 
the nursing room each day dUting the second week of June 199823 
More recently, a sub-committee on Industrial Environment Management Coordination 
set up by the govelllment to find solutions to the problems reached the conclusion that a 
new school would need (0 be built in a new site, and that the polluting factories must 
pay for the relocation. 24 However, two major finns blamed for the air pollution 
problem, Star Petroleum Refining Co (SPRC), and Rayong Refinery Co (RRC) have yet 
to confinn that they are wi lling to foot the bill 25 
Who is to blame for the incident? Of course, the finns which released a great deal of 
pollutants including sulphur dioxide and hydrocarbons into the atmosphere must be 
responsible for their non-compliance. However, evidence shows that the IEAT also 
failed to di scharge its regulatory responsibilities. The IEAT has the power to control 
pollutants fi'om plants located in its estates but failed to perfonn this role26 One report 
quoted Mr Saksit Tredech. secretary-general of the Office of Environmental Policy and 
Planning at the time, as saying "I EAT never monitored those factories whether they 
implement pollution preventi ve measures until the severe air pollution took its toll on 
people's health"n 
20 Under the 1992 Enhancelllent Act. the Nalional Enviromnenlal Board is empowered to issue an 
announcement. slipu lating any standards for the purpose of protecting Ihe enviroIUnent. 
" 'Tox ic Gas in Mab Ta Phut ', Marichon, II Jul y 1997. 
22 Anchalee Kongrul, 'School sti ll affected by induslrial stench', Bangkok Post, 15 June 1998. 
2] Ibid. 
24 Uamdao Noikorn, 'Polluters pay for schoo l's relocation' , Bangkok Post, 12 June 1998. 
2S Anchalee Kongrut, 'School sti ll affected by industrial stench', 15 June 1998. 
26 Post reponers, ' IEAT taken 10 task over pollution'. Bangkok Post, 29 November 1997. 
27 Ibid. 
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To find out first-hand infollllation in this regard , I interviewed Mr Yutthana Putchong, a 
Map Ta Phut community leader during my fieldwork. In hi s view: 
I EAT has never paid enough attention to environmental issues. Evidence is seen from the 
fact that the pollution problem has existed for about two years. After IEAT had ignored our 
outcry, we petitioned Illany authorities concerned in the province. Again, there was no 
"esponse frolll thcm n 
Pal1 of the problem is that lEA T has a double role to play: as a promoter of industtial 
investment; and as an enforcer of environmental regulations over plants in the estates29 
It is however apparent that the agency prioriti ses the former ro le as it fears that 
enforcing the regulations will jeopardise plivate investment.3o So far, no legal action 
has been taken agai nst polluting factories 31 , demonstrating that the conflict of interest 
has resulted in econom ic growth being favoured and envirorullental quality being 
sacri ficed. 
2. Mae Illoh case 
In October 1992, a few months after the 1992 Enhancement Act came to effcct (in June 
1992), hundreds of vil lagers in Mae Moh , a disttict in Lampang, a northern province of 
Thailand in which power plants of the Electricity Generation Authori ty of Thailand 
(EGAT) are located, had to be hospitalised after ex posure to toxic fumes emitted by a 
li gn ite-fired power pl ant. EGAT bl amed the air pollution on excessive sulphur dioxide. 
Mr Phisan Moolasal1sathorn, the Minister of Science, Technology, and Envirorunent at 
the time. infolllled the public that EGAT would pay compensation to thosc injured, and 
at the same time the power plant would not continue to operate unless pollution control 
measures were instaled under the supervision of his Ministry32 
2S The interview took place on 6 Februa,y 1998. 
29 Panat Tasneeyanond, SlImmarv on Ihe /992 Enhancelllenl (lnd Conservation of Ihe Nmiona/ 
EI1I'il'Onlllcnta/ Qualit, · ;/el, Year of Publi cat ion unknown, at 17. 
10 Post reporters , ' IEAT taken to task over po llu tion'. Notably, when a Mab Ta Phut community leader 
demanded that the IEAT get tough on Star Petroleum Re finin g Co (SPRC), and Rayong Refinery Co 
(RRC) as those responsible for the pollut ion incident if they could not manage to rectify the problem. Dr 
Somchet Th i,mapong. the IEAT Govemor a t the time argued lhat closing down polluting factories could 
jeopardise the country's investment atmosphere as a whole. For furth er details . see Ancha lee Kongrul. 
Bangkok Post, 15 Jun e 1998. 
1t Kanittha lnchuku l. ' Po lluting factories escape prosecution ', Bangkok POSI . 16 July 1997. 
12 John Baker, Formalion. Mailllenallce. alld Operaliol1 of Ellviranlllenla/ NGOs in Thai/and, Ph D thesis , 
Department of Politica l Science, Northemillinois University, 1995 , at 152-3. 
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Astonishingly, the incident reculTcd two weeks later when the plant continued to 
operate at full power despite the Mini ster's promi ses. As a result, several hundreds 
more villagers fell sick, 8 cows and 20 buffaloes died, and many agricultural products 
were damaged 33 Against this background, EGAT paid the sum of 8. 14 milli on baht to 
vill agers as compensation, as well as spending 7.02 billion baht on the instalation of 
desulfurising equipment at four out of its eleven plants to decrease air pollution at Mae 
Moh 3 4 The case ended up with a compromise which includ ed payment of 
compensation, and an agreement to instal dust scrubbers at power plants and to lengthen 
the power plants' chimneys35 
Despite such a compromise, the tragedy reculTed in 1996 when 20 vi ll agers of Ban 
Huay Fai village in Mae Moh di stri ct died mysteriously. A lthough doctors of Lampang 
Provincial Hospital ruled that al l of the dead died of heart fail ure, the vi llagers have 
strongl y believed that their sudden deaths were caused by continuous exposure to 
su lphur dioxide polluted air from an EGA T power pl ant since the beginning of the 
plant ' s operation in 1987. J6 
Mr Somsak Jaemkrua, one of the village leaders, maintained that the reason Ban Huay 
Fai continues to face air pollution problems is because the village is located at the 
mouth of the lignite-fired power pl ant. For this reason. the Ban Huay Fai vi ll agers have 
conti nuously demanded that EGAT, as well as the government, should relocate them to 
a safer area37 
However, Mr Yongkiat Pithakthon, ass istant manager of EGA T's Mae Moh power 
p lant, denied that the pollution to which the villagers were exposed was caused by the 
power plant operation. Instead, he all eged that it was caused by the mine dug by four 
private companies under EGAT concession to obtain li gnite: Ban Huay Fai village is 
located only a kilometre away from the qualTy. The ass istant managcr further defcnded 
EGAT by saying that EGA T has asked the four compani es to deal with the dust and 
sulphur dioxide smell problem generated at the mine by spraying water. 
;, Slin ce Mallikamarl, Environmental Lall' En/iJrcement. 1997, al 126-9. 
14 John Baker, Formation. Maintenance, and 'Operation of Environmental NGOs in 71railand. at 152-3 
" Slince Mallikamarl. Environmental Lall' En/orcement, 1997, at 129-3 1. 
", Somsak Sliksai, 'Tox ic fallout haunts Mac 'Moh villagers ' , Bangkok Post, 30 June 1997. 
" Ibid. 
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In response to the villagers' demand for relocation, the government has rccently 
proposed to sct up a fact-finding committee to find out the actual cause of the fatal 
incident before considering the relocation. This has antagon iscd the villagers, as 
Somsak Sooksai quoted Mr Naruedol Suchartpong, another vi llage leader, as saying: 
We disagree with the establishment of a fact-find ing committee. We believe that the 
EGA T and the state want to buy time and are insincere about taekling the problem. It is 
elear that the vi llagers face air and noi se pollution. Why must a study be made? We 
are dyi ngJ8 
B. Water Pollution 
I. Phoellix Pulp alld Paper Case 
Phoenix Pulp and Paper Co Ltd (hereinafter Phoenix) is located near the Nam Phong 
river in Khon Kaen, one of thc largest provinces in the northeast of Thailand. Since 
1994, Khon Kaen residents havc begun to complain that the factory released untreated 
wastewater into the Nam Phong ri ver, the main waterway for many provinces in the 
region, thus killing tens of thousands offish 3 ,! As a result, it was ordcred by authorities 
that the company must abide by the zero-di scharge rule, that is, it was not allowed to 
dischargc any kind of water. including treated water, into waterways. 
Phoenix then appealed to the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP), 
aski ng for pern1ission to continue re leas ing water. It justi fied its appeal on the basis that 
the company was in the process of improving its technology to cope with strict 
measures rcquired by its environmental impact assessment study. Strikingly, the 
company did not wait for the OEPP's decision on its appeal. Rather, it continucd to 
dischargc water from its plants into the Nam Phong rivcr. 
[n mid-1 998, Phoenix 's wastewatcr treatment system failcd, resulting in the di scharge 
of wastewater kept in the company's ponds, into the Nam Phong river. As a 
consequencc, the Ministry of Industry issued an order to shut down Phoenix's polluting 
plants for 180 days to improve its wastewater treatment facility.40 The company was 
.\S Somsak Suksai, ' Villagers say no to panel idea' , Bangkok Post. 26 June 1998. 
"'Phoenix Paper mill to be closed' . The N(t/iol1 . 21 Jul y 1998. 
40 Ibid. 
'0 o~ 
thcn allowcd to open again. Howevcr, it is evident that thc polluted water is still leaking 
(i'om Phoenix 's plant onto the bank of thc rhong river. For example, Pcnnapa 
Hongthong quoted Mr Saksit Tridej , the rCD 's director-general , as saying; 
To stop discharging polluted water trom the factory into the Phong River through the 
Huay Chode swamp, the company used to recycle all the discharged water by 
showering a eucalyptus plantation. But the water was leaking from the plantation into 
the swamp and funher into the river. It caused local villagers to complain that the 
polluted water had killed the fish in the river"' 
Also, according to Dr Yuwaree Inna, the rCD's director of Wastcwater Management 
Division, water pollution is repeatedly caused by Phoenix because the company closes 
down its wastewater treatment plant from timc to time in an attempt at cost cutting."2 
2. Klity Mille case 
In April 1998, residents of the Lower Klity village situated downstream of thc Klity 
stream in Kanchanaburi province lodged a complaint to the govell1ment that the Klity 
mine dumped toxic waste into the stream, causing hundreds of their li vestock to die, or 
fall ill aftcr drinking watcr from thc contaminated stream."] The villagers themselves 
a lso suffercd severe diarrhoea and di zziness. and rashes."" 
After inspcction, a Mineral Resourccs provincial officer found that the mine's tailings 
pond. which was used for storing toxic sed iments, had broken, resulting in the 
discharge of overf10w into the strcam. To rectify the problem, the mine was ordered to 
suspend its operations. The reopening of the plant could not be conducted unlcss its 
waste water pond was improved to meet the safety standards ."5 
" Pennapa lI ongthong, 'Polluting company faces order to pay 8t6m for swamp rehabilitation'. The 
Nalion, 7 August t 999. 
" Kamol Sukin, 'Phoenix to pay for its blunders', The N(tfioll. 7 September 1999. 
4 .1 'M ine accused of lead contamination'. Bangkok POSI. 23 April 1998. 
44 Supawadee Susanpoolthong, 'Groups unite to block lead threat', Bangkok Pasl, 22 May 1999. 
45 Vasana Chinvarakol11 and Atiya Achakulwisut, 'Lead mine shut down', Bangkok POSI, 24 April 1998. 
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It was also alleged after the complain was made that the mine had been discharging 
lead-contaminated water without proper treatment for 30 years 4 6 The Environmental 
Health Bureau, Ministry of Public Health can'ied out a health examination on villagers 
in Lower Klity village in early 1999. Alamlingly, the blood tests on 119 out of 150 
people in the polluted area showed that they have unusually high amount of lead in their 
bloodstrcam. Among these, thirty-nine children from infancy to six years old were 
found to have an average 23.56 micrograms/decilitre, eight children aged 7-15 years had 
about 28.3 micrograms/decilitre. and seventy-two villagers aged 16 years and over had 
about 26.31 micrograms/decilitre of lead in their bloodstream, whil e a repOt1 conducted 
by an Occupational Health Division in 1996 showed that a non11al person who did not 
work in a lead concentrated environmcnt such as that of a lead mine had only about 4.92 
micrograms/decilitrc in his or her bloodstream 4 7 
It should be noted that Klity creek has been the lifeline for Lower Klity villagers for 
drinking water, fishing and iITigation. Water fi'om the creek flows into Lam Khlong 
Ngoo, a stream which feeds the Sri Nakarin reservoir48 At present, the Rescrvoir 
serves as a main source of fish for people in Kanchanaburi. However, it was also found 
that fish in the Sri Nakarin reservoir contained 90.5 milligrams per kilogram, which is 
348 times higher than safety standards49 
Furthcll11ore, given that the creek is located in the middle of Thung Yai Naresuan 
Wildlife Sanctuary, which has been recognised as a World Heritage Area, many are 
concemed that thc sanctuary may lose its high status if the pollution remains50 
Many feel that they cannot affo rd to be complacent merely because the Klity Mine was 
shut down. For this reason, affected vi ll agers have been demanding that the govemment 
rcvoke the concessions of all lead mines5t For example, Sanitsuda Ekachai quoted Mr 
Wuth Boonlel1, secretary to the Forest-dwelling Ethnic Karens in Westem Thailand 
Network, as saying: 
46 ' Klity water still health-hazardous'. Bangkok Post, 14 February 1999. 
47 Anchalee Kongrut , ' Ili gh Icvel ofcontaminalion seen in Klity', Bangkok Post, II May 1999. 
48 Ibid . 
49 ' Klily water slill health-hazardous' , Bangkok Post, 14 FebrualY 1999. 
50 Supawadee Susanpoo lthong, ' Grollps unite to block lead threat ', Bangkok Post, 22 May 1999. 
51 Ibid. 
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Every time the vil lagers comp lain , the mine manager promises to turn over a new leaf 
but they never live up to their words. The only way to solve the problem once and for 
all is to stop the mine.52 
lndeed , Mr Wuth's suggestion has a point. Records show that the mine has always re-
opened to continue discharging tox ic substances into public waterways despite 
occasional closures53 Recently, the Klity mine has appealed to the Department of 
Mineral Resources (DMR), a government agency overseeing mine busi ness, to allow it 
to re-open its operation 54 The DMR deci sion on the appeal is not available at the time 
of writing . 
Sign i ficantly. studies show that apart from the Klity mine, there are six other lead mines 
in the vicinity. some of which al so dumped toxic waste into the public waterways. 
Nevertheless. no action Ii'om the authorities has so far been taken. 55 
We conclude, both Ii'olll the overview and from the case stud ies, that Thailand's air and 
waler pollution problems are very serious ones, and that these have not been 
significantly mitigated by the ' big bang ' environmental law ref0ll11 of 1992. Why this is 
the case, is the subject of the following chapters. 
51 Sanitsuda Ekachai, 'Lead mine faces rising oppos ition ' . Bangkok Post , 14 Jul y 1999. 
51 ' Klit y water still hea lth-hazardous' , Bangkok Post , 14 February 1999. 
54 Pennapa Hongthong, ' Po lluting mine seeks new 5ta,1 ' . The Nation. 2 July 1999. 
55 Ibid . 
35 
Chapter 4 
Detailed analysis of the reasons for failure 
Intmduction 
As we havc learned from Chapter 3, the environmental situation in Thailand has not 
improved despite the ' big bang' refonl1. Before going on to consider alternative 
strategies for future ref o 1111 , it is important to identify more clearly the reasons why the 
'big bang' rcfoll11S substantially failed. 
Socio-economic studies of social policy implementation suggest that there is a myriad of 
salient factors responsible for the success or failure of environmental rcgulation in many 
countries, including Thailand. Thcse include the charactcr of the law; lack of political 
will; the agency's task environment; size of fi1l11S; cultures; regulatory capture; and 
cOITuption. These factors and others, will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The large majority of these issues will be explored in this chapter under two main 
headings: the character of laws and the agency ' s task environment. However, the issue 
of cOITuption, which is so important and so pervasive in a developing country like 
Thailand, will be considered separately in Chapter 5. 
I. Character of Laws 
Regulation is enacted to achieve many different objecti ves. Somc laws do indeed 
provide a powerful and reliable mechanism to deal with particular problems, but others 
are merely symbolic tools for politicians to appease their electorates by attempting to 
show that they are doing their job: passing legislation. I As we will see, the character of 
particular laws, and these and other differences in the ways laws evolve. result in 
strikingly different outcomes in the effectiveness or otherwise of environmental 
regulation. 
I Da\ id Parks, 'GAIT and the Environment: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies with En vironm ental 
Preservation'. UCLA fnternational Environmental Law alld Polie\'. Vol. t 5 No.2, 1996/97. at t 65·6. 
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One of the greatest problems in this regard, is vague legislation. Ambiguity causes 
uncertainty. Because of this , vague legislation is generally undesirable. Most 
importantly, it could lead to regulatory failure 2 Take the case of the 1992 Enhancement 
Act. The Act allows any individual to have access to infollllation regarding 
environmental and natural resources quality. Interestingly, the word "may" is somehow 
included in this provision. This inclusion has caused ambiguity and led to confusion and 
ineffectiveness in the application of the law. 
This can be illustrated by a 1993 Thai case. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
(hereinafter BMA) granted a concession to Thanayong Co. Ltd. to construct an elevated 
trainline for transporting commuters in Bangkok. The construction of the railways and 
many stat ions tended to affect the public with regard to environment and scenery. In 
March 1994, Khunying Chodchoy Soponpanich, president of the Thai Environmental 
and Community Development Association, an environmental NGO, requested the 
Governor of BMA to disclose infollllation on this project according to the legal 
provision desclibed above. The Governor for some reason ignored her request. 
Consequently, Khunying Chodchoy, along with another 74 citizens jointly brought this 
case to the Bangkok Civil Court in March 1995. 
The ambiguity of the statute became a critical issue. 1 interviewed Mr Warin Tiemjaras, 
one of the attomeys who represented the plaintiff in the case. He stated that: 
Surprisingly. the Enhancel1lent Act does not include much emphasis on public 
participation. Although Section 6 of the Act underlies this issue, the word 'may' in this 
provision creates ambib'1lity. It tUIl1S out that the govell1ment officials have discretion to 
consider if they will disclose the required infol1l13tion 3 
Similarly, Dr Sunee Mallikamal, associate professor and director of Environmental Law 
and Development Center, Chulalongkorn University's faculty of Law suggested to me 
that: 
2 Douglas Tookey, 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Lea111 ing Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy'. The CeorgelOlI'n International 
En\'lronmental Lenl' R(!vieH', Vo!.ll, 1999, at 331. 
) The interview was conducted on 28 December 1996. 
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Some provisions in the refOimed law are vague. Examples include Section 6 of the 1992 
Enhancement Act 1992 which contains the word ·'may". This creates a controversial 
argument if the govemment rea lly has to disclose relevant infonnation to the public.4 
The defendants took advantage of the ambiguity described above in arguing that the 
controversial provision did not require government agencies to provide any data and 
info11l1ation to anyone. Rather, it merel y recogni sed the fundamental rights to know of 
the people5 After a few trial sessions, the case ended up with a compromise: the 
defendants agreed to disclose such infoll11ation to the publi c and the plainti ff wi thdrew 
the case from the CO Ult. 6 
Had the law been clearer, the plaintiff wou ld have been able to take a much stronger 
position, and had they succeeded in court, this would have provided an impOitant 
precedent for other environmental groups seeking to take advantage of "the right to 
know" . But thc ambi guity in the law prevented any such outcome. 
To asceltain why and how thi s provis ion was included wi th the word "may", I 
interviewed Mr Panat Tasneeyanond, the drafter of the ref o 1111 ed Enhancement Act in an 
interview. He di sclosed that: 
When I wrote the draft of this legislation , there was no such word. It was Mr 
Akkarathorn lularat of the Office of State Counsel who added it7 
However, in the interview with Dr Akkarathorn Jularat , he put it: 
I had a little involvement in reviewi ng the 1992 Enhancement Act. I remembered I 
reviewed the draft for only one day. As for the word "may", I do not remember if! 
4 The interview was conducted on 9 JanualY 1997. 
5 See Defendants ' answer statements in the l3lack Case No. POl' Kor 87/ 1995, Red Case No. POI' Kor 
100/ 1995 of the Bangkok Civil Coul1. 
6 Chodchoy Soponpanich ef aI., Is [f True rlll/t Ballgkokial1s' Qualin' of Life Will Be Beller Off?, 1995, at 
5-13. 
7 The interview took place on 5 JanualY 1997. It should be noted that. according to the Thai Legislat ive 
Drafting System. all the draft legislation must be reviewed by the Office of State Counsel. This offi ce is 
empowered to edit any word(s). plu-ase(s) or sentence(s). as well as render its comments regard ing the 
drafts it has reviewed to the Parliament for further consideration. 
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added this word in the Act. It was a long time ago. I think it must have been someone 
else who did that 8 
While the preci se origins of the ambiguity in the case remain unclear, this example 
sensiti ses us to the broader sociological literature on thc enactment of legislation which 
suggests that commonly, legislators can appear to give considerable benefits to one 
group (colllmonly a popular cause) while at the samc time protecting powerful interests 
by insel1ing ambiguous tenns which make the law effectively, unenforceable.9 
Also, vaguc legislation could discourage public participation, which has been hoped as 
a salient factor for the success of environmental regulation. As described in Chapter 2, 
the 1992 Enhancement Act unprecedentedly recognises the role of NGOs and grants 
cel1ain privileges to a registered NGO. These include the light to receive assistance and 
support on some activities from the govemment. IO However, the Act also stipulates that 
if any registered NGO's activity causes any disturbance, is against public order, or is 
unsuitable, the Minister of Science, Technology and Environment is empowered to 
revoke the registration of such NGO. 11 
A question arises: what kind of activity can be considered disturbance, be against public 
order, or be unsuitable? As we have seen, NGO's movements have played a crucial role 
in helping improve environmental situation in Thailand, including galvanising 
government to pass environmental legi slation, as well as to take action against polluters. 
Considering the nature of NGO's activities which are inevitably in disagreement with 
goverl1l1lent in many cases, this ambiguous provision poses a concem among registered 
NGOs as it leaves room for the Minister to use hi s discretion as to whether an NGO's 
activity is disturbing, against public order, or unsuitable. Conceivably, this provision 
could discourage a registered NGO from doing their job vigorous ly as it realises that 
los ing registration will deprive it of many rights given under the law. 
' The interview was conducted on 16 March 1998. 
Q Neil Gunningham. Pol/lltion, Social Interest and the La\\', Martin Robertson. UK, 1974. 
10 See Douglas Tookey 'Southeast Asian Environmentali sm at its Crossroads: Learning Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy', at 33 1 
" Sec the 1992 Enhancement Act, Section 8. See also Panat Tasneeyanond, 'The 1992 Enhancement of 
the National Environmental Quality Act'. Chllialollgkorn Enviromnenlal Law JOllrnal , JanualY 1995, at 
90. 
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I I. Agency's Task Envi!'onment 
Govelllment agencies are indispensab le mechanisms to make environmental regulation 
work. However. their effectiveness may be influenced by many elements including the 
level of financial support and the provision of resources; lack of heavy penalties, 
political will; regulatory capture; a firm 's ability to comply with regulation; and 
corruption. 
A. Financial support and number of regulators 
Despite the impoliance of funding, studies however reveal that enforcement agencies 
sometimes suffer from an insufficient allocation of funds. This problem could reduce 
the efficiency of the agencies in many aspects, including resources neccssary for 
research; inspection; and enforcement. 12 
The relati vely small remuneration paid to government officials in Thailand (a situation 
unchanged by the ' big bang ' refonn) is one example of inadequate financial suppoli, and 
thi s in turn has important consequences for their effectiveness. As Eugenc Bardach 
argues. many civil servan ts, owing to the small salaries and wages they receive. do not 
have enough motivation to exeli their best effoli to do their jobs. 13 In its extrcme form, 
this can also lead to con-uption. and it is in thi s context that tile issue will be more fu ll y 
explored in Chapter 5. 
Inadequate financial resources may also resu lt in the lack of sophisticated equipment 
necessary for regul ators to do their job. In the case of Thailand, this situation seriously 
hinders the efficiency of regulatory agencies. In my interviews, Ms Krittayapolll 
Tappatat and Mr Titi Jantaengpol , scienti sts of the Industrial Estate Authori ty of 
Thailand (I EAT). pointed out that: 
As for the air pollution problem in Mab Ta Phut in mid 1996, we have not bcen able to 
pinpoint who the polluters exactly are because we did not have the device sophisticated 
cnough to detect the direction from which pollution came. Although this hi·tech device 
12 Peter Yeager. Th e Limits o(Lall's. 1991. a137. 
II Eugene Bardach, The fmplementaliol1 Game: What Happens afier a Bill Becomes a Law? 1977. at 76. 
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is avai lable now, the Thai government has not had it yet. Without thi s kind of device, it 
is difficult to do so as direction of ai r pollution can vary to the wind 14 . 
Thc number of regulators \ 'is-a-vis that of regulated firms also has serious implications 
for rcgulato ry succcss. The clearest evidence of this comes from a US study of the 
Office of Surface Mining (OSM). There are two differcnt enforcement styles between 
thc OSM officials in the wcstern region and their counterparts in the eastern region of 
the United States. In the western region, the number of mining operators was not too 
grcat for the official s to monitor. Each inspector was responsible for 23 sites, and in turn 
was able to visit each site regularly. For thi s reason , the OSM western region inspectors 
gradua lly developed more understanding of the finllS' situation, and adopted an effective 
cooperation-oriented enforcement style. In contrast, there were many mining operators 
in the eastern region. Each inspector had to deal with III enterprises. Given that the 
OSM eastern region inspectors were not able to visit each finn very often, they adopted 
a detetTence-oriented enforcement style. 15 Such an enfo rcement style, while perhaps 
inevitable with such limited resources, has proved to be less successful, particularly 
when the chances of detection and prosecution are themselves small as a result of the 
lack of regulatory reso urces. 
In Thai land, shortage of manpower is frequently invoked as an explanation (or excuse) 
for the ineffecti veness of environm ental regulation. 16 As Dr Prakit Kirawanich, fonner 
director-general of the Pollution Control Department (PCD) explained to me: 
Environmental situation in Thailand has not improved satisfactoril y because we lack 
manpower. There are about 300 officia ls who have to dea l with 60 million population in 
the area of 500, 000 square-kilometres . I 7 
Despite this problem, the PCD has attempted to optimise its perfornlance. As Dr Supat 
Wangwongwattana, the PCD's Director of Air Quality Management put it: 
14 The interview took place on 21 January 1998. 
15 Shover et al. ( 198-1.1 986), ci ted by Roben Kagan, in David Rosenbloom and Richard Schwartz. (eds.), 
Handbook of Regulation and Administrative LOll'. 1994, at 395-9. 
16 Sunee Mallikamari , Environmental LOll' Enforcement, at II. 
I) The interview was co nducted on 18 December, 1996. It should be noted that the Po lluti on Control 
Department has its jurisd icti on across the country, which covers an area o f approx imately 500. 000 square 
kilometres. 
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reo does not have enough officials to monitor motorists who violate the laws. 
Therefore. we have authorised police and officials from the Land Transpol1ation 
Department to do this job on our behal f. It now appears that each of these two agencies 
implements the law to which it is responsible individually, justi fying that the 
Enhancelllen/ Acr does not have the heaviest penalties. 18 
B. Lack of sufficiently heavy penalties 
As this thesis suggests in Chapter 6. command and control must remain one of the 
mechani sms to help revitalise Thai environmental regulation. Gi ven that sanctions are 
an essential element of a command and control regime, criminal penalties must be in 
place. What kind of criminal penalties do we want remembering that there are many 
different kinds of polluters who bend the rules? Some tend to comply with regulation 
voluntarily, others after they receive only one warning letter, while still others will not 
be cooperative unless they are forced into compliance by tough sanctions. 
Against this backdrop, there must be various kinds of penalties, ranging hom leni ent to 
severe puni shment imposed on recalcitrants according to the magnitude of regulatory 
violation. Among these. tough penalties (sticks) are indi spensable to apply to a hard-
headed polluter after lenient ones (carrots) are ignored. 
Studies show that many countries increase the penalties to make the puni shment more 
expensive so that it becomes no longer economically rational to break the law. Take the 
case of the United States. Stricter penalties are being used as a means of ensuri ng 
environmental protection. Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (hereinafter 
Commission), upon the suggestion of its Advisory Group on Environmental Sanction, 
has proposed a new guideline on environmental crime to the Congress. The Commission 
has suggested the imposition of very stringent conditions on polluters. Tf the regulated 
industry cannot meet the requirements, they will face harsh fines with an extremely 
18 The imerview was conducled on 27 December 1996. 
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limited mitigation opp0l1unities. 19 
Australia is another example. In 1981 , the maximum fines under the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act (NSW) were increased fourfold from those in the past. Further, in 
1989, the then New South Wales Environment Minister, Tim Moore announced the 
'getting tough on polluters' policy and subsequently introduced the Environmental 
Offence and Penalties Act in 1989. Interestingly, this Act brought about a dramatic 
increase of penalties for environmental offences. The maximum penalty is $ I million 
for a corporate offender and S 150, 000 or seven years imprisonment, or both for 
individual offenders found guilty of serious offences. 'o Also, scholars point out that the 
increase of penalty has been very imp0l1ant in providing incentives to industry to 
improve its environmental perf0n11ance. " 
Turning to the Asian region, a number of countries have also increased penalties as a 
tool to curb environmental pollution. Take the case of Taiwan. Given growing pollution 
problems, Taiwan has recently increased penalties for non-compliance fi'om US $ 2,400 
to US $ 24,000 per day22 Singapore too, has increased the fine for illegal dumping and 
contamination of a site from Singapore $ 2,000 to $ 10,000 and/or an imprisonment. 
Moreover, such a jail sentence is mandatory if an offender is convicted for the second 
timen 
Unlike the countries above, Thailand did not rely on the increase of penalties despite the 
1992 environmental law refonn. Rather, the country focused on introducing a number 
of innovative measures such as the polluter pays principle, and strict civil liability as 
important tools to help improve the environmental si tuation24 As a result, many 
regulations still contain penalties which are not suitable for the present situation. 
19 Jason Lemkins, 'DetelTing Environmental Crime Through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for the New 
Organizational Environmental Sentencing Guidelines'. Universitv of California Law Review, 1996, at 
308-9. 
20 Jennifer Norbeny, 'Australian Pollution Law: Offences, Penalties, and Regulatory Agencies', a paper 
delivered to A IC/ACEL Conference Crime and Environlllent. Hobart, at 20-1. 
" Zada Lipman and Lachlan Roots, ' Protect ing the EnviroJUllem through Criminal Sanctions: The 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW) ' . Environmental and Planning Lall' )onrnal. 
FeblualY 1995 , at 30-3. 
" Andrea Zavadszky. ' Balancing the Legal Scales ', Asian SlIswinable Development Report. June-August 
1994, at 28-9. 
23 Susan de Sil va. 'Enforcemem and Compliance Priori ties' in American Bar Association, Proceedings of 
Environmel1lal Priorities in SOlllheast Asian Nations. 1997, at 132-3 
24 See more details in Chapter 2. 
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For example, the 1992 Maintenan ce of Public Cleanliness Act has only fines but no jail 
sentence25 (despite an opportunity for Thai legi slators to include such an option when 
the regul at ion was enacted to supersede the now-defunct Act whi ch had been in use 
since 1960). Another example can be drawn from the 1903 Maintenal1ce of Canals Act 
whi ch is still in operation. With respect to an offence related to water pollution, thi s Act 
stipulates that whoever dumps wastes into the canal will be subject to a fine up to 20 
baht. which is less than A $ 1.00, or an impri sonment for up to one month, or both fine 
and impri sonment. 26 C learly, the ' big bang' lacks heavy penalties to serve as sticks to 
help ensure the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement. 
C. Political Will 
Politics and regulation are inseparable. Many suggest that regul ation is a political 
process, emerging from political demands and struggles.27 As discussed earlier, many 
politicians pass the laws to merely appease their vo ters, regardl ess of how effectively 
such laws wi ll be enforced. That is why many countries, Thailand included, have a large 
vo lume of laws but very weak enforcement28 Perhaps a good example to demonstrate 
thi s situation can be drawn from vague legi slati on, which causes uncertainty and in tum 
undennines the effectiveness of environmental regulation discussed earli er. 
Studies also show that after a movement to have regulation enacted is successful, the 
politicians involved usually tUIll their attention to other issues29 Take the National 
Environment Board (NEB) meeting. As described in Chapter 2, the 1992 El1hal1cement 
Act restructured the NEB to make the board powerful enough to deal with environmental 
issues more effectively. This included having the Prime Mini ster as Chairperson of the 
board. However, it was found that some prime ministers did not attend the NEB 
meetings at a ll. Rather, they assigned the deputy prime minister who was the NEB's 
vice-ChaillJerSOn to preside over the meetings30 
25 Chatchom Akapin. ' Law Enforcemem: An Issue to be improved for the Protection of the Thai 
Environmem ', Dul/apaha, 1996, at 91. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Robel1 Kagan, in David Rosenbloom and Richard Schwartz, (eds.) , Handbook of Regulation and 
Administrative LeI"', 1994 , al 399. 
28 See An tonio Oposa, 'Legal Marketing of Envirollmemal Law'. Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Lml', Vol. 6.273 , 1996, at 273-5. See also C-Zero. 'We find ourselves wi th too man y laws', 
Bangkok Post, 3 July 1998. 
29 Marver Bellls te in, Regulating Business bl ' Independelll Commission, 1955. 
~o Amnat Wongbandit et al .. Recommendations Jor Lml 's and Regulations for Env;roJlmental Proteclion 
and Operating Mechanisms for Control {tnd Enforcement , A Report Submitted to th e Pollution Control 
Depat·tment, 1997, at 10. 
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III 
At the stage of enforcement, evidence shows that political will is crucial in detennining 
the success or failure of regulation. Examples include the vital issue of political 
interference with law enforcement in an environmental case31 As Mr Somnuk 
Rubthong, director of the PCD 's Legal and Complaint Division put it: 
Sometimes government prioritises economic development and political stability, 
regardless of environmental consequences. For example, while public prosecutors were 
prepared to prosecute intruders of the national reserved forest in 1975, M.R?2 Kukrit 
Pramoj, the Prime Minister at the time, asked the prosecutors to set the offenders free." 
Put in its broader context, this last statement encapsulates the broader problem: there is 
often a tension between economic development and environmental protection, and 
politicians, in the absence of concerted pressure from environmentalists, international 
forces, or external markets, will usually have a much stronger interest in protecting 
development. Not only will there be greater economic and political rewards from doing 
so, but also, in a considerable number of cases, there will be other temptations, explored 
in the next chapter when we examine issues of corruption. The ' big bang ' refonns are no 
exception to this analysis. Despite the steps purportedly taken in the 1992 Enhancement 
Act to protect the environment, little was done which would threaten economic 
development. 
D. Regulatory Captul"c 
As discussed earlier, when regulators have time to visit finns regularly, they are able to 
gain insight into finns ' situations, and in tUlll adopt an accommodative enforcement 
style. On the other hand, however, a close relationship between films and regulators 
could lead to the problem of regulatory capture. 
Regulatory capture is a situation where regulators are sympathetic to the regulated 
industry and end up accommodating weak compliance by the industry34 Why and how 
31 Wasant Techawongtham, 'Courage to do the job will overcome' , Bangkok Post, 3 July 1998. 
31 M.R. stands for 'Momratchawong', which is the word used in front of the name of those related to any 
king in the Chakri dynasty (Thailand's present dynasty) by bloodline. 
11 The interview took place on 16 December 1996. 
34 See David Parks. 'GA IT and the Envirotunent: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies with Enviromnental 
Preservation' , at 170. 
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does this happen') One must not forget that regulators themselves are a p3I1 of industry. 
Thus. if the industry no longer exists, there is a possibility that regulators can become 
jobless because they wi ll have no one to regulate35 For this reason, regulators arc prone 
to end up accommodating the interests of the regulated industry so as to sustain their 
existence. 36 
Capture can also cmerge in the situation where rcgulators can see oppol1unities to switch 
to join regulated firms which ofter better salaries and other benefits, such as bonuscs. In 
this case, regulators wi ll adopt accommodativc enforcement to the industry's interest37 
An example can be extrapolated from the Baryulgil repol1 (1984). which suggested that 
at least onc inspector who was responsible for mine safety at Baryulgil left hi s 
government job and then joined the finn he had regulated 38 
It is also interesting to note, in relation to the agency's task environment, that regulators 
tend to adopt an accommodative style of enforcement if they are not ovcrloaded with the 
number of finns they have to inspect. However, thi s could be a double-edged sword as 
far as regulatory capture is concerned. Scholars argue that a close relationship 
developcd from fj'equent interactions between regulators and fil111 S makes regulators 
p3l1icularl y vulnerable to capture by regulated finlls 39 
This phenomenon takes place in Thailand as well. For example, regulators of the 
Department of Industrial Work (DIW), whose main function is to oversee industry' s 
operation at almost every step, are reluctant to enforce the law against regulated plants 
when non-compliance is found because they are captured by a too close relationship. As 
Mr Supaporn Pukasemwarangkul , environmental officer, Harbour Depal1mcnt revealed: 
Whenever a plant's activity violates the laws under the DIW and my department's 
jurisdiction simultaneously, the DIW regulators often ask us to enforce the law. 
justifying their request that they know the polluter 100 well to get tough on them 4 0 
35 Neil Gunningham, 'Negotialed Non·Compliance: A Case SlUdy of Regulalory Failure', [tnl' & Polie\', 
1987, at 85. 
36 Peter Yeager. a l 37. 
37 Neil Gunningham, 'Negotiated Non-Compliance: A Case Study of Regu latory Failure'. at 85. 
J8 Ibid. at 78-9. 
19 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaile (1991). cited by Roben Kagan. in David Rosenbloom and Richard 
Schwanz, (eds.), Handbook of Regulation and Administrative [all'. 1994. at 396. 
40 The inlerview was conducled on 16 March 1998. 
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Regulatory capture in Thailand could also result from the Thai culture of gratitude41 
Research has found that many agencies do not enforce the law against some factories 
because these factories always provide sUpp011 to their agencies. The support includes 
donation of office facilities such as air-conditioners and fax machines to remote and 
small government agencies whose budget allocation is often insufficient42 More details 
about how Thai culture influences regulation will be discussed later in this chapter. 
E. Size of Firm: The Ability to Comply 
Many technologies necessary for environmental management are too expensive for 
most small and medium firms to afford 43 Studies have also found that small and 
medium fi11l1s often generate more pollution per unit of output than large tim1s operating 
in the same sector44 From this it would seem that the ability to afford expensive 
compliance technology is an essential factor in making regulation work and that in this 
context, size offinTI will be a critical variable. 
The challenge of regulating small fin11S is made cven greater by the fact that they are not 
easily identified and targeted for enforcement action because of their size. As a result, 
they have an 0ppoliunity to maintain a low public profile, and this assists them to ignore 
environmental regulation 45 As Mr Supaporn Pukasemwarangkul , Environmental 
Officer, the Harbour Department pointed out: 
Most small plants still cause water pollution problem. Our difficulty is to find these 
recalcitrants as the plants are normally situated in either remote areas, or residential 
41 See Scott Christensen et al., The Lessons of East Asia: Thailand, The institutional and Political 
Underpinnings o/GI'O\\ ,th, A World Bank Publication, 1993, at 20. 
42 Amnat Wongbandit, 'Laws Related to Factory's Wastewater Treatment' , DullapaiJa, Janu31y-March 
1996, at 117. 
41Jason Lemkins, ' Detening Environmental Crime Through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for the New 
Organizational Envirorunental Sentencing Guidelines' , at 335. 
44 Carter Brandon 311d Ramesh Ramankatty, Toward an Environmental Strategv for Asia, World Bank 
Discussion Papers, 1993, at 72. 
45 Christen White, 'Regulation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure' , 
Journal o/Environlllental LalV. Vol. 14: 105, 1996. at 148-9. 
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community.'" 
However, as extensive research has revealed, small finns are a serious source of 
pollution. Take the case of the United States. Stunning statistics show that ninety-seven 
per cent of the first 280 finns sentenced under the General Organisational Guidelines 
introduced in 1994 were small firms 47 Also, the case of the underground fuel tanks in 
San Francisco can serve as another example. Statistics show that of the 1017 sites 
reporting an unauthorised release between 1985 and 1990, 870 of the site owners were 
relatively small and less sophisticated finn s.48 
In Thailand too, the major sources of pollution arc small and medium finns 4 9 This 
assertion is supported by a study on the sta te of water pollution in the lower basin of the 
Chao Phraya River, Thailand's main river50 The study found that most factories 
situated in the basin are small and medium businesses, many of which allcged ly 
dischargcd untreated wastewater into the rivcr without prior treatment, thereby causing 
the problem of water pollution". Here, it is crucial to emphasise that the 1992 
Enhancement Act did not develop any coherent or potentially effective strategy for 
dealing with the problem of pollution by small finns , notwithstanding the seriousness of 
their aggregated environmental pollution. 
Turning to large finns , do they always contemplate rcgulatory compliance given their 
financial ability to afford relatively costly environmental management technologies? 
Extensive research has found that large firms are more likely to comply with regulation 
because they not only can afford the environmental costs, but also need to maintain their 
public image. 52 As we will see later in thi s thesis, markets are becoming more 
environmentally sensiti ve. For this reason, some large firms realise that they risk losing 
46 The interview was conducted on 16 March 1998. 
4J Davidson (1995), cited in Jason Lemkins , ' Deterring EnvirolUllental Crime Through Flexible 
Sentencing: A Proposal for the New Organizational Envi ronm ental Sentencing Guidelines '. at 337. 
48 Clu'isten White, 'Regulation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of RegulatolY Failure' at 
149-50. 
49 Amompot Kullawijit, 'EnvirolUllental Problem: Depletion of the Ozone Layer' , Dullapaha, 1996, at 
160. See also Thailand EnvirOlUllent Insti tute, Cleaner Techn%gl' in Thai/and. 1997, at 6: and Dhira 
Phantumvanit , ' Infrastructure Development and Pollution Prevention Priorities', in American Bar 
Association. Proceedings ojEnvironl1len{({/ Priorities in SOll/heas! Asian Nations, 1997, at 11 2. 
50 Office of Environmental Po licy and Planning, Report 011 Envirolllllellta/ Sitllatioll in the Year /99-4, 
1995. at 263-6. 
" Ibid. 
"Christen White, ' Regulation of Leak)' Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of RegulatolY Failure', 
at 148-9. 
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II, 
their competitive advantage if their products are perceived to be major sources of 
pollution5 ] 
But even if large finns do not decide it is in their competitive self-interest to comply 
with environmental regulation, it will at least be easier for regulators to take effective 
action against them. Robert Kagan compares large finns with elephants (which are very 
visible to regulators, communities and others). Hence, it is very difficult for the large 
firms to hide their non-compliance from detection because their violations are more 
visible54 Furthemlore, the public always targets large finns as a main source of 
pollution as many enviromnental disasters in the past resulted from very large 
corporations such as Exxon-Valdez and Union Carbide55 Against this background, 
many large finns are very concemed about their image in relation to environmental 
protection. 
Currently, many largc finns in Thailand have put environmental management programs 
on their agenda. They have inteillalised the costs of expensive technologies in their 
production costs, as Mr Apaichon Wacharasindu, the Vicc President of c.P. Group 
suggested: 
51 Ibid. 
Business sectors must take pal1 in improvements of environmental situation. We do not 
mind spending money on expensive equipment for environmental management. This is 
not because we are a big finn , but because we can perceive profits in the long run. 
When we comply with the law, we do not have to worry about paying fines, or providing 
special treatment (emphasis added) to govenU11ent inspectors and so on. Furthermore, 
people now have more awareness than those in many years ago. So if our products are 
environmentally friendly , we do believe that people will trust our reputation and always 
look for our products. Eventually, we will gain more profits than the money we have 
paid for environmental treatment facilities. In addition, we have seen the laws as 
minimum requirements. So we always contemplate dealing with environmental issues 
54 Robel1 Kagan, in David Rosenbloom and Richard Schwartz, (eds.), Handbook of Regulation and 
Administrative Law, 1994. 
55 Ibid. 
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beyond the criteria set out by the laws 56 
Studies reveal that government officials have a propensity to trust that large firms, in 
light of their financial ability, will be more willing to comply with regulation , and as a 
result they adopt an accommodati ve enforcement style towards such finTIs 57 However, 
it would be naive for regulators just to rely on the size of finTIs and to assume that all 
large fit1l1 S will do the right thing voluntari ly. Research has also found that large finTIs 
sometimes take advantage of the trust received from regulators, and violate regulations. 
Take the casc of SFRWQCB Leaky Underground Fucl Tank (LUFT) program. As 
large fitlllS arc not facing frequent site visits, some of them violate the applicabl e 
regulation 58 
Thailand has also experienced the same situation; Mr Vira Mavichak, deputy director-
general, Department of Industrial Work pointed out that dcspite the fact that many large 
finTIs have sophisticated envirorullental management systems, "it has been found somc 
of them di scharge untreated wastewater and polluted air to the public,,59 
So we are left with a situation where small and medium-sized finn s are major sourccs of 
pollution and have, by and large, neither sufficient capacity nor interest in voluntary 
compliance. Regulators lack sufficient rcsources to deal with them and the 'big bang' 
reforms provide no credible strategy for doing so . The picture with regard to large finllS 
is somcwhat more optimistic. Some of them at least wil l perceive an cnlightened sclf-
interest in complying voluntarily. But othcrs will not, and thcre is considerablc evidence, 
both in Thailand and clsewhere, that a substantial number of large finns also require 
considerable regulatory oversight, and without thi s, are likely to continue to be 
substantial sources of pollution ; the case studies cited in the previous chapter provide 
graphic evidence of this. Yet once again, the ' big bang ' refon1lS do not offer any 
credible strategy for dealing with them and the forces identified in previous sections 
(e.g. rcgulatory capture, lack of political will, inappropriate style of regulation , lack of 
regulatory resources) suggest that thc 'big bang' refonTIs will in themselves be 
insufficient to achieve satisfactory environmental outcomes. 
56 This inrormant gave the interview on 8 January 1997. 
57 Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan. Going bl" Ihe Book: The Problem of Regulalon' Unreasonableness, 
1982. at 260-1. See also Neil GurU1ingham. La1\" & PoliCl". 1987. at 82. 
5R Ch.risten White. ' Regu lation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure', 
at 151. 
59 The interview took place on 26 December 1996. 
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II, 
F. Cultures 
As discussed earlier, regulation is an instrument invented to control human behaviour. GO 
Cultures, which influence the way people behave, are involved in the success or failure 
of regulation. For the purposes of this thesis, Thailand has some cultures which help 
explain why enviromnental regulation does not work effectively in the country. 
Overview of Thai culture 
Thai culture is very much religion-oriented. Studies show that Buddhism is identified 
as the national religion of the country, as ninety-five per cent of the population, which is 
approximately sixty million, are Buddhists6 !, Given that Buddhism teaches people to 
treasure environmental values, Thai culture therefore encourages the Thai to live in 
harmony with the natural environment6' . 
Thai cultures which hamper the success of environmental regulation 
But Buddhism is a double-edgcd sword. Paradoxically, despite the nature-oriented 
attitude discussed above, some Thai cultural values can also become impediments to 
the success of environmental regulation. Cultural values include the power-oriented 
trait; the rule ofka11l1a; a preference for compromise; individualism; and gratitude. 
I. Power-oriented trait 
Thailand has a historical background of being an authoritarian-ruled country; one of the 
main reasons is that the country has had a king as the leader for over seven hundred 
years. Given that Thailand had to do battle with some neighbouring countries who 
wanted to conquer and occupy it in the past, the king, who was also leader of the anny, 
played an important role in defending the country. In doing so, the Thai king led the 
60 Peter Yeager, The Limits ojL(I1I': The Public Regulation of Private Pollution, 1991, at 29. 
61 Douglas Tookey, 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Leall1ing Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy' , at 308-28. 
62 Adul Wichienchareon, 'The Environment and Culture of Thailand' , Svmposiull1 on Environment and 
Culture !Vith emphasis on Urban Issues, 1993, at 8-9. See also Eugene Clark and Suwit Laohasiriwong. 
'Thailand's Quest for Sustainable Development' , The Australian Joul'l1al of Natural Resources LOll' and 
Policy, Vol. 3 No. I, 1996, at 80-1 
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army to tight with enemies himself. Therefore, Thai people are held together by intense 
loyalty to the monarchy'"] 
Historians divide Thai history into four periods, Sukhothai , Ayudhaya, Thonburi, and 
Ratlanakosin. In the Sukhothai period (1237-1350), there was minimal government as 
we know it in modern times. Nor was there f0l111al recruitment of officials with 
institutionalised positions. Instead, the king was the supreme ruler of the country. He 
also appointed a number of people, most of whom were members of the Royal family 
and the elites, chosen at his favour to serve certain functions 64 The administrative 
regime at the time could be te11l1ed a paternal regime as the relationship between the 
king and the Thai people was like that of a father and hi s children 65 Despite such an 
administrative regime, high-ranking govel11ment officials were appointed by the king to 
administer remote cities which the king was not able to oversee by himself. 
During the Ayudhaya period, which started in 1350, the paternal regime was replaced 
by the absolute mOllarchl'. How did the transfol111ation of the administrative regime 
occur? Notably, Thailand adopted the Devaraja cult from the Hindus during the 
Ayudhaya period. According to this cult, the king was regarded as a demigod, who was 
the Lord of lives and the sole owner of the land. For the purposes of this chapter, it is 
essential to note that the Thai also considered high-ranking govel1lment officials who 
were in power as representatives of the king and paid high respect to them 66 
Ironically, although the absolute monarchy was replaced by constitutional monarchy in 
1932, the power-oriented trait among the Thai continued. Many Thai are sti II inclined to 
obey and respect those who have authority. Also importanlty, the Thai prefer social 
problems, including environmental issues, to be handled by the government and 
incumbent pol iticians67 
63 Sippanondha Ketudat. The Middle Path for the Future of Thailand: Technology in Harmonv lVith 
Cullllre and Environment , 1990, at 4-5. 
64 Likhit DhiJavegin, The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand, at 16-8. 
65 The reason was that Thailand in the Sukhothai period was a new-bam kingdom, with a small 
population who lived not far from each other. Besides, the counliy was frequentl y attacked by several 
groups of enemies who wanted to occupy it. The Thai relied heavil y on the king who was their leader in 
forming the country as well as in fighting the enemies. See Pornsak Pongpaew et 01. , at 67-9. 
66 See Thinapan Nakata and Likhit Dhiravegin. 'Social and Cultural Aspects of Thai Polity', in Suchart 
Prasith-rathsint, ed .. Thailand's National Development: Social and Economic Background. 1989, at 168. 
67 Ibid at 184. 
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How does the power-oriented culture impede the success of environmental regulation in 
Thail and ? Evi dence shows that thi s culture cou ld both hamper public pat1icipation and 
si multaneously di scourage regulators ' perfonnance. 
As for public par1icipation, we have already learned that it has been integrated in the 
newly reformcd legislation as one of the innovative elements to help improve the 
environment. Conceivably, however, if Thai people sti ll have too much respect to 
government authority and are reluctant to get involved in environmental issues, which 
includes expressing their views, chances for the success of public participation are very 
slim. Of more impot1ance, allowing those in powcr to administer the country without 
suffi cient publi c monitoring resu lted in degradation of natural resources and the 
environment, including air and water pollution as discussed in the previous chapters.6s 
At the other end of the continuum, the power-oriented culture could und ermine the 
efficiency of the rcgulators ' perfonnance. It was found that many finns tend to invite 
thosc in power to be members of boards of directors, who do not have much to do with 
the fi11l1S ' operation. Also, they usually thrive to establish 'strong connection' with 
incumbent authorities69 This is because they rea lise that regulators, most of whom hold 
low or medium ranking in the govel1lment service, will be reluctant to enforce the law 
against their firms as they do not want to confront such powerful fi gures70 As Mr 
Supapol1l Pukasemwarangkul, environmental officer, Harbour Depannent revealcd: 
During inspection, some plants often threaten us by mentioning strong relationship with 
powerfu l authorities7'. 
2. The rule of kal'lI/a 
68 For example, the Thai govemment in the past conducted many activities arbitrarily to trade off 
Thai land's natura l resources with economic growth. These include the concessions to private companies. 
both local and foreign , to cut the trees for over 100 years since the Forestry Department had been 
established in 1889. However, this has 1lI1l1ed out to be detrimental to many local people's welfare. After 
the OCClIlTe nce of many serious inc idents result ing from deforestation , such as the unusual drought in 
1979. and heavy noods in 1988, the govell1ment decided to close down the concession forests across the 
country in 1989 (The Envirorunental Organisation Network, 1995: 122). 
69 Amnat Wongbandit, ' Laws Related to Factory's Wastewater Treatment', at 11 7. 
70 Asavi n Ch intakananda, 'The need for change cries out', Bangkok POST, 13 July 1999. 
71 The interview was conducted on 16 March 1998. 
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It is necessary to re-emphasise that the Thai cultures are closely related to Buddhism. 
ImpOliantly, Buddhism teaches people to believe in karma (deeds). Under the karmatic 
rule, people usually believe that whatever they are confronting now is what they deserve, 
for it has been predetennined by their actions in a past or fonner life.72 This belief 
directs people to believe in fate, thereby discouraging them from struggling to make 
changes for the better. 73 As far as regulatory success is concerned, this culture-related 
perception has become one of the major obstacles to making regulation work in 
Thailand. As Dr John Yeates, Managing Director of CMPs (Thailand) put it: 
The majority of Thai people are Buddhists. However, the principle of "kanna" in 
Buddhism has taught people to accept thjngs as they are. That is why most of the Thai 
are too quiet to speak out...Guys at the bottom should do something74 
Given that current environmental regulation depends on public participation to help 
make the law work, the concept of karma could hamper legal implementation if people 
do not contemplate changes. For example, the 1992 Maintenance of Public Cleanliness 
Act, one of environmental legislation, allows any person who witnesses wrongdoing 
under this legislation to rep01i to government officials although such person is not an 
injured paJiy in the case." Therefore, if such a person sticks to the rule of karma, the 
chances arc that he or she will accept that the wrongdoings are the result of an action in 
the past and in tum does not feel like taking action prcscribed by law. In other words, 
how will environmental situation be improved if people do not perceive any 
wrongdoing as something to be tackled by legal mechanism? 
3. The Culture of Compromise 
72 Withaya Sucharithanarugse, 'The Thai Concept of Power', in Ernest Boesch. ed., Thai Culture: Report 
on rhe Second Thai-European Research Seminar, 1982, at 506. 
73 See Thinapan Nakata and Likhit Dhiravegin, ' Social and Cultural Aspects of 11,ai Polity' , at 181-4. 
74 The interview was conducted on 26 November 1996. 
" Section 51 of the Maintenance of Public Cleanliness Act, 1992 states that 
In the case any offence is committed under this Act, any person who witnesses the case may 
report to a police investigator, local officer or any authorised official to pelfonll his or her duty without 
any delay. In this case, such a witness shall be deemed as an injured party according to the Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
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"The cu lture of compromise obstructs the success of law enforcement" (Mr 
Somnuk Rubthong, director of Legal and Complaint Division, the Pollution 
Control DepaI1ment). 76 
To a celiain extent, the "middle path" precept of Buddhism helps to explain the culture 
of compromise77 As a result of this cu lture, the Thai are modest, considerate, and 
reluctant to hurt others' feelings by decisive acts . Thais prefer to avoid contlict and 
confrontation. 78 Notab ly, the Thai express the compromising culture by adopting "mai 
pen ,.ai" (never mind) , "choei" (to feel indifferent) , and "chai yell" (cool heart) 
approaches to end ilTitating events in a peaceful way79 
What is wrong with the culture of compromise? It is evident that Thai people are quiet 
tolerant of many unlawful practices. For example, the Thai refrain ii'om rep0l1ing 
environmental violations by their neighbours , merely to avoid creating problems with 
each other80 Obviously, the culture of compromise has discouraged the Thai from 
standing up to protect their rights for fear that a contlict will take place. As Dr Sunee 
Mallikamarl has suggested: 
According to Thai culture, people seem not to protect and maintain the rights they have. 
Panicularly if any adverse effects do not happen to them directly, they always ignore 
them. Importantly, many people see environmental problems as an issue which is 
remote from them.sl 
The above assel1ion is well suppol1ed by the Mae Moh case discussed above. Although 
sulphur dioxide emitted from EGA Ts plants caused injury to human health and damage 
to many assets in the locality, the case ended in a compromise as EGAT has agreed to 
pay compensation to injured persons, and to relocate local people living away from the 
plants82 
76 The interview took place on 16 December 1996. 
JJ Thinapan Nakata and LikJlit Dhiravegin, 'Social and Cultural Aspects of Thai Polity '. at 185-6. 
78 Eugene C lark and Suwit Laohasiriwong, 'Thailand 's Quest for Sustainable Development' , The 
Australiall}ournal of Natural Resources La\Vand PoliCY, Vol. 3 No. 1, 1996, at 67. 
79 Chalinee Atthakornkowit. An Analrsis of Marketing Commullications Development and Practices in 
Thailandfrolll 1987 to 1991, A Master of AI1S in Communications thesis, the Universily of Canberra, at 
35-6. 
80 Douglas Tookey. 'Sou theast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: Leallling Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy', at 328. 
81 The interview lOok place on 9 Janumy 1997. 
" Sunee lVIallikamarl. Environmental LmJ' Enforcement. 1997. at 125_33. 81 The interview was conducted 
on 10 January 1997. 
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From the government point of view, the culture of compromise also has potential to 
undermine regulatory enforcement in which government officials playa key role. As Mr 
Somjai Nilsittanukroh pointed out during my fieldwork interview: 
Thai culture encourages people to be understanding and sympathetic. This concept is 
good but problems arise when strict enforcemcnt is required. Officials are always 
reluctant to be tough on people who broke the law because they could not afford an 
environmentally friendly teclmology83 
4. Individualism 
Studies show that most Thai people are freedom-loving 84 Ironically, the Thai attitude 
towards freedom has got out of control over time. This is evident in the saying among 
the Thai of "Doing whatever pleases one's mind is a genuine Thai trait,,85 
Perhaps misinterpretation of the above saying has made the Thai become self-centred. 
Some critics argue that most Thai people lack discipiineR6 and social responsibilitl 7 
Given this fact, one may suggest that the law, which is invented for the purpose of 
social control, be applied. Research has found that the Thai do not like to be forced 8R ; 
they do not like to be forced even by the law. As Mr Tinnawat Marukapitak, fOllner 
deputy minister of Public Heath, put it: 
To address environmental problem in Thailand, we cannot just rcly on the command and 
control approach. It is a culture of the Thai that they do not like to be forced by 
anyone S9 
Similarly, Dr Kittisak Prokati, ofThammasat University, Bangkok suggested: 
8) The interview was conducted on 10 JanualY 1997. 
84 Thinapan Nakata and Likhit Dhiravegin, 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroads: 
Learning Lessons from Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy' at 183. 
S5 Interview with Dr I-Iansa Sanguannoi on 10 JanuralY 1997. 
'6 . Lazy. lawless Thais did it themselves', Bangkok POSI. 27 September 1999. 
" Thinapan Nakata and LikJlit Dhiravegin. in SuchaJ1 Prasith-rathsint. ed .. Thailand's Narional 
Development: Social and Economic Backgro/lnd, 1989. at 183. See also 'We must sit down and think 
critically', Bangkok Post, I FeblUaJY 1999. 
88 Manas Sa-nguandeekul, 'Feedback from Private Sector towards Govenunent Policy on Envirorunental 
Management'. A Paper Presented in the Seminar, Industrial Development and EnvirOlunental 
Conservation. Cholburi. Thailand, 27 September 1996. 
89 The interview was conducted on 19 March 1998. 
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Law enforcement in Thailand has failed as a result of two main causes. These include 
lack of legal consciousness among the Thai. It appears that they perceive the law as an 
alien90 
For the purposes of this thesis, this phenomenon could lead to environmental regulatory 
failure as many Thai skirt environmental law9 1 According to Dr Hansa Sanguannoi, an 
advisor to the Bangkok Governor, 
Behaviour has obstructed the development of discipline, which is the first stage of 
so lving environmental problems?2 
5. Gratitude Culture 
Gratitude is one of the most prominent characteristics in Thai culture93 Perhaps this 
culture was invented to encourage the ethic of giving, which derives from a concept of 
Iwi thall9' in Buddhism. The Iwi than precept teaches people to know how to sacrifice 
and give things to othcrs. The Thai are taught to be euafeua pheua phae and mi nam 
jai, both of which mcan to be generous and willing to give.95 Equally importantly, a 
rcceiver is supposcd to have gratitude towards the giver. 
Wl1at is wrong with the gratitude culture? Despite the philosophy of gratitude, the 
culture could becomc an impediment to regulatory success. Obviously, the giving 
practice creates a patron-client relationsh ip between giver and taker. Wl1ile a patron 
provides assistance to a client, the client is then bound by gratitude to reciprocate to his 
or hcr patron. Studies show that gratitude could make the Thai forgo principle, and turn 
to prioritising personal obligation. For example, local people are inclined to put up with 
pollution generated from a plant where they or their relati ves work as they realise that 
90 The interview was undertaken on 10 February 1998. 
91 Dhira Phantumvanit, ' InfrastlUcture Development and Pollution Prevention Priorities', in American Bar 
Association, Proceedings oj£l1vironll1enla/ Priorilies in SOlilheasl Asian Narions, /997. at 92. 
92 The interview took place on 9 Janurary 1997. 
'1.1 Adul Wichienchareon , Svmposillll1 on Environmel1l and Cli/Iure willt Emphasis on Urban Issues, 1993 , 
at 9. 
94 The phrase iwi Iltan is a combination of Itai, a Thai word, meaning ' give' and Ihan, a Sanskrit word 
meaning 'gift'. 
95 See Patrick Jory, 'Corruption, the Virtue of Giving , and Thai Political Culture ' . in Proceedings of the 
Sixth Intemational Conference on Thai Studies , Chiengmai. Thailand, 1996, at 115. 
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repotiing to the authority will cause trouble to the employer who is considered their 
patron 96 
Take the case of qualTying in Saraburi , a province which is home to limestone, marble 
and other rock quarries. From 1989, a survey conducted by the Pollution Control 
Department (PCD) fo und that the level of rock dust was 120 micrograms per cubic metre 
over the standard. Following this finding, the Public Health Ministry's Occupational 
Health Division cond ucted a survey on health condit ions among teachers and students at 
the Napralan school, located in Napralan sub-di strict of the province, during the past few 
years. The study in 1996 revealed that three out of fo rty students and nine out of forty-
seven teachers had sili cosis, a kind of lung disease, which was caused by accumu lation 
of small particles ofdust. 97 
How did parents and school teachers react? So far, none of them have reported this 
situation to the authorities. As Mr Sompong Thoopwong, the school director, revealed, 
most parents were workers at the quarry plants themselves. They were worried that thcy 
would be unemployed if the plants were shut down . As for the teachers. evidence shows 
that consistent support from quan)' owners to the school is another reason why teachers 
were reluctant to report their ordeal to the government agency concerned. Anjira 
Assavanonda quoted Ms Suntri Sri-aram. a teacher at the Napralan schoo l, as sayi ng 
"nobody hcre wants to cause thcm (the quarries) trouble. The operators are kind to us. 
Our school can survive because of their help. Donations, teaching equipment and even 
anti-dust equ ipment such as face masks mostly come from them". 98 
Research has found that many firms manipulate the gratitude culture to work their way 
towards regulatory capture. In doing so, some finns often provide assistance to 
government regulators. This creates grat itude among regulators. who will feel reluctant 
to get tough on the donors when they violate the law99 
96 See Sunee Mallikamarl, 'An Aitelllative to Remedy Those Affected from Pollution Problems'. 
DIII/ap,,"a. 1996, at 103. 
97 Anjira Assavanonda. 'Quarry dust damages young lungs', Bal/gkok Post. 22 June 1998. 
98 Ibid. 
9" Amnat Wongbanclit. ' Laws Related to Factory's Wastewater Treatment', at 117. 
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Chapter 5 
The Problem of Corruption in Thailand 
Introduction 
Among the factors responsible for regulatory failure enumerated and discussed in the 
previous chapter is corruption. When corruption takes place, regulation , which is 
expected to work as a mechanism to maintain legitimacy and fairness in soc iety, is 
always forgone or distorted. For example, corrupt authorities connive at non-
compliance of regulated firms , which causes damaging consequences to people at 
large. Clearly, corruption creates inequality and threatens the basis of a democratic 
regime. 
This chapter examines how corruption undennines regulatory success. It begins by 
providing a bird's eye view of corruption at the global level before focusing on the 
situation in Thailand. The chapter also provides a number of case studies of corruption 
or unusual practices in the environmental context. These cases also epitomise the failure 
of Thai environmental regulation stemming from corruption: the central theme of the 
chapter. 
Defining Corruption 
Many scholars of sociology and political science conclude that it is not possible to 
provide a universally comprehensive definition of corruption. The reason is that 
corruption is not a scientific or mathematical formula which can be translated 
straightforwardly. Rather, what cOITuption is depends on the individual , on perception, 
and on the context. The definition of corruption may change not only with indivi dual s, 
but with circumstances. A kind of behaviour which is considered indecent in one 
situation may be acceptable in another context. For example, one does not condemn a 
Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration camp. I 
Susan Rose-Ackellnan , Corruption: A Stud" in Political Ecol1ollll'. t 978. See also John Gardiner, 
'Defi nin g COIl'uption' , in Maurice Punch et al. eds .. Coping wilh COI'I'up/ion ill ([ Borderless World. at 
27. 
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Despite the difficulties involved in definition, it is worthwhile to provide some different 
definitions of corruption in order to get a broad understanding of the phenomenon. [n 
the DictiollGlY of the Social Sciences of 1964, con'uption is defined as " ... the use of 
public power for private profit. . .in a way that constitutes a breach of law ... ,,2 Leslie 
Palmier states that such a definition applies not only to an official who takes the bribes 
to act or not to act, but to the one who does not take any bribe, but uses his office to 
enrich himself illegally. 
For'llls of COlTuption 
Many scholars point out that cOlTuption is neither a single fonn of behaviour nor a 
certain kind of conduct. It is the name of reciprocities among some people in some 
contexts at some times'" Various definitions of cOlTuption as we have seen above 
inevitably create confusing "pictures" of cOITuption. What kinds of practices are 
considered cOlTuption? How many fonns of cOlTuption are there altogether? Given that 
perception of con'uption could be subjective as already discussed, one might be 
disappointed at not receiving a satisfactory answer: it is not possible to conclude what 
the f0l111S of corruption are. However, the most common practices include bribery, 
extortion, state-bribery, and auto-corruption 4 
Bribery is the most ubiquitous f0l111 of corruption. According to this method, officials 
are paid to exercise their authority in favour of the paymasters. It is usually initiated 
either by officials who see their authority as the machine to make money, or by the 
people who are willing to pay the corrupt officials to "buy convenience" for their 
businesses. In this process, govel11ment officials convert their offices into private gain 
in Illany ways. For example, parliamentarians can sell their votes in important sessions 
such as censure debates. Bureaucrats sell their discretions over licenses, pennits, etc. 
Procurement officials expect kickbacks. Inspectors look to exto11 payoffs. S 
, See Leslie Palmier, The Contral of Bureaucratic Cormption: Case Studies in Asia, 1985. In his study, 
Palmier cited Aikin , who suggested the above definition in 1964. 
3 Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs, The PllrSllit of Absoillte Integriv: Hal\' Corruption ContralMakes 
Government Ineffective. 1996. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Heidenheimer. Amold, Michael Johnston , and Victor LeVine, eds. , Political Corruption , 1987. 
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Extortion is an attempt initiated by a powerful official with an aim to obtaining money 
or other valuables from the people concerned. It includes a threat that the services or 
permits from the government are unlikely to be provided. Such threats wi ll of course 
forcc people who want to recei ve services or pennits fi'om the governmcnt to respond to 
thc corrupt official's dcmand. 
State-bribery is an abuse of public resources or properti es for the purpose of political 
control or strengthening patronage. According to thi s kind of corruption, public 
resources or properti es are usually allocated to the cliqucs of corrupt officia ls. Auto-
corruption is the taking of public resources to an official's own coffers in any deals with 
which two or more partics are involvcd. For example, a corrupt official may award a 
contract to himself through a dummy company6 
J. Corntption and RegulatOl'y Failure 
"COITUptian is the main actor for regulatory fa ilure" (Dr Pasuk Phong Phaichitr) 7 
As prcviously di scussed, regulation is scen as a mediator to help solve social conflicts 8 
Yet it often fails when con'uption is involved. Clearly, corruption creates di scrimination 
among people to whom the same regulation applies9 Givcn that the main obj ecti ve of 
rcgulation is to control social bchaviour by means of equal treatment to people in the 
society, when discrimination takes place as a consequence of corruption , it disrupts the 
regul ato ry goal. 
A. Overview of Corntption Internationally 
Corruption is not a novel phenomenon, nor is it limited to certain places. Indeed, 
corruption was complained about in the Bible over three thousand years ago. 'O At 
6 Sakkarin Niyol11silpa. The Political Econom." of Telecommunications Liberalisation in Thailalld, Ph D 
thesis. The Australian National University. 1995. at 181. 
7 Interview with Dr Pasuk PhongPhaichitr on 22 January 1998. 
8 Neal Shover, Donald Clelland and John Lynxwiler, Enforcemel1l or Negotiation: Constructing a 
Regulator" Bureaucracl', 1986. at 9. 
9 Jan T inbergen, 'Soc ial Integrity in the New World Order' , in Maurice Punce et ai, eds., Coping H'itlt 
Corruption in a Borderless World, at 105 . 
10 Henry Bosch. 'G rowing threat of intemational colTtlption '. The Jakarta Post. 30 September 1997. 
6 1 
present, cOITuption is being identified as a major impediment to the administration of 
justice and the achievement of development, which exists both in developed and 111 
developing countries. I I Against thi s background, scholars have suggested that 
corruption should be not only watched closely, but addressed at the international level. " 
Consistent with the above suggestion, corruption has received a great deal of attention 
from international institutions such as the World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).1 3 
As for the World Bank, evidence shows that its most recent report focuses on the 
problem of corruption and demonstrates that conuption has extremely damaging effects 
on economic development." 
Also, cOITUption has bcen a subject of discussion among OECD countries. In the 
convcntion held in early 1998, twenty-nine members of OECD countries and five others 
attcnding the convention have agreed that blibing any forcign official is no longer 
busi ness as usual. Rather. it is a crime. IS The OECD Convention has come into effect 
since 15 February 1999 16, requiring the thirty four signatories to employ the provision 
of the convention in their domestic laws. 17 The enforcement of the convention's rules 
includes the criminal prosecution and the imposition of heavy penalties on both 
corporations and indi viduals guilty of a violation. 
Extensivc studies show that transnational bribery is pervasive within international trade 
regimes. IS Against this background, WTO has planned to embark on negotiation with 
regard to the issues of transparency, openness, and due process in government 
procurement practices among WTO members. 19 This could readily be applied to the 
particular area of environmental problem such as pollution. 
" See ~ laurice Punch in Maurice Punch et al .. eds., Coping lI'ith Cormption ill a Borderless World, 1992. 
at 15. 
"See Daniel Kadlac, 'Corrupti on: The Facls ', Foreign Polic.". 1997, at 114. 
[) See Ibrahim Shihata, 'ColTuption - A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank ' . Dickinson Journal o/ll1Iernational Lall ', 1997, at 468-71. 
14 The World Bank, The World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World,1997. 
15 Michael Hershman, 'A blow against bribery'. The Financial Times (US Edilion). 23 FeblUary 1998. at 
14. 
16 Kowit Sanandang. 'Bribes are the bane of society', Bangkok Post. 16 October 1999. 
17 Stephen Silber QC, 'New Defmilions to Root OUI COllllption', The Times . 3 March 1998. 
18 Philip Nichols. 'COlTuption in the World Trade Organisation: Disceming the Limits of the World Trade 
Organisation's Authority', Nell' York JOll/'l1al a/International LalV and Politics, 1996, at 713. 
" Steven Salbu. ' BribelY in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign CUlTent COlTlipt 
Practice Act'. Washingtoll & Lee Lall' Reviell'. 1997. at 235. 
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Sudden and vigorous attacks on corruption however have not necessaril y served to 
reduce the recurrence of the phenomenon. Many studies show that corruption has long 
ex isted in the U.S .'o Not long ago. research found that, during the eight-year Reagan 
Administration. over one hundred federal officials were either indicted or convicted of 
corruption. Most recently, several members of President Clinton's adm inistrati on, 
including Agriculture Secretary Mike Epsy and fonner Associate Attorney General 
Webster Hubbell , have been charged with cotTUption .'1 
Elsewhere, several ministers in the U. K. had to resign on charges of CotTuption with 
which business interests were involved. In Italy, a Milan businessman who had been 
awarded a contract to clean a municipal nursing home disclosed that he was forced to 
pay a ten per cent kickback to the politi cian who oversaw the contract. As a result, the 
accused politician was found guilty by the Magistrate of Milan. This case triggered a 
crack-down on cOlTuption across Italy. Subsequent extensive investi gations found that 
around 40,000 governmcnt officials might have been invo lved in all kinds of con"Uption. 
FUl1hcr, as many as 200,000 bureaucrats, businessmen , and politicians were subject to 
chargcs. It was also estimated that in 199 1 alone, up to 15 per cent of the nation's $ 100 
billion budget defi cit was siphoned off as kickback money in Italy." 
Although cOlTuption has been found in both developed and developing countries, many 
)' 
scholars argue that corruption tends to be more pervasive in developi ng countries.-' 
This is evident from a survey conducted by Transparency Intemati onal (TI) , the Berlin-
based organisation dedicated to attacking graft. In 1999, TI ranked the 99 surveyed 
countries on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (very con·upt). Important ly, the survey 
found that the top ten COITUpt countries are developing ones, the worst being Cameroon 
(1.5), Nigeria (1.6), Indonesia (1.7) , Azerbijan (1.7), Uzbekistan(1. 8), Honduras (1.8) , 
'0 Examples include the 1922 Teapot Dome scandal. In this case, Albert Bacon Fall , the Secretary of tile 
Tn terior, was convicted fo r accepting a bribe from two companies in exchange for granting the rights to 
drill oil in the Navy's oil reserves. Regrellably, cOllupti on even involved those who were supposed 10 
render justice. In 1939. Judge Martin T. Manton was convicted of bribery for accepting money from 
litigants to 'fL,(' cases. See Maurice Punch. Emile Kolthoff. Kees van der Vijver and Bram van Vliet, 
Coping with Corruption in a Borderless World. Proceedings of the Fifth Intelllational Anti-COITUption 
Conference, 1992. at 565-8 for greater detai ls. 
" Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs. The Pursuil of Absolute Inlegrill", at 10-11. 
n Pasuk PhongPhai chitr and Sungsidh Piri yarangsan, COlTuplion and Democrac1' in Thailand, 1994. at i-
ii. 
)J Ledivina Carino and A.T. R. Rahman, 'Negati ve Bureaucratic Behavior and Development: An 
lmroduclion to a Seven-Nat ion Research Project ' . in Carino. ed .. Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia, at 1. 
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Tanzania (1.9), Yugoslavia (2), Paraguay (2), and Kenya (2). Thailand is ranked 68 th 
(3.2) in this survey24 
More specifi ca lly to Asian region , TI ranked Indonesia as the most corrupt country, 
followed by Vietnam and Thailand. 25 This survey is a prominent indi cation showing 
how seri ous the problem of corruption in Thailand has been. 
B. Corruption in Thailand 
One of the fundamental problems facing any attempt to outlaw cOlTuption in Thailand is 
that fonns of bchaviour which are regarded now as corrupt have been previously 
regarded for centLllies as a n0Jl11al and understandable part of the whole admini strati ve 
system. As Uthai Hiranto postulates, corruption is a common practice in Thailand 26 
Several studi es suggcst that there are two major catcgories of corruption in Thail and: 
bureaucratic co rruption and political corrupti on27 , both of which playa significant rolc 
in undermining regulatory success in the country, including that related to 
environmental regulation. 
1. Bureaucratic Corruption 
Likc many other democratic countries, Thailand empowers bureaucracy substantially to 
implement applicable laws as well as national policies. In doing so, many offi cials are 
easil y tempted to conupt behaviour due to thc ro le of decision makcrs who provide 
serviccs to people. Hence, they are susceptible to being dragged into a vicious circle of 
cOlTupti on because there are many people who are wi lling to "buy conveni ence" from 
the officials in exchange for fast services, especially where the resources are limi ted 2 8 
"'Thailand ranked 68th in palm grease poll ', Bangkok Post, 27 October 1999. 
15 'The Corruption and the Free' , Bangkok Post , 18 November 1999. 
16 See Ut hai Hiranto, c ited Sutton in Civil Selv{lI1ts: Why Corruption? 1962. at 49-50. Notably, this 
view has been endorsed by many critics and confinl1ed by my fieldwork interviews. For example, Dr 
John Yeates, an envirOlUl1ental consultant who was working in Thailand for almost two years pointed out 
that : COtTltption has become nonnal practice in Thailand '. The interview was conducted on 25 November 
1996. 
" Pasuk PhongPha ichitr and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan. Corruption and Democrac), in Thai/and, at 2. 
28 Pasuk PhongPhaichitr and Chris Baker. THAILAND: Economl' and Politics. 1995 , at 235-7. 
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At present, bureaucratic con-uption remains not only a widespread phenomenon , but an 
inescapable aspect of life in Thailand. But many government officials do not perceive 
corruption as wrongdoing. As Mr Klanarong Jantik, Secretary-general of the Counter 
CotTuption Commission put it: 
Widespread conuption makes officials get used to it, and do not think it is wrong. Take 
the bribery case in which [ and police have atTested a COtTUpt policeman recently. The 
corrupt officer asked the wife of an offender in a theft case to give him 10,000 baht in 
exchange for setting the offender free. Amazingly, this bribery case occurred in the 
police stat ion. Indeed, it is apparent that many bribery cases take place in the police 
stations where a number of police are working in the same room. This shows that 
cortuption is done openly among government officials. What I think is very dangerous 
is that many officials do not think corruption is illegal. This leads to familiarity with 
corruption in the end 29 
So far, many complaints have been submitted to the Nat ional Counter Corruption 
Commission (NCCC)3o, the government agency responsible for combating corruption. 
Among these complaints, there are cases involving all leve ls of bureaucrats from 
. . 31 
va rIOUS agenctes. 
29 Tbe interview took place on 9 March 1998 . 
. 10 The National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) was established under the 1997 Constitution to 
replace tbe now-dissolved Counter COlluption Commission (CCC). The organic law empowering the 
NCCC to do its job has just been passed on 18 November 1999. The NCCC has assumed all the CCC's 
responsibilities. thus taking over all the work pending under the CCC's investigation. 
]1 [n 1996 alone. there were 1,497 complaints submitted to the CCc. Among these, officials from 
Ministry ofInterior had the most complaints with 479 cases . while those in the Ministry of Justice were 
least complained about with 3 cases. See Counter Conuption Commission, Annual Repor11996, at 35-41 
for furtber details. 
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2. Political Corruption 
Political corruption is a tenn used when politicians either by themselves or in 
collaboration with bureaucrats abuse their power and authority for private gain32 
Political cOITuption surfaced long after bureaucratic corruption. This is because 
democracy was introduced in Thailand for the first time after absolute monarchy was 
abolished in 1932. With the emergence of independent politicians, corruption soon 
followed. 
Thai Regulation dealing with political corruption (prior to the emergence of the 
National Counter Corruption Commission on 18 Novembel'1999) 
Despite the pervasiveness of both bureaucratic and political corruption, most relevant 
regulations in Thailand nevertheless focus on bureaucratic corruption. For example, the 
1956 Criminal Code contains several provisions dealing with misconduct and 
iITegularities among govemmcnt officials33 However, although the Code was enacted 
in 1956, which was the time Thailand had the national parliament, it has contributed 
only one section to political corruption34 It is arguably an example of politicians using 
their self-interest to avoid criminalising themselves. 
Although the CCC was established as an agency which dealt with corruption in 
Thailand since 1975, its jurisdiction was limited under the relevant law to dealing with 
bureaucratic corruption only35 
Previous attempts to combat political corruption: A story of failure 
Despite the lack of legislation to weed out political cOlTuption, an attempt to topple 
corrupt politicians emerged without regulatory suppot1. It was a coup d'etat that 
32 Louge (1988), cited in Sakkarin Niyomsilpa, The Political Econol11v of Telecol11munications 
Libcralisation in Thailand, at 181. 
]] See sections 147-166; 200-205 of the Thai Criminal Code. 
34 Section 149 provides that "Any official; legislative member; member of provincial council: member of 
municipality council who has asked for; received; agreed to receive any assets or benefits for himself or 
anyone else illegally, in order to conduct or not conduct any action which is under his authority, whether 
or not the action is legal, such person shall be subject to an imprisonment of five to twenty years. or life 
imprisonment, plus a fine as from two thousand baht to fOliy thousand baht, or execution". 
15 See the 1975 Prevel1lion and Suppression of Corruption and Misconduct among Civil Servall1S Act, 
Sections 3,13,17. 
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provided an opportunity to improve the status quo . The revolution was conducted by 
the National Peace-Keeping Council (hereinafter NPKC), which justified its action as a 
way to save the country from the chronic political cOITuption which pelmeated 
Thailand's quasi-democratic regime at the time. The N PKC toppled the government 
under the premiersh ip of General Chatichai Choonhavan in February 1991 3 6 
Ousting corrupt politicians rrom their offices was not the ultimate goal of the coup 
d'etat. The NPKC also appointed the Asset Examination Committee (hereinafter AEC) 
to investigate the unusual wealth of the alleged COITUpt politicians, as well as the 
sources of their assets. After a long investigation , the AEC found that there were ten 
politicians who were unusually rich and accordingly imposed orders to confiscate their 
assets, the sources of which were illegal. Not surprisingly. these politicians included the 
fonner Prime Minister, General Chatichai Choonhavan. The total amount of assets 
confiscated from the ten politicians was around two billion baht37 
However, the attempt of NPKC to eliminate COITUpt politicians finally failed when the 
defendants submi tted a motion to the Court of Justice to revoke the confiscation order 
imposed by the AEC. Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the NPKC's order No. 
26, whi ch appointed the AEC, was against the 1991 COllstitution (which was passed in 
the reign of Prime Minister Anan Panyarachoon in 1991) which stated that the power to 
hear and render verdicts on the cases belonged to the cOLll1. As a result, the AEC's order 
to confiscate the defendants' assets (which the Supreme Court considered as a kind of 
verdict) was held to be against the constitution and therefore voidable. 38 Importantly, 
however. although the ten defendants were free from assets confiscation according to 
the Supreme C0U11 order, it should be noted that the Supreme COLll1 did not say that 
they were not corrupt. 
.16 The Chatichai government was notorious for cOlluption. The govelllrnent was dubbed the "buffet 
cabinet". which reflected the increasingly widespread cOlluption among political authorities at the time. 
Soon after coup d'tal. NPKC appointed Mr Anan Panyarachoon. a fornler diplomat-milled-businessman. 
as the Prime Minister. 
.1 7 POlllsak Pongpaew el al .. 80cll' of KI70lriedge on the Cormption in Thai Governmenl Service, A rep0I1 
submitted to the Counter COlluption Commission. 1996. at 281-9. 
18 Ibid. at 290-7. 
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Establishment of the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC): anothel' 
attempt to fight against political cOlTuption 
As di scussed above, CCC lacked power to deal with political comlption. Against thi s 
backdrop, there has been an attempt to improve the law to enable the agency to do so . 
The attempt took place when the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CD A) was set up 
during the Bamharn administration in 1996 in order to improve the ailing situation of 
Thai politics by changing the Thai constitution. 
CDA tirelessly drafted thc new constitution to supersede the old one and completed its 
task within nine months. The new constitution also includes the provisions aimed at 
combating political corruption. These include repl acing the Counter Conuption 
Commi ssion (CCC) which did not have power to tackle political cOITuption with the 
National Counter-ColTuption Commi ssion (NCCC); and a mandate that all politicians 
who hold cabinet posts must declare their assets to the NCCC upon taking up and 
leaving offices. Another important issue prescribed in the new constitution is that any 
MP who is appointed a minister must resign his or her MP status. Thi s is to separate 
admini strative from legi slative power to encourage checks and balances, which will in 
tum help prevent political con-uption through the parli amentary system 39 
After the cUlTent Constitution came into effect in 1997, the organic law legally 
cstabli shing the NCCC was passed on 18 November 1999. The NCCC is equipped with 
substantial power to deal with both bureaucratic and political corruptions. Such power 
includes to have senior goverrunent official s, as well as cabinet mini sters, declare their 
assets within 30 days after taking up their posts, every three years during their tenure, 
and immediately after leaving the posts40 The NCCC is al so empowered to impound 
the assets of thosc accused of corruption to prevent them changing hands during 
invcsti gations. 
19 The changes according to the new constiru tion, which is the national comprehensive law, wi ll not come 
into effect unless organ ic laws which include the new Ami·Corruption Act (whi ch wi ll supercede the 
existing 1975 Prevention and Suppression of Corruption and Misconduct among Civil Ser\'{/Ilts Act). and 
the new Parliam ent Act (which will replace the ex isting Parliament Act) are promul gated. These organics 
laws are being drafted by the Senate at present as a part of the law·making process . 1 t is expected that the 
organ ic laws will be passed by the parliament soon. 
40 Mongkol Bangprapa. 'Graft agency aims at public office· holders' . Bangkok Post. 19 November 1999. 
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Another crucial power enabling the NCCC to weed out corruption among government 
officials is that the NCCC's suggestions must be observed. In the past, when CCC 
found that there were sufficient grounds to conclude that an accused official had been 
in volved in cOITuption or misconduct, the case would be submitted to the Plime 
Minister to acknowledge and send the case to the direct boss of the suspect to take 
disciplinary action. However, the agency to which the suspect belonged might disagree 
with the CCC's suggestions, and clear the suspect of the charge. Under the NCCC's 
law, the ageney concerned must mete out di sciplinary action against the suspect if the 
NCCC discovers evidence of cOITuption 41 
II. COrt"uption and Failure of Envi,·onmental Regulation 
Although regulation has been a key mechanism used to pro tect the environment, the 
goa ls of environmental regulation cannot be achieved where corruption is involved. A 
centra l question arises: how does corruption become involved in environmental issues? 
For the purposes of thi s thesis, there are two main factors responsible for con·uption: 
di scretion and opportunities arising from environment-related proj ects. 
A. Corruption and discretion 
A dilemma for regulatory design is that discretion seems essential to relieve the 
stringency and rigidity of law yet at the same time, discretion provides considerable 
opportunities for abuse by enforcement officials, and can result in regulatory 
ineffecti veness. As Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan point out, the ri sks involved in 
di scretion include unpredictability, and unequal treatment, and a high risk of 
corruption42 In thi s context, a set of questions arises: on what basis do the authoriti es 
misuse their discretion? Why does thi s basis differ fi·om one authOlity to another? And 
how does discretion end up in corruption? 
In the context of enforcing environmental regulation, discretion is commonly used in 
ways favo urable to the regulated. This can happen at a ll levels of the bureaucratic 
system. In this case, many people tend to 'give' money or other benefits to the officials 
41 Ibid . 
41 Eugene Bardach and Rober Kagan. Going b" the book: The Problem of RegulatorI' Unreasonableness, 
I 982, a t 34-5. 
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in power in exchange for favourable di scretion given to them. This is particularly the 
case where resources, services , permits, or licences are limited 43 In Thailand, where 
bureaucratic cotTuption is widespread as discussed earl ier, there is a tendency for 
envi ronmental enforcement to be seri ously hampered by COITuption, through the misuse 
of di scretion by officials-in-charge44 Such misuse of di scretion leads to the failure of 
cnvironmental regulation in the situations discussed below. 
1. Discretioll at the illspectioll level 
Most corruption cases occur at this stage in a " rent-seeking" fashion. Theodore 
Panayotou argues that rent-seeki ng corruption is facilitated by the rigid and tough 
language written into the laws, which catTy the threat of puni shment to the 
wrongdoers45 While stringent regulation makes regulators look powerful , such 
di scretion creates an atmosphere of negotiation because the stri ct imposition of thc 
regulation would appear wholly unreasonable, not only to those regulated, but often to 
politicians, third parties and indeed to regulators themselves (it mi ght for example, 
prove sufficient to close the business entirely).46 Regulated firms are therefore tempted 
to "approach" the regulato rs for discretion favourable to them. Clearly, these integrated 
factors, stringent regul ation and di scretion, help make the rent-seeking successful. 
Given that corruption usually occurs by mutual agreement between a "giver" and a 
"taker", it is difficult to find hard evidence of cOlTupti on cases. However, there are 
some indications which "infer" unreasonableness and irregularities in the pcrfonnance 
of officials. For example, it seems to be a common practice that inspectors call the 
fi1111 s before their visit. Although the reason for such prior notification cannot be 
conclusively stated, it might be a result of cotTuption or co-operation, or something 
more innocent such as to ensure that a meal would be prepared for them 47 
43 Michael Johnston. 'Co lTl'ption, Inequality and Change'. in Peter Ward, ed .. Corruption, Development 
and Inequality, 1989. at 18-23. 
44 See Theodore Panayotou, ' Problems in environmental management in developing countries', in DECD 
Documents: Economic ll1strument/or Environmental Managem ent in Developing Countries, 1993. at 25. 
45 Ibid. See also Eric Orts, . Reflex ive Environmental Law', in Northwesrern University Law Review, 
(1995), at 1227. 
46 Cass Sunstein , 'Constituti onalism after the New Deal', Harvard Lal!' Review, 1987, at 448-51. See also 
Eugene Badach and Robert Kagan, 1982, at 34-5. 
4J Ne il Gunningham. 'Nego tiated Non-Compli ance: A Case Study of Regulatory Failure'. Law & PoliC\'. 
1987.at 79. 
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The case of non-compliance which has occurred and continued regardless of applicable 
regulation and public outcry is another indication of unreasonableness and irregulariti es 
among regulators-in-charge. The Mab Ta Phut air pollution case discussed in Chapter 3 
is a good example. 
As in many other corruption cases, although it is difficult to find clear evidence to prove 
that cOlTIlption was involved in thi s case, the facts that the disaster had continued for 
over one year without any action from relevant authorities to improve the situation, and 
a rumour that the factories were prepared to take the officials and media abroad in order 
to buy their acquiescence48 , are salient indications that COITuption was invo lved in this 
case in one way or another. 
2. Discretion at the pre-trial level 
If non-compliance is found by an inspection, the case is usually passed to a pre-trial 
process for investigation and prosecution. Discretion is nevertheless involved in the 
process at both levels49 Quite how this discretion will be exercised can vary 
dramatically from country to country. This can be illustrated by comparing the USA 
with Thailand. 
Studies show that in the US, discretion has been used as an "incentive" to encourage 
compliance among regulated entities. This strategy is applicable at the investigation, 
prosecution and sentencing50 At the investigation level, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has recentl y issued a guideline for the use of discret ion in investigating 
environmental cases. According to the EPA's Director of Criminal Enforcement, the 
EPA will use its discretion in mitigation of cases where they find that the regulated 
" ' Pollution in Mab Ta Phut', Thai Rat, II July 1997. 
49 In add ition to in vest igat ion and prosecution, discretion is also embedded in the stage of sentencing. See 
Gregor Mcgregor, Environmental Lml' and Enforcement, 1994. at 106 and Peter Menell and Richard 
Stewart, Environmental LalV and Folic)'. 1994. at 543 for more details. 
50 Eric Orts, at 1278-84. . 
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entities have conducted self-monitoring, self-auditing, self-disclosure and self-
correction. 51 
At the prosecution level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has simi larly issued a 
guideline, empowering prosecutors to consider the facts that the offenders have 
conducted self-auditing, self policing and voluntary disclosure of envirorunental 
vio lations as mitigating factors. These factors will enable the prosecutors to exercise 
their discretion to adopt a compliance approach instead of legalistic one.52 The use of 
discretion at the prosecution level has been suppot1ed, from a different perspective, by 
Christine Wettach. She argues that in criminal cases, prosecutorial discretion can help 
protect individuals who make honest effot1s to comply with the law from facing criminal 
liabi lity. She addresses the US Clean Water Act (CWA) to justify her argument, adding 
that many conditions associated with environmental permits under CWA are relatively 
complex and difficult to understand and obey, thus causing regulated individuals and 
agencies to make errors such as miscalculation. She then concludes that the discretionary 
provisions under CW A which empower prosecutors to drop the cases if they consider 
there is no mens ,.ea involved, wi ll help distinguish good entities who committed 
offences without intent from the hard-headed recalcitrants who always contemplate non-
compliance53 
Thus in the USA, considerabl e effotis have been made to nurture the creative and 
constructive use of discretion, enabling the regulatory unreasonableness implicit in the 
strict application of regulations, to be considerably mitigated through a clearly 
structured set of guidelines for the use of that discretion. 
But when we turn to the use of discretion in Thailand, we find a very different picture. 
Cetiainly very considerable discretion exists in the Thai legal system. Thailand's pre-
trial process is handled by police and public prosecutors. After an investigation is 
complete, a police investigator will hand over the case to a public prosecutor together 
with his suggestion as to whether the case should be prosecuted. However, the 
prosecutor need not comply with the police's suggestion. He is empowered to either 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
51 Christine Wetach, 'Mens Rea and the 'Heightened Criminal Liability' Imposed on Violators of the 
Clean Water Act', Siandford Em'ironmental Lall' Journal, 1996. at 398-9. 
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agree or disagree to such a suggestion 54 On what is police action and prosecutorial 
determination based? The Thai criminal procedure code stipulates that both police and 
prosecution have to base their suggestion and detennination on evidence in the case. Yet 
it does not specity how convincing the evidence should be in making a suggestion and 
detennination respectively in the case. Thus it leaves room for both agencies to use their 
discretion, especially when the evidence can be decided either way: prosecution or non-
prosecution. 
While discretion at the investigation and prosecution level can encourage voluntary 
compliance as discussed above in the case of the USA, on the other hand it has the 
potential to undennine regulatory success as well as to affect the institutions concerned, 
if the process is pell11eated with corruption. And for the reasons described in the 
preceding sections, such conllption is rifc in the case of investigation and prosccution in 
Thailand. Rather than reiterating the discussion in the previous sections, the severity of 
corruption in the case of environmental regulation at pre-trial level can be most 
graphically illustrated by a study of the case of land rights ref0ll11 which resulted in a 
col lapse of the Thai government recently. 
Thailand promulgated the 1975 Lalld Reform for Agriculture ActS5 to help so lve the 
deforestation problem 56 According to this law, the Office of Land Refonn for 
Agriculture was established as the implementing agency whose responsibilities include 
allocating the rights to use public land to entitled people. Significantly, the law 
54 A Thai prosecutor is also empowered to order police to conduct further investigation if he considers the 
evidence in the case submitted to him is not sufficient to make a prosecution or non-prosecution order. 
See the Thai Criminal Procedure Code, Section 143. 
55 The main purposes of this Act were to help the falmers who did not have land to live on; to legitimise 
those who had encroached on the national reserve forests; and to protect the forests from future 
encroachment. 
S(, It is widely known that deforestation has been a chronic problem in Thailand for many decades. 
Research found that in 1961. the fo rested areas were 53.33 per cent of the whole country's area. Fifteen 
years later. the forest has continued to decrease. Most recently, the repol1 on the forestry situation ill the 
year 1995 revealed that the forested areas remaining in Thailand amounted to as little as 25.6 per cent of 
the total land area of the country. For more detail. see Office of Environmental Policy and Planning. 
Annl/al Report onlhe EI1I·ironll1ental Ql/alill' Sill/alioll 1994. at 188. 
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stipulates that only fallllers who did not have the land to make a living are entitled to 
receive land. The farmers to whom the land rights are allocated will receive the land 
right certificate (known as Sor. Por. Kor. 4-0 I) to ensure their rights on specifically 
allocated lands. 
However, in 1994, Mr Suthep Tueksuban, the fOllller Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
overseeing the land right allocation projects, was heavily criticised by thc media and the 
public tor involving in cOITuption in relation to the projects5 7 The scandal came to 
light when the media found that among those who received land rights in Phuket58 were 
fifteen millionaires whose qualifications did not meet the requirements set forth under 
the applicable Act59 This unusual practice clearly created inequality among people and 
was contrary to thc regulatory objectivc. 
The scandal triggered a censure debate in the parliament fi.-om the opposition parties. 
Not only politicians, but many people, including the media, accused Mr Suthep of 
corruption. The scandal became one of the major causes which resulted in the collapse 
ofthc fonner Prime Minister Chuan Lcekpai's govelllment. Not surpri singl y, Mr Chuan 
had announced his rcsignation in thc parliament before the debate was complete. 
Subsequently, Mr Suthep, along with the fOllller cabinet members who approved the 
land right allocation project, and three pellllancnt land officials involved in 
administrative work were accused of malpractice by allocating the land rights to those 
57 Mr SUlhep was also an MP from the Democrats. the same political party as Mr Chuan Leekpai. the 
Thai Prime Minister at the time. 
58 Phuket is a province in the south of Thailand. The province is not only a touri st destination because of 
its exqu isite beaches, but a place which comains many lucrative natural resources such as palms, and ores. 
Thus, there are a number of wealthy busi nessmen in Phuket. 
5" The Green World Foundation , El1virol7lllel1ral Siluation in Thailand, at 100-10. 
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who were not entitled to them 60 Moreover, the fifteen millionaires were accused of 
pet jury by informing the government officials that they were "fanners" and did not have 
sufficient lands to make a living, thus being entitled to recei ve the land rights. 
The investigations were then conducted by the police. After the cases had been handed 
over to the Office of the Attorney General in 1996, Dr Kanit Nanakorn, the Attomey 
General at the time, rendered non-prosecution orders to all offenders in all charges. He 
justified hi s non-prosecutorial order on the grounds that all the cabinet ministers merely 
did their job by pushing pernlanent officials to speed up the process in response to 
government policy. As for the three land officials and fifteen millionaires, the f0l111er 
Attorney General explained that the fifteen millionaires misunderstood that they were 
entitled to the land rights because they had occupied the land before submitting their 
appl ications, while the land officials just believed the statements from the fifteen 
millionaires and consequently, suggested that the land rights be issued to them. 
The reasoning of the non-prosecution order with regard to the three land officials and 
fifteen millionaires drew many criticisms from the public. The millionaires had perjured 
themselves in making statements to the land officials that they were fanners, because 
they must have known that they were not. Similarly, the excuses made by the three land 
officials that they issued the land ri gh ts to the millionaires because they had believed 
their statements have also been heavily criticised. How cou ld the officials rely on the 
app licants' statements without checking their qualifi cations as required by the law" 
This led to another question: what made the fonner Attol11ey General believe that the 
statements made by the three land officials and millionaires were true and let them go 
free? 
60 It is notable that Mr Suthep Tueksuban was not accused of corruption owing to lack of hard evidence 
on such an offence. 
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The media also di scovered that one of the fifteen millionaires who received the land 
ri ghts was Dr Kanit's sister-in-I aw61 Despite lack of hard evidencc of cOnl.lption, 
scepticism about the basis for the non-prosecution order was such that the then Deputy 
Director General of the Police Department, General Salang Boonnag, lodged a 
complaint to the now-defunct Counter-Corruption Commission (CCC) to take action 
against the fOllller Attoilley General on a con-uption charge. The cOITuption case is, at 
the time of writing, under the investigation of the NCCC, the new agency established 
under the 1997 COl/stitution to supersede the CCC in dealing with cOlTuption, which has 
taken over all the corruption cases from the old agency. 
3. Discretion at sentencing level 
Again, the dangers of discretion in the Thai context can be highlighted by contrasting it 
with the position in the USA and the UK. In the USA, Collin Munro points out that the 
courts have been accustomed to enjoying broad discretion, associated with their 
extcnsive independence in making decisions on what sentences to imposc on convicted 
offcnders62 Judicial discretion however posed many problems. As a result, the US 
Congress has established the Federal Sentencing Commission to address the 
unpredictability and extensive judicial discretion which paralysed federal sentencing63 
The commission has also been considering the issue of new environmental sentencing 
guidelines for organisations. 6-l The new guidelines will empower the c0U11s to use their 
discrction in considering environmental auditing and management as detenninants to 
impose lenient penalties on the regulated finns. 
In the United Kingdom, studies show that although the government strongly supported 
judicial independence and the judiciary's sentencing discretion, a number of measures to 
limit the judicial discretion were introduced. Thcse included restrictions on custodial 
6 1 Niyom Ti wutanon, ·Sor. Por. Kor. 4-0 I: the main cause of deforestation'. The Creen World, 
November-December 1996. a l 84-86. 
6' Collin Munro. 'Judicial Independence and Judicial Functi ons ', Sentencing. Judicial Discretion and 
Training, 1992, at 13. 
6.1 Jed Racoff, cited in Jaso n Lemki.ns, 'Deterring Environmental Crime through Flexible Sentencing: A 
Proposal for the New Organizational Environmental Sentencing Guidelines'. Califomia La1\" Review, 
1996, a1312. 
64 US Sentencing Commission Advisory Panel. cited in Eric 011S, at 1281 
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sentences for young offenders which came into force in 198265 Such measures reflected 
concerns about misuse of the judicial discretion. 
In Thailand, many pieces of legislation empower the court to excli discretion in 
sentencing, but without any of the sorts of constraints that have developed in the US and 
thc UK. The discretion bestowed in Thailand includes discretion in suspending the jail 
sentence. Specifically. the Thai Criminal Code provides that if the court has decided to 
convict the defendants for a period of not over two years, the couli is entitled to 
commute such jail sentence to a suspension of imprisonment for a period of not over five 
years. This entitlement is contingent upon the defendant never having bcen convicted. 
The cOUli must also take into account age, criminal record. behaviour, wisdom, 
education, health, state of mind, occupation and environment of the defendants.66 
Howcver, the above provision is not compulsory so the COUliS need not commute a jail 
sentence on defendants to a suspension in every case which meets the requirements 
stipulated in such provision. Rather, it leaves an opportunity for the courts to exercise a 
wide discretion. Obviously, this kind of discretion is unprcdictable and given the extent 
of systemic corruption described in the preceding sections of this chapter, is commonly 
seriously misused and abused. As a rcsult it commonly produces outcomcs which are 
against the government policies and public opinion, and which seriously undermine 
regulatory effectiveness. 
Again, rather than repeating the material in the previous sections on the type and extent 
of cOITuption in Thailand, we use a case study to provide a clear picture of how judicial 
discretion impinges on regulatory effectiveness. In June 1996, two Thais and fivc 
Koreans illegally poached and killcd bears67, which are protected animals under the 
1992 lVildlife Conservation and Protection Act. The incident took place in a forest of 
Chainat6 8 Clearly, the poaching and killing of the protected wildlife were both illegal 
and against the Thai government's policies to protect the environment and natural 
65 Andrew Ashw0l1h, 'The Criminal Ju stice Acl 1991', Sentencing, Judicial Discretion and Training, 
Bangkok. 1992. at 77. 
66 See the 1956 Thai Crimina! Code. Section 56. 
67 The reason they killed the bears was because they wan led 10 cut off their paws to eat with Chinese 
herbs. They, like some other people, believed that eating both paws mingled with suc h herbs would cure 
some illness and at the same time make them healthy. It is rea lly tragic that they killed the bears just to 
eat their paws. 
68 Chainat is a province in the central region of Thailand. Most of its area is still wild. 
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resources. However, the Chainat provincial court, after having convicted the defendants 
with two years imprisorunent, used its discretion to commute a jail sentence to a 
suspcnsion of imprisonment, although the applicable law stated that the defendants were 
subject to an impri sonment of up to four years. This was despite public demand, asking 
the court to convict the defendants with maximum penalties69 
What are the judicial criteria set out to impose on defendants accused of the same 
charges in differcnt cases? And what are the judicial critelia on which to award the 
suspension of a jail sentence to the defendants? Such criteria seem unlikely to be 
established because they will be against the independence of the judiciary. Clearly, the 
unpredictable di scretion still remains to create unceliainty of regulatory enforcement. 
Questions also arise: how can we be sure that judicial discretion is not made on the basis 
of corruption? What will happen to the society if people no longer believe in the 
discretion and then resort to handling the cases by themselves such as by adopting "an 
eye for an eye" principle? Unrestricted discretion, which is susceptible to corruption, is 
conducive to regulatory failure, as well as social disaster. 
B. 0ppol·tunities arising fl'om development 
As many scholars suggcst, cOITuption tends to be more prevalent in developing 
countries. 7o One of the most impoliant tasks of governments in many such countries is 
to accelerate development tlu-ough the introduction of large capital-intcnsive projects. 
Most such projects involve extremely high budgets, including those related to gigantic 
environmental management projects. 
What is the relationship between expensive projects and corruption? As Jan Tinbergen 
argues, the occasion may make the thier,ll Given that political authorities are usually 
involved in the dccision-making process of large development projects, the 
opportunities for corruption are great. 72 According to Hemy Bosch , grand corruption 
occurs when large payments are made to people in power to get things done that would 
69 Chakkri t Rithmontri. 'Bears killed for paws', Bangkok Post. 19 August 1996. 
70 Ledivina Carino and A.T.R. Rahman , 'Negative Bureaucratic Behavior and Development: An 
Introduction to a Seven· Nation Research Project' , at l. 
71 Jan Tinbergen, 'Social Integrity in a New World Order'. in Coping with Corruption in a Borderless 
World, at 105 . 
72 See Samuel Huntington, ' Techniques of Political Graft'. c ited in Sakkarin Niyomsilpa. at 186-7. 
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otherwise be illegal. These people include politicians. In his miicle, Bosch argues that 
the most common form of corruption is the awarding of major contracts on development 
projects to exporting or contracting companies in developed countlies who have already 
bribcd people in power in developing countries73 
Thailand has experienced considerable political corruption associated with development 
of cnvirolU11ental management. Examples include the case in which thc fonner prime 
minister Banham Sillapa-archa transferred the funds for construction of wastewater and 
wastc treatment systems, which were initially allocated to the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Environment for the development of Thailand's environment, to the 
Department of Public Work which hc also oversaw74 Interestingly, he did it with no 
regard to the applicable law which stated that the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment controls the budgets for waste and wastewater treatment systems for every 
province. 75 This mi sconduct was one of many critical issues addressed by the 
opposition pmiies in the no-confidence dcbate. Eventually, Mr Banham dissolved the 
parliament betore the debate reached a conclusion. 
The transfcr of funds to an agency which is not authorised by law to receive them is 
undoubtedly wrong. However, the question is: was there any privatc gain involved? 
Although there was no concretc proof that Mr Banham received any benefits £i'om the 
budget transfer, it was evident that such ilTegularity was pmi of a corrupt process. This 
is because some time before thc mi sconduct, he exercised his power as the Minister of 
Interior to transfer Mr Supol Sripan from thc position of Chief of Supanburi Provincial 
Public Work Office to be the Director of Sanitary Engi neers, Department of Public 
Work, the agency which controls thc construction of all systems related to environment 
across the country. Given that Mr Supol had been working in Supanburi, which was Mr. 
Banharn's electorate for eight years, he was believed to have a close tie with the ex-
Prime Minister76 
)) IlelllY Bosch. 'Growing threat of intell1ational conuption ' . The Jakarta Post, 30 September 1997. 
" Apart from being the prime minister, Banham oversaw the the Department of Civil Work at the same 
time. 
75 See the 1992 EnhanceJllelll Act, Section 39. 
76 Wattachak, 'Prime Minister transferred environmental fund to the Department of Civil Work' , a 
verbatim report of the no-confidence debate against Banham govemillent. 20 September 1996. 
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Mr Supon was not the only official in the DepaJ1ment of Public Work whom Mr 
Banharn knew. Indeed, the fOllller prime minister had very strong connections with 
many officials in the agency since he worked in his uncle's shop near the agency after 
he first left Supanburi for Bangkok at the age of seventeen. Shortly thereafter, he started 
hi s own business by purchasi ng chlorine from a company and reselling it to the 
Department of Public Work. He then so ld pipes to the agency before establishing a 
construction company, the major work of which relied on contracts with the agency. 77 
After several and various deals with the agency for a long time as noted above, he ended 
up having close connections with many officials in the agency. It is therefore 
conceivable that when Mr Banharn successfully becamc a politician holding a 
ministerial post, he prefcrred to control the Depm1ment of Public Work so that he could 
use hi s long-time connection wi th the agency to seek profits for ei ther himself or hi s 
cliques or both . 
Another corruption scandal rel ated to development o f environmental protection can be 
seen in the Mae Moh scrubber purchase case. Mae Moh residents all eged that 
irregularities were in volved in the purchase of such equipment , as the Electricity 
Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) bought used scrubbers fi'om Chi na instead of 
the new ones. This resulted in excessive air pollution generated by EGA T's plants 
which led to fatal incident as di scussed in Chapter 3. 78 
Not least, corruption scandal is also involved in an environmental managemcnt project 
responsible by the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment. In March 1999, 
local people in Klong Dan sub-di strict, Samutprakarn province lodged a complaint to the 
House of Senate's Local Administration Committee that the planned construction of the 
22.95-billion-baht central wastewater treatment plant to be built on a 1,903 rai plot of 
land lacked transparency. They clai med that the purchase of such land was made in 
unsual ly high price because some parts of the land had subsided and was inundated dai ly 
by seawater and hi gh tide. The in vest igation in this regard is underway at the time of 
writing79 
)) James Ockey, Business Leaders. Gangsler.s·, and Ihe Middle Class: Socielal Groll!,S and Civilian Rule 
in Thailand, at 229-30. 
78 'Egat den ies faulty co mponents are used items from China', Bangkok Pasl, 15 October 1998. 
J9 Sunthom Pongpao, ' Water treatment project in trouble', Bangkok Posl, 10 March 1999. See also 
'Water treatment project opposed' , Bangkok POSI. 24 March 1999. 
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Conclusion to Part I 
Thc cnvironmental problems of developing countries such as Thailand are immense, and 
growing rapidly. One crucially important policy mechanism to curb, and ideally halt, 
such degradation, is the law, and environmental regulation in particul ar. In the case of 
Thailand, such regulation was slow to develop and, as we have seen, before the 'big 
bang ' refoml of 1992, was almost entirely ineffective. 
It might have been hoped that the rcfoml of 1992, which compared to what had gone 
before, was far-reaching, would mark a new and important chapter in environmental 
protection in Thailand. As we saw in Chapter 2, that refonn invol ved substanti al 
institutional reorganisation, a reinforcement of the power of the National Environmental 
Board, the introduction of the public right to know and a greater role for NGOs, the 
polluter payss principle, economic incentives and the deccntralisation of environmental 
planning. 
Yet, some eight years later, the evidence is that the ' big bang' refonn has achieved very 
little, and can be characterised as a failure rather than as a success. Air and water 
pollution have continucd largely unabated, and the enviromnental and hcalth problems 
they cause have continued to increasc. The type, extent and severity of these problems 
was illustrated in Chapter 3 through a series of case studies. 
The reasons for the failure of the ' big bang' refonns were the subject of Chapters 4-5. In 
Chapter 4, wc saw that a series of inter-related circumstances and structural failures 
rendered most of the 1992 reform s ineffective. In part, the character of the law itself 
caused problems, as too did a lack of political will, the intractable nature of the 
economic and environmental problems in small and medium sized enterprises, and the 
problem of agency capture. Of paliicular importance were celiain aspects of Thai 
culture, which made effective environmental policy refonn more difficult. Not least, 
these included Thailand's authoritarian history, thc influence of Buddhism and the 
fatalism that the rule of karma generates, the importance of compromise and of freedom 
from extemal constraint, and the culture of gratitude. 
But above all else, an almost insuperable hurdle for environmental law refoml and for 
cnvironmental regulation in Thailand , is the entrenched conllption which is endemic to 
81 
the country and cu lture. This was the subject matter of Chapter 5. We examined the 
various forms of cOlTuption in Thailand , the relationship of cOlTuption to regulatory 
fai lure, both internationally and nati onall y, the paJ1icui ar importance of bureaucratic 
corruption in the Thai context, the causes of that cOITuption, and the economic and 
political factors it is rel ated to. We saw that ineffective admini stration and laws related 
to cOlTuption, and Thai political culture, all compounded what was already a scrious and 
intractable problcm. 
Finally, we related these charactelistics of corrupti on in Thailand general ly, to the 
specific context of environental regulation. We demonstrated through a series of case 
studies how these vari ous components that entrenchcd corruption so deeply into Thai 
cu lture gcnera lly, had a paJ1icuiar impact on envi ronmental regulation. These case 
studies showed the importance of corruption in cmasculating regulation at the levels of 
inspect ion, prc-trial, and sentencing. 
It is against this background of the failure of envi ronmcntal regulation in Thai land, and 
the inability of tradi tional command and control regulation so far to overcome certain 
deep-seated and entrenched probl ems in Thai society and culture, that we turn to 
exam ining the prospects for future policy ref 01111. In the following, central sections of 
this thesis, we examine fi rst, the potential for policy refolll1 using instruments geared to 
the nat ional level (Chapter 6) and second , the potenti al for instuments at the international 
level, to achieve effective environmental protection (Chapter 7). 
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rntroduction 
Chapter 6 
Domestic Strategies 
in Making Thai Environmental Regulation Work 
We have seen fi'om the previous chapters that CU!Tent Thai environmental law falls far 
short of providing for effective environmental protection, even after the 'big bang ' 
reforms of 1992. Indeed, the 'law in action' , as it relates to air and water pollution , is 
still grossly inadequate to achieve the goal of environmental protection. This thesis has 
identified a selies of economic, political and cultural impediments to the implementing 
effectivc environmental legis lation in Thai land; the existence of these impediments 
helps to explain the current unsatisfactory situation. 
With this background, what prospects are there for effective environmental protection in 
Thailand though regulation, broadly defined? Chapters 6 and 7 attempt to identify a 
selics of measures, at both national and intemational levels , which have the potential to 
make a substantial improvement on the status quo. They seek to analyse the 
instruments and policies which have the most chance of success if applied to the 
particular economic, political, and cultural circumstances of Thailand. In doing so, the 
chapters draw to some extent upon the intell1ational literature on regulation and related 
policy instruments, and apply this literature to the paliicular Thai context. They also 
draw from the infonnation obtained in our interviews with various stakeholders, and use 
this infom1ation to further substantiate our recommendations on what is most 
appropriate for Thailand. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the intell1ational dimension, identifying a selies of measures 
which range from intell1ational treaties , through conditions applied to govell1ment loans 
by intemational institutions, to the role of environmental management systems and ISO 
14001; these show considerable promise of applying leverage and pressure to polluters 
in Thailand. 
The present chapter focuses on the Thai domestic situation, and upon instruments and 
policies that could appropriately be applied at the national level. It argues that no 
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single policy instrument is likely to provide a total solution. All instruments have 
limitations and some are better suited than others to certain situations, or to some 
particular types of polluters. Moreover, while Thailand has been overwhelmed with 
so many impediments to the effective administration of policy (not least, corruption, 
lack of heavy penalties, and inadequate funding) it is imp0l1ant that the country use a 
number of different instruments, particularly those which are least vulnerablc to 
implementation failure. 
This chapter explores the main policy options under a series of general classifications. 
In doing so, it begins with educational instruments and training because there is good 
reason to believe that almost all other policy instruments yield better results if both the 
gencral public and particular groups, including industry, who are being asked to change 
their behaviour, have an adequate foundation of understanding of why environmental 
protection is necessary and how it might be achieved. Second, and closely related, the 
chapter examines the role of information, and the considerable potential of instruments 
such as community right to know and environmental reporting, to influence larger 
companies, pm1iculariy those with reputations to protect. 
Third, the chapter explores the role of economic instruments such as taxes, charges, and 
tradable pellllits. While such instruments are exponcntially advocated as a better 
aiteillative to command and control regulation, it argues that such instrum ents, for the 
most part, wi ll be very difficult to implement successfully in the Thai context because 
they rely upon a substantial degree of cffective goveillment intervention . Exampl es 
include monitoring the emissions that are to be taxed , collecting taxes, and preventing 
tax evasion. Previous chapters have identified the very substantial adm inistrative 
deficiencies of goveillment: the obstacles to effective administration of economic 
instruments are such that these instruments tend to playa minor role in environmental 
policy design in Thailand. In contrast, the other mainstay of economics, a more clearly 
defined system of private propel1y rights, does have the potential to playa significant 
role in improving environmental regulation in Thailand, notwithstanding some 
substantial limitations. 
FOUl1h, the chapter explores the role of self-regulation, which involves goveillments 
providing fi11l1S, or industry associations, with the authority to regulate themselves. 
While thi s system has a number of advantages in its ideal form , it is in its infancy in 
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many developing countries and it remains an open question whether the many barriers 
to its success may be overcome. 
Finally, the chapter returns to the role of command and control regulation in order to see 
to what extent refonns might improve the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime. 
Here it examines the role of regulatory flexibility , and the capacity for greater third 
pat1y enforcement by environmental groups and others. 
I. Envit'onmental Education and TI'aining 
A. The need for environmental education and training: an ovel'view 
It is too late to see dramatic improvements of environmental situation from this generation. 
We however should expect to see a big change from the new generation - I mean those who 
are now about seven years old or younger. To make this possible, we shou ld educate 
(emphasis added) the new generation in order to let them get the sense of the environmental 
issue now. Besides, we must take them to see the problems in addition to leaming from the 
books. Then they will gradually intemalise the value of sound environment in their agenda 
which will, in tum, result in a great deal of environmental improvements. 
An interview statement made by Dr Phaichitr Uathavikul, Chairman of Executive 
Board, Thailand Environment institute during my fieldwork interview. I 
Environmental education may take many forms and may be very broadly defined. For 
example, according to the US Environmental Education Act 1970, it involves studies on 
the relationship between humans, the natural environment, and the man-made 
environment. This includes the relationship between population, pollution, natural 
resources and their depletion and conservation, transport, technology, planning of cities 
and rural areas and the surrounding environment. ' From a different perspective, William 
Stapp defines environmental education as a process aimed at producing a citizenry not 
only capable of knowing about the environment and its associated problems, but also 
skilful in helping to solve these problems, and motivated to find their solutions.3 
:The interview took place on 2 March 1998. 
- W1I1al Weerawatananond, Envil'Onmenr and Development, 1994, at 126. 
J William Stapp, 'Historical Setting of Environmental Education', in James A. Swan and William Stapp, 
eds., Environmental Education: Strategies Toward a More Livable Future, cited in Poranee Natadecha, 
Nature and Culture in Thailand: The implementation of Cu/tllra/Eecology in Environmental Education 
through the Application of Behavioral Sociolog)l, Ed.D thesis, University of Hawaii , 1991 , at 104. 
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Environmental education and training have the potential to change human behaviour 
towards the environment in a variety of ways. For example, they can help hamess self-
interest among the general public, and within industry, infoll11ing people and 
organisations of means whereby they can achieve their economic goals while also 
protecting the environment (so called 'win-win ' outcomes). And even where win-win 
outcomes are not possible, environmental education and training may nurture altruism , 
by creating awareness of the significance of sound environment, which at least in some 
cases, may convince people of the need to fight for environmental conservation even 
when it is not in their own interest to do so. And even when other measures, such as 
regulation, arc introduced to force people to change their behaviour, education may 
make these mandatory measures more acceptable by making people realise why they are 
necessary. Finally, environmental education and training may assist govemment 
regulators to improve their perfonnance and gain a better understanding of the 
technologies necessary to mitigate environmental halln. 
Environmental education is not new, but originated several decades ago. The late 1960s 
and 1970s saw unprecedented time and efforts spent on various programs and 
publications concerning the environment 4 In North America, the celebration of Earth 
Day in 1970 and the enactment of thc U.S. Environmental Education Act 1970 were 
significant events in this development. fn the same era, there emerged a varicty of 
environmental education publications and joumals, including the Journal of 
Environmental Education , the International Journal of Environmental Studies, and 
Environmental Ethics5 Since that time, environmental education has developed further 
and has gained considerable momentum, depth, and scope. 
Attempts to use environmental education to tackle environmental problems have been 
made not only at the national but also at the global level. For example, in 1987, 
UNESCO, in association with UNEP, held the International Assembly Conference on 
Environmental Education and Training at Moscow. The Conference agreed that the 
objectives of environmental education and training at the international level included 
4 Trilochan Bakshi, 'Why Environmental Education'? ', in Trilochan Bakshi and Zev Naveh, eds, 
Environmental Educaliol1, 1980, at 9. 
5 Poranee Natadecha, Nalure and Cullure in Thailand. .. ". 1991 , at 98-9. 
86 
creating awareness among teachers, trainers, students and trainees; creating sources of 
info rmation and using it; and developing cuniculum and teaching equipment6 
B. Thailand's current action with I'cgard to cnvironmental education and training 
Thcre have already been some significant developments in environmental education in 
Thai land upon which future refonns could build. We describe briefl y current initiatives 
at these levels and the limitations of these initiati ves. In the light of these deficiencies, 
we then propose additional measures and refonns best suited to the Thai context. 
Like many other countries, Thailand has perceived human behaviour to be one of the 
majo r causes of environmental degradati on, and has contemplated education as one of 
thc most suitable instruments to address thi s probl em 7 This was a recurrent theme in 
my interviews with senior deci sion-makers. For example, according to Mr Somnuk 
Rubthong, Director of the Legal and Complaint Division, Pollution Control 
Dcpaliment: 
We should create more awareness among peoplc by means of education. Thc 
cUITiculum should be tailored to encourage people to have thcir attitude towards sound 
environment.s 
Simil arly, Mr Somjai N il sittanukroh, an adviser to th e Bangkok Governor (Dr Pichit 
Rattakul) suggested : 
The Eighth Nat ional Social and Economic Development Plan which targets human 
rcsource developmcnt provides a good opportunity to solve the environmental problcm 
in Thailand gradua ll y. This is becausc we cannot change human behaviour overnight. 
Rather. we have to educate people to know about catastrophe of envirolUllental 
degradation and at the same time instill environmental awareness among them to 
change their behaviour over time9 
6 Office of EnvirolUuental Policy and Planning, Reporl on Environmental QualilY Sill/alion, 1995-1996, 
at 251. 
7 Office of Environmental Poli cy and Planning, The Nalional Policy and Planning on Enhancement and 
Conservation oflhe Environment 1997-2016, 1997. at 86. 
8 The interview was condu cted on 16 December 1996. 
9 The interview took place on 8 Janumy 1997. 
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At present, environmental education has been included as one of the six main objectives 
under the Nat ional Policy and Planning on Enhancement and Conservation of the 
Environment 1997-2016. Environmental education and training in Thailand currently 
take place at three levels: at the school level, the higher education level , and the 
infollllal education level. 'o 
At the school level, the objectives of envi ronmental education include providing 
understanding of the interrelationship between humans and their envirorU11ent; why and 
how environmental problems occur: and what students can do to help improve the 
environment." Accord ingly. Dr Suvit Yodmanee, regional director and representative, 
UNEP's Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, suggested: 
We must prioritise environmental education at the school level as an important measure 
to solve Thailand's environmental problem. Education will create awareness among 
students who are children and youths. '2 
To what extent are these objcctives currently being achieved? Thailand, like many 
other countries, first introduced subjects related to the environment in the 1970s, as part 
of the national policy on education . I ) Notwithstanding such a policy, it was not until 
1987 that environmental education in Thailand really became effective after the 
Ministry of Education received financial and technical assistance from the United States 
Agency for Intelllational Development (USAlD). The comprchensive plan on 
cnvironmenta l education was introduced and subsequently has been used as a reference 
point in integrating this subject in the curricula of the Ministry of Education (which 
docs not extend to higher ed ucation)." 
10 The six main objecti ves set [ol1h in the National Policy and Planning are: 
I. Policy on natural resources. 
2. Policy o n prevention and eradication of pollution. 
3. Policy on natural sites and cultures. 
4. Policy on community envirorunent. 
5. Policy on environmental education and information. 
6. Policy on environmental technology. 
See Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, 1997, for more details. 
" Kowit Varapipatana and Vanli Prasarttong-Osoth. 'Environmental Education in Countries of the 
Region: Thailand', in Environl11enral Education in Asia and rhe Pacific, UNESCO bulletin, 198 1, 
at 195-211. 
" Amol11pot Kullawijit. Special In terview with Dr Suvit Yodmanee, Dullapaha, Vol I, January-March 
1996, at 23. 
13 The Thailand National Educational Scheme of 1977 states that ' the State shall undel1ake to inculcate 
the awareness of the importance of conservation of natural resources and environment as wel l as 
population educat ion'. cited in Po ranee Natadecha. at 136. 
14 Winai Weerawatananond, Environl11el1l and Development, at 127. 
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However, although attempts to promote a sound environment by means of education 
have increased substantially. there remain difficulties m their successful 
implementation. These include lack of sufficient budgets and skilled teachers. 
Fortunately, however, some government agencies and NGOs which perceive the 
significance of environmental education. havc helped the Ministry of Education to 
enhance its perfollllance in this regard. For example, the Department of Environmental 
Quality Promotion has helped the Ministry of Education to establish environmcntal 
education centres at the provincial level, as well as prepare an action plan for 
environmental cducation at the national level. I; 
Interestingly, the government agencies which provide the assistance include those 
whose responsibility do not directly include the provision of fonnal education. 
Examples include the National Energy Bureau which has given financial assistance to 
the Ministry of Education to launch a project whose main objectives are to improve 
environmental education in schools, while the Thailand Environment Institute (TEl), an 
environmental NGO, has provided technical assistance. 
Another impOt1ant initiative was described by Dr Tongroj Onchan, President of TEl : 
CutTently, we have jointly been conducting the 'Dawn Project ' in association with the 
Ministry of Education as an operator and the National Energy Bureau as a sponsor. This 
is a kind of 'educational refOIm ' which has been launched for 8 months. We have a 
budget of three million baht (equivalent to approximately A $ 120,000) donated by the 
'blue fund', which is operated by the National Energy Bureau to fulfil this task. The 
project will run for three years, targeting students at all levels in 600 schools across the 
country." 
Environmental education is also important at the tet1iary level. It should be however 
noted that although many universities have included this program in their curricula, 
most environmental courses merely focus on the application of science and technology 
to so lve the environmental problem.' ? As a result, Poranee Natadecha suggests that 
environmental courses which focus on social science and humanities shou ld be 
15 See Office of Em ironmental Policy and Planning, Report on Environmental Qualill' Situation, 1995-
1996. at 253-4 for more details. 
16 The intef\ iew was conducted on 11 March 1998. 
17 Paranee Natadecha. Nature and Culture in Thailand: The implementation of CullllralEecologl' in 
Environlllental Education through the Application o{Sehal'ioral Sociologl', at 148-9. 
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integrated into the school cUlTiculum and at the same time reiterated at the uni versity 
level. Given that human behaviour is at the heart of most environmental problems, 
addressing environmental study in the social science and humanities context could make 
a valuable contribution to awareness and through this, to behavioural change. 18 
As in many other countries, environmental education in Thailand also takcs place 
outside educational institutions. So far, a variety of educational programs with regard to 
environmcntal matters have been organised by many different agencies, including 
NGOs . The programs are undertaken in many fom1s such as training courses, 
workshops. conferences, and seminars. Examples include the seminars in environmental 
law enforccment, organised by the Pollution Control Department, in which participants 
are the government officials whose responsi bilities involve in enforcing environmcntal 
regulation ; an annual conference on environmental issues held by the Thailand 
Environmental Institutc (TEl) which aims at training a wider range of pcoplc such as 
government officials, academics, and NGOs; and the training workshop on law and 
environment, jointly organised by UNEP and the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn 
Univers ity. 
C. Target g"oups for 'off-campus' environmental education and training 
Which l:,'l'oups are the particular targets of environmental education and training') With 
regard to air and water pollution, three main groups are involved: industry, regulators, 
and the general public. The discussion below examines whether environmcntal 
education and training in Thailand are cUITently tailored towards these particular groups. 
If so. how are such education and training undertaken, and is there any need to refonTI 
thc stalliS quo') 
I. Il/duSf!)1 
Extensive research has found that industry is one of the major sources of air and water 
pollution in Thailand. 19 While industry contributes substantially to economic growth, it 
18 Ibid . 
19 Chatchom Akapin. Water Lall' Reform in Thailand. LL.M. thesis. Harvard Law School. May 1994 at 
23-4. See also Amnat Wongbandil. ' Laws related in Wastewater Treatment from Industrial Factories ' . in 
Dlliapaha. a Ministry of Justice Law Joulllal. 1996, at112. 
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also contributes to accumulative pollution in the air and water2 0 Sometimes the costs of 
industrial pollution outweigh its positive contribution to economic health. 
Can cducation contribute to changing industry's attitude towards its environmental 
responsibilities? Much can be done to fulfil this task. This includes educating business 
about the advantage of 'state of the art' altematives such as ISO 14000, and clcan 
technology. So far, various agencies have provided training for industry on these and 
related issues. Examples include an introduction to ISO 14000 provided to industry by 
thc Ministry of lndustry21 The samc introduction was also recently made to the 
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand by Robere & Associates, an envi ronmental 
management fim1. 22 The Thailand Environment Institute (TEl) also provides a number 
of training courses. including ISO 14000 and clean technology. Ms Peeraporn 
Palapleewan. project manager of the Promotion of C leaner Technology in the Thai 
Industry said during my fieldwork interview: 
1 am involved in supervising the Cleaner Technology (CT) project, which was designed 
to persuade the industry to change their behaviour ... Our main objective is how to avoid 
waste and pollution generated from the entire process of manufacture, in other words , 
how to get the most efficient output. We have convinced the firms that the most 
efficient output is the 'real profits' .. .The project does not need high cost. Instead. it 
looks at management of the firms , which in fact means behaviour of people responsible 
for managing the fimls 
After pal1icipating in the pilot project, around 90 per cent of the firms have more 
understanding in CT and recognise that CT can playa key role in helping the fimlS deal 
with environmental problems without impeding their growth." 
'0 Songpol Pollayiem. 'Criminal Measures and the Problem of Industrial Pollution ' . in Dullapaha. 1996. 
at 125. 
" Interview with Ms Prima Wangwongwiroj, director of the Thai Industrial Standard Institute. on 20 
FebrualY 1998. 
22 The training was undertaken on 30 January 1998 at the lEA 1"'s Mab Ta Pud site. Rayong province. 
The site is a location of heavy and chemical industry. 
n The interview was conducted on 15 JanualY 1998. 
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Similarly, Dr Pongwipa Lohsomboon, project manager of Business and Environment 
Di vis ion, Thailand Environment Institute (TEl) pointed out: 
First, let me supplement Ms Peerapom on the issue of cleaner technology (CT). The CT 
corresponds to the ISO 1400 I, wllich deals with management system of the factories .. 
ISO 14001 is being introduced to the Thai industrial business by TEl, in association 
with the Ministry ofIndustry to reduce environmental impacts and capitals. 
So far. 15 firms have adopted ISO 1400 I. 
Significantly, Thai govemment agencies consider environmental education so impoJ1ant 
for changing behaviour among industrial business that they usually assign their officials 
to educate polluting industries. This is evident from Ms Prima Wangwongwiroj, a 
director of the Thai Industrial Standard Institute, who suggcstcd: 
Awareness must be created and enhanced continuously ... we have to devote ourselves in 
disseminating this idea to the public. I often give a talk to industrial firms to let them 
know what the ISO 14000 and green label are all about and at the same time encourage 
them to tum their manufacturing practice towards the two approaches " 
2. Regulators 
As found in the previous chapters, regulators arc also responsible for environmcntal 
regulatory failure in Thailand, especially as a result of corruption, lack of sufficient 
personnel and insufficient budgets. Accordingly, there is a need to changc their attitude 
and behaviour to be in accordance with sound environment policy, which in tum will 
help make environmental regulation work more effectively. 
Currently, a number of training courses have been provided for regulators in order to 
help achieve the goal oflaw enforcement; Mr Siritan Pairojboriboon, director-general of 
Pollution Control Department stated during my fieldwork interview: 
Education creates awareness ... we are organising two kinds of training courses. One is 
for the provincia l govemors and sheriffs to get to know their important roles in 
environmental protection. This includes relevant regulation and main principles. The 
24 The interview took place on 20 FebnlalY 1998. 
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other course is for those appointed from the province as we sometimes request the 
province to assign a team, consisting of approximately ten officials to attend the training 
course. This course will educate the trainees how to spot and inspect pollution sources 
at cel1ain level." 
Environmcntal education given to regulators is so essential that it has had support from 
othcr countries, as in the case of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (SMA). 
Recently, SMA, which was one of the environmental enforcers, received assistancc 
fi'om thc United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) in the fonn of a 
training course on enforcing environmental regulation. During my fieldwork, Dr Hansa 
Sa-nguannoi , adviser to the Bangkok Governor, said: 
Knowing that we cannot leave enforcement out of the picture, we have been training 
our officials to equip them with knowledge and experiences. CUITently, we have 
received assistance from the USEPA to organise an enforcement training rogram. The 
program is aimed at educating relevant government officials not only from SMA, but 
from many different agencies who are also involved in envirol1Jl1ental protection in 
one way or another. The ultimate goal of the program is to make these official s as 
powerful as ' EPA COpS· .'6 
What do regulators gain from the training? Not only does the training educate trainees 
to know the applicable laws which they are empowered to cnforce, it also teaches them 
how to administer regulations when resources are limited. In thc USEPA training 
mentioned above, to overcome the problem of resource limitation, it was suggested that 
priority should be given to violations posing the greatest hall11, and that the penalty 
metcd out must be severe enough to create a perception that it is more expensive to 
violate the law. In other words, they encouraged the officials to ' get a ' big bang' out of 
the buck ' . 27 
Education and training are also imporiant means to influence the perfonnance of Thai 
regulators in a variety of agencies, and to ensure that they place a higher priority on 
environmental protection objectives. For example, during my fieldwork interview, Mr 
15 The interview took place on 19 JanualY 1998. 
26 The interview lOok place on 26 FeblUalY 1998. 
27 Wasant Techawongtham. 'Courage 10 do the job wil l overcome' , Bangkok Post, 3 July 1998. 
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Chatree Chuayprasit, deputy secretary-general, Office of the Environmental Policy and 
Planning suggested: 
Although the 1992 Enhancement Act allows a provincial governor whose jurisdiction is 
in either pollution control area or environmental protection area shall have a plan on 
environmental management, a problem has however arisen as there are many different 
agencies working in one province. Most of these agencies think that the work as to 
environmental protection is not their direct job, they therefore do not pay enough 
attention to the job. More imp0I1antly, most of them, including decentralised agencies 
such as sub-district administrative organisation do not even know the concept of 
sustainable development, which is our ultimate goal. Thus, training must be provided to 
educate these people." 
3. The Public 
For the purposes of this chapter, the public means those who do not fall into the two 
categories outlined above: industry and regulators. It therefore includes people in the 
local community, media, politicians, and people in all walks of life. The fOTITIS of 
school and university education discussed earlier are particularly directcd at these 
groups. 
Why is education and training for the public necessary despite the presence of 
environmental regulators? One must not forget that in Thailand regulators are vastly 
outnumbered by industry." As a result, it would be naive to expect that regulators can 
do their job effectively without the Thai's cooperation. Dr Chokchai Aksoranan, the 
then president of the Federation of Thai Industry, said during my fieldwork: 
Enhancement of environmental education must continue constantly to create awareness 
among people in all walks of life ... Let the society force them (polluting industries). It 
appears that those who pollute illegally will be complained about by the public:io 
" The interview was conducted on 9 March 1998. 
29 See Chapter 4 for more details on the insufficient number of environmental regulators in Thailand. 
]0 The interview was conducted on 16 Februmy 1998. 
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Increasingl y, the role of environmental education of the public has also been recognised 
by the authority administering the law. For example, Mr Pornthep Teichapaiboon, 
deputy mini ster. thc Ministry of Science. Technology, and the Environment, pointed out 
that the public should be educated to have more awareness towards environmental 
protection3l , and Ms Krittayaporn Tappatat, and Mr Titi Jantaengpol of Industrial Estate 
Authority of Thailand similarly suggested: 
We should focus on educating people to have awareness in environmental issue as this 
will bring about public pal1icipation sUbsequently. We clo believe that vigorous and 
constant p3I1icipation from the public wi ll playa significant role to help improve the 
state of environment in Thailand 32 
Further to suggestions made by the respondents above, environmental education has 
been provided for the public in many different forms by the agencies concerned. For 
instance, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) disseminated regulations 
related to the enviromnent through a radi o program. In doi ng so, and to make the 
regulation more effecti ve, BMA simplified the legal language of the regulation in order 
to make it easy for laypeople to understand J3 Another example can be seen in many 
activities undertaken by the Department of Enviromllental Quality Promotion, the 
Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment. In 1994 alone, this agency 
disseminated a great deal of knowledge regarding the environment to the public in 
various forms, including television programs, radio programs, posters, brochures, and 
stickers: and organising many training courses and seminarsJ4 
D. Shol·tcomings of environmental education in Thailand 
Despite these initiatives, both at school , at the tertiary level, and off campus, and 
strategies aimed at industry. regulators and the public, much remains to be done to 
achieve effective education. This is against the background of recent records which 
show that the country's environment has been worsening:'; 
)1 The interview took place on II March 1998. 
)2 The interview took place on 2 1 January 1998. 
)) Amompot Kuliawijit , Special Interview with Dr Suvit Yodmanee, DlIllapaha, at 23. 
34 Office of Environmental Pol icy and Planning, Report on State of the Environment in the .,'ear 1994. 
1996,at 151 -3. 
)j Th is statement was made by the fonner pennanent secretalY of Science, Technology and Environment 
when he was stepping down from the position. See Kanittha Inchukul, ' Disaster for Environment 
Pred icted'. Bangkok Post, 4 October 1998. 
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What is wrong with environmental education in Thailand? The most urgent problem 
which impedes the progress of environmental education in the country is the lack of 
sufficient funding for educational initiatives. For example, although environmental 
education was introduced in Thailand in the 1970s, it only became effective after the 
country received financial and technical assistance from USAID in 1987.16 Similarly, 
the 'Dawn Project' , which aims at providing environmental education in schools, is 
only successful to the extent that it is supported by the money donated by the National 
Energy Bureau, a government agency outside the field of education. Moreover, it also 
receives technical assistance from TEL Significantly, the project is funded for three 
years only. " 
This heavy reliance on external aid is perhaps surplising, given that educational 
improvement more generally has been a priority of the present Thai government. This 
is evident fi'om the budget allocation for the year 1999, in which the Thai cabinet 
approved a sum of207.4 billion baht (approximately A $ 9.4 billion) for the Ministry of 
Education. Remarkably, such an allocation was the highest among all ministries38 
Ironically, only a sum of 13, 131.6 million baht (approximately A $ 596.8 million) was 
allocated for the Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environmene9: this clearly 
shows a lack of political will by the Thai government in improving the environmental 
situation. However, it must be emphasised that while education generally may be 
receiving substantial financial suppot1, environmental cducation is not. Within the 
general Ministry of Education budget, there is no guarantee that a substantial proportion 
will be allocated for the specific purpose of environmental education, and if past 
experience is any guide, the percentage allocated to environmental education will be 
extremely small. 
E. Suggestions for reforms 
Without fUl1her action, the potential of environmental education to influence the 
behaviour of the next generation may never be realised. Yet the importance of doing so 
16 It should be noted that such assistance was merely limited to education at school leve l. See Winai 
\Vcerawatananond. Em'irol1mem (lnd Development. at 12 7 for greater details. 
17 See an interview statement made by Dr Tongroh Onchan above. 
18 'Cabinet gives education priority in B800bn budget', Bangkok Post , 29 April 1998. 
19 Ibid. 
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is paramount. As one of my respondents, Dr Tongroj Onchan, President of TEl, 
emphasised: 
We must instil enviromnental awareness into people wh il e they are still young. The 
reason is that it is not easy to change people ' s behaviour. Therefore, if the awareness is 
inculcated to the people when they are young, it wi ll become a part of their lives. Then 
the environmental governance wi ll take place spontaneously .... we realise that it takes a 
lot of time to make people change their behaviour. Clearly, education is a crucial way to 
achieve this goal. We have been inspired from the way Japanese children love nature. A 
clear example is that the young Japanese appreciate the trees whi le most Thai chi ldren 
do not, but even pull or cut off the trees40 
To fulfil the task of changing human behaviour through environmental education, 
deepseated and arguably intractable problems relating to the lack of political will , and 
the cultural attributes of the Thai , will need to be addressed. These arc examined below. 
1. Correctness of po/iticallViII 
Based on the shortcomings discussed above, it is apparent that a lack of political will 
substantiall y explains inadequate budgetary support for environmental education. How 
can the political will towards environmental education be created? Under the 
democratic regime, a govemment is elected and it is the people who decide what kind of 
govemm ent they want to have 41 If people pressured election candidates to include in 
their policy the enhancement of environmental education, in exchange for their votes, 
and monitored their performance in doing so, the situation would improve4 2 But this 
wi ll only come about if people both have a commitment to a sound environment and 
exercise their commitment through the political system. 
This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it is the very lack of an 
environmental education, and the lack of an environmental education budget , which 
p3lily explains the public 's lack of awareness of environmental issues. So wi thout 
getting the education, they are un.likely to press the pol iti cians to provide the education . 
Second, the Thai can hardly be expected to exerci se their political will freely without 
40 The interview was conducted on 11 March 1998 
41 Pam Hartm an . ' It all comes down to the citi zens', Bangkok Pas!, 13 JanuaJY 1999 . 
• , Phaichitr Uathavikul. Thailand, King BlllIllIibol Adulvadej The Golden Jubilee 1946-1996, at 222. 
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being caught up in a vicious circle of patron-client relationships which nonnally 
influence people to vote for the politicians who have been their patrons43 Such political 
gratitude has the strong potential to influence voters to render reciprocal consequences 
including voting for their 'patron'. A partial, but less than satisfactory answer is offered 
in the section on 'cultural refOlm' below. 
Ultimately, things will only change if the Thai exercise their political will and put 
pressure on the politicians to promote environmental education in exchange tor their 
votes. But not only are the factors raised above serious impediments to this being 
achieved, but so also are the cultural impediments, to which we now turn. 
2. Cultural Reform 
As Chapter 4 revealed, Thai culture hampers the success of enviroruncntal initiatives. 
The Thai power orientation, the rule ofkanna, and an over-compromising approach, are 
all serious impediments. In these circumstances, it is hard to see how environmental 
education can bc prioritiscd, along with other measurcs such as introducing new 
environmental technology to industry, training regulatory enforcers on relevant laws 
and rcgulations, and providing infonnalion about the harmful consequences which 
could stem £i'om air and water pollution, to create awareness among the public. Of 
particular importance will be (i) the promotion of a civic culture, (ii) influencing 
perccptions about karn1a, and (iii) undennining the culture of compromise. 
Turning first to the imp0l1ance of introducing a civic culture, we found in Chapter 4 that 
an excessively freedom-loving trait, the culture of gratitude, regulatory capture, and 
corruption are extensively pervasive in the Thai way of life and all serve to inhibit the 
success of environmental initiatives, including education. Could the introduction of a 
civic culture overcome these obstacles, and promote a social interest rather than a 
personal one?44 
With regard to the excessive love of freedom , which makes many Thai neglect the sense 
of social responsibility, a traditional belief that ' doing whatever pleases one's mind is a 
43 See Chapter 4 on the section of gratitude culture for more details. 
44 Robert Patnum, Making Democracl' Work, 1993, at 121-85. 
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genuine Thai trait' should be revisited. '; Ideall y. the Thai should be educated that air 
and water pollution may stem from their careless activities and cause serious hanTI, both 
in the immediate vicinity and el sewhere. Means must be found to persuade them to 
think about the consequences of their action beyond their own interest, that is, to ensure 
that what they do must not cause adverse effects to the society as a whole. 
But are any such means availab le or practicable to implement? While the general 
answer is negative, there are at least some glimmers of hope, in some of the activities of 
NGOs to educate people to become more sociall y responsi ble as to environmental 
protection. According to Khunying Chodchoy Soponpanich, president of the Thai 
Environmental and Community Development, one of the foremost environmental 
NGOs: 
I believe that we have to create environmental awareness among people in the first 
place ... In our pilot project, we educated people to throw garbage into the bins. In so 
doing, we came up with a song saying 'No, no, don ' t litter. Magic eyes can see. So, 
throw your garbage into the bins'~6 
As for gratitude (and regulatory capture), it is important that Thai people learn how to 
distinguish between personal obligation and principl es. As the air pollution case in 
Saraburi province discussed earl ier shows, none of the local people who suffered from 
respiratory probl ems have so far taken legal action against the polluting factories simply 
because they feel gratitude towards the factories which employed thcir relatives. Also, 
teachers who confi'onted the incident did not want to bring the case to justice because 
the factori es always providcd support to the school s. How can the Thai bc convinced 
that having gratitude towards anyone should not override a social responsi bility to act 
aga inst the polluter 's mi sconduct? Clearly, a change of behaviour towards a civic 
culture is the answer to thi s question. 
Civic culture also has the potential to help tackle regulatory capture. As previously 
discussed, the problem of regulatory capture generally occurs because regulato rs feel 
4; According to Dr Hansa Sanguannoi, an advisor to the Bangkok Governor: 
Th ai people have a mOllo ' doing whatever pleases one's mind is a genuine Thai trait ' . Thi s 
deeply rooted behaviour has obstructed a di sc iplined development which is the first stage of 
solving environmenta l problems (The interview was on 9 JanmllY 1997). 
46 The interview was conducted on 9 JanualY 1997 
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sympathetic towards the regulated industry47 Studies however show that this situation 
could stem fj'OIn the gratitude culture of the Thai.48 Regulators should be educated not 
to allow personal obligation to divert their perfonnance in favour of those who have 
provided assistance to them; they should always consider the interests of society as a 
whole rather than their personal interests. 
However, while the introduction of a civic culture would in principle do much to 
address some of the most serious cultural obstacles to effcctive environmental action, 
introducing such a culture would be enonnously difficult to achieve, and, as discussed 
earlier, a major part of the problem is that the changes would be made much easier by 
effective education, but effective education is unlikely to come about without the 
changes. It may well be that there is little chance of major cultural change, at least in 
the Shoti teml , and that we have to look elsewhere (e.g. to hamessing the power of 
NGOs) rather than relying too heavily on educational changes which may be very 
difficult. 
Turning to the notion of kanna, we have seen that this teaches people to accept that 
what happens to them at present is a result of what they did in the past49 Yet people are 
likely to change their attitudes only if they perceive that environmental damage is the 
result of human activities, which could be prevcnted, if sufficient and appropriatc care is 
provided. 
Given that it is difficult to change people's beliefs, the best chance of shifti ng pcople's 
perceptions is by examples which demonstrate that to prevent environmental hatlll is 
possible. That this is a valuable strategy is evident. Dr Hansa Sanguannoi, an adviser to 
the Bangkok Governor said: 
Regarding our success in making Sathorn road free from dust, we have never 
contemplated that other roads will follow th is clean pattem ovemight. Rather, we want 
people to leam that to make a clean road is possible. We also hope that they enjoy 
.7 See David Parks, UCLA [nrernational Envirolll1lenral La\\' alld Polic\', Vol. IS No.2, 1996197. 
at 170. See also Chapter 4 for further details. 
4H Amnat Wongbandit, 'Laws Related to FactOlY's Wastewater Treatment', Dullapaha, January-March 
1996, at 117. 
49 Chal inee Atthakomkowit. An Analvsis of MarkeTing Communications Del-e/opmenr alld PraCTices in 
ThailandFom 1987-/991. Master of Ans in Communications thesis. the University of Canberra, 1994, at 
35. 
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sound environment and want to improve their quality of life by means of making other 
roads clean in the future.5o 
A third obstacle to environmental awareness and change is the importance of 
compromise in Thai culture. [n the Mae Moh case, for example, no one has so far 
brought the case to the court of justicc despite its fatal consequences, and severe illness 
allegcdly caused by pollution. It is apparent that the main reason why the victims did 
not pursue the case was simpl y because the EGAT, the polluter, admitted that the 
tragedy resulted from its fault. Furthcrmore, it also agreed to pay compensation to those 
whose health and asscts had been affected, and at the same time to improve the 
pollution abatement measures such as installing dust scrubbers at its power plants, and 
lengthening the plants ' chimneys.51 
What will make people realise that compromise is not an effecti ve way to deal with 
environmental problems? Clearl y. thc Thai should be encouraged to protect their rights 
more seriously, and to compromise less. According to Mr POl1lthep Techapaiboon, 
deputy minister, the Mini stry of Science, Technology, and Environment: 
To improve the state of the cnvirotll1ent, Thai people should no longer stick with 
compromising culture, or gratitude associated with patron-client system. [n other words, 
we need to conduct a cul tural reform.52 
Similarly, assistant professor Dr Kitti sak Prokati of Faculty of Law, Thammasat 
Uni versity, sa id : 
I am of the opinion that socia l control emanates from education, based on people's 
belief that ' my ri ghts must be protected'." 
Research shows that, in the case of Thailand, people's ignorance and unwillingness to 
protect their own rights provides greater opportunities for polluters to break the laws. 5~ 
This is parti cularly the case when the number of regulators is relatively meagre. 
so The interview was condu cted on 9 JanuaJY 1997. 
51 Joh n Baker. Formation. Maintenance, and Operation of Environmental NCOs in Thailand, Ph D thesis , 
Department of Political Science. Northern Illinois Uni vers ity. 1995. at 152-3. See also Sunee 
Mallikamarl. Environmental LOll" Enjorcelllelll, 1997, at 131-2. 
52 The interview took place on II March 1998. 
53 The interview took place on 10 FeblUary 1998. 
54 See Associate Professor Sunee Mallikamal 's interview in Chapter 4. 
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Therefore there is a need to tailor education towards a civic culture, to encourage 
people to see envi ronmental problems as everyone's business regardless of the direct 
consequences they are confronting5 5 This will in tum bring about more participation 
from the public which is one of the most important components to help improve the 
implementation of Thai environmental regulation 56 Such participation may include 
reporting to the govemment agenci es concemed when any non-compliance is found, 
and taking legal action against polluters. 
To summari se, environmental education is a very important component of an overall 
envirorunental strategy and an importan t found ation for envirorunental regulation. Yet 
although some important educational initiatives have already taken place, much more is 
needed if the serious obstacles to environmental protect ion in Thailand are to be 
overcome. Not least, the lack of politi cal will and certain crucial aspects of Thai culture 
currently impede the success of environmental education. But changing these aspects of 
politics and culture is very difficult and an environmentally educated public is a critical 
component; yet the chances of introducing more effective environmental education are 
very limited in the absence of political and cultural change. 
So it would appear that, notwithstanding the importance of environmenta l education, it 
is unlikely in the short term to figure prominentl y in an environmental reform strategy. 
However. as other strategies work, so will the opp0l1uniti es for environmental education 
themselves increase. For example, if an environmental infonnation and 'community 
right to know' strategy is effective, thi s will reinforce and emphasise the imp0l1ance of 
environmental educati on and also make people more receptive to it, and more 
demanding of it. We now explore the potential of the related but distinctive strategy of 
providing envirorunental infonnation. 
II. Disclosure of environmental information 
Environmental information is potenti ally a crucially important means of protecting the 
environment and changing human behaviour. The more infonnation related to the 
enviromnent people recei ve, the more likely they are to espouse environmentally 
55 See M D . Young et al .. Reimbursing the Future, 1996, at 107-8. 
56 Richard Blue ' Publi c P3I1i cipation Priorit ies', Proceedings of EI1l·ironlllental Priorities in Soutileast 
Asian Nations. 1997, at 75. 
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friendly behaviour57 Further, infonnation deriving from such disclosure can influence 
local communities to monitor and negotiate with polluters regarding their industrial 
behaviour.58 The infonnation regarding industry's behaviour also empowers consumers, 
who may boycott the products of polluters revealed to be non-compliant5 9 
Information disclosed from industry also enables regulators to do their jobs more 
effectively, for example enabling them to better target the worst poiluters60 Richard 
Burnett-Hall also points out that infonnation disclosed to the public either by industry 
or the government, can be used to press regulatory authorities to adopt a more active 
policy on pollution control , as well as prosecution.6! This was confinned by Dr Pitsamai 
Eamsakulrat, manager of the Industrial Environmental Management, the Federal of Thai 
Industry, who said: 
The most important thing for tackling the pollution problem is infonnation. The public 
must have access to information62 
But somc of the most important infonnation about air and water pollution is in the 
hands of industrial polluters, who in the past have been most reluctant to disclose that 
information. This raises the question: what fonns of infonnation are most impOliant, 
who needs and will use the information, will it be provided voluntarily and if not what 
is the appropriate role for government? In this section we explore these questions by 
examining three main types of environmental information disclosure: community right 
to know; green labelling; and environmental reporting; and to a lesser extent, somc 
specific environmental infom1ation refonns under existing Thai laws. 
Community Rights to KnolV 
57 See Anand Panyarachun, Who Manages Tha; Environment - Government, Business, or the Public?, a 
Keynote Speech, Thai Environment Institute 's Annual Conference, 3 July 1995, at 8. See also M.D. 
Young et al., at 107-8. 
58 Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty, Toward an Environmental Strategy for Asia, World Bank 
Discussion Paper. 1993, at 37. 
59 Ibid. See also Richard Bumett-Hall, 'Environmental Hazards and Duties of Disclosure: England', in 
Dennis Campbell (ed.), Environmental Hazards and Duties of Disclosure, 1994, at 172. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Richard Bumett-Hall, in Dennis Campbell (ed.), Environmental Hazards and Duties of Disclosure, 
1994, at 172. 
62 The interview took place on 25 December 1996. 
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I. 
As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, environmental regulations in many countries allow 
the public to have access to information related to any activity which could possibly 
cause damaging consequences to human health, and the environment. Such legislation is 
commonly referred to as 'community right to know' (CRTK)63 The laws related to 
community right to know apply to (i) the disclosure of environmental information from 
the government to the public, and (ii) that fi'om industry to the public. However, there 
are three forms of the environmental infonnation that can be disclosed from industry to 
the public: mandatory environmental reporting, optional environmental repotiing, and 
voluntary environmental reporting; so it is impotiant to understand that only mandatory 
environmental reporting falls into the community right to know regime. 
A. Government and discIosUJ'e of environmental information 
Arguably, the government agcncy overseeing a polluting industry is a good source of 
information related to the environment as it is generally involved with the industry from 
the outset in providing pennission to operate, monitoring, and enforcement. The 
importance of government undertaking this role is clear. According to Mr Dej-udom 
Krairith, president of the Thailand 's Lawycrs Association for Environmental 
Protection, one of many active environmental NGOs in Thailand: 
To solve this (environmental) problem, the govemment must provide sufficient 
infomlation to people. This includes to infonn them of their rights to have clean air, 
clean water, including the right to initiate environmental cases." 
However, although there are many regulations dealing with the disclosure of 
environmental infonnation at present as described above, few of these are directly 
concerned with government disclosure about its own activities and most target industry 
(the principal polluters) as a prime source of infonnation.65 Nevertheless, a number of 
European countries such as the United Kingdom have made a breakthrough in 
introducing laws requiring government to disclose infonnation on pollution control and 
chemical hazards. 66 These initiatives have subsequently engendered a number of 
!oj Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smarl Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 1998. 
64 The interview was unde11aken 011 5 JanuaJY 1997. 
65 Jacquelyn Ottman, Green Marketing, 1993, at 53. 
66 M. Purdue, 'Integrated Pollution Control in the Environmental Protection Act 1990: A Coming of Age 
of Envirol1mental Law?', Modern Law Review, 1991, at 538-9. 
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European Community directives on Freedom of Access to Infollnation and Control of 
Major Hazards of Industrial Activities 67 
In Thailand, the 1992 Enhancement Act has undertaken an obligation to disclose 
environmental infollnation. However, such initiative has so far achieved so little. The 
failure of these initiatives to yield effective results has also been examined in previous 
chapters, and this discussion will not be repeated here. Rather, suggestions are provided 
later in this chapter on how to make these laws work effectively. 
B. Disclosure from industry to the public (Corporate environmentall'eporting) 
' Industrial activity is followed critically by a concel11ed public. Much of the public 
distrust is caused by industry's own lack of openness.' 
A statement made by Norsk Hydro in its 1993 Annual Report68 
Alongside environmental info1111ation disclosed by the govel11ment, corporatc 
cnvironmental repoliing is increasingly gaining momentum as an environmental 
improvement strategy. What is corporate environmental reporting? In a broader sense, 
it can be described as the various means by which companies disclose infonnation on 
their environmental perfonnance69, and can take one of three fonns: mandatory 
environmental repoliing; optional environmental reporting; and voluntary 
environmental reporting. 
1. MandatOlY Ellvirollmental Reporting 
In addition to undertaking a duty to disclose infonnation themselves, govel11ments 
increasingly use infonnation disclosure as an incentive to make regulations work better. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See Anand Panyarachun, ' Merging Business and the Environment: Three Steps to Leadership' , TEl 
Quarrerly Environmenr Joumal, Jan-Mar 1995 , Vol.3, No.1, at 4. 
69 Asa Skill ius and Ulrika Wennberg, Continuiry, Credibiliry and Comparabilil1', The Intemalional 
Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics at Lund University, a report commissioned by the 
European Environment Agency, available on -line at 
http:www.lu.se/lIIEE/researchlmanagement/asa_ CCC _report/htm I. 
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In particular, they require polluters to release publicly, infomlation with regard to their 
environmental perfonnance. Such infonnation commonly concems the use and disposal 
of material, especially hazardous chemicals, as well as other activities that can have 
adverse effccts on the environment. These laws require industrial plants to provide the 
public with infonnation on the quantity of substances they discharge into the 
environment. Examples of these laws include the Toxic Release Inventory (TRl) under 
the Emergellcy Planning and Community Right to Knolll Act (EPCRA) introduced in the 
United States in 19867°. and a national pollution inventory, the contents of which are 
identical to those of EPCRA, introduced by Canada recently. 71 The information 
compulsorily disclosed is then used by investors, consumers and others in ways which 
put pressure on polluters to improve their environmental perfonnance. 72 
How does this strategy work? First, polluters are required to disclose estimates of their 
emissions to government (and through a govemment infomlation base to the public) in 
such a foml as to facilitate environmental groups and others ranking finns in tenns of 
their comparative pollution output. It then becomes possible for environmental groups 
to publish ' league tabl es' of the best and worst companies and, through the powcr of 
publicity, to shame the worst companies into better perf0l111ance. As Nei l Gunningham 
and Peter Grabosky argue, ' no executive likes to see their company exposed publicly at 
the bottom of the performance rankings,.73 This strategy exhorts high-ranking officers 
of each finn to make effol1s to ensure that the envirorullental perf0l111anCe of their plants 
compl ies with regulation. The equation is simple: the poor environmental performance 
rankings , when published, can bring about a great deal of adverse impact to the 
companies, ranging from decrease of customers to tougher cnforcement from regulators. 
Such disclosure provides a message to the public as to the likelihood of some fonn of 
enviroruncnta l disaster or damage from an industry's chemical substances-related 
activities and usua lly encourages public monitoring. At the same time, realising that it 
70 Paul Kleindorfer and Eric Orts. Infoll11ation Regulati on of Environmental Risks, at I. See also Robin 
Bidwell, 'Business and the EnvirOllllent: A Changing Agenda', TEf Quarterlv Environment Joumal. 
Jan-Mar 1995. Vol 3. No. I at 3 1. In this article, Bidwell states that the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory 
req uires films to provide infonnation on the quantity of over three hundred specific substances which are 
discharged into the envirOllll ent. 
71 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, SlIIarr Regul(ltion: Designing Environmental Policr, 1998, 
at 64. 
72 Paul Lanoie. Benoit Laplante, and Maite Roy, 'Can Capital Market Create lncenti ves for Poll uti on 
Con tro]?'. A World B(lnk Policl' Research Working Paper (PRD Working Paper # 1753), web si te at 
http: //v.'Ww.N1PR.org/workyaperinipr2/ index . ht111. 
7J Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regul(ltion.· Designing Environmental Policy, at 64. 
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is being 'watched' by the public, industry strives to improve its corporate behaviour 
which, in turll, reduces toxic emi ssions7 -l In the United States, within five years of the 
introduction of the Toxic Release Inventory mentioned above, toxic wastes released by 
industrial finns were reduced dramatically75 This success is so commendable that it 
was hailed by William Reilly, the fOrlller administrator of the EPA as 'one of the most 
effective instruments available ' for reducing toxic emissions. Mr Reilly' s view was later 
reinforced by his successor, Carol Browner, and many others76 At the other end of the 
continuum, the TRI data have proved to be of bcnefit to firlllS in regard to financial 
markets. Sound environmental performance disclosed by the data will help attract more 
customers to buy their products. as wel l as to invest in the firms 77 
In Thailand, the strategy of using environmental disclosure as a supplementary tool to 
help regulatory enforcement has been initiated on ly recentl y. For example, the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration (BMA) now releases inforlllation as to non-compliance of 
polluting finns, directly to the media, so that all detail s of eaeh firm , as well as its 
environmental perfonnanee, are publicly exposed. A Thai newspaper recently described 
how the BMA is planning to take action aga inst 18 named factories responsible for 
causing air and water pollution. These factories included Im-Huad steel furniture maker 
which dumped toxic waste into canals; Thip cooking oil producer which di scharged 
wastewater and sludge into a canal; and TPI cement factory which di scharged dust into 
the air. 7R 
Industry di sclosure of environmental infonnation is also required through 
environmental audits stipulated in some environmental regulations. For example, the 
1992 Enhancement Act requires the owner or possessor of the point source of pollution 
equipped with a polluted air system. wastewater treatment system, or waste disposal 
system to collect statistics and data showing daily the functioning of the system, and 
requires the repolis thereof to be kept at the site of the point source. Also, such person 
must provide a repoli showi ng the functioning outcome of the system, as well as submit 
74 Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty, Toward an Environmental St!'{{tegl'for Asia, at 37. 
J5 Ibid. 
76Neii GU1ll1ingham and Peter Grabosky. Smarr Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, at 64. 
JJ Asa Skillius and Ulrika Wennberg, Continui ty. Cred ibility, and Comparability. available at 
htlP:www.lu.seI1I IEE/research/management. 
7S Poona Antaseeda. 'C ity to act against plants dumping waste into canals' , Bangkok Post, 17 June 1997. 
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it to the local authorities where the point source is located at least once a month79 
Finally, Ministerial Rule No.3, issued under the 1992 FactolY Act, requires any factory 
the operation of which has potential to cause serious impact on the environment to 
conduct environmental auditing, and then provide relevant reports on the auditing, as 
well as reports on the efficiency of the systems for toxic environment prevention to the 
government. 80 
Tow31'ds Reform? 
To summarise, while the experience of community right to know legislation in 
developed countries has been very positive, Thailand at present has only a very limited 
number of infonnation disclosure requirements and nothing approaching the breadth 
and comprehensiveness of Community Right to Know legislation. This raises the 
question, can and should broader community right to know legislation be introduced in 
Thailand and are Thai culture and institutions conducive to its success? 
Given that the use of mandatory infonnation disclosure in Thailand is in its infancy, it is 
too soon to answer this question conclusively. However we may gain insight from a 
comparative study of mandatory infonnation provision in Indonesia, a developing 
country whose problems are similar in many respects to those of Thailand. 
As in Thailand, weak enforcement is one of the main reasons for environmcntal 
regulatory failure in lndonesia81 Faced with limited budgets and the growth of industry 
at the rate of 10 per cent annually, the country resorted to an application of information 
bascd regulation, which, unlike command and control regulation, did not rely heavily on 
financial and human resources from the government82 In particular, Indonesia's 
National Pollution Control Agency (BAPEDAL) in 1995 launched a program for rating 
and publicly disclosing the environmental perfonnance of factories in the country. The 
79 See Section 80 of the 1992 Enhancement Act. 
80 See Section 8 of the 1992 FactOlY Act, and Clause 4 of the Ministerial Rule No.3 (1992), issued under 
the 1992 Factorv Act. 
81 Paulus Effendie Lotulung, indonesian Environmental Future, A paper presented in the Seventh General 
Assembly and Conference Workshop, ASEAN Law Association, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 6.10 
Decemberl995, at 2-3. See also Riyatno. Environmental Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia, 
LL.M. thesis, the Australian National University, at 1. 
82 Shakeb Afsah et aI., Conrrolling Indllstrial Pollution: A New Paradigm, The World Bank's Policy 
Research Working Paper, October 1996, at 9. 
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objective of the program was to use pressure generated by public disclosure as a low-
cost substitute for fonnal enforcement of regulations. Such pressure was anticipated to 
force companies not only to comply with environmental regulations but to adopt cleaner 
technologies, which would lead to improvements in the state of the environment. s3 
The program was officially called Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and 
Rating, widely known as PROPER. It works by setting a colour rating system for 
informing consumers of finns ' environmental perfonnance. Under this system, five 
different colours are used to classify five levels of compliance. Gold is usually reserved 
for factories whose environmental perfonnance is recognised at the world level. Green 
is given to plants whose emissions control and housekeeping procedures exceed those 
needed for compliance. Blue is for firms whose compliance accords to national 
regulatory standard. Red signifies intennediate ratings. It is given to plants which have 
some pollution control but fall short of compliance, while Black is given to plants which 
fail to make any effort to control pollution and are causing environmental harm 84 
PROPER rated 187 plants during its pilot phase conducted in June 1995. No plant was 
given Gold, while five were given Green. Sixty-one plants were rated Blue, one 
hundred and fifteen plants were given Red, and six plants were rated Black. At this 
stage, plants' perfonnance was publicly announced with the exception of those given 
Red and Black which were privately informed. A period of six months was given for 
these low-rated plants to improve their perfomlance. PROPER rated the plants again as 
well as conducting a full disclosure of their perfonnance in December 1995. It was 
found that 50 per cent of the Black plants, and 6 per cent of Red plants successfully 
upgraded their status85 One may conclude that public disclosure under PROPER was a 
successful strategy for improving industrial finns' behaviour. 
In the light of the Indonesian experience in particular, it might seem that some fonn of 
community right to know legislation has very considerable potential in the Thai context. 
In a country where regulation is weak, where the problems of inadequate regulatory 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid, at 10. 
85 Ibid, at 11. 
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resources and corrupt regulators are endemic, the strategic use of en vi roru11ental 
infonnation could potentially do far more to achieve improved envirorunental 
perfonnance of at least reputation-sensitive companies, than almost any other individual 
mechanism. Loss of public reputation and of public credibility, pressure from 
consumers and envirorunental groups, and, the influence which poor environmental 
perfonnance has on financial markets , are very powerful pressures. 86 
Moreover, these pressures need not operate in isolation. For example, the fact, revealed 
by infonnation disclosure, that some companies are polluting at alanningly high rates , 
might in itself bring pressure to bear on government regulators to enforce the law more 
convincingly. The same infol111ation might enable them to better focus their inspections 
on the worst offenders. Again, various third parties (banks, insurance companies, 
NGOs, investors) are also empowered by this information and are likely to act upon it in 
ways which also give polluters incentives to improve their environmental perfonnance. 
And yet there are reasons to be cautious about the direct applicability of the Indonesian 
experience to Thailand and about whether government-sponsored public disclosure of 
industry's environmental perfonnance, like Indonesia 's PROPER, will yield the same 
effective results. One must not forget that the problem of regulatory failure in Thailand 
stems not only from weak enforcement, but from cultural and other problems as well. 
According to Mr Pornthep Teichapaiboon, deputy minister, the Ministry of Science, 
Teclmology, and Environment: 
Another problem is that often time we are deeply rooted in compromise culture and 
patronage system. These result in regulatory failure in the end. Take a case of 
Department of Industrial Work (DIW). DIW has a feeling that it is a parent of industrial 
plants because it is involved with the plants from the outset, ranging from giving 
permit, to inspection. As a result, it always hesitates to get tough on any tl1111 who 
violates the laws. Currently, it has to ask other agencies such as Pollution Control 
Department to take part in enforcing the law whenever non-compliance is found 87 
Similarly, Mr Supaporn Pukasemwarangkul, an enforcement officer, suggested: 
86 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The impact of PubliCity on Corporate Offenders , 1983, at 246-314. 
See also Fiona Haines, Corporate Regulation, 1997, at 222. 
87 The interview was conducted on II March 1998. 
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Where jurisdictions of DIW and my office (Harbour Dep3liment) overlap, DIW often 
asks us to take legal action against polluters. They justify their request that they know 
the polluters too well to get tough on them 88 
Under these regulatory circumstance of capture and compromise, would an instrumcnt 
such as PROPER work wcll ? It must be remembered that PROPER uses the di sclosure 
of rated colours as a 'carrot and stick' strategy: such disclosure serves to praise those 
whose environmental perfOllnance is given Gold and Green ratings, but simultaneously 
shames those whose perfollllance is given Black and Red. 89 Given the extent to which 
many Thai regulators have been compromised by their too close relationship with those 
whom they regulate, it is doubtful whether DIW in p31iicular (which has jurisdiction to 
oversee industrial factories and their environmental performance) would be willing to 
engage in the shaming component which is crucial to PROPER's success. 
One must conclude that it wo uld be no simple matter for Thailand to embrace 
compulsory environmental reporting. Whi le such an approach does have considerable 
promise, that promise is on ly likely to be real ised if the carriage and enforcement of a 
mandatory environmental repoliing requirement is given to an agency which is not, by 
reason of its history, culture and close relationship with regulated industry, too 
compromised to discharge its responsibilities. Ultimately, only with considerable 
political wi ll. and external support for independent verification of the rcpoliing 
requirement, would it be likely to succeed in Thailand. Here, the growing role ofNGOs 
and international markets and pressure (examined in Chapter 7) may make important 
contributions in serving to overcome political and cultural resistance to such measures 
from within Thailand. 
2. Green Labelling: Optional Environmental Reporting 
As environmental consciousness has increased, many consumers now prefer to buy 
'environmentally friend ly' goods and services 9 0 However, consumers have difficulty 
identifying accurately wh ich products are genuinely 'environmentally friendly' and 
distinguishing them from those that merely claim to be so. To resolve this problem, 
88 The interview look place on 16 March 1998. 
89 Shakeb Afsah et aI., Controlling Industrial Polllllion: A Ne\\' Paradigm , The World Bank's Policy 
Research Working Paper, October 1996. at II 
90 OECD, Environmental Labelling ill OECD countries, 1991 , at 12. See also Neil Gunningham and Peter 
Grabosky, al 65-6. 
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various fom1s of green labelling certification schemes have been introduced in a number 
of countries9t 
What is green labelling, and how does it work? Green labelling is a voluntary scheme 
whereby a label is awarded by a third p3I1y when a product meets cel1ain criteria. It 
works by hamessing consumer power to encourage manufacturers to adopt 
environmental protection policies throughout the manufacturing process92 Moreover, as 
fa r as trade competition is concerned, it is believed that green labelling can serve as an 
incentive for industries who want to prosper in an increasingly environmentally 
sensitive market. Supposedly, the manufacturers whose products have been awarded 
green labelling will benefi t from the increas ing member of products purchased by 
consumers. This will in tum force other manufacturers to improve their environmental 
pcrfonnance so as to obtain the cel1itication as well 93 
Green labelling is gaining worldwide popul arity. Examples include the European 
Union's Eco-I abel Award Scheme, which established a procedure for government 
certification to be awarded to environmentally friendly products. Other government-
sponsored g reen label schemes include Blue Angel of Gem1any, Environmental Choice 
of Canada, Eco-Mark of .l apan, and White Swan of Scandinavian countries.94 
Interestingly, despite an exponential expansion of the market for green products in the 
USA, that country has not yet had government-sponsored eco-Iabelling schemes as in 
many European countries. Instead, the country has two non-profit organisations, Green 
Seal and Scientific Certification Systems, which are competing in the market for 
rccognition 95 
At the intemational level, the environmental labelling program is on the rise among 
OECD countri es. Tt was introduced in 1992, and it is expected that all OECD member 
91 Eric 0 11S. 'Reflexive Envirorunental Law' , at 1246. 
n Dhi ra Phantum vani t. ' Linking Trade and the Environment'. TEf Quaner" · Environl1lent Journal. Vol. 3 
No. I . .Ian-Mar 1995, at 15. 
91 Green Label Sec retariat Office, Thailand Environment Inst itute, Green Lahel Projecl , an introductory 
r,amph let (n.d.). 
4 Eric Orts. ' Refl ex ive Environmental Law' , at 1247. Also. it should be noted that Gelll13ny is the first 
coun try which il1lroduced this eco-Iabel scheme in 1977. See also, Green Label Secretariat Office. 
Thailand Environment Institute, Green Label Projecl, for greater details. 
95 Eric Orts, 'Renexive Environmental Law' 1995, a11248. 
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countries will offer products with enviroruTIental labels in their markets in the near 
future. 96 
Has green labelling provided substantial incentives for manufacturers to develop more 
enviroru11entally sensitive products, in order to acquire the label and in tum to attract 
consumers? Except for GenTIan's Blue Angel, many national-based green labelling 
schemes have not received full cooperation from industry because of difficulties in 
detenTIination of cliteria and procedures; and establishment and operation costs of 
labelling. Also governments have had to provide substantial assistance to several 
schemes in order to make them viable. 97 
Thailand and green labelling 
Green labelling made its debut in Thailand in 1993 with the introduction of the Thailand 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (TBCSD), an environmental NGO. The 
scheme subsequently received support from both relevant government agencies, the 
Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Science, Tcchnology and Environment; and 
many other environmental NGOs98 
To make this scheme work, the green labelling committee was officially established in 
1994. The committee consists of 18 members, having the penTIanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Industry as the chairperson, while Thai Industrial Standards Institute (TIST) 
and Thailand Environment Institute are appointed as joint secretariat offices. Main 
responsibilities of the committee include approving a green labelling certificatc for a 
product, which must satisfy specified criteria99 
It is apparent that green labelling is gaining momentum among Thai industries. The 
reason is that many Thai want to avoid environmental ham1, and in tum, support green 
products. Dr Chokchai Aksoranan, then president of the Federal of Thai Industry, 
suggested: 
96 OEeD, Environmental Labe/ling in OEeD countries, 1991, at 36. 
97 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental PoIiCl', at 65-6. 
98 Green Label Secretariat Office. Thailand Environment Institute, Green Labe! Project, an introductOIY 
phamphlet (n.d.). 
99 Ibid. 
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Consumers are becoming wiser. They know about adverse effects of environmental 
degradation. As a result, the old-fashioned industries which do not care for the 
environment will not be able to survive for their products cannot compete with those 
who protect the environment. Now many people are looking for green products.IOO 
In order to obtain more details on this issue, I interviewed the persons in charge of each 
joint secretariat office. According to Dr Pongwipa Lohsomboon, project manager of 
Business and Environment Division, Thailand Environment Institute (TEl): 
The green label is a certificate awarded to any products which have very little 
environmental impact. So far, the green label certificates have been issued to nine 
fimls ... The concept of the green label is to encourage consumers to take part in 
environmental protection by means of choosing environmental friendly products. It is 
expected that people will go for the products the manufacturing process of which 
does not cause adverse effects to the environment in one way or another. In other 
words, it relies heavily on 'consumer power' to force the industry to integrate sound 
environmental management in their manufacturing process. The project has already 
been in operation for about four years. The first two years were spent on creating 
principles of the project. The last two years have been spent on producing 
regulations. IOI 
Ms Prima Wangwongwiroj, a TISI director, said: 
There are a number of business operators interested in receiving green label at present, 
but only nine firms have so far received the certificate ... Before the emergence of green 
label project, Thailand Environment Institute (TEl) conducted a survey to find out how 
the consumer thought about the project. It was found that many consumers were 
interested in green products, but they wanted the manufacturers to start first. In other 
words, they wanted industry to put the products in the market and they would try them. 
At the same time, the manufacturers were not sure if this kind of product would be 
needed by consumers and therefore wanted the consumers to ask for them first. I02 
100 The interview took place on 16 February 1998. 
101 The interview took place on 15 January 1998. 
102 The interview was conducted on 20 FeblUaty 1998. 
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While the survey mentioned above shows that Thai consumers are increasingly 
interested in environmentally friendly products, this in itself may not be sufficient to 
make such a scheme work. There are a number of problems with such schemes. First, 
they require a 'critical mass' of manufacturers to recognise the green labelling scheme 
and to obtain celiification under it. Only then will the label become widely recognised 
by consumers and only then will consumers be provided with a 'green choice' across a 
wide range of products. 
Second, the labelling scheme itself may be very expensive to run effectively. It is 
extremely difficult to rank products according to their environmental impact and a full 
analysis requires a detailed life cycle analysis which is complex, controversial (with 
regard to the value put on different characteristics) and costly. 
Finally, the mere fact that consumers say they would prefer to buy green products does 
not mean they would necessarily do so in practice, patiicularly if there is any price 
differential in obtaining such a product. This issue is particularly important in the 
cunent Thai economic crisis. Indeed, many industries which have adopted green policy 
in doing business are aware of this situation, and do not sell their products at a higher 
price than thosc which arc not awarded green labels. They have realised that if they do 
so, the chances are that customers will choose the cheaper products, as Dr Pongwipa 
Lohsomboon, the respondent mentioned above suggested: 
What we are wOlTied about is that people usually prefer cheaper products. To prevent 
this problem, entrepreneurs whose products are awarded green label have attempted to 
ensure that their products are not expensive than those of others.'03 
On the positive side, it appears that industries have increasingly realised that 
compliance with environmental regulation is a long-term investment. Given that they 
will benefit fi'om their green products gradually, it is not necessary for industries to 
overprice the products at present. This is confilmed by Dr Chokchai Aksoranan: 
Currently, evidence shows that sophisticated technology concerning enviromnental 
protection put in manufacturing process can help the industry have more productivity in 
the long term. For example, some pulp and paper businesses whose factories are 
103 The interview was conducted on 15 January 1998. 
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equipped with new technology are able to reuse wastewater discharged from 
manufacturing process. [n so doing, they have saved a lot of money for water and 
received the pay-back in two years. 'O• 
Mr Abhaichon Vacharasinthu, Assistant Vice President of c.P., a Thai-based 
multinational company, said: 
We do not mind spending money on expensive equipment for environmental protection. 
The reason is not because we think we are a large film, but because we can get profits 
in the long tUn. People now have more awareness than those in many years ago. So if 
our products are environmentally friendly, we do believe that people will trust our 
reputation and always look for our products. Eventually, we will gain more profits than 
the money we have paid for environmental treatment facilities 105 
To conclude, it is probably too early to evaluate the benefits and costs of a green 
labelling scheme in a country such as Thailand. It is, however, no coincidence that the 
small number of successful schemes operate in the most prosperous Westem 
democracies and that green labelling has not yet taken off to any serious extent in any 
developing country. Given currcnt economic circumstances and the other problems 
identificd above, grecn labelling has the potential to be at best a long tenn strategy for 
Thai environmentali sm. 
3, Volullta/y Envirollmental Reporting 
In the past, industry has been most reluctant to disclose environmental infonnation. A 
recent survey commissioned by the Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(BCSD) and the In ternational Institute for Sustainable Development found that 
busincsses in more than 30 countries are not currently providing information on 
environmental policies or activities to the publi c in general. Rather, they have merel y 
released some infonnation to particular groups closely associated with the company 
such as shareholders, and employees. 106 
104 The interview took place on 16 February 1998. 
105 The interview took place on 8 Janwuy 1997. 
106 Stephan Schmidheiny, Changing Course, 1992, at 94. 
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In any event, the public tend to distrust infOlmation which is provided from industry 
sources. According to Vincent Covello, the public usually tend to distrust the accuracy 
of industries and governments' environmental health risks infonnation.107 Yet at the 
same time companies, or at least reputationally sensitive companies, are increasingly 
realising that they need public trust in order to grow and prosper in the longer tenn, and 
that without trust, they risk losing their 'social license'. This realisation is strongest in 
relation to high-risk induslIies such as chemicals and is more pronounced in developed 
counties with environmentally sensitive populations. Nevertheless, the same pressures 
are growing in some developing countries too, with transnational corporations (whose 
image can be tarnished almost as much by disasters anywhere in the world) leading the 
way. 
To improve their image, attempts have been made to transform from reactive to active 
measures with respect to information disclosure. Recently, the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) has adopted a principle of 'compliance and reporting': to encourage 
business 'to measure environmental perfonnance; to conduct regular environmental 
audit and assessments of compliance with company requirements, legal requirements 
and these principles; and periodically to provide appropriate infonnation to the Board of 
Directors, shareholders, employees, the authorities and the public ,.lo8 This 'state of the 
art' disclosure of environmental infonnation has received a positive response from 
BCSD, which has been encouraging its members to follow the ICC's principle.109 
This same trend was encouraged by the Agenda 21 action program at the Earth Summit. 
It suggests that companies should be encouraged to 'report annually on their 
environmental records, as well as on their use of energy and natural resources'. 1 10 
107 Vincent Covello, 'Informing People about Environmental Health Risks: A Review of Obstacles to 
Public Understanding and Effective Risk Communication', in Michael Baram and Daniel Pat'tan (eds) , 
Corporate Disclosure oj Environmental Risks: u.s. and European Law, 1990, at S. Covello stales that 
public trust and confidence can be undennined by several factors. These include perceptions: (I) that 
govelllment agencies are unduly influenced by industry and inappropriately biased in favour of promoting 
hazardous technologies; (2) that managers and persOImel in govelllmenl agencies and industry are not 
teclmically competent ; (3) that health and envirolUnental protection programs have been mismanaged; (4) 
that experts and officials in govemment agencies and industry have lied, presented half truth, or made 
serious errors; at1d (5) that adequate coordination among responsible authorities is lacking. 
108Stephan Schmidheiny, Changing Course, at 94-5. 
l"Ibid. 
110 Anand Panyarachun, 'Merging Business and the Environment', a14. 
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As a result there is now a very significant number of companies involvcd in 
environmental reporting, not just in developed countries but wherever they have 
operations, and this in turn is putting pressure on local companies to do the same. 
TUllling specifically to the Thai situation, there is already some voluntary disclosure of 
environmental infonnation from industry to the public. The Thailand Business Council 
for Sustainablc Development (TBCSD) which was founded not long after the 
emergence of Agenda 21, is playing a leading role in persuading its members to publi sh 
environmental reports to the public. III However, given that allowing the public to know 
its intelllal affairs is a new and potentially threatcning experience, such change is likely 
to come about only gradua ll y. It is therefore unsurprising that only a few enterprises 
have already taken the TBCSD's advice so far. These include thc Siam Cemcnt 
Company Limited which has established an Environmental Standard Co-ordinating 
Committee to oversee the implementation and dissemination of inforn1ation with regard 
to its environmental policies to the public. I 12 
Pcrhaps we can anticipate the direction of future developments by examining the recent 
initiati vcs of one high-risk, reputationally sensit ive industry: chemical manufacturing. 
In the aftclll1ath of the Bhopal and Seveso l13 disasters when the chemical industry 
fearcd that it might lose its 'social licence' internationally, it made very considerable 
effol1s both to change its image and to improvc its environmental perfonnance.114 It did 
so primarily through its 'Responsible Carc ' program: a scheme by which chemical 
companies commit themselves to the improvement of their environment. health, and 
safety perforn1ance. Responsible Care started in Canada in 1985" 5 before being 
III Apat1 from envirolUllental rep0l1ing, TBCSD is also encouraging its members to establ ish corporate 
envirolUllental activities, and implement intemal audits. See Anand Panyarachun, TEl Quarterh' 
Environment Journal, Jan-Mar 1995, Vol.3 , No.1, at 5 for further detail s. 
III Ibid. 
11.\ Harry Otway. ' Risk Communication Po licy in the European Communities: Background , Status. and 
Trends'. in Michael Baram and Daniel Partan (eds), Corporate Disclosure 0/ Environmental Risks: u.s. 
and European Lclll', 1990, at 27-8. 
114 Neil Gunninghatll, 'Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsib le 
Ca re', Law and Policl'. 1995. aI57-95. 
115 Peler Simmons 'and Brian Wynne. ' Responsible Cat'e: Tmst. Credibility.and Environmental 
Management', in Kurt Fischer and Johan Schot (eds), Environmental Strategies/or [ndllstll', 1993, 
at 207. 
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modified and adopted in the U.S. shortly thereafter. It was later introduced in Australia 
in 1989. It has since been adopted by many other countries around the world. 116 
Obviously, disclosure of environmental information is so impol1ant that it is included as 
a means to achieve the goal of commitment to community participation and 
consultation, which is one of the two characteristics of the Responsible Care scheme. I 17 
With respect to the issue of infonnation disclosure, Responsible Care's specific codes 
and operating plans encompass provision of info1l11ation on possible hazards, 
encouragement of community involvement in emergency response planning, and 
establishment of a regular process of positive communication. I I S 
More recently, Responsible Care has received a great deal of attention from the 
chemical industry in Thailand. It appears that the Chemical Industry Group, the 
Federation of Thai Industries, is to produce Responsible Care among its members in the 
near future. Currently, the Chemical Industry Group is applying to be a member of the 
Intell1ational Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), the agency who oversees the 
authorisation of Responsible Care. 119 If Thailand is accepted as a member, the Thai 
chcmical industry will disclose infonnation on its performance voluntarily as a part of 
its commitment. 120 
Not least, voluntary environmental reporting overcomes the problem of captured or 
compromised govell1ment departments, because the information goes directly from the 
company to the public. Thus the problem with environmental reporting is not with the 
role of govemment but rather with the quality of the infonnatioll being reported by 
individual compames. Until such time as environmental reporting becomes 
standardised, with common perfonnance measures, it will not be possible to make 
serious comparisons between one company's performance and another's. And for this 
reason it will not be possible for environmental NGOs and others to successfully shame 
the poorer performers into improvement. However, rapid strides have been taken over 
116 Neil Gunningham, 'Environment. Self-Regulation, and the Chemical IndustJy: Assessing Responsible 
Care ' . at 62. 
III Two fundamental characteristics of Responsible Care are establishment of codes of practices: and 
commitlnent to community pal1icipation and consultation. See N eil Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-
Regulation. and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care ' . Law & Policy, Vol. 17 No. I, 
January 1995, at 62-3 for more details. 
liS Ibid. 
119 Federation of Thai Industry. Chemical [ndusliy Group is Planning 10 Adopl Responsible Care, Press 
Release. at 1-2. 
120 Chote GeamsakuL Responsible Care [nilialiv€. a public relations release, at I. 
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the last few years to improve the quality of environmental reporting, and the time may 
be fast approaching where it becomes a very important policy tool both in developed 
and in developing countries such as Thailand. 
Significantly, the forces that drive it (which are external to government) are largely 
independent of the cultural and political constraints identified earlier as so important in 
impeding other initiatives such as environmental education. 
C. Other information-based approaches in Thailand 
Although it has been argued that cOl1U11Unity right to know, green labelling and 
environmental reporting are the principal strategies for using enviromnental infonnation 
to achieve improved environmental perfornlance, they are by no means the only 
potential inf()lmation-based strategies available. In the particular context of Thailand, 
four other specific potential refonns are at least wot1hy of mention. All these are 
intcnded to improve upon existing Thai legislation which, as we have seen earlier, does 
require disclosure of environmental infonnation but despitc this, does not deliver 
satisfactory results. 
First. we have scen in previous chapters that although the 1992 Enhancement Act 
encompasses provisions of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), it does not 
provide an opportunity for the public to take part in the asscssment process. How can 
the government produce an accurate assessment in the absence of input from the public, 
especially from those who live in the area in which the project will be located? The 
most obvious refollll would be to include provisions for public hearings within this Act. 
Such provisions would ensure that the public has access to infonnation about the 
projects so as to be in a position to express their views and influence projcct outcomes. 
The expression of public views could make essential contributions to the decision-
making process and in particular, influence Thai govelllment policy so that it accords 
more closely with the public interest. 121 
121 See Komet Tongpinyochai , 'Legal Observation about Environmental Impact Assessment' , 
Chulalol1gkorn El1virol1l1lel1lal La]V Journal, January 1995 , at 41 for further details. See also Panat 
Tasneeyanond, 'The 1992 Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act: It 
is time for an overhaul', Journal of Ecolog\!, May-August 1998. at 36-7. 
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A second refonn would be to remove the qualifying word 'may' under this Act, thereby 
removing the ambiguity as to whether govemment officials have discretion to allow an 
individual access to infollllation. If the light to infonnation were made explicit, one of 
the main objectives of the 1992 Enhancement Act would be substantially advanced. 122 
But does removal of the word 'may ' guarantee the effectiveness of this provision? 
According to Amnat Wongbandit el al., this provision is intended to serve as a broad 
framework to recognise the light of an individual to have access to the infonnation 
which is in the possession of the government. Many detail s are however needed to make 
this provision concrete and effective. These include questions as to who will be 
responsible tor the expenses inculTed in obtaining the infonnation (such as a 
photocopy); whether an individual is entitled to appeal, if his or her application for 
environmental infonnation is turned down; and whether the government official who 
refuse to provide the requested info11l1ation is liable to any lawsuit. 123 Therefore, it is 
essential to enact organic laws which 3liiculate practical methods of implementing 
environmental infonnation provisions in detail , in addition to removing the word 'may' 
t'·om the 1992 Enhancement Act. 
Third, in order to make public hearing provi sions work effectively, the organic laws 
issued under the 1992 Enhancement Act could be modified to facilitate such public 
hearings more explicitly. It would be necessary to specify when an announcement for 
the hearing will be made to the public; what infonnation government has to release to 
the public before the hearing; what government will do with the input from the public; 
and how the project will be monitored as to whether it still complies with regulations 
after the EIA is approved. 
Finally, as to the 1997 COl·emment Information Act, we recommend that sanctions 
against government officials who refuse to disclose the requested infonnation be 
included in the provisions of this law. In the absence of these sanctions, there is reason 
to believe that the Thai officials who have been used to holding info11l1ation in their 
possession as confidential will be reluctant to cooperate in disclosing such info1111ation 
under this Act. 
122 Anand Panyarachun, Who Manages Thai Environment - Govelllment, Business, or the Public?, A 
Keynote Speech. Given to the Thailand Environment Institute's 1995 Annual Seminar, 3 July 1995, 
at 8. 
m Amnat Wongbandit el (II .. Reporl on Recollllllendafions for Lall's and Regulmions for Environlllenlal 
PrOfeCfion and Operalillg Mechanisms for COl11rol and Enforcemelll, submitted to Pollution Control 
Department. 1997. at 54-5. 
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D. Will disclosure of environmental information be effective in Thailand? 
Although it has been argued that the provision of environmental information is a 
potentially powerfili instlUment for reducing air and water pollution, it is , like most 
other instruments, more suited to some situations than others, and not without its 
limitations. These limitations are related to three main groups concerned with air and 
water pollution: industry, regulators, and the public. 
With regard to industry, extensive research shows that only large and wcll established 
finns operating in areas where they have a public profile, are desirous to protect their 
reputation for their commercial benefit. Many small and medium firms, on the 
contrary, do not have a reputation to protect and accordingly are not threatened by 
infollllation based instruments. 124 Similarly enterprises in high risk industries such as 
chemicals, are likely to be more reputationally sensitive than those in low risk industries 
where environmental problems do not attract attention and are not an everyday conceill. 
In the casc of regulators, there are risks that they wi ll not use the infonnation disclosed 
to them appropriately by enforcing the law against intransigent finns, particularly given 
the history of con·uption and cultural inhibition demonstrated by certain regulators in 
the past. This ri sk can be mitigated to the extent that such infonnation must be disclosed 
to the public as well , thereby facilitating transparency and accountability and creating 
pressure on regulators to use the information they have to enforce environmental 
regulation. 
In essence, it is not possible for an environmental infollllation disclosure scheme to 
achieve its goal in the absence of a public commitment to take environmental issues 
seri ously. Most importantly, the scheme of infonnation disclosure works best when the 
public have a commitment to environmental quality.125 Environmental infonnation 
releascd from either government or industry will by no means lead to regulatory success 
114 See Neil Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing 
Responsible Care', at 63-4, 92 for more details. 
125 Phaichitr Uathavikul , 'Managing the Environment' , Thailand King Bhumibol Adulvac/ej, The Golden 
Jubilee 1946-1996, at 222-4. The author justifies his argument that a wide gap separates public awareness 
from public action in Thai land. 
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if the public, a major stakeholder, ignores the infoll11ation, and fails to put pressure on 
industry or to buy environmentally fi-iendly products. Other potential roles for the public 
include monitoring industry 's perfonnance and reporting to the authorities concell1ed if 
any wrongdoing is found, or giving preference to environmentally friendly products 
such as those which are awarded green label. 
Here the roles of education and information are very closely interwoven. Only if the 
public is educated about environmental issues, and persuaded of their importance and 
the need to act upon them, will infonnation strategies such as have been outlincd above, 
be effecti ve. 
Finally, some environmental infonnation strategies, and in particular, community right 
to know, will only be effective if it is possible to break the patron-client relationship 
betwecn regulators and industry described earlier in the case of the DIW. In particular, it 
is necessary to entrust the disclosure of corporate environmental reporting to a 
govell1ment agency which does not have a very close relationship with industry. As the 
focus of this thesi s is on air and water pollution, it is suggested that the Pollution 
Control Department (PCD) take up this task, as indeed it has already begun to do. Such 
a view is endorsed by Mr Siritan Pairojboriboon, Director-General of the Pollution 
Control Depat1ment: 
To create more public participation, it is necessary to enhance people's right to know 
about anything the consequences of which may affect their health and the envirorU11ent. 
In fact , such rights are not only recognised by the 1992 Enhancement Act, but also by 
the newly enacted Constitution. 
In this regard, the Pollution Control Department has provided 'hot lines' [or those who 
want to get any information with respect to the state of the environment. So far, there 
has been a lot of participation from the public. Moreover, we have also provided 
services to give suggestions on hazardous or chemical substances by phone. People who 
want to know characteristics or impacts of any substances can ask for such infonnation 
by phone. This service has accordingly encouraged and enabled people to participate 
more in environmental protection. This is evidence that education and information 
creates awareness, and awareness creates public participation. 126 
126 The imerview was conducred on 19 January 1998. 
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In sUllUllary, this chapter has argued that a variety of forms of environmental 
infoI111ation could contribute substantially to improving air and water pollution but that 
some types of infoI111ation (community right to know) are more potent than others 
(green labelling) and that some groups (high risk, publicity-sensitive industries) will be 
more vulnerable to thi s strategy than other types of industry. The chapter also refcrred 
to the considerable success of an infomlation based strategy in Indonesia but cautioned 
that only if certain problems with agency co-option were overcome in Thailand would 
such a strategy be likel y to succeed. Finally, the relationship between infonnation based 
stratcgies and other strategies is important. The key to successful infomlation strategies 
is an environmentally educated, aware, and responsive public. And such a publi c will 
only cmerge in Thailand if other strategies-most notably envirorullental cducation, are 
successful. Once again. the case is bcing made ror a mi x of strategies rather than for 
promoting any single approach alone. 
II I. Economic Instruments 
Need for economic instruments in addressing environmental problems 
As the limitations of command and control regulation become increasingly apparent, so 
many policymakers are tuming increasingly towards economic instruments, because of 
their potential to provide more innovative, efficient and effecti ve so lutions to many 
envirorunental problems, including the issues of air and water pollution. 127 
The starting point tor economic approaches to environmental protection is the insight 
that many of the hamlful side effects of economi c activity, including pollution, can best 
be viewed as extemalities:"g hidden costs, which have not been taken into account in 
calculating the cost of the economic acti vity in question. Instead of bearing these costs, 
many polluters however extemali se these costs to the public and the environment. 129 The 
so lution, according to mainstream economic theory, is to change the rules so as to make 
the polluting enterprise bear the actual costs of pollution (eg pollution-abatement costs) 
so that, in economic temlinology. those costs arc intemalised in the polluters' busincss 
t27 Eric Orts, 'Refl exive Evironmental Law', at 124 1-2. See also Albert Nichols. Targeting Economic 
fncelltir'esjor Environmental Protection, 1984, at 1-6. 
128 Eric Ons. 'Reflexive Evironmental Law' . al 1241-2. 
Il9 American Nuclear Society. et al., GECD Documents: Po,,·e,. Generation Choices: Costs, Risks, and 
Extemalities. Pari s, 1994. al 56 
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transaction costs. uo The result will be to provide appropriate incentives for enterprises 
to reduce their levels ofpolJution in circumstances where it is cost-efficient to do so. 
Not until the 1980s was this idea translated £1'om concept into action, although the idea 
of economic instruments had drawn a great deal of attention from economists, 
regulators, environmentalists, and industry for many years. It was largely the efforts of 
the OECD, which perceived the potential of economic instruments and then 
disseminated this idea among its members, which achieved at least a partial shift in 
environmental policy amongst some of its members. The OECD's support, coupled with 
the increasing recognition of the limits of conventional command and control 
regulations , has resulted in greater acceptance and application of economic instruments 
in many Westem industrial nations 111 to the extent that in 1992, James Krier could 
assert, with some empirical SUpp011, that economic instruments were by then regarded 
by many as 'the hottest growth industry in environmentallaw '.1l2 
Thailand too, has recognised that economic instruments can significantly help to 
revitalise its environmental regulation, although as we will see, it has only adopted a 
very limited number of such instruments at ihis stage. Nevertheless, the more extensive 
usc of economic tools has received support from a number of quarters, including the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). According to Lal Kurukulasuriya, 
chief ofUNEP's Regional Environmental Law Programme: 
The whole world is moving away from command and control regulation. More 
application of economic incentives will enable Thailand to overcome its environmental 
problems. lll 
But which types of economic incentives have most potential to attack problems of air 
and water pollution in a country such as Thailand? It is this question we address in the 
following sections. 
]]0 Thomas Schelling. 'Prices as RegulatolY lnstnIments' , in Thomas Schelling (ed.), Incentives for 
Environmenral Froteclion. 1993 , at 4-32. 
I.lI Neil GUlmingham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmenral Folin', at 69-70. 
112James Krier, 'The Tragedy of the Conunons, PaJ1 Two' , Harvard Journal of Law & Fublic Polic.'". 
1992, at 325. 
l3J The interview took place on 9 December 1996. 
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Forms of economic instruments 
The contribution of economic instruments to environmental protection can take many 
forms. 134 However, given that thi s thesis has its focus on air and water pollution, this 
chapter accordingly limits its di scussion to the types of economic instrument whi ch are 
most suited to reducing these particular types of pollution. These are pollution charges 
and tax system s, property rights, tradable pennits, subsidies, financial assistance, civil 
li abi lity, and pertonnance bonds. 
A. Pollution Charge and Tax Systems 
The pollution charge or tax systems embody the Polluter payss Principle discussed in 
the previous chapters I" . The objective of charge and tax systems is to provide the 
necessary incentives for business to internali se the costs of pollution. Providing the 
charge is set at the appropriate level, industri es will have an incentive either to 
di scharge less pollution to avoid payi ng the charges or taxes , or to use appropriate 
technologies that help them reduce pollution. 136 Or in some cases it may be more 
efficient for a company (for example operating with capital intensi ve old technology) to 
pay thc charge or tax, at least in the short term. 
This approach deti ves from the Briti sh economist, Pigou, who suggested the imposition 
of taxes on pollution emissions in I 930s 117, and is known as the ' Pigouvian Approach'. 
Notably, thi s approach subsequentl y encompassed charge systems within its regime. 1JS 
Under this approach the level of the tax should be based on the degree of hatm caused, 
or in proportion to the amount of pollutant di scharged from polluting activity, wh ile 
calculation of the charge should be based on the use of resources, infrastructure, and 
services in tackling pollution. 139 
114 Theodore Panayotou.lnsll'1llllenls ofC/wnge. 1998. at 115. The author also states that any instruments 
that aim to induce a change in behaviour of economic agents, by inte111alising environmental or depl et ion 
cost through a change in the incenti ve stlUcture that these agents face (rather than mandating a standard or 
a technology), qualify as economic instlUments. 
115 Ibid. See also Chapter 2 for more details o f the Polluter pays Principle. 
136 Amnat \Vongbandit et al.. Recommendations for Laws alld Regulations for Ellvironmental Proreclioll 
and Operating Mechanisms for Control and Enforcell1ent. A report submitted to Pollution Control 
Department, 1997, at 257. 
117 James Kri er, Harvard Journal of La w & Public Policl', 1992, at 325-6. Notably. Krier doubts if Pigou 
virtually suggested the pollution taxes. Krier uses Pigou's major treatise which implies that he actually 
proposes to subsidise (emphasis in original) pollution control to justify his scepticism. 
118 Eric 011S. 'Reflexive Evironmental Law '. at 1242. 
1.10 Theodore Panayotou, fnSlr/llnel1ls a(Change, 1998, at 29. 37. 
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Pollution charge and tax systems are among the most common economic instruments 
used in a wide vatiety of countries. 140 For example, charges on water pollution and on 
certain air emissions have been established in many European countries for many 
years.i4l Australia, France, Gennany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland, in 
particular, use effluent charges in the regulations related to water pollution. i42 Tn Asia, 
research has also found that pollution (effluent or emission) charges are the most 
common fonns of economic instrument. l4] As for the tax system, the United States 
levies taxes on patiicular chemicals in proportion to their adverse effects on the 
environment, while Sweden and Gennany apply different tax levels to different 
pollutions, for example, taxing unleaded petrol at lower rates than leaded petrol to 
entice motorists to switch to the fonner, which generates less pollution. i44 
Thailand and Polluter Charge and Tax Systems 
Thailand has not yet introduced either pollution charges or taxes at the time of writing. 
However, the 'big bang' environmental law refonn in 1992 introduced the polluter 
pays principk, as a result of which the country is now collecting fees for wastewater 
treatment, and waste disposal, as well as the administration fees for collection of 
garbage under the 1992 Enhancement Act, and 
respectively.l45 
the 1992 Public Health Act 
Despite the existence of fee collection under the polluter pays principle described 
above, the Thai government agencies concerned are actively interested in the 
introduction of pollution charge and tax systems For example, Dr Prasert 
TapaneeyangkuI, a technical adviser to the Depatiment of Industrial Work (mW) 
indicated during my fieldwork that: 
140 Neil GU1Ulingham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, at 
75-7. 
14i Robin Bidwell, 'Business and the Enviromnent: A Changing Agenda', TEl Quarterlv Environment 
Journal, Vol. 3 No. I, Jail-Mar 1995, at30. 
i42 Thailand Environment Institute and Department of Industrial Work, Development of Economic Tools 
in Industrial Environmental Management, August 1997, at 5-6,and 5-7. See also Eric Orts, 'Reflexive 
Eviromnental Law', at 1242. 
i4] Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty, Toward an Environmental Strateg1' jor Asia, at 76. 
i44 Environmental Research Institute, Chulalongkol11 University (ERlC), 'New Dimension For 
Environmental Management with Economic Instruments', A paper submitted to the New Dimension For 
EnvirolIDlental Management with Economic Instruments seminar held on 28 May 1998, at Environmental 
Research Institute, Chulalongkol11 University, at 2-3. 
i45 See Chapter 2 for greater details. 
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We will introduce pol lution charge as a means of creating incentives. Even those whose 
discharge complies with the standard will have to pay a charge, the rate of which is 
based on the quantity of wastewater. 146 
As a preliminary step, DIW, in association with the Ge1l11an govell1ment, has assigned 
the Thailand Environment Institute (TEl) to conduct a feasibility study on the 
'application of cconomic instruments in managing industrial pollution' .'.7 The study has 
suggested the DIW should introduce emission charges and pollution management fees 
as the economic instruments best suited to deal with pollution emanating from industrial 
plants. I.' Most recently, Mr Rachada Singalavanij a, DIW's deputy dircctor-general has 
announced that the agency will introduce emission charges and pollution managcment 
fees by the year 200 I. 149 
What are characteristics of the emission charges and pollution management fecs to be 
introduced by DIW') These two instruments differ in many aspects . For example, the 
emi ssion charges will be levied on the large fill11S which have machinery in excess of 
fifty horse-power and fi fty employees, or on firm s whose operation may cause hann ful 
effects to the public or the environment, whi le the pollution management fees are 
coll ected from plants generating a great deal of pollution regardless of their size. The 
emission charges will be levied at hi gher rates than the sum of money actually spent on 
pollution treatment or disposal and the proceeds will go to the govell1ment. The 
pollution management fees, on the contrary, will be collected according to the exact 
amount of money spent on pollution treatment or di sposal, and a part of these fees will 
be retull1ed to the plants which have not only had the systems for rehabilitation of 
environmental quality in place, but successfully convinced the DIW that such systems 
will be able to reduce waste during the manufacturing process or waste treatment or 
disposa l systems. ISO 
Whi le the pollution charge system seems on the brink of being implemented in Thailand 
(as appears from the DIW 's movement above) , a question arises: how appropriate is an 
146 The interview was condUCled on 20 FebrualY 1998 
147 Itlirit Prakamlhong, 'Polluters Must Pay According 10 Consumpti on Quantity and Styles ', The Creen 
World. November-December 1998, at 24. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Wasant Techawongtham. ' Industries to be fo rced to be cleaner: Economic Incenti ves likely in two 
years'. Bangkok Post, I April 1999. 
150 Ittirit Prakamlhong, ' Polluters Must Pay According 10 Consumption Quantity and Styl es', at 25. 
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environmental tax system to the ci rcumstances of Thailand and how suited are taxes and 
charges to addressing air and water pollution in Thailand in particular? This chapter 
approaches thi s question not on ly by examining strengths and weaknesses of the 
economic approach but also through a comparative study of the use of these instruments 
in a country in the developing world where the charge and tax systems are in place. 
Hcre, the chapter has selected China, not only because it is a developing country, but 
because the country also has a problem of enforcement simil ar to that of Thaiiand. l si 
However, even within the developing worid, there are of course very substantial 
differences between indi vidual countries and what works well in one country may yield 
different results in another. Accordingly, our final analysis will also take into account 
relevant circumstances in Thailand in assessing the ultimate value of economic 
instruments in that country. 
The weaknesses of taxes and charges 
As indicated earlier, in principl e, taxes and charges, provided they are set at an 
appropri ate level, can provide a substantial incentive for industry to discharge less 
pollution. However, in practice, they may be far less effective, for a variety of reasons. 
Fi rst, scholars suggest that many tax and charge schemes which have been implemented 
around the world are used by the govemment as means of raisi ng revenue, rather than 
for improving the environmental situation . IS2 The fact that the rate of charges or taxes 
set by govemments in most countri es is relatively low is consistent with this view. 153 A 
low rate of charges and taxes can be introduced with much less political opposition than 
a high rate, and allows polluters to pay with littl e or no diffi culty, and for this reason is 
insufficient to encourage polluters to improve environmental perfomlance. It does, 
however, enhance the govemment's revenue and may, notwithstandi ng its ostensible 
environmental benefits, be introduced solely or largely for this reason. 
A second prob lem with envirorunental taxes and charges is that, at least in some 
circumstances , pollution-abatement costs may not be genuinely intemalised by the 
industry. As Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky suggest, such costs may simply be 
15J Andrea Zavadaszky. ' Balancing the Legal Scales', Asian Sustainable Developmel1l Report, Vol 1. No 
2, June-Augusl 1994. at 28 . 
152 Nei l Gu nningham and Peter Grabosky. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, at 76. 
IS] Theodore Panayotou, [nSlI'llill ents ojChallge, at 30. 
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transfelTed to final customers. at least when demand is relativel y inelastic. 15. In thi s 
case, industry merely pay the taxes or charges before including these payments in thc 
product prices. If this happens, the strategy of using taxes or charges to makc industry 
change its behaviour will fail since industry lacks motivation to improve its 
cnvirorullental perfonnance. 
Third, it is difficult (even if the political will exists) to set the taxes or charges at the 
right level. 155 As Theodore Panayotou points out, to set the correct tax , there is a need to 
estimate the marginal benefits and marginal costs curves to determine the optimum 
pollution level, wh ich is a complex and demanding task. 156 
The final weakness of charge and tax systems is that these systems depend heavi ly on 
monitoring from the government. Thus, they incvitably necessitate considerable 
administration and enforcement costS. 157 Thi s causes a concern in Thai land, which has 
been facing economic downturn at the time of writing. For this reason, it wo uld be 
naive to rely solely on charge and tax systems to reduce air and water pollution in 
Thailand. 
Use of pollution chat'ge and tax systems in developing countdes: China's 
expedence 
China introduced pollution charge systems in its 1982 regulation. ISS The systems' 
objective was to levy fees from polluting industry whose pollutant discharges exceed 
the limit set by the state. Fees are charged according to quantities and concentration of 
the pollutants released. 159 Research has also found that the revenues from pollution 
charges provide the second largest source of fund s for environmental investments in 
China. 160 
154 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabos~J', SlIIart Regulation: Designing Environmental POIiCl', at 76-7. 
155 Carler Brandon and Ramesh Ramanklltty, Toward an Environmental Strategl' for Asia. Discussion 
Papers. 1993. at 76 . 
156 Theodore Panayotou. instrulllents of Change, at 30. 
157 Ibid. 
ISH Paul Clement-Hunt , Thailand's Status as an Ellleiging EI11'ironlll ental Market: A Comparati\'e 
Analvsis of Six Asian Countries . A paper presen ted at the con ference Industry & Environment , 29 May 
1995, at Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, Bangkok, at 22. 
15 9 Shakeb Afsah et aI., Controlling Industrial Pollution: A New Paradigm. Policy Research Working 
Paper. 1996. at 8. 
160 Theodore Panayotoll, instruments of Change. at 173. 
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Studies conducted by the World Bank, in collaborat ion with China's National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), focusing on thc water pollution levy in 29 
provinces and urban regions during the period 1987-1993, reveal that the levy scheme 
delivered different results from place to place. More effective levies are found in 
urbanised and industrialised provinces. especially in the eastern coastal regions although 
the official levy rate set by the national government applies unifonnly across Ch ina. On 
the basi s of these findings, Shakeb A fsah et at. suggest that the effectiveness of the 
levy depends on two local factors: local valuation of pollution damage, and community 
capacity to comprehend and react to environmental problems in the locality.1 61 
Applying charges and taxes in the Thai context 
As discussed above, DIW is on the verge of introducing emission charges and pollution 
management fees in Thailand by the year 2001. 162 This coincides with the studies 
conducted by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), and the 
Pollution Control Department (PCD) which suggest that pollution charge and tax 
systems have the potential to playa dynamic role in dealing with the problems of air 
and water pollution in Thailand, as the polluters reali se that they have to be responsiblc 
for the cost for abatement of the pollution they have generated. 16] Consistent with this, 
Mr Panat Tasneeyanond, the main drafter of the 1992 Enhallcement Act, also advocates 
that pollution taxes and emission charges are important ways to help revitalise pollution 
controL 164 
Although there is evidence that taxes and charges have been applied in the developed 
world with considerable success as discussed earlier, and the preliminary results in 
China are also promising, it is by no means certain that these economic instruments will 
work equally well in Thailand. On the contrary, a number of characteristics of Thai 
161 Ibid. at 9. 
162 See note 148 supra. 
16J Environmental Research Institute. Chulalongkom University (ERIC), Nell' Dimension For 
Environmental A1anagement l¥ilh Economic lnslrumellls: A paper submitted to the New Dimension For 
Environmental Management with Economic InstlUments seminar held on 28 May 1998, at Environmental 
Research Instinne, Chulalongkom University. See also, Amnat Wongbandit et al. , Report on 
Recommendations for Lall's and Regulations for Environmental Protection and Operating Mechanisms 
for Control and Enforcement. submitted to Pollution Control Department. 1997. at 281. 
It should be also noted that the DlW is an enforcement agency, while the NESDB is involved in 
envirolUllental issues at the policy-making level. and the PCD is empowered under the 1992 Enhancemel1l 
ACI to act as a coordi nator rather Ihan as a genuine enforcer of environmenta l law and policy. For more 
details, see Ittirit Prakamthong. The Green World, at 25. 
164 See Pana[ Tasneeyanond. 'The 1992 Enhancement ACI: It's aboul lime for overhaul', Journal of 
Ecologl·. Vo l. 25. No.2, May-Aug 1998. at 38-9. 
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culture will make the successful introduction of economic instruments in Thailand a far 
greater challenge. For example, regulators may adopt an accommodative enforcement 
style towards industries which have provided assistance to their agencies in the light of 
the gratitude culture, as we have learned from the previous chapters. 165 
Alongside gratitude, the culture of individualism could also hamper the success of 
charge and tax systems As shown in Chapter 4, the Thai do not like to be forced, even 
by law. '66 This could lessen the effectiveness of the system, as charges and taxes have 
coercive characteristics. Finally, the lack of technological and professional 
sophi stication of Thai regulators may make both measurement and collection a 
substantial challenge. 
Besides, given that corruption is pervasive in Thailand as discussed in Chapter 5, there 
is a serious concern as to how effective the system will bc, cspecially when regulators 
are empowered to impose charges or taxes on polluters. The problem of how best to 
limit regulatory discretion again becomes paramount. 
On the other hand, as in China, the local community can playa crucial role in making 
charge and tax systems work effectively, and the Thai goverrunent must harness the 
power of the local community to help strengthen the charge, tax, and fee systems which 
are introduced. '67 Such measures include the provision of environmental education and 
information to all thc stakeholders concerned as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Overall, taxes and charges could playa constructive role in enhancing environmental 
protcction, and, taking a long-tenn perspective, the initiatives taken by the Thai 
government to introduce taxes and charges are to be welcomed. In the short tenn, 
however, the political and cultural problems described above may prove a substantial 
impediment to their effectiveness: taxes and charges will not be successful in isolation. 
More honest and expeli regulators will be needed to manage the system, and this need 
'65 See Scott Christensen el al., The LessollS 0/ Easl Asia: Thailanc!, The [nslillllional allc! Polilical 
Unde/pinnings 0/ Growlh, A World Bank Publication, 1993. at 20. See also Amnat Wongbandit, 'Laws 
Related to Factory's Wastewater Treatment' , DIII/apaha. January-March 1996, at 117. 
166 Thinnaprul Nakata and Likhit Dhiravegin. 'Social and Cultural Aspects of Thai Polity'. in Suchru1 
Prasith-rathsin, ed. , Thailand's Nalional Developllle11l: Social alld Economic Backgrollnd, 1989 , 
at 183. 
167 See Theodore Panayotou, Todd Schatzki, and QwalUuedee Limvorapitak, 'Differential [ndusliy 
Responsc to Fonnal ruld Informal Environmental Regulations in Newly Industriali zing Economies: The 
Case or Thailand'. A Case Study for the HIID 1997 Asia Environmental Economics Policy Seminar, 
Han'arc! Inslillile/or 111Iernalional Deve/oplIlelll, FeblUary 1997. 
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will not be met in the short telln. The public will have to be better infoll11ed. 
Furthermore, as discussed, there are many technical difficulties involved in creating an 
effective tax and charge system. Thailand 's rel ative lack of experience in this area, 
together with the uncertainties created by an econom ic system which is still recovering 
from crisis, wi ll complicate the introduction of the system. Only when the educational 
and in follna tional ini tiatives create the conditions for more accountability and 
transparency, and more effective community groups and other NGOs (acting as a 
countervailing force and keeping regulators and others honest). are we likely to see a 
credibl y effective tax and charges system. 
B. Property Rights 
Extensive research has fou nd that many of the problems of resource depletion and 
environmental degradation are attributablc to market fa ilure l68 , resulting from the 
absence of wel l-defined , secure and transferable property rights over resource or 
environmental assets. 169 Under these ci rcumstances, people have no incenti ve to protect 
the resources because they do not own them. 170 Rather, they harvest as much of the 
resources as possible regardless of other people's interests or long-tenn depletion of the 
resource, or even the ultimate extinction of a pmiicular specics. lll This situation has 
been referred to as the ' tragedy of the commons'. 172 
The propeliy rights approach is widely proposed as a means to rectify the problem of 
resource overexploitation and environmental degradation. l73 The propeliy rights 
approach assumes that people are self-interested and that incentives must be created to 
loS See Carter Brendon and Ramesb Ramankutty. Toward an En\'ironlllel11al SlralefS\' for Asia. 76: 
Theodore Panayotou. inSlnllllelllS of Change. 1998. at 17: and Neil Gurmingham and Peter Grabosky. 
Smart Regulation: Designing Em'ironmental Policy. at 70-1. 
160 Theodore Panayotou.lnslnllnel1ls of Change. 1998. at 17. 
170 M.D. Young. el al., ReimburSing the Futllre: An Evalualion of MOliwllional, Volul1lCilT, Price-based, 
Properl\'-righls,and RegulalOIl" incenlives for Ihe Conservalion of Biodiversity, 1996. Biodiversity Series 
Paper NO.9. Department of the Environment. Sport and Territories. Biodiversity Unit. Canberra. 
1'1 Da,id Pearce and Jeremy Warford. World \\'itholll End:Economics, Ellvironmenl, and Sustainable 
De\'elopmelll, 1993. at 239. 
I" Hardin. Tragedy of the ConUllon. cited in Ronald Johnston. Nalllre, Siale alld EC0I10ml" A Political 
Economr oflhe EI1\'irol1l11el1l, 1996. at 134-5. 
m See M.D. Young et al .. at 113 for tile case of natural resources. With regard to pollution. see Ten-y 
Anderson & Donald Leal. 'Free Mar'ket Versus Political Environmental ism' . Harvard Journal of La1\' & 
Public Policl". Vol. 15. No.2, 1992. at 304. 
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hal11ess their self-interest in the public interest. This may be achieved by creating 
appropliate propel1y rights over scarce resources and allocating these to private 
individuals. That is, well-specified and enforceable property rights create an appropriate 
incentive for those holding the rights to maintain the resources so that they can 
maximise thcir profits. 174 As the scarcity prices for resource and environmental assets 
are internali sed, a rational rights owner will not ovcrcxploit them. 175 
A vivid example in this regard could be drawn from Eric Orts's Reflexive 
Environmental Law. Orts suggests that if elephants are treated as a private resource 
capable of private ownership, then their owners wi ll have an appropriate incentive to 
preserve their animals for future interest. 176 In contrast, when nobody owns the 
elephants, the experience is that their long-tellll preservation is not valued and they face 
depletion and ultimately, extinction. 
The property right approach is low in administrative and transaction costs for it does not 
rely on government in overseeing the resources.177 However, propel1y rights regimes 
also have some limitations. In particular, they can be manipulated for political purposes, 
as when political incumbents take the 0ppol1unity to assign the propel1y rights for their 
own political benefits, such as to reward their political supporters, or to gain more 
popularity with their constituencies. 178 
Thailand, air and water pollution, and the role of Property Rights 
A property rights scheme has not been introduced in Thailand yet despite increasing 
debate on the issue. 179 However, there is considcrable interest in adopting a propel1y 
rights approach to help combat deforestation, but much less debate about its potential 
role in mitigating air or water pollution. This is understandable, because wh il e the ro le 
property rights might play in addressing forestry issues is clearly evident, thi s potential 
174 TelTY Anderson & Donald Leal. 'Free Market Versus Political Environmentalism' , Harvard Journal of 
Law & Public PoliCl', Vol. 15, No.2, 1992, at 303-5. 
175 Ibid. . 
176 Ibid . 
177 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Reglllation: Designing Environmental Policy, 
at 70- 1. 
178 See Theodore Panayotou. InstrumelllS of Change. 1998, at 20-1 for more details. 
179 Gordon Fairclough, ' The Big Dry: Water shortage threatens Thai rice production ' , Far Eastern 
Economic Rel'ip\\', 27 January, 1994. at 25 -6 . 
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as a mcans of dealing with pollution is much more problematic. As regards forestry , Mr 
Sri suwan Kuankajorn, director of the Ecological Recovery Project said: 
In the past, the Thai govemment made use of forcsts to make money. They issued 
concessions to those who won the bid. Then the concessionaires could cut down the 
li censed forests. This brought about an idea that the forests did not belong to people, but the 
state, who got benefits from the forests through the giving or concession. As a rcsult, many 
vi llagers just cut down the trees for their own benefits because they thought if they did not 
do so, the concessionaires would do it anyway. Clearly, there was an absence of propeI1y 
rights over the forests among people, resulting in uncontrollable deforestati on. If people 's 
ri ghts over resources a l'c well defined , they will have feelings that they are the owners of 
cnvirollli1ent and natura l resources which will in turn help protect them. 180 
But what is the potential of propel1y ri ghts in respect of pollution? With regard to the 
issue of air and water pollution in particular, Theodore Panayotou argues that thc 
propel1y rights systems are neither possible nor desirabl e as it is impossible to exclude 
any indi vidual from using air and water. 181 However, at least in respect of water 
pollution, a less pessimi stic view is at least credible. Terry Anderson and Donald Leal 
argue that propel1y rights could help solve thc problem of watcr pollution , on the basis 
of the British cxperience that pollution cou ld be rcduced in the Unitcd Stales if private 
fi shing lights were establ ished. Thcy suggest that under a system of liability rules 
(sun'ogate propel1y rights) the owner of fishing rights downstream could bring sui t 
against an upstream polluter whose activ ity has damaged their fishing rcsources. 182 On 
the other hand, Andcrson and Leal however concur with Panayotou that property rights 
are not suitable for dealing with the problem of air pollution, because its origin is 
usually very difficult to trace owing to uncertain air cUlTents. 183 
For si milar reasons to those al1iculatcd by Anderson and Leal, it is suggested that 
propel1y rights should indeed be introduced in Thail and to help tackle the problem of 
watcr pollution despitc the controversial arguments described earlier. Such an approach 
will increase public participation as it will serve as a mean s for the injured individuals 
li ving downstream to claim compensation rrom upstream polluters. To work 
successfull y, however, a number of other factors must be sati sfied , because the property 
180 The interview was conducled on 3 FebrualY 1998. 
181 Ibid. 
182 TCITY Anderson & Donald Leal , ' Free Market Versus Politica l Environmentalism', a[ 305. 
183 Ibid. 
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rights regimc is not a 'stand alone' so lution for water pollution in Thailand. For 
example, it is obvious that the property rights approach relies very much on civi l 
liability. This necessary measures must be taken to ensure that the civil liability 
instrumcnt, when applied, will respond to the propel1y rights regime effectively. 
Discussion on civil liability is provided latcr in thi s chapter. 
However, it would be totally wrong to conclude that the propel1y rights which help 
reduce water pollution in some counlIies will yield the same results in Thailand, givcn 
the particular cultural and political circumstances of Thailand, which can be seen in 
microcosm through the example of the Klity mine case discussed in Chapter 3 . It will 
be remembered that it took the villagers 30 years to complain about the water pollution 
issue,184 an illustration of the culture of compromise. Evidence shows that the mine was 
owned by a Democrat politician,18S an example of the close links between politics and 
business and the dangers of political corruption. Thc villagers therefore felt reluctant to 
act against a poli tician owing to the power-oriented trait discussed in Chapter 4. 
U ltimately, it was support from a number ofNGOs such as the Wildlife Fund Thailand, 
and Karen Study and Development Ccntre, encouragcd the villagers to complain abo ut 
thi s casc. 186 
In thesc circumstances, other measures must be taken to ensure that the Thai will 
exercise any propel1y rights bestowcd upon them. These mcasures include 
environmental education and infonnation as to the existence of the property rights, what 
hallllful effects the water pollution can cause to living things, how the propel1y rights 
could help address the problem of water pollution, if the scheme will be introduced in 
thc country, and greater powers for NGOs to help them overcome both their cultural 
inhibitions and the politi cal constraints described earlier. 
C. Tradable Emission Permits 
Like property rights, tradable pennits are another attempt to create a 'missing' market to 
help address environmental problems. IS ) As Theodore Panayotou points out, tradable 
184 'Klity water still health-hazardous', Bangkok Post, 14 FeblUalY 1999. 
185 Sanitsuda Ekachai. ' Lead mine faces rising opposition' . Bangkok Post, 14 July 1998. 
186 Supawadce Susanpoolthong. 'G roups unite to block lead threat'. Bangkok Post , 22 May 1998. 
187 Nei l Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smarr Regulatioll: Designing Environmelltal Policy. at 71-4. 
Also Theodore Panayotou suggests that tradable emiss ion permits are a means of market creation. See 
Theodore Panayotou, Ilistruments oj Change. at 24 for greater details. 
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emission permits are nothing but tradable emission quotas, and are in effect, a 
combi nation of property rights and a market-based variant of a command and control 
perm it system. 188 
How does a tradable emission pellllits system work? The scheme regards the ' right to 
discharge emissions' as a fonn of property. Then the govelllment, which retains 
effcctive control of the scheme, sets an aggregate level of polluting emissions in one 
particular area. 189 Each finn situated in the arca is allocated the level of polluting 
emissions it can discharge. 190 However, all industries in the area are allowed to trade 
such ' right to discharge emissions' among themselves, providing the overall level of 
polluting emissions is not exceeded. 191 
How can one be sure that p3l1icipating finn s wi ll not discharge em issions over the 
pellllitted quotas? This requires government (or conceivably third-party) involvement in 
monitoring and policing the implementation of the scheme, and in particular in ensuring 
that p3l1icipating fillllS have complied with the allocated emi ssion quotas. If any non-
compliance is found, governments will conduct enforcement in a similar manner to that 
used in the traditional command and control regulation. In 
Tradable pcrmits havc the attraction of providing industri es with greater flexibility to 
manage thcir business according to the circumstances. For example, if they want to 
increase production, they can buy the rights to discharge emissions fi·om other finn s in 
the same area. On the other hand, if their business is declining, the industries might 
want to reduce their production. In this case, they can sell their rights to di scharge 
emissions to other fillll S.193 
Another advantage of this approach is that it encourages industries to switch to 
sophi sticated technologies which can help them reduce pollution (while producti vity 
remains intact, or even increases), and then sell their remaining rights to discharge 
188 Theodore Panayotou, [nstrulllel1ls ojChallge. at 24-5. 
189 Given that command and control regu lation is one of the two elements of the tradabl e penn it sys tem, it 
is inevitable that govemment must be invo lved significantly in making this system work . 
190 Nei l Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 
at 71-4. 
19 1 Jonathan Wiener, ' Globa l Environmental Regulation : InstlUment Choice in Legal Context' , Th e Yale 
Lm l' Journal, 1999, at 715 . 
192 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smarr Regulation: Designing Environmental Polier, 
aI 7 1-4. 
19) Ibid . 
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emissions to other firms. '9-l Tn some circumstances such a sale can make huge profits if 
the buying finns desperately want to increase their production and need more pennits to 
achieve thi s legall y, given the anticipated level of pollution discharged. '9S 
But the tradable pennits approach has a number of shortcomings. These include high 
management costs of the scheme associated with the government involvement. 196 These 
costs are required for recruiting qualified officials, and purchasing the necessary 
equipment for administration and monitoring. However, the crucial question here is: 
high compared to what? That is, these costs would not necessarily be larger, and might 
well be substantially less, than those involved in reliance on the traditional alternative to 
tradab le pernlits: command and control regul ation. 
There is also a difficulty in detennining a fair allocation of the emission permits among 
participating firm s. 19) Such a detennination could be subjective and possibl y lead to the 
problem of unfairness given the pervasiveness of corruption and patronage in Thail and 
as di scussed in Chapter 4. Furthennore, as government does not collect any fee from 
finn s in exchange for allocation of the rights to di scharge emissions, a problem of 
inequality arises when these rights are totally allocated, since new entrepreneurs are not 
abl e to obtain the fi'ee allocated rights, but have to buy them from the existing firms. 'os 
It is also difficult to monitor and enforce tradable penn its when the sources of pollution 
are mobile such as vehicles, or there are too many different point sources of pollution 
situated in the same area, or where pollution ari ses fi'om non-point sources such as 
methane cmissions from fanns. '99 Gi ven the attractions of tradable pennits, but also 
their potential shortcomings, how successfu l have such schemes been in the past, 
p3l1icularly in developing countries, and how successful are they likely to be in the 
P3l1icular circumstances of Thailand? 
194 Jonathan Wiener, 'Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context'. at 718. 
195 Eric Orts, 'Reflex ive Regulation ' . at 1271. 
196 David O'Connor, 'The Use of Economic InstlUments in Environmental Management: The Experience 
of East Asia', in OECD. Economic Ins/rum ems jor Environmental Mal1agemenl in Developing Counlries , 
1993. at 38. See also Theodore Panayotou, !nsll'llmenls ojChange, at 24. 
197 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smart Regulation. Designing Environmental Policy, 
at 7 1-4. 
,98 Environmental Research Institute, Chulalongkom University. 'New Dimension For Environmental 
Management \¥ith Economic InSlIuments'. at 2-3. 
199 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smarl Regulalion: Designing Environl1lelllal Folicl·. 
at 73. 
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Tradable emission permits schemes in pt'actice: lessons for Thailand 
In gcneral, tradable emission pennits schemes fall short of success. They have so far 
been introduced in only a few countries. For example, the system is a limited option 
used in the coal-fired thennal power plants industry in the United States, where the 
command and control approach is pervas ive.2oo However, the tradable emi ssion pennits 
scheme is conducted under the EPA's acid rain pemlit trading program, which was 
establ ished under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act to reduce sulphur dioxide 
emissions that cause acid rain and directly affect human health 2 0 1 To achieve this goal, 
the program sets an overall cap on emissions of sulphur dioxide at a number 
representing a large cut in emissions. The program simultaneously allows operators of 
affcctcd facilities. most of which are large electric utilities, the most prominent 
contributors to acid rain, to trade emissions allowances between their own facilit ies or 
other fimls so as to save costs in achicving thc national emissions allowances202 
Records show that the program has a considerable effects. During 1995 and 1996, 
utilities cmitted approximately 30 per cent less su lphur dioxide than thc program 
emissions allowances. Furthe11110rC, the program helped lower the compliance costs 
signi Acantly. When the reductions were achieved, the costs fell from an expected $ 4 
billion per year under the previous regulation to approximately:5 2 billion. 203 
There has also been a proposal to use tradable pennits to tackle the problem of 
grcenhouse gascs at the intemational level but this has not yet becn impiemented 204 
This program is called Joint Implementation (JI). Under 11 , actions taken in one country 
can counterbalance or offset greenhouse gas emissions that originate in another country. 
These offsets can either be technical in nature such as upgrad ing equipment to improve 
efficicncy, or biological , depending on forests or so il to store carbon 205 According to 
200 Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty, To IVa I'd an Environmenral Strategl' jor Asia, al 77. 
201 Byron Swift. 'The Acid Rain Test'. The Environmental Forum, Vo1.14, No.3, May/.June 1997, 
al 17. 
202 Ibid, al 18. See also Da\'id Dri esen . ' Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incel1live Program'?: 
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incel1live Dicholomy', Washington and Lee La1\.' 
Rel 'ie,, ', Vol. 55. No.2. Spring 1998. at 317-8. 
20) Byron Swift. The Environmental ForulII, Vo1.14 , No.3. May/June 1997. al 17. 
204 R. Siewal1 and J. Wiener. 'The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design 
and Practicality', Arizona Journal oj1nternational and Comparative Lcl\l', 1992, at 103-1 0. 
205 Jim Leslie, 'Climate Change Convention and Jo int Implemen lation', TEl Qu{[rter(r Environment 
Journal, Vol. 3 No. I, Jan-Mar 1995 , at 8-9. 
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" 
Ms Wanna Tanunchaiwatana, Chief of International Cooperation Section, Office of 
Environmental Policy and Planning: 
Cun·ently. several developed countries have proposed the idea of joint implementation to 
be used worldwide. Joint implementation is a concept that a developed country comes to 
help a project in a developing country reduce greenhouse gas. After the reduction is 
successful, the developed country will take some shares of such reduction as its' 
greenhouse gas reduction credits', while in turn enable it to emit the gas up to the amount 
of the credits it has got. At present, Japan is playing a leading role to have the joint 
implementation in operation. 
So far, many developing countries have strongly opposed this idea because the amount of 
pollution will not be reduced in the end. Instead, richer countries which have bought the 
rights to discharge emissions from less developed countries will keep polluting, resulting in 
an unchanged amount of pollution globally206 
1t is important to note that the business sector has been actively involved in using n. 
Take the case of TransAlta Corporation, a Canadian based supplier of electric and 
thet1l1al energy. Realising that its business activities generate a large amount of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, TransAtla has committed itself to finding a way to 
reduce the gases. Joint Implementation is one of its options to achieve such a goal 2 07 
As for developing countries, although the World Bank presumes that more of these 
countries may adopt the tradable permit system in the future, records show that there is 
little well-documented evidence on their implementation of the system at present. 208 
However, one of the most important experiments with tradable pennits in developing 
countries has been conducted in Poland, which had its first demonstration project on 
tradable industrial emissions implemented in Chorzow in July 1991. Two enterplises 
have pal1icipated in this pilot project, Steel Mill Kosciuszko, and the Power Plant 
Chorzow, both of which are heavy polluters. Under this project, the regional 
administrator would issue an emission pennit for the Power Plant, which would use a 
combination of control technology and emissions reduction credits (acquired from the 
Steel Mill) to meet an ambient standard . How did the Steel Mill have emissions credits 
206 The interview took place o n 16 January 1998. 
207 Jim Leslie, 'Climate Change Convention and Joint Implementation' , at 8. 
208 The World Bank, Greening Industn': NelV Roles for Communities, Markets, and Governments. A 
World Bank Policy Research Repon, 2000. at 50. 
140 
Icft for the Power Plant to use? An external subsidy drawn from regional environmental 
funds was provided for the Steel Mill to restructure its cnvirorunental management 
which in turn improves its pollution level. As a result of this project, the city's air 
quality has improved significantly209 
Kasakhstan is another developing country which has adopted an emissions trading 
permit system to help improve a persistent air quality problem facing the city of 
Almaty. This is because the existing air quality control schemes which include 
technology-based normatives and non-compliance charges have proved to be 
insufficient to reduce air pollution as a result of high compliance costs2lO Under the 
'cap-and-trade' program, the city government allocate a five-year strcam of emission 
allowances to 1200 firms The initi al allocation for each facility wi ll bc based on its 
actual emissions in 1991 and 1994. The aim of this program is to reduce air pollution 
by 7-10 per cent annually. To achieve this goal, finns will be required to operate within 
their emission allowances or purchase additional penllits from other finns if they want 
to increase production. Simultaneously, finns that succeed in reducing their emissions 
by more than 7 per cent a year would be allowed to deposit thc surplus allowances for 
future use, (up to three years), or to sell them to other fi11l1S 2 11 
How do small finns whi ch usually cannot afford the expensive technologies comply 
with the emission-reduction requiremcnts? To encourage compliance, these ti11l1S are 
given access to the capital of the air credit buyers to invest in sophisticated pollution 
control equipment, as well as to create sellable assets. Given that the program is st ill in 
the stage of planning, no outcome is avai lable at the time of writing. '" [n Thailand, so 
far this approach has not been adopted, although it has aroused the interest of some 
important stakeholders in the environmental area. As Mr Siritan Pairojboriboon, then 
director-general of the Pollution Control Department pointed out in an interview: 
We are thinking of introducing tradable permits in environmental management. 
UnfOliunately, this is still a concept at the momcnt due to lack of applicable laww 
209Thodore Panayotou, 1l1sll'11l1lel1l.< o{Clral1ge, 1998, at 175-6. 
210 Ibid. at 26-7. 
' " Ibid. 
'" Ibid. 
213 The interview was conducted on 19 January 1998. 
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According to Dr Prasert Tapaneeyangkul, technical adviser of the Department of 
Industrial Work, 
Concept of tradable pemlit is still unclear in Thailand. I low ever, our expel1 committee is 
studying this concept to apply to the existing fimls which are expanding their businesses. In 
so doing, the committee is looking at c3lTying capacity of the designated area in which 
fin11S are allowed to trade off their pollution with each other'" 
To ful1her assess the potential of this approach to Thailand, a number of studies funded 
by the goverrunent agencies have been undel1aken in this regard. Amnat Wongbandit et 
aI., who conducted the research for the Pollution Control Department suggest that 
tradable pem1its should be introduced in Thailand because such pem1its might prove an 
efficient way of forci ng polluting enterpri ses to internali se the external costs in 
pollution.215 Obviously, this coincides with the polluter payss principle. Furthennore. it 
is concl uded that the management costs associated with govel11ment involvement, 
would be less than thosc incuned in pollution charge and tax systems (which the 
researchers also suggest they be introduced in Thailand)2 16 
The other study was fun ded by the National Economi c and Social Development Bureau 
(NESDB). The Envi ronmental Research Insti tute, Chulalongkol11 University, which 
conducted this study, produced separate suggestions for air and water pollution. With 
regard to air pollution. researchers suggest that tradable pennits should not be 
introduced as the system could cause unfail11ess among industries since those who come 
later have to buy the pennits, whil e the existing fin11S get the allocated lights to 
di scharge emissions fi'ee of charge. On the other hand, the researchers suggcst that 
tradable pel111its should be used (a long with charge and tax systems) to help address the 
problem of water pollution, at least in circumstances where there is no central 
wastewater treatment avai lable. In thi s case, tradable pennits provide flexibility , 
cnabling films to adjust their business according to the circumstances, such as to 
increase or decrease thei r productivity. 217 
214 The interview was undertaken on 20 FebrualY 1998. 
215 Am nat Wongbandit et 01 .. Report on Recommendations Jar Loll'S and Reglliations Jar Environmelllal 
Protection and Operating Mechanisms Jar Control and Enforcement, submitted to Pollution Control 
Department, 1997. at 281. This coincides with the OECD report. See OECD, fnternational Economic 
Inst/'llll1el1ls and Climate Change, at 14 for more details. 
216 Ibid. 
2I7Environmental Research Institute, 'New Dimension For Environmental Management With Economic 
lnstruments'. at 6-3. 
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Despite considerable interest in tradable pennits among govelllment agencies, a central 
question arises: is the tradable emissions approach suitable for Thailand? A tradable 
permits regime can only work when governments set an overall level of emissions 
which fimls can discharge, including an allocated level for each fiml. Such conditions 
potentially exist in Thailand, at least within the confines of the designated areas called 
industrial estates, which are administered by the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 
(I EAT), a state enterprise218 
What role can the IEAT play in administering a tradable pcrmits scheme and why do 
firms have to listen to the IEAT? It is important to note that the agency is both 
regulator and industrial investment promoter. Hence, it is authorised to set overall 
emissions allowances, as well as to allocate the emissions level which each finn can 
discharge and to monitor the finns ' perfonllancc. 2I9 Of course, fimls do not have to 
locate their plants within the lEA T's industrial estates, but may choose to do so bccause 
it provides a 'one-stop service' to industry. This ranges from coordinating pemlit 
granting, to providing necessary facilities for doing business, including environmental 
treatment systems."o 
Dcspite industries' willingness to locate their plants within TEAT's sites, and 
obligations to comply with environmental management systems provided by lEAT as 
discussed above, it would be naive to assume the success of tradable pellllits from these 
facts alone. Indeed, it is uncertain how effectively the lEAT will perfonll as a 
rcgulatory body, given the number of factors that could hamper its success: factors such 
as political interference, corruption, lack of sophisticated equipment for monitoring, and 
lack of skilful inspectors. Certainly a number of agency insiders including Ms 
Krittiyapom Tappatat, and Mr Titi Jantaengpol , lEA T's scientists, pointed out in my 
fieldwork interviews that the agency is not ready to establish a tradable pennits scheme 
as it does not have the on-line monitoring system necessary for the scheme.221 
Nevertheless that while it might be premature to introduce tradable permits just yet, in 
the longer tellll the TEAT provides a good pilot scheme through which to experiment 
218 Panat Tasneeyanond, SUl1Il1Iall1 of the 1992 Enhancement and Conservarion of the Narional 
Envil'Onmel1lal Qllality Act, (n.d.) at 17-8. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Interview with Dr Somchet Titmapong, the IEAT' s governor. and Ms Kasemsri Homchuen, director of 
the lEA T's Environmental and Safety Control Depanment on 25 December 1996. 
221 The interview was conducted on 21 January 1998. 
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with tradable pennits in the Thai context and to detennine the limits of their 
applicability. It is here that in the future, with additional capabilities such as on-line 
monitoring, tradable pennits have the greatest likelihood of success. 
Although Thailand has the potential to introduce the tradable pennits system to help 
reduce air and water pollution, it should not rely on the scheme as its sole policy; other 
measures must be uscd at the same time. These include education and training for the 
TEA T's inspectors, and provision of the sophisticated equipment necessary for 
monitoring the scheme. Environmental education and di sclosure of infoll11ation must be 
provided to the public constantly, to hall1ess the public power to force government 
inspectors to do their job seliously. 
D. Subsidies 
A subsidy is the another kind of fiscal instrument'" distinct from the tax and chargc 
systcms discussed earlier, and functioning differently from such systems. A subsidy 
aims at providing industries with financial assistance as an incentive to improve their 
environmental behaviour.'" More specifically, these financial subsidies usuall y involve 
tax concessions which could take various f0ll11S These include tax deductions on any 
expenses related to environmental improvements such as mine site remediation; or tax 
exemptions for those who use environmentally friendly products, such as motorists 
whose cars have catalytic converters (who could be temporarily exempted from car 
registration fees)ll4; and lower tax rates on preferrcd products or materials, such as 
unleadcd petrol."5 
Subsidies have been well recogni sed internationally. Records show that all OEeD 
countries and a number of Asian countIies such as India, Korea, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Taiwan are all dependent upon subsi dies to attain the goal of their 
cnvironmental policy. ' 26 
222 Neil Gunni ngham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Polic.' ·, 
at 77-8. 
m Theodore Panayotoll. Instruments a/Change. at 32. 
214 Environmental Research Institute. Cbulalongkoll1 University. 'New Dimension in Managing the 
Enviromnent wi th Economic Instruments ', 28 May 1998, at Chulalongkoll1 University. at 1-9. 
ns Theodore PanaYOlOll, InSTruments a/Change. at 33. 
226 Can er Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty. Toward an Environmental Strategl"jor Asia. World Bank 
Discussion Papers, 1993, at 77. 
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Subsidies have both advantages and di sadvantages. With regard to advantages, 
subsidies provide oppOltunities for the industry which otherwise cannot affo rd the costs 
of reducing pollution to do SO .227 On the other hand, some particular kinds of subsidies 
such as tax concessions on expenses rel ated to enviromnental improvements also 
provide benefits to finn s which normall y can afford the costs of polluti on reduction. 
This is to cncourage these finns to continue their environmentally friendly practice.228 
As for weaknesses, subsidies have the potential to induce new entrants into the industry, 
posing a serious threat that more pollution will occur. Moreover, subsidies deprivc the 
govelllment of considerable revenue it is othcrwise supposed to receive. 229 Of equal 
importance, subsidy schemes violate the polluter pays principle as the costs of reducing 
pollution will fa ll on the taxpayers instead of the polluters.23o 
Why are financial subsidies popular among many goYclllments despitc their 
weaknesses? According to Theodore Panayotou, govelllments still use financial 
subsidies for two reasons. First, these subsidi es arc oftcn hidden from public scrutiny in 
that it is not immediately obvious that they serve to take money out of thc government's 
coffers. Second, government can claim to industry that fin ancial subsi dies enab le them 
to improve environmental perfonnance without reducing business competitiveness23 1 In 
addition, governments could use the provision of financi al subsidies as a justification 
that they have done their jobs in promoting environmental quality. Disappointingly, as 
thi s discussion demonstrates, many governments base their policy and action regarding 
economic instruments on politics rather than the potential of the best economic 
instruments to address environmental problems232 
Thailand and subsidies 
As described in the previous chapters, the 1992 Enhancement Act also introduces 
financial subsidies as one of the incenti ves for polluters to change their behaviour 
towards the environment. Under this approach, any polluter who is requircd by law to 
227 Theodore Panayotoll, Instrllments o/Change. at 32. 
128 See Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 
at 77-8 . 
"9 1b id. 
"oTheodore Panayotou, Inst/'llmel1ls a/Change. at 32. 
131 Ibid. at 33. 
m See Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty, TOI rard an Environl1lel1lal StrategJ for Asia . at 77 for 
more detail s. 
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have air polluti on and wastewater treatment systems is entitled to apply for a reduction 
of impOt1 duties on the equipment or material s related to these systems233 
Studies however show that financial subsidi es in the forn1 of import duty reduction have 
not received much attention from industry despite the 95 per cent reduction 234 What 
makes thi s kind of subsidy unattractive? In practice, the reduction of import duties does 
not occur immediately upon the arri val of the imported equipment or materials. Rather, 
an importer has to make full payments for the duties first, before obtaining the rebate 
after the governmcnt is sati sfied from inspection that the systems have been installed.235 
To the ex tent that subsidi es are justifi ed, a more attractive strategy than the present one 
is required to induce industry to take advantage of such subsidies. Specifically a 
reduction of duties should be designed to come into effect immedi ately upon the arrival 
of impOt1ed equipment or materials. However, after thi s 'carrot' approach is given to 
industry, the 'stick' one, that is, tough enforcement must be used if it is found that the 
industry does not instal the imported equipment, or does not operate the equipment after 
it is installed 236 This is to ensure that polluters use privileges granted under subsidies 
for the sake of ai r and water quality. 
Notably, Thailand has also had the other kind of fin ancial subsidi es in the fonn of lower 
tax rates on prefeITed product. In 1991 , the Thai government introduced unl eaded petrol 
to help improve air quality. 237 Despite some hurdl es such as the relatively high cost of 
manufacture, and public coneem as to whether unleaded petrol is compatible with 
existing ear engines, the govenU11ent lowered taxes on this kind of petrol ; as a result 
vendors were ab le to sell unleaded petrol at a lower price than leaded. 238 Not 
surpri singly, most people switched to the unl eaded petrol. After people had become 
familiar with unleaded petrol for fi ve years, the government totally abo li shed leaded 
petrol from the market in 1996239 This experiment can be regarded as a success in that 
the subsidy was used as a ' circuit breaker' to induce the population to change their 
233 See Chapter 2 for more details of the finan c ial subsidies introduced in the 1992 Enhancement Act. 
234Amnat Wo ngba ndit et ai., Report on Recommendations /01' Laws and Reguiations /01' Environmentai 
Protection and Operating Mechanisms/or Controi and En/orcement, at 280. 
m Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
2J7 Office of Environmental Policy and Plan ning, Report 011 Environmentai SilUation1995-1996 , 1997, at 
110. 
m Amoll1poj Kullawijit. 'Special interview with Dr Suvit Yodmani. UNEP regional director and 
representa tive. Regional O ffi ce for Asia and the Pacific', Duiiapaha, January-March 1996 , at 13. 
239 Ib id. 
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purchasing behaviour. Once this objective has been achieved, it is possible to remove 
the subsidy entirely, since it has achieved its main (and shOIi-term) objective. 
To conclude, there are serious objections to the use of subsidies as a major tool of 
environmental policy, not least the fact that it so seriously violates the 'polluter payss' 
principle. However, there may be at least a limited range of circumstances where short 
tel1n expedicncy suggests they have a valuable role to play. Of these, their contribution 
as a 'circuit breaker ' is most important, and the leaded petrol example given above is a 
classic example of how such a policy can be used successfull y to change motivation and 
behaviour of target audiences. 
They may also be used as a short-teml means to encourage and facilitate cleaner 
production strategies on the p3!i of industry . Providing tax breaks on pollution contro l 
equipment is one means of achieving such a result; but, subsidies alone are most 
unlikely to succeed in these circumstances. Only if they are combined with more 
coercive techniques designed in the long tenn to sa tisty the polluter pays principle can 
their use as a part of the solution, be justified . 
E. Financial Instruments 
The main object of financial instruments is, like most economic instruments, to provide 
incentives for polluters to improve their environmental perfollnance. Financia l 
instruments are similar to subsidies in that they provide money-related assistance to 
polluters, but they also have a distincti ve characteristic: nOl1nally they are extra-
budgetary and financed from foreign aid 240 Exampl es of financial instruments include 
revolving fund s, green funds (these may be called 'environmental funds ' in some 
countries including Thailand), subsidised interest rates, and soft loans241 
The advantage of financial instruments is to enable industries to afford the necessary 
expenses for improving their environmental perfomlance in circumstances where 
otherwise they might be unable to do so. In the case of Thailand, given that govemment 
agencies, p3liicularly those involved in environmental issues, also have access to the 
240 Theodore PanayOiou. fnstmmenrs oj Change. at40. 
241 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smart Regulation: Designing Enl'ironl11ental Polic, ·. at 77-8. 
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, 
assistance (see below/42, this could be considered a very considerable advantage of 
financial instruments. However, financial instruments also share the principal 
disadvantages of subsid ies described above, including breach of the polluter pays 
principle, and the risk of attracting new polluters into the industry.243 
Thailand and financial instruments 
As described in Chapter 2, the 'big bang ' refonn under the 1992 Enhancement Act 
encompasses financial instruments, in the fom1 of the environmental fund, among of 
sevcral innovative measures244 The environmental fund has been less successful than 
anticipated because, perhaps surpri singly, it has not gained much popularity among 
industry, largely because of a number of onerous conditions associated with the fund, 
which serve to discourage fund applicants. For examplc, it is a prerequisite that any 
municipality requesting financial support fro m the fund must be partly self-financed 
with regard to the envi ronmentalmanagemcnt project245 
Another example of onerous conditions is the fact that the fund's interest rates are high 
comparcd to those from the bank. According to Dr Prakit Kirawanich, then director-
general of the Pollution Control Department, the environmental fund charges interest at 
6.8 per cent. while the Krung Thai Bank, one of the state-owned banks, charges only 1.7 
per cent246 
Moreover, although the environmental fund comm ittee comprises a number of people 
from many different agencies, as well as expetis who may be appointed from the plivate 
sector24 7, a majority of the commi ttec members are govemment officials. This in itself 
raises selious problems What is wrong if government officials outnumber those from 
thc private sector in the committee? As we found in Chapter 4, patronage relationships 
,., See also. the 1992 Enhancement Act, Seclion 23. 
~ .. n Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 
at 77-8. 
244 See Chapter 2 for more details. 
145 Thailand Environment Institute, Executive Slimmary, Decenfrali:ing Environmental A1anagemen( -
Panicipatoll" Approach, Thailand Envirotul1ent lnstitule 1995 Annual Conference. 3 July 1995, at Queen 
Siriki t National Convention Center. Bangkok. 
246 Inlerview with Dr Prakil KJawanich on 18 December 1996. 
'" Under the 1992 Enhancement Act. the Envirotullental Fund Commiltee comprises twelve ex officio 
members from gove1l1menl agencies concerned. and up 10 five expet1S appointed by the National 
Environmental Board. NOlably, these ex pert members are nOI necessarily from privale seclors: 
gove1l1menl officials could be appointed as expert members as well. For more details. see Section 24 of 
the 1992 Enhancement Act. 
148 
between govemment officials and politicians; between govemment officials, politicians 
and business; and among govemment officials themselves are pervasive in Thailand. 
Chapter 4 also reveals that the political will to tackle the environmental issue seriously 
is lack ing in Thailand 248 Therefore, it would be naive to expect that the Committee's 
decision is free fi'om distortion as long as promotion of the Committee members who 
are goverrunent officials is under the control of their bosses, who are either govemment 
officials in higher positions, or incumbent politicians who oversee their agencies. This 
assertion is confinned by Amnat Wongbandit et al. 's suggcstions that priority in fund 
al location has been given only to large-scale projects, most of whi ch are owned by well-
known people with political connections at present249 
The fund usua lly involves a large amount of money. Accordingly, given Thailand's 
experi ence in the abuse of power conccming budget allocation for environmental 
treatment systems mcntioned in the previous chapters250 , coupled with the discussion in 
the preccding paragraph, there is a vcry serious ri sk of abuse and misallocation of funds. 
The so lution to thi s inevitably necessitates transparency and public monitoring if the 
fund is to be used as initiall y intended25 1 In parti cular, infonnation regarding the 
balancing amo unt of the fund, and all transactions concerning the fund, should be more 
open to the public. Thi s will bring about not only transparency to the public, but 
conveni ent infonnation for those who want to apply for the fund as to whether the fund 
is avai lab le. 
At the same time, more representatives from NGOs should be included on the 
Environmental Fund Committee. This will create a balance of power to cnsure that the 
Committee making work is free from politi cal or bureaucratic influence which will in 
turn lead to the Committee's fair and rational deci sions that provide the utmost benefits 
to Thailand's environment. 
Moreover, the cond ition that any muni cipality wh ich wants to apply for the fund must 
be partly self-financed should be rcvoked, as activities conceming environmental 
248 See Chapter 4 for greater detai ls. 
249 Amnat Wongbandit et 01 .. Reporl on Recommendations for L([\,'s and Regulations for Environmental 
PrOleClion and Operaling Mechanismsfor Conlrol and Enforcemenl, at 277. 
250 Chapter 4 showed that Mr Banham Silapa-archa, ex-prime minister of Thailand , allocated budgets for 
envirolUnentalmanagement to the Departmen t of Civil Work, with which he had a close tie, 
instead of the Ministry of Sc ience, Technology and the Environment. 
25 1 See Neil Gutmingham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Envirollm elllal Policy, at 77-
8 for more detai ls. 
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management could involve a large amount of money. Accordingly, it would be too 
burdensome for municipalities, most of which do not have seed money to initiate 
environmental management projects, to fully or partly shoulder the expenses incurred. 
Predictably, if this condition still exists, there may be only a few municipalities 
applying for the fund. 
Also, the fund's interest rates should be reduced. As we have already learned t,'om the 
previous chapters showed, many small and medium firnls have become major 
contributors to air and water pollution, for various reasons including an inability to 
afford the expensive technologies required for environmental management. These 
factors have already made these fill11S inclined to disobey the law. It is therefore 
essential to reduce the interest rates if the fund is to attract these small and medium 
fill11S to participate in the scheme252 
Finally, more attention should be paid to small-scale loans. This will give many smal l 
and medium finns more opportunities to obtain the financial assistance under the 
environmental fund scheme. 
F. Civil Liability 
Thc tenet of civil liability is based on tort law, a traditional (and ex pOSI)253 legal 
mechani sm used for claiming compensation from those who causcd damages254 With 
appropriate civil liability provisions, the damaging consequenccs of air or water 
pollution could result in substantial legal and financial liability for the polluter, which in 
turn could be an incentive for them to rcduce pollution 255 For example, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) in response to the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in Alaska, thereby increasing oil spill liability as an incentive to prevent 
the problem of water pollution from oil spills256 
151 See interview with Dr Prakit Kirawanich above. 
25J See Theodore Panayotou, Instruments o{Change, 1998, at 41. 
254 Brian Jones . 'DetelTing, Compensating. and Remedying Environmental Damage: The Contribution of 
Tort Liability'. in Peter Wetterstein (ed.), Harm to the Environment: The Right to Compensation and the 
Assessment ojDamages, 1997, at 1-1 8. 
155 Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramanl"my, Tall 'arc! an Environmental StJ'{{tegl'for Asia, at 80. 
256 See Richard Dunford, 'Natural Resource Damages from Oil Spills', in T.H.Tietenberg (ed.), 
innomtive Environmental Policy, 1992. at 175-6. 
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However, using civil liability to tackle environmental issues is not free from 
drawbacks, not least its total dependence upon the court system. In particular, litigation 
is commonly time-consuming and expensive and is generally not worthwhile in any 
except very high-value claims25 7 Another banier to success in claims for air and water 
pollution is the difficulty of proving causation and fault (except where there is strict 
liability): that the defendant is the person who caused the damage to the plaintiff, and 
that he or she was negligent in doing S0258 Further, as Peter Wetterstein argues, the 
consequences of environmental hann in many cases are mani fest long after the incident 
concemed. Thi s could make the plaintiff s case less convincing as the defendant can 
simpl y contend that the plaintiffs injury could be caused from anything else other than 
the defendant's activity.259 Perhaps these ShOt1COmings of civil liability arc responsible 
for the ineffecti ve results of thi s approach in many countries. This is especia lly the case 
among Asian nations26o The case of Thailand is di scussed below. 
Thailand and strict civil liability in environmental cases 
The 1992 Enhal1cement Act introduced strict civil li abi lity as one of the methods 
tailored to improve environmental quality. Why is strict liability essential for addressing 
environmental issues in Thailand? Th ail and had used conventional civil li ab ility under 
tOl1 law to facilitate compensation for environmental hann before the emergence of the 
1992 Enhancement Act. However, because it is a complex and demanding task to prove 
that the plaintiffs injury was directly caused by the defendant 's fault, conventional civil 
li ab ility under the tort law was superseded by strict civil li ability. This was intended to 
257 Ibid. See also. Panat Tasneeyanond, 'The 1992 Enhancemenl ACI: It's abolll lime for overhaul ', 
JO/l/'l7al o!Ecologv, Vol. 25, No.2, May-A ug 1998, at37. 
258 Donald Dewees, 'TOri Law and the Deterrence of Environmen tal Pollution', in T.H. Tietenberg (ed.), 
Innovalion in EnvironmenTal Policy, 1992 , at 151. See also. Chatchom Akapi11, 'Enforceme11t and 
Compl iance Priorities ' , a presentation given 10 the Bangkok Conference. Environmental Priorities in 
Southeast Asian Nations, organised by Standing Committee on Environmental Law, A merican Bar 
Associa ti on. This presentation was later published i11 Sarah McCaffrey and Elissa Lichtenstein (eds), 
Environmental Priorities in SOlltheast Asian Nations, 1997, at 136. 
259 See Peter Wetterstein, 'A Proprietary or Possessory Interest: A Conditio Sine Qua Non for Claiming 
Damages for EnvirolUllcntal Impainnent? ', in Peter Wetterstein (ed.), Harm to the Environment: The 
Rigillto COll1pensation and the Assessmenl of Damages, 1997, at 29-30. 
260 CarieI' Brandon and Ramesh Ramanlnllty. Toward an Environmenlal SlralegJIor Asia. 1993, at 80. 
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, 
enhance the effectiveness of compensation claims in environmental cases2 6 1 
Under a strict liability regime, the defendant is liabl e for all injuries caused by his or her 
action, even without showing negligence. The plaintiff merely has to prove that it was 
the defendant who conducted the damaging action, regardless of his or her intention or 
negligence. If the court is convinced of this, it will award compensation to the 
plaintife62 
Unfol1unately, the strict civil liability provisions under the 1992 Enhancement Act have 
not proved effective. For sim ilar reasons to those identified by the World Bank's study 
which reveals that li ab ility is not effecti ve in Asia today as described above263 , it is 
evi dent that strict civil liability has not yielded sati sfactory results in Thailand at 
present. As Mr Warin Tiemjaras, assistant secretary to the Thailand Lawyers 
Association for Environmental Protection said: 
Although Sect ion 96 of the 1992 Enhancement Act introduced strict civil liability, the 
plaintiff slill has to prove thai it was the defendant who caused the incident. This kind 
of burden of proof discourages those who want to bring the cases to the courts as it is 
hard to prove.264 
To illustrate the difficulties of bringing successful civil litigation, even under strict 
liability provisions, an air pollution case is an example. In 1993 Mrs Mayuree Taevivat 
filed a lawsuit to the Central Labour Court, claiming compensation of six million baht 
from Electro Ceramics (Thailand) Co, Ltd. , her former employer. She claimed that she 
261 Sunee Mallikamarl , Environmental Lml' Enforcement, 1996, al 102. See also, Chalchom Akapin, 'Law 
Enforcement: An Issue 10 be Improved in Prolec tion of Ihe Thai Enviromenl' , Dul/apaha, 1996, at 86. 
262 SuneeMal likamarl ,EnvironmentaILall'Enforcement, 1996. a t 102. See also. Paul Clements-Hun\. 
Thailand's Status as an Emelging Enl 'ironmental Market.' A Comparative Ana~\'sis of Six Asian 
Countries . A Paper Presented at the Conference: Indusuy & Environment, 29 May 1995, al Queen Sirikil 
Nal ional Convention Centre, Bangkok. For the exact meaning of striclliabi li ty, Steven H. Gifis defines as 
'Liab ility without fault. Often in IOn law. one who engages in an ac ti vity that has an inherent risk of 
injUly is liable for all injuries proximately caused by his or her enterpri se, even wi lhoul a showing of 
neg ligence' . See Sleven H. Gifts, 1991 , LalV Diction(l!ll (Third Edi tion), at468 for more details. 
261 Carter Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutty. Toward an Environm ental Strategl"/or Asia, 1993. al 80. 
264 The interview look place on 28 December 1996. 
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had been exposed to aluminium dust for five years during her work at the defendant's 
plant. Consequently, she later suffered body pain and headaches. During the trial , she 
also produced as supporting evidence a hospital's test results diagnosing that she had 
been exposed to chemical poisoning. In 1996, the court handed down its verdict, saying 
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that aluminium dust in the plaintiff s plant was the 
cause of her illness. For this reason, the plaintiff was not allowed to get any 
compensation 265 
Wl1at do we leam from this case? Apparently, the plaintiff did not have a problem in 
establishing that she had been exposed to the aluminium dust in her work environment. 
However, she could not convince the court (the onus being on her to do so) that there 
was a causal link between her exposure to the aluminium dust and her illness, because it 
was extremely demanding to prove that it was thi s dust in her workplace that was 
responsible for her illness. This illustrates the weakness of the civil liability scheme. 
In addition, the Thai court system itself is also responsible for the ineffecti veness of 
strict civil liability under the 1992 Enhancement Acr. According to Mr Dej-udom 
Krairith, president of Thailand Lawyer Association for Environmental Protection 
suggested: 
Compensation in envirolll1ental cases is awarded on the basis of punitive damages. This 
practice does not seem to be practical for environmental cases in which hannful effects 
could be invisible and take some time to manifest. I think the country shou ld introduce a 
principle of consequential damages to the compensation claiming system for it will 
ensure that any damage stemming from an environmental offence will be remedied in 
the future 266 
Despite the existence of strict civil liability, it is evident from the above discussion that 
the problems of civil liability in Thailand are substantial and are principally the burden 
of proof, and the court's attitude which regards environmental cases as ordinary civil 
cases. This chapter therefore suggests the following refonn be undertaken. 
265 Thaksina Khaikaew and Chakrit Ridmontri , 'Toxin law case end s in defeat', Bangkok Post, 29 October 
1996. 
266 The interview was conducted on 5 January 1997. 
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First, the burden of proof under the 1992 Enhancement Act should be amended. More 
specifically, the plaintiff's duty to prove that there is a causal link should be revoked. 
He or she should be required to prove only that the defendant's action discharged 
pollution which had a potential to cause hannful effects to him/her, and to establish a 
prima facie case that he or she received harmful damage from the pollution. Then it 
must be the defendant's duty to convince the court that there is no causal link between 
its action and the plaintiffs injury. If the defendant fails to convince the court, he or she 
must be liablc for compensation 267 
Second, following thc change in burden of proof suggested above, environmental 
courts should be established. This is to create understanding and experience among 
judges who handle environmental cases, which have unique characteristics such as the 
difficulty of proving that the damaging conscquences result from the defendant's 
polluting activity discussed above. 
But is there any possibility of establishing an envirorunental court in Thailand? Will the 
environmental courts be sure to take into consideration the unique nature of 
cnvironmental cases when making judgements? There are a number of uscful 
precedents for such a proposal. Thailand currently has a number of exclusive courts 
establi shed for dealing with certain kinds of cases such as taxation courts , labour courts, 
and intellectual propcrty cOUlis. 
But to ensure that any newly established envirorullental court fully comprehends the 
unique characteristics of envirorunental cases, a number of other measures need to be 
implemented simultaneously. These include the provision of environmental training 
and infonnation for the judges in these courts. In conjunction with these other 
mechani sms, civil liability might at least make a modest contribution to improving the 
environmental perf0I111anCe of Thai industry. 
267 Amnat Wongbandit et aI., Report on Recommendations for Lall's and Regulations for Environmental 
Protection and Operating Mechanisms for Control and Enforcement, at 2 10. 
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C. Performance Bonds 
Under this scheme, environmental performance bonds are charged in advance from 
polluters for potential damage resulting from their activitics268 How much the bonds are 
repaid varies with the degree of damage the polluters have caused: the fu ll amount of 
thc bonds will be repaid to industry if no damage took place, whereas the bonds could 
be forfeited in the event of poor perfonnance2 69 
A good example of environmental perfonnance bonds can be drawn from the case of a 
mining company which must lodge a bond with the relevant government authority upon 
the beginning of mining. When the projcct is complete, the bond will bc spent on 
rehabilitation of the land used for mining. If the company fails to restore the land, or 
causes substantial water pollution such as continued leaching of pollutants into the 
water, the cost of remediation will be deducted for the rehabilitation.270 
Environmental perfol1l1ance bonds schemcs have a number of strengths. First, the 
concept of environmental perfonnance bonds is to shift responsibility for controlling 
pollution from the government to polluters. 271 This schemc, as far as air and water 
pollution is concerned, provides incentives for polluters to take adequatc measures to 
minimise such pollution caused by their activities so that they can obtain the return of 
all , or most of the bond after complction of the project. Second, thc bond schcme has 
the potential to be an effective way to help clean up pollution because the moncy 
nceded to do so is already in the government's hands272 Third, envirorunental 
perfonnance bonds also con'espond to the polluter pays, and precautionary principles273 
Finally, interest generated from the bonds could be used for the purpose of 
environmental improvement. This includes to putting interest into an environmental 
fund, or a reserve fund to be used in the case the bonds' amount is not sufficient to clean 
up pollution. 
However, environmental perfonnance bonds schemes have some limitati ons. They work 
best in the situation where there is only one point source of pollution whose 
268 Theodore Panayotou, Inslrumenls a/Change, at 43. 
269 M.D. Young, et al., Reimbursing the Future, 1996, at 123. 
270 Nei l GUlmingham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing EnviroJ1menfal Policy, at ? 
271 Theodore Panayotou, Instruments o(Change, at 43. 
272 Ibid. 
27l Ibid . 
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performance can be estimated individually27-l Also, they are most suitable when a 
polluting activity has a finite duration. The final weakness is that it is difficult to specify 
the bond's amount as it is not easy to estimate potential damage in the future. 
Thailand and environmental pedol'mance bonds 
Thailand has recently introduced environmental performance bonds. However, the 
scheme does not deal directly with the issues of air and water pollution; rather, it is 
limited to hazardous waste management. Under the CUiTent scheme, industrial fil1l1s are 
required to post performance bonds according to projected levels of hazardous wastes. 
Rebates will be paid if it is found by the environmental audits that finns attain lower 
wastes per unit of output. 275 
Should this scheme be expanded to address the problem of air and water pollution in 
addition to hazardous waste? Considering the strengths of environmental perfonnance 
bonds discussed above, this chapter suggestcd the scheme should indeed be extended to 
the issues of air and water pollution in Thailand. However, there is one signifi cant 
practical problem, namely the capacity of most industries to afford the bonds, given the 
economic downtul1l in Thailand at the time of writing. To make thi s schem e work, it is 
suggested that polluters be allowed to deposit the bonds by instalments. The full amount 
of bonds must however be deposited to the authority concel1led before hal fway through 
the project. This is to provide incentives to a finn to do business in an environmentally 
friendly manner, so that it can get the bonds back after the completion of the project. 
Conclusion 
This chapter suggests that Thailand should move towards a more pluralistic regulatory 
system based more on economic instruments as well as on command and control 
274 See Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmenlal Poliev , at 79-
80. 
mean er Brandon and Ramesh Ramankutly, Toward an Environmellwl Strateg.1'/or Asia, at 76. 
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regulation. As we have seen, although economic instruments have the considerable 
advantages of flexibility, cost-effectiveness and efficiency, at least in their ideal fonn, 
some economic instruments however work better than others and some are more suited 
than others to the pal1icular political and cultural context of Thailand in practice. 
For example, while tradable rights particularly purport to deal with a limited number 
of read ily quantifiable pollutants efficientl y, the problems of corruption, limited 
technical skill s and other failings of regulators (including regulatory capture) make 
their use problematic. However, as regards the contained area of the lEA T's industrial 
estatcs thcy have considerable potential for success. 
In broader tenns, despite the trend towards the use of economic instruments, as shown 
by the introduction of the polluter pays principle in the 1992 refonns, many complex 
issues are still to be reso lved. First, Thai land sti ll needs to develop the expertise to 
properly fon1lulate and administer these instruments. For example, what industries are 
to be taxed, and at what levels? Given that many of these technical problems have not 
been satisfactoril y solved in developed countries whi ch have a long experience in the 
use of these instruments, the situation may be even more unclear in Thailand. 
Secondl y, although many financial instruments are based on market-based incentives, 
active administrati on by expert regulators is substantiall y required if these instruments 
are to function properl y. As pointed out, corrupti on and patronage impede the 
regulatory process in Thailand. Thus the shift from command and control to economic 
instruments will not change the fact that efficient, competent and honest regulators 
have to be produced. Thirdly, the whole economic system in Thailand is in a state of 
fl ux fo llowing the crisis of 1997. Thus the govelllment is currently focusing more on 
kccping the economy afloat than on environmental protection. Thousands of 
businesses in Thailand have been bankrupted or are facing the threat of bankruptcy, and 
are struggling for surviva l. Apparently, the govemment is sympathetic to their cause, 
and will be unlikely to intensify pressures on them through enhanced envirolU1lental 
requirements. 
Finally, the introduction of many new regulatory instruments could pose a great danger 
as it may confuse and overburden the regulatory system, as well as th e regulated 
parties. Thus it may be best to currently focus on selected instruments such as the 
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'polluter pays principle', which has already been established in the 1992 reforms, and 
fully implement that before progressing to others. 
IV. Self-Regulation 
A. Need fOI' Self-Regulation 
Although it is difficult to provide a universally common definition276, self-regulation 
may, for the present purposes, be defined as initiatives by firms or industry sectors to 
regulate themselves through the setting of self-imposed standards, and involving 
monitoring of member finl1s to ensure compliance2 77 As far as industry, the ma1l1 
polluter of air and water, is concerned278 , self-regulation could also be defined as 'a 
regulatory process whereby an industry-level (as opposed to a government or firm-
level) organisation sets rules and standards (codes of practices) relating to the conduct 
of finm in the industry,.m Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
(OECD) defined self-regulation as a process whereby an organised group regulates the 
behaviour of its members280 
Self-regulation has become increasingly important as a policy instrument to curb 
pollution as policy makers have come to recognise the substantial limitations of 
command and control regulation and to some extent economic instruments, as the 
central strategies to deal with environmental issues 281 Self-regulation is increasingly 
seen as a viable alternative, or complementary, policy tool, which has the potential to be 
276 As Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees point out, 'no single definition is entirely satisfactory'. For 
more details see Ne il Gunningham and Joseph Rees. ' Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional 
Perspective' , in Ne il Gunningham and Joseph Rees (eds). Law & PoliC!", Special Issue on Self-
Regulation. Vol. 19. No. 14, October 1997, at 364. 
177 Australian Manufacturing Council, 'The Environmental Change: A Rep0!1 on Best Practice 
Environmental Regulation', 1993. 
278 United Nations, Transnational Corporation und Environmental Managenu?11f ;n Selected Asian and 
Pacific Developing COlll1lries, ESCAP/UNTCT Publication Series B, No. 13, Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, at 288. 
279 See Neil Gumlingham and Joseph Rees. ' Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective', at 
364-5. 
280 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Meeting on Alternatives 10 
Traditional Regulation , 1994, May, OECD, Paris, at 7. 
281 Eric Ons, 'Reflexive Environmental Law', at 1253. 
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integrated into a policy mix which still includes command and control regulation and 
economic instruments282 Indeed, for some years, self-regulation has been important in 
many areas such as securities, commodity futures, and advertising regulation283, in 
paI1icular in advanced economies such as the United States and Western Europe.284 
In environmental protection, the importance of self-regulation was highlighted by 
Agenda 21, the main policy agenda to emerge from the ' Earth Sunullit' in 1992, which 
emphasised its capacity to enhance business and industry's environmental 
perfOnllance?85 At the domestic level , self-regulation has been integrated as a crucial 
part of environmental policy in many countries, including the United States, Canada, 
and Australia 286 
However, in contrast, self-regulation is so far much less popular in developing 
countries, and only slowly is it being adopted as a policy in such countries. For this 
reason case studies of these countries, especially those from Asia, are very limited. Yet 
it is in precisely these countries that strategies to improve business ethics and behaviour 
are most needed , as recent evidence from the Organi zation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) confinlls In particular, the OECD suggests that the 1997-
1998 financial crisis in Asia has shown the need for better standards of business 
282 Stephen Sclunidheiny. Changing Course, 1992, at 29-30. See also Nei l Gunningham and Joseph Rees, 
Law & Policy, Special Issue on Self-Regulation, Vol. 19, No. 14, October 1997, at 364; Eric Bregman 
and Arthur Jacobson , 'Enviromnental Perfonnance Review: Self Regulation in Environmental Law' , in 
Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Fanner and Declan Murphy (eds.) , Environmental LalV and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Se!fOrgani~ation. 1994, at 207. 
m Franco Furger, 'Accountability and Systems of Self-Govell1ance: The Case of the Maritime IndustIY', 
in Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees (eds.). Lall ' & Po lieI', Special Issue on Self-Regulation, Vol. 19. 
No. 14, October 1997. at452. 
284 See Bardach & Kagan, Going b\' the Book, 1982; Roberta Kannel, 'Securities Industry Self-
Regulation - Tested by the Crash', Washington and Lee [{Ill' Review, Regulation SVlllposiul11, 1988 , 
VoIA5; and Eric Bregman and AI1hur Jacobson. ' Environmental Perfonnance Review: Self Regulation in 
Environmental Law' . in Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Falmer and Declan Murphy (eds.), Environmental 
[(Ill' and Ecological Responsibilil)': The Concept and Practice of Ecological Se!fOrgani=ation , 1994, at 
207. 
2S5 Agenda 21. Chapter 30 ('Strengthening the Role of Business and Industry'); see also Neil 
Gunningham, ' Environment, Self-Regulation and the ChemicallndustIy', LalV & Policy, Vol. 17, No. I 
January 1995, at 58. 
286 See Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Sl1Iort Regulation: DeSigning Environmental Policy, at 50-
6. 
159 
behaviour, and that ' the Asian crisis highlighted the weakness in transparency, in 
regulation, and in overall good governance in the corporate sector in a number of 
countries287 
Tn its ideal form, self-regulation has a number of advantages over direct government 
regulation, providing a 'win-win' solution achieving both the private interests of 
individual enterprises and the public interest288 From the government's perspective. an 
effective self-regulatory scheme could help reduce regulators ' workload289 whi le also 
passing responsibility to the group (industry) which has the greater specialist ski ll s and 
more sophi sticated expertise and experience than government regulators. The latter are 
forced to be generalists because of the shortage of manpower, and common ly lack 
technologically advanced equipment and expertise as a result of budget constraint.29o 
Given these constraints on government in spectors, it is tempting for them to pass at least 
pati of the role of regulation to industry itself provided they can be confident that 
industry will regulate itself honestly. 291 Thi s is of course a very large qualification and a 
highly contentious issue to which we will return. 
A fLllih er attraction of self regulation is its capacity to encourage higher ethical 
standards of conduct on the p311 of industry rather than an attitude of merely complying 
with minimum regulatory standards. This could help improve industry'S behaviour, thus 
leading (0 integration of environmental concerns into the management process292 Self-
regulation also provides flexibility for fil1llS to meet regul atory requirements by their 
own means
293 Moreover, a number of impol1ant, and apparently relatively successful 
28 ' Paul Lewis. 'Corporate Conduct Code is Proposed for Third World Nations', Email News, 29 April 
1999. 
288 See Manas Sa-nguandeehil , 'Feedback from Pri vate Sector towards Govenunent Po licy on 
Environmental Management'. A Paper Presented in the Seminar, Industrial Development and 
Em'ironlllental Conser\'{/tion. Cholburi, Thailand . 27 September 1996, at 6. See also, Nei l Gunningham 
and Joseph Rees, ' Indusl1y Self-Regulati on: An Institutional Perspective', in Nei l Gunningham and 
Joseph Rees (eds), La", & Policv, Speciallssuc on Self-Regu lation. Vol. 19, No. 14, October 1997, 
at 364 
289 See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 
1992, at 103. See also Robert Kagan, 'Regulatory Enforcement' , in D. Rosenbloom and R. Schwartz 
(eds.), The Handbook a/Regulation and Administrative Law, 1994, at 395-9. 
290 Darren Sinclair, 'Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies'. in Neil 
Gunningham and Joseph Rees (eds), Law & Policv, Spec ial Issue on Self-Regulation, Vol. 19, No. 14, 
October 1997. at 530. 
291 See Roberta Kalmel , 'Securities Industty Se lf-Regu lation - Tested By the Crash ', Washington ane! Lee 
La\\' Reviell', Regulation Sl'lIIposilll1l . 1988, Vo1.45. at 1306-7; and Jolm Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, 
'Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime', in Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning (eds), 
Pri\'{/te PoliCing. 1987, at 222-4. 
292 Ri chard Welford. Cases in Environmental Managem el1l and Business Strateg)', 1994, at 16-20. 
293 Roberta Kannel, 'Securities Industry Self-Regulation - Tested By the Crash ', at 1305-6. 
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environmental initiatives, are built around self-regulation. These include ISO 1400 I, 
which is discussed in detail in Chapter 7, and the Responsible Care program later in this 
section. 
Increasingly, govemments in many countries are integrating self-regulation as a 
regulatory strategy. [n the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has recently launched the 'Reinventing Environmental Regulation' initiative, which 
includes Project XL (for Excellence and Leadership) and the Environmental Leadership 
Program (widely known as ELP). Project XL involves the development by regulated 
enterprises of site-specific alternative compliance plans, while ELP allows firms to 
develop their environmental management systems according to their resource 
availability. In retum, finns are committed to improve corporate accountability for 
regulatory compliance; however, Project XL also requires finn applicants to negotiate 
their proposals with all parties involved, including the local community, before EPA 
considers the project approval 294 
In essence, under both these initiatives, finns that can demonstrate that they are 
environmental leaders and committed to environmental best practice are given very 
considerable discretion to regulate themselves largely free of some of the constraints 
which are imposed by environmental law on other firms These are 'regulatory 
flexibility' initiatives which are built around a degree of self-regulation reinforced by 
govemment and third party oversight. 
Some govemments in Asia also perceive the significance of self-regulation, although so 
far, only to a limited extent. For example, Hong Kong's Environmental Protection 
Department (EPD) has recently introduced a self-introductory program to provide 
flexibility for industry to be able to comply with regulation. This is consistent with 
studies which show that Hong Kong's govenunent has consistently adopted a 
philosophy of working alongside trade associations and the Federation of Industry to 
make sure that self-regulation works effectively295 
294 Rena Steinzor, 'Reinventing Enviromnental Regulation: The Dangerous Joul11ey from Command to 
Self-control', Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vo1.22, 1998, at 111-2. 
295 Andrea Zavadszky. 'Balancing the Legal Scales', Asian Sustainable Development Prejects, YoU, No. 
2, June-August 1994, at 26-7. 
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B. Forms of Self-I'egulation 
Self-regu lation may take many fornls ,296 and can be classified according to various 
typologies, though none shows that self-regulation can be entirely separated from 
government regulation 297 Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees seek to locate various 
fot1ns of self-regul at ion in ternlS of social control, and place pure self-regulation and 
government rcgulation at opposite ends of a continuum, with various forms of co-
regulation located in between. The nearer such co-regulation points towards the 
government regul ation end, the greater magnitude of government oversight is 
developed 298 
Based on the above, forms of self-regulation can for the purposes of this thesis be 
classified into two approaches according to the degree of government involvement: pure 
self-regulation, and partial self-regul ation. In pure self-regulation, industries are granted 
entire autonomy from govemment's regulatory control. In paJ1iai self-regulation, 
governments grant rcgulatory t1exibility to the firm s which can demonstrate thcir 
commitment to best practice environmental management. 
How do these different fOt1n s of self-regu lation perform in practice? Studies show that 
pure self-regulation has a poor record as most firnl s which have adopted this regime 
nomlally succumb to their self-interest in the absence of rcgulatory control 299 For this 
reason, examples of self-regulation in this form which are successful or endorsed by 
govcrnmcnt are almost impossible to find in the real world 300 Partial self-regulation, on 
thc contrary, has constantly been in the limeli ght among environmental stakeholders 
and it is thi s form of self-regulation that has been adopted in some contexts in Thailand. 
For al l thesc reasons, the discussion in thi s section is limited to partial self-regu lation. 
296 Nei l Gunnin ghal11 and Joseph Rees, ' Industry Self-Regu la ti on: An Institutional Perspective' , in Neil 
Gunningham and Joseph Rees (eds), Law & Policy, Spec ial Iss ue on Self-Regulation, Vol. 19, No. 14, 
October 1997, at 364-6. 
297 As Rena Steinzor argues, self-regulation is the term used by political scientists and legal scholars to 
connote alternati ve compliance plans conceived by regulated entities. with some degree of govemment 
review and public invo lvement. See Rena Stein zor, 'Reinventing Envirorunental Regulation: The 
Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-control'. Harvard Environmental Lml' Review, Vol 22, 1998, 
at 104. 
298 Neil Gunninghal11 and Joseph Rees . ' lndustiy Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective', at 366. 
299 See further Neil GUI111 inghal11. ' Environment, Self-Regul ation and the Chemical Industry' , at 58-109 . 
.100 DalTen Sinclai r. ' Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies' , at 533-
-l. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary that we break down partial self-regulation 
into two approaches: (i) self-regulation by individual firms; and (ii) industry-based self-
regulation, before examining how self-regulation can help to address environmental 
problems under each approach. 
I. Self-regulation by individual firms 
Under this approach, each participating finn is allowed to regulate itself providing it is 
cOlmnitted to improving its environmental perfonnance so as to achieve at least 
compliance with applicable regulation. The Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) 
initiated by the United States Occupational Health and Safety Administration serves as 
a good example. Under this program, OSHA will render more flexible (less frequent 
and less intrusive) inspection and enforcement to any company which implements an 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management system: largely trusting it to 
achieve by its own means the better result required by the legisiation30 1 
However, because establishing systems does not necessarily guarantee regulatory 
compliance, OSHA does not grant complete autonomy to a participating finn to regulate 
itself. Rather, the firm is required to convince OSHA not only that it has a system, but 
also that it will meet certain outcome-based requirements. These include elaboration of 
its hazard assessment procedures; training program and operating process; and a 
commitment to rectify all hazards identified through self-audit, employee reports, or 
accident investigations, as well as to disclose the investigation results to its 
employees. 302 
What do we learn from the OSHA case? It is clear that it would be naive for the 
government to grant regulatory flexibility to a participating firm merely because it 
claims to self-regulate. For this reason, government must be convinced that the finn's 
environmental perfornlance at least meets regulatory requirements, and that such sound 
perfonnance will continue. This leads to another question: how can regulators and 
management be sure that the finn's perfonnance meets govenunent requirements? In 
addition to the other mechanisms identified in the VPP above, not least, transparency 
lO I Neil Gunningham, From Adversarialisl1I to Partnership?: [SO 14000 and Regulation, a paper 
presented to the conference, ISO 14000: Regulalion, Trade and Environment, 2 July 1996, Hyatt Hotel 
CanberTa, at 18. 
102 Ibid, at I 8-9. 
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and accountability to third parties, it is crucial that there is some independent means of 
detennining whether the fi1ll1 is discharging its environmental responsibilities. To this 
end, scholars suggest either that the finn itself or some independent auditor conduct 
envirOlU11ental aUdits 3OJ , providing the results to the regulator. Given that environmental 
audits can help both individual finns and industry associations achieve the goal of self-
regulation, and to provide assurance to the regulatory agency that self-regulation is 
indeed working in the public interest, it is appropriate to discuss the role of audits here. 
Perhaps the best way to understand the role of environmental audit is to begin with a 
basic question: what is an environmental audit? As defined by the EPA, an 
environmental audit is a systematic, documented, periodic, and objective review by 
regulated entities of operations and practices related to meeting environmental 
requirements304 Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce (TCC) in drawing 
up audit guidelines which promote the need for self-regulation in the Responsible Care 
program, has defined an environmental audit as: 
A management tool comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and objective 
evaluation of how well environmental organisation, management and equipment are 
perfolming with the aim of helping to safeguard the environment by: (i) facilitating 
management and control of environmental practices; and (ii) assessing compliance with 
company policies, which includes meeting regulatory requirements J05 
The traditional role of environmental audits is to act as a mcchanism for management to 
get an objective appraisal of an enterprise's perfonnance for regulatory compliance3 06 
Howevcr, in response to the emergence of the concept of pollution prevention and the 
promotion of Total Quality Environmental Management by the Global Environmental 
Management Initiative (GEMI), the objective of at least some corporate envirorunental 
management has undergone a radical transfonnation, that is, to advance envirorunental 
management and envirolUl1entai outcomes 'beyond compliance' with regulation. Given 
JOJ Eric Bregman and Arthur Jacobson, 'Environmental Perfonnance Review: Self Regulation in 
Environmental Law', in Gunther Teubner. Lindsay Fanner and Declan Murphy (eds.), Environm ental 
Law and Ecological Responsibilitv: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization , 1994, at 
220. 
304 See P. J. Ennis, ' Environmental Audits: Protective Shields or Smoking Guns? How to Encourage the 
Private Sector to Perfolln Environmental Audits and Still Maintain Effective Enforcement'. Washington 
Universit.l' Journal of Urban and Contemporwl' Law, 1992, Note 24 , at 394. 
lOS Richard Welford, Cases in Environmental Management and Business StrategJ', 1994, at 21. 
106 Richard Wells, 'Auditing for Compliance Is Only the Beginning: Lessons from Leading Companies' , 
in John Willig (ed.), AuditingJor Environmental Qualil1' Leadership, 1995 , at 13-14. 
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this transfonnation, there are now two major roles for environmental audits. First, 
compliance audits, the traditional type, identify whether an organisation is in 
compliance with environmental laws, and if it is not compliant, to identify ways to 
make it comply; and second, 'environmental management audits' audit the entire 
environmental management practices and systems of an organisation, holding out the 
potential of moving the organisation 'beyond compliance'. 
In self-regulation, compliance audits can help provide feedback to the management of a 
participating finn as to whether the finn's environmental performance meets regulatory 
requirements. Also, management audits help management to perceive potential risks 
associated with the finn's operation, anticipate environmental damage, and prevent it 
from happening307 Obviously, audit is central to a finn in detennining whether it is 
meeting its self-regulatory commitments, just as it is to ensuring it is complying with 
regulatory requirements. 
Alongside industry, government agencies involved in regulatory enforcement have 
increasingly paid attention to environmental audits. In the US for instance, both the 
Department of Justice and EPA persistently encourage regulated entities to carry out 
compliance or management audits voluntarily as they hope that the audits will actively 
induce finns' compliance without extensive government oversight308 
A question arises: who should conduct an environmental audit? As critics argue, finns 
may audit their environmental perfomlance merely to buy trust from regulators and 
interest groups, rather than to actually improve their environmental perfonnance or to 
ensure their compliance with environmentallaws3 09 Two solutions to this problem may 
be suggested. The first is that the audit should be conducted not by the finn itself, but 
307 Richard Welford, Cases in Enviromnenral Management and Business Straleg)l, 1994, at 21. 
308 P. 1. Ennis, 'Environmental Audits: Protective Shields or Smoking Guns? How to Encourage the 
Private Sector to Perfonn Environmental Audits and Still Maintain Effective Enforcement' , Note 24, at 
396. 
109 Theodore Panayolou, Todd Schatzki, and Qwamuedee Limvorapitak, Differential industrv Response 
to Formal and Informal Environmental Regulations in Newlv Industrializing Economies, A Case Study 
for the Harvard Institute for Intemational Development (HIlD) 1997 Asia Environmental Economics 
Policy Seminar, at 2-3. 
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by an independent third patiy nominated by govenunent310 The reason is that it would 
be naive to be sure that a self-audited finn would improve its environmental 
perfonnance after finding out its non-compliance (where a conflict of interest may 
arise), given that it is no longer subject to direct government scrutiny. The second 
option is industry-based self-regulation, which is discussed below. 
2. Industly-hased Self-Regulation 
According to this approach, an industry association is empowered by its members to 
police the activities of each member company. That is, the industry association largely 
takes over the function s of a government regulator. 311 One crucial component of any 
industry-based self-regulation is its capacity to identifY how its members are 
perfonning. Some fonn of environmental audit is generally the most appropriate means 
of sati sfYing this goal. 
An illlovative method of improving the credibility of audits under a system of industry-
based self-regulation has been tested in Alberta, Canada. Under this scheme, each 
participating fillll agrees to allow a certified independent auditor from another 
participating fill11 in the same industry group to audit its operation.312 Since the projcct 
has started only recently, it is too early to judge its success regarding self-regulation. J13 
However, the project provides us with a clear model of one credible means of using one 
firm to audit the environmental perfonnance of another within an industry group in 
response to increasing scepticism about self-audit. 
Another model, which recognises the dangers of allowing finns to audit each other 
when there are personal ties and reciprocal monitoring between auditing and audited 
310 Eric Bregman and Arthur Jacobson, ' Enviromnental Performance Review: Self Regulation in 
Enviromnental Law'. in Gunther Teubner, Lindsay FaJl11er and Declan Murphy (eds.), Environmental 
LeI\\' and Ecological Responsibilitv: The Concept and Practice of Ecological SeifOrgani~ation, 1994, at 
220. 
311 Joseph Rees , Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safetv since Three Mile Island, 
1994. 
312 See Neil Gunningham. 'EnvirOllllental Management and Community Participation: Rethinking 
Chemical Industry Regulation', University of California at Berkeley Environmental Law Journal, 1998, 
at note 190 
313 Ibid. 
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finns, is for the industry association itself to take on this role,'l4 in effect substituting 
itself for the regulatory body and monitoring the behaviour of finns within the same 
industrial community. Take the case of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation 
(INPO). Located in Atlanta, INPO was created by American nuclear industry executives 
in 1979 in response to the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. Recognising that any 
repeat incident of similar severity might result in the closure of the entire nuclear 
industry, the industry itself took far-reaching steps to regulate itself. Despite its status as 
a private entity, INPO perfonns the duty of a regulatory body by developing standards, 
conducting inspections, and investigating accidents. There is strong evidence that it has 
done so very successfully and that as a result, environmental perfonnance and safety 
among finns in the nuclear association have remarkably improved. llS 
What is behind INPO's success? Although INPO is empowered to exercise tough 
sanctions against intransigent members if non-compliance is detected, research has 
found that it also promotes the atmosphere of a distinctive kind of community in the 
nuclear power industry. As Joseph Rees argues, this movement towards community has 
helped develop an innovative responsibility-centred culture in the industry, thus 
bringing about the regulatory success mentioned in the preceding paragraph W' 
This model of an industry association perfonning as a regulatory body is not limited to 
the nuclear industry. For example, the chemical industry has also adopted industry-
based self-regulation under its Responsible Care program, empowering the chemical 
association to regulate its members, as described later in the subsection on community 
of fate, one of several factors suggested to help enhance the effectiveness of self-
regulation. 
C. Weaknesses of Self-I'egulation 
Self-regulation, like all other regulatory tools, is not without its shortcomings. First, 
there has been criticism that the project approval, under the SOlis of regulatory 
flexibility initiatives described earlier, is a time-consuming, expensive and confusing 
314 Franco Furger, 'Accountability and Systems of Self-Gove111ance: The Case of the Maritime Industry ', 
at 452. 
l iS Joseph Rees, 'Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical Industry ', in Neil 
Gunningham and Joseph Rees (eds.) , Law & Policy, Special Issue on Self-Regulation. Vol. 19, No. 14, 
October 1997, at 478. 
l l6 Ibid. 
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process, which discourages industry hom participating. The case of Project XL suppOlis 
this assertion. Research has found that Project XL staff lack technical expertise to 
foresee potential problems posed by industry proposals to participate in the program, 
thereby causing delays in review and approval. As a consequence, EPA received a total 
of forty six applications in 1998, much fewer than the several hundred expected upon 
the launch of the program in 1995.317 
Furthennore, Project XL is also plagued by confusion over the criteria EPA uses in 
detennining if a project will achieve 'superior environmental perfonnance,' a 
prerequisite to participation and to the bestowing of partial self-regulation.318 EPA did 
not define the criteria to evaluate the environmental improvements offered by XL 
proposals for the first two years of the program. Obviously, this resulted in the failure to 
identify the true costs necessary for attaining the goal of superior environmental 
perf0l111ance. Despite subsequent cOITections in 1997, these revi sed criteria still create 
costs and complications in joining the scheme and also fail to provide a transparent set 
of standards used for judging the overall merits of XL proposal s. 319 
Second, the scheme is not well trusted by the public. It is often seen not only as a sham 
among industries in order to escape fi'om direct government intervention and public 
scrutiny, but as an excuse for government regulators not doing their jobs. Indeed, there 
is a genuine and serious risk, according to John Braithwaite, that 
Self-regulation is frequently an attempt to deceive the public into believing in the 
responsibility of an irresponsible industry. Sometimes it is a strategy to give the 
government an excuse for not doing its job.320 
These public concerns about the efficiency of self-regulated entities and relevant 
regulators described above have some substance. For example, in the case of the Mab 
317 Rena Steinzor, 'Reinventing Environmental Regulation', Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 
22, 1998, at 124-5. 
lI8 Thomas Caballero, 'Project XL: Making It Legal , Making It Work', Standford Environmental Law 
JOllrnal, Vol. 17, 1998 , at407. 
319 Ibid. 
320 John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, ' Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime', in Clifford 
Shearing and Philip Stenning (eds.), Private PoliCing, 1987, at 242. 
168 
Ta Phut air pollution case discussed in the previous chapters, evidence shows that even 
Bayer Premier and Bayer Polymers Co. Ltd, the finns adopting self-regulatory schemes, 
were involved. Yet these are finns which had quite far-reaching self-regulatory controls. 
Dr Wolfgang Herrig, President and CEO of these finns, said during my fieldwork 
interview: 
We have the system of intemal auditing among our affiliate companies because we 
always want to do our best in telms of envirorunental protection regardless of applicable 
laws32 1 
Yet despite these selt~regulatory controls, the evidence was that these finns were among 
those responsible for serious violations of environmental regulation. 
Furthennore, research has found that many rules and standards used as codes of practice 
to monitor participating firms' behaviour tend to be set at the lowest common 
denominator: an industry association is inclined to establish the rules and standards with 
which all participating firms can comply with no difficulty. 322 And even if there are 
stringent codes of practice, industry associations are loath to impose tough action on 
participating finns. 323 As John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse arguc, nothing could be less 
like a family than an industry association. Since the association officials are drawn from 
those representing finns within industry, and more importantly, the benefit each official 
receives from the association is far less than that received from his or her own company, 
it would be naive to contemplate tough sanctions imposed on member companies324 
On the other hand, in acknowledging the failings of self regulation we must remember 
to ask the crucial question: how does it compare to the alternatives? [n the case of the 
Mab Ta Phut air pollution it must be remembered that the govemment also fail ed to 
regulate effectively and this itself was a major cause of the enviromnental disaster. Mr 
Yuthana Phudchong, a community leader ofMab Ta Phut, said: 
321 The interview was conducted on 6 Febtuary 1998. 
m See Naomi Roth-Arriaza, 'Shifting the Point of Regulation: The Intel11ational Organization for 
Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Enviromnent ', Ec%gv Law Quarter/v, 1995 , at 
529-31. 
J2J John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, 'Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime ', in Clifford 
Shearing and Philip Stenning (eds), Private Policing, 1987, at 243. 
324 Ibid. 
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People in Mab Ta Phut district have suffered from air pollution emitted from factories 
within the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (lEAT), Mab Ta Phut site for two 
years. We therefore asked IEAT to resolve the problem but our outcry was ignored. We 
then submitted our petition to many local goverrunent agencies, ranging from municipal 
to provincial levels. Again, there was no response from them (until the disaster took 
place in I997). '25 
Third, government's loose control under the self-regulatory scheme could provide an 
opportunity for finns to succumb to self-interest, and then bend the rules in exchange 
for shoti-tenn profits. This situation is widely known as ' frec riding.' What is free 
riding? How does it affect the success of self-regulation? As scholars point out, free 
riding is a phenomenon in which an individual enterprise does not participate in a 
collective action but still benefits from such an action participated by others326 Indeed, 
free riders could be the finns which initially paIiicipated in a self-regulatory scheme, 
but do not genuinely implement it, or those who refused to take pati in the scheme from 
the outset. Essentially, either situation could lead to failure of self-regulation as the free 
riders enjoy less government scrutiny at the expense of those who implement the 
scheme. Hence, there is reason to believe that if free riding continues, those who have 
complied with self-regulatory schemes may be discouraged and their interest in self-
regulation could eventually wane. J27 What will happen next is clearly forcsecable. 
Without adequate and sincere cooperation among finns, a self-regulatory scheme will 
no longer receive trust from all those involved , thus limiting the success of the schcmc. 
We have seen that traditional forn1s of regulation do not have a good record in countries 
such as Thailand, and that self-regulation, at least in principle, has somc considerable 
advantages in its flexibility; the fact that it enables scarce regulatory resources to be 
redeployed elsewhere; and its capacity to involve industry directly and to cause industry 
to go 'beyond compliance' and to achieve successful results. Yet in practice self-
regulation often falls foul of the Sholi-tenn self-interest of individual companies 
continuing to pollute; it can sometimes degenerate into a sham; and it may result in a 
325 The interview was conducted on 6 FeblUalY 1998. 
326 Mancur Olsen. 1965, The Logic ofCollecrive Acriol1. 
J2J Neil Gutmingham and Joseph Rees, , 'Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective ', at 392-
6. 
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lowest-common-denominator approach on the part of industry associations. Yet when 
we ask the crucial question: how does self-regulation compare to other regulatory tools 
in practice, there may be at least some circumstances where it compares favourably to 
other alternatives. We explore these issues further in the context of environmental 
protection and pollution control in Thailand. 
D. Towal'ds effective self-regulation in Thailand 
As we have seen, the concept of self-regulation can involve the grant of regulatory 
flexibility to a finn which has successfully convinced regulators that it will produce 
better environmental performance voluntarily. Considering that regulatory tools must be 
designed with sensitivity to cultural mores, this approach fits the Thai context very well. 
As many suggest, the Thai do not like to be forced 328 and respond badly to government 
regulation and legal compulsion. For example, Assistant Professor Dr Kittisak Prokati 
of Faculty of Law, Thammasat University suggested: 
It appears that Thai people have a compromising lifestyle. Therefore, they perceive the 
law as alien. In the Chinese community, law is seen as a tool for suppression and 
punishment. (hundreds of thousands of Chinese migrated to Thailand many years ago; 
at present, many Thai citizens are of mixed Thai and Chinese origin.) Consequently, 
many Thai tend to avoid complying with the law J29 
Thus we are comparing grossly imperfect regulatory instruments and in Thailand, there 
Illay well bc more potential to harness self regulation in the public interest than has so 
far been realised. 
The circulllstances where self-regulation has the greatest potential are those where there 
is a community of shared fate, an underpinning of government regulation, and co-
regulation, third-party oversight, the involvement of transnational corporations, and an 
128 Manas Sa-nguandeekul, 'Feedback from Private Sector towards Govenunent Policy on Enviromnental 
Management'. A Paper Presented in the Seminar, Industrial Development and Environmental 
Conservation, Cholburi, Thailand, 27 September 1996. 
129 The interview took place on 10 February 1998. 
171 
intell1ational audience. However, as this chapter is concell1ed with domestic issues on ly, 
thi s last factor, the use of an intell1ational audience as a solution to enhance the 
effectiveness ofsclf-regulation, will be left to Chapter 7. 
1. A cOllllllulli~" ofshared fate 
A 'community of shared fate' exists in circumstances where an environmental calamity 
caused by one member of the industry group will ruin the reputation of the entire 
industry.llo For the purposes of thi s thesis, cooperation among industry members for the 
adoption of self-regulation could be anticipated if each member company realises that 
its business will no longer survive if there is non-compliance by any of the other 
members. 
A classic example of how community of shared fate brings about the success of self-
regulation can be drawn from INPO discussed earlier. In that case, the industry realised 
in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island disaster that it could not afford to have another 
such incident invol ving an,l' American nuclear power facility because if it did, the entire 
industry risked closure and the fate of one would be the fate of all. However, the nuclear 
industry is not alone in generating a community of shared fate. Other industries whi ch, 
unlike nuclear power, are prevalent in Thail and also confront a si milar dynamic and 
similarly might be susceptible to effective self-regulation because they have a similar 
interest in the effective regulation of the entire industry. 
Take the chemical industry here instead. It is no coincidence that Thailand's chemical 
industry has introduced a very extensive and sophisticated scheme known as the 
Responsible Care program. which embodies industry-based self-regulat ion in response 
to public pressures. 
As briefly discussed in the section on disclosurc of environmental information, the 
Bhopal and Seveso disasters posed a serious threat to the reputation of the entire 
chemical industry regarding environmental health and safety (EH&S) issues. The 
industry therefore introduced the 'Responsible Care' program to help improve its 
image. Under thi s scheme, chemical companies commi t themselves to the improvement 
1]0 Joseph Rees . Hostages of Each Other' The Transformation ofnllc/ear safetl' since Three Mile [sland. 
199-1. 
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of their EH&S performance3J' To ensure that such a commitment is genuinely 
undetiaken, the Chemical Industry Association of each country which has adopted the 
program takes the role of regulatory body in overseeing the members' perfonnance. JJ2 
It should be noted that the Responsible Care program has interested many agencies 
involved in environmental issues at both international and domestic levels, such as the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). How has it been possible for an industry trade association to 
successfully persuade its member companies to pursue the concept of environmental 
protection, and in many circumstances to take action beyond what environmental 
regulation requires? For example, Jacqueline Aloisi de Larderel, director of UNEP's 
Industry and Environmental Program Centre in Paris observed: 
(The chemical industry's) Responsible Carc program is the most advanced 
voluntary program [ have seen. It is providing leadership for all industries by 
developing a program aimed so clearly at environmental excellence.m 
Similarly, an EPA official revealed to Joseph Rees in his research that the Responsible 
Care program (in its USA version) was the most advanced initiative related to 
environmental protection among industry. Most impOt1antly, he gave credit for the 
program's success to the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) which oversaw 
the program and whose 195 member companies were involved in approximately 95 per 
cent of the chemicals manufactured in the US 334 
Turning to Asia, Responsible Care has also been the flagship program to help achieve 
sound occupational and EH&S perfollnancc among chemical companies in many 
countries in the region.m Among these, research has found that the program is 
331 Neil Gunningham, Environment. Se/fRegulation, and the Chemical Induslir Assessing Responsible 
Law& Policy, 1995, at 59-61. 
Federal of Thai Industries, 'Chemical Industry Group is Plalming to adopt Responsible Care'. Press 
Release, at 1-2. 
m Michel Roberts. 'Care Gives Industry a Leadership Role in Sustainable Development ', Chemical 
Week, 7 July 1993. at 20. 
314 Joseph Rees. 'Development of Communi tar ian Regulation in the Chemical Industry' , at 479. 
335 'Enviro11l11ental Management in Asia's Chemical Sector', Asia Environmental Review, April 1999, 
available on the internet at the website www.asianenviro.com/ 
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remarkably successful in Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore."6 It is apparent that this 
success is attributable to constant pressures from both international and domestic 
influences and to the dynamic of a community of shared fate. Regarding the fornler, 
international NGOs have been particularly influential in bringing pressure to bear. For 
example, Greenpeace in late 1998 criticised governments of developing countries in 
Asia for not paying enough attention to chemical problems The international 
envirorunental NGO also denounced producers and suppliers rrom Western countries 
for having done too little to warn their customers in this region.m The chemical 
industry, which attracts much public attention internationally, is very vulnerable to the 
public relations damage of such allegations. Regarding the second factor, the Bhopal 
disaster in India served as an alanl1 to the chemical industry internationally and 
dramatically forced the industry to recognise that it was involved in what scholars now 
call a community of shared fate. 
At about the same time as the Greenpeace campaign, Hong Kong's High COUli handed 
down its judgement against Ciba-Geiby (Hong Kong) over a case involving one of its 
pesticides. The court found that the defendant failed to meet its responsibilities to 
handle the impOlied chemical substances properly. m This case also brought the 
chemical industry internationally into the public spotlight. 
As for Thailand, it is necessary to re-emphasise that the Thai chemical industry has 
recently applied to the International Council of Chemical Association (ICCA) to be a 
member of the Responsible Care program339 in response to criticisms concerning a 
series of accidents resulting from the industry's operation. Examples include the 
explosion of chemical substances stored in the POIi Authority ' s warehouse in 1991. 
Sixteen people living in the vicinity died and many were injured as a result of 
explosion. Also, many became seriously ill as the incident involved 3,810 kinds of toxic 
chemicals 3 40 Most recently, a huge explosion at a /ongan processing factory in Chiang 
Mai province caused a fatal disaster, killing 38 people, injuring more than 100, and 
ll6 Email interview with Mr Bundit Pattawekongka. Senior Safety and Environmental Manager. Rayong 
Olefins. Co. Ltd. on 23 September 1999. 
337 'Environmental Management in Asia's Chemical Sector'. Asia Environmental Review, Jun e 1999, 
available on the internet at the website www.asianenviro.comJ 
118 Ibid. 
119 See the section on Disclosure ofEnvironmentallnfomlation, supra. for greater details. 
340 The Environmental Committee, the House of Senate, Th e Committee 's Report on Disasterji'om Toxic 
Subsrances al Klang Teuy (Bangkok) Parr, at 1-2. 
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destroying many assets near the plant. According to the investigation, potassium 
chlorate, thc chem ical used for the /ongan processing, was to blame for the incidcnt341 
More specifi ca ll y, chemicals are often responsible for air and water pollution. This is 
evident from (he air pollution case in Mab Ta Phut discussed in the previous chapters 
and the water pollution case at Samutprakarn province discussed in the next section 342 
What do we learn from the above di scussion? As in many other countries, Thailand's 
chemica l industry has responded to the recogniti on that they confront a community of 
shared fate by embracing the internationally rccognised Responsibl e Care program as a 
cred ibl e self-regul atory soluti on. A central question however remains: how long will the 
spirit of comm unity of shared fate continue? As previously discussed, a firm may 
initiall y join its fel low companies to adopt a self-regulato ry scheme, but succumbs to 
self-interest and then takes a 'free ride ' later343 
Dealing with free riding to maintain the spirit of community of shared fatc 
To overcome the free riding problem, scholars have suggested a number of measures. 
For example, disclosure of each parti cipating member's behaviour not only (0 other 
members of the self-regulatory scheme, but to (he public as well , might well serve to 
bring pressure on reca1citrants344 So also might a process of shami ng within the 
industry association, in conjunction with a history of effective cooperative action taken 
by industry associations (as has been the case with INPO), reinforced by a system of 
punishing non-compliant finns or handing them over to the govemment regu lator345 
How can we make the above suggestions work in the Thai context? With respect to 
disclosure of finns' behaviour wi thin the same industry, recent criminological studies 
show that this practice could be used by an industry association to 'shame' a non-
341 Subin Khelllkaew and Omsan Suksai, ' Factory explosion killes 28', 'Chuan orders check on chemi cal 
stocks', and 'Chem ical Hazard: Taksin's nephew repons to police', Bangkok Post, 20, 22, and 28 
September 1999. 
342 See Chapters 3 and 4, for the details of Mab Ta Phut a ir po llution case. For the Samutprakarn water 
pollution case. see the sec tion of command and control regulation. 
HJ See Theodore Panayotou, et al .. Differential [ndllstrv Response to Formal and inforl11(11 Environmental 
Reglliations in Nell-ir [ndllstrialicing Economies, A Case Study for the Harvard Institute for International 
Deve lopment (I-IIID) 1997 Asia Enviro!Ullental Econom ics Policy Semi nar, at 2-3. 
344 Ibid, at 2 I 3-4 . 
. 145 Nei l Gunnin gham and Joseph Rees. ' ' Indus try Self-Regu lation: An Institutional Perspective, 
at 393--1. 
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compliant fiml so that it will subsequently comply with applicable regulati on346 This 
strategy can bc very effective in the case of large firm s which are concerned about their 
reputation. And as public interest in environmental issue is constantly increasing, the 
public relations damage of being perceived as non-compliant also increases347 
In contrast, research has found that finns which do not have a reputation to protect, such 
as small firms, are likely to skirt the laws as their smallness enables them to hide from 
public scrutiny. 348 This is also the case for Thailand where small and medium fillllS are 
major sourccs of pollution349 Thus, it would bc naive to expect that the shaming tactic 
will succeed in the case of small finns in Thailand. 
However, the strategy may be able to influence small finns indirectly through the 
application of product stewardship. How does this strategy work? Product stewardship 
demands responsibility for environmental health and safety, from those involved with a 
product from inccption through to final disposition. Under this strategy, large finns are 
in an advantageous position to press small finns who are suppliers into compliance in 
the light of infollllation disclosed about a firm's behaviour35o Indeed, research has 
found that numerous interactions between upstream chemical producers and their 
downstream industrial customers are made to improve the risk management throughout 
the business cycle of each chemical 351 For example, some finns are requiring each 
supplier to have a company environmental policy which is affilllled by an independent 
audit. Others assist suppliers in self-evaluation and help them find ways to improve 
their environmcntal perfonnance352 The interactions therefore could Icad to 
improvement in many small finns' behaviour, as they usually do their business as 
subcontractors353 In essence, large finns can bc shamed into compliance through public 
346 John Braithwaite. Crime, Shame, and Reintegration. 1989. 
147 Indeed, this chapter has already di scussed the virtue of the infoll11ation disclosure approach as one of 
the effective mechanisms to help improve regulatOlY compliance in Thailand. See the section on 
disclosurc of environmental in[ol111ation for further details. 
]43 Christen White, ' Regu lation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulation Failure' , 
UCLA Journal of Environmental Law, 1996, at 148-9. See also Fiona Haines, COlporate Regulation, 
1997, at 182. 
]49 Amoll1pot Kullawijit, 'Environmental Problem: Depletion of the Ozone Layer'. Dullapaha, 1996. at 
160. See also Thailand Envi!'OlU11ent Institute, Cleaner Technology in Thailand, 1997, at 6. 
350 See Neil Gunningham, ' EnvirolU11ent, Selt~Regulation. and the Chemical Industry: Assessing 
Responsible Care', a t 83-4. 
'" Michael Baram and Patricia Dillon. 'Corporate Management of Chemical Accidents Risks', in Kurt 
Fischer and Johan Schot (eds.), Environll1el1lal Strategies for IndustiT . at 233-4. 
'52 Neil Gunningham. ' Proactive Environmental Management: Business and Regulatory Strategies', 
Australian Journal of Environmel1lal Managemel1l . Vol. I, No.2, September 1994, at 123. 
353 See Fiona Haincs, COIpolYlte Regulation, 1997. a t 182. 
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disclosure and such fim1s, as part of their commitment under Responsible Care, will 
apply the principle of product stewardship to their smaller trading partners. 
Evidence shows that product stewardship does indeed exist in Thailand, although it 
could be developed further. According to Mr Pertpal Singh , Director, Environmental 
Health and Safety for Asia/Pacific, Penang Seagate Industries, whose manufacturing 
plants are located in various countries, including Thailand: 
ISO 14000 is, basically, an environmental management system which requires a lot of 
self-audit .. If ISO 14000 takes the same route as ISO 9000, it is going to provide quiet 
a bit of encouragement. People expected [SO 9000 to influence suppliers because as an 
[SO 9000 contractor you expect your suppliers to comply. I would require suppliers to 
Seagate 10 comply with ISO 14000.154 
The power of publicity is reinforced by the fact that the media in Asia have paid a great 
deal of attention to environmental issues. In Singapore, newspapers always publish 
pictures of those who have violated environmental laws; details of thi s are discussed in 
the next section which deals exclusively with command and control regulation. In 
Thailand too, environmcntal issues always receive attention from the media. Mr 
Michele Corash, an environmental lawyer from San Francisco, spoke from his 
experience in Thail and: 
We have been here for four or five days , and every day there is an aliicle about the 
environment on the front page of the Bangkok POSI and the television is full of stori es 
about the environment:'55 
Similarly, Mr Amnalj Sonimsali, a news commentator and senator, said : 
So far, I have noticed Ihat the envirollli1ental situation is a little bit better than il 
was .. The media has constant ly rendered a lot of cooperation for enviromnental 
. 156 
campaigns. 
154 Pcrtpal Singh, ' [nfraSlructure Developmc11l and Pollution Prevention Priorities' , in American Bar 
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Thus in Thailand, a combination of publicity, high visibility and shaming, can be 
effcctive in press large cO'lJorations to honour their self-rcgulatory commitments, while 
product stewardship can at least contribute to improving the environmental performance 
of small and medium sized enterprises, which are not directly vulnerable to shaming 
and publicity. 
2. Power ofRegulafOlY Body 
The power of the self-regulatory body is also crucial to the success of industry-based 
selt~regulation. Thc more powerful the self-regulatory body is, the more likely it is to 
persuade participating members to comply with the self~regulatory requirements. 35 ) 
The case of INPO di scussed earlier serves as a classic example. INPO has achieved 
significant improvements in environmental perfOI1l1anCe and safety within the industry 
because it has taken a direct approach to inspection and has used its considerable 
powers to persuade recalcitrants to mcnd their ways. As Rees has demonstrated, thi s 
includes undet1aking its own inspections of participating companies, using both its own 
staff and those co-optcd from individual facilities; demanding and gaining access to all 
areas of inspected facilities; studying each plant thoroughly; and issuing a critical 
evaluation of each plant 's perfonnancc. 35R 
Since that such an evaluation is sometimes ignored by recalcitrant members, INPO 
accordingly resorts to the corporate shaming tactic: sharing inspection and audit 
information with other members and, if necessary, with government regulators so that 
the poor perfonnance of indi vidual firms is widely known. Such cOqJOI'ate shaming has 
proved widely successful against all but a very small minority. l59 However, on the very 
few occasions when this strategy docs not work, then INPO will expel thc recalcitrant 
member. Such an INPO action will provide a strong and unmistakable signal to thc 
government regulator to step in and apply tough measures to the recalcitrant facility. 
These measures include withdrawal of the member's operation licence."'() 
m Anil Gupta and Lad Lawrence. ' Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic. Organizationa\' and Political 
Analysis' Academy of Management Review, cited in Neil GUllllingham. En vironmel1l, Se({-Regulaliol1, 
and the Chemicallndlls fly: Assessing Respollsible Care, at 83 
'" Joseph Rees. Hostages of Each Other: The Transfollllation of Nuc lear Safety since Three Mile Island. 
1994. 
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Core, al 82. 
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In Thailand, sclf-regulation is less dcvelopcd than in countries such as the USA, 
Canada, and Australia. At the time of writing, it appears that there is onl y onc major 
self-regulatory body functioning in Thailand, and this relates to the chemical industry 
(although the IEAT may also in the future play this role). This body, th e Chcmical 
Industry Club, has been authorised by ICCA to oversee the Responsibl e Care self-
regulatory program in Thailand. 361 But is there any guarantee that the Chcmi ca l 
Industry Club will perfonn the duty ofa selt:regulatory body seriously? 
The chemical industry has a notorious record of hannful accidents and of causing 
industrial pollution, and for these reasons is a continuing cause of public anxiety. More 
importantly, it is the entire chem ical industry, not an indi vidual finn , whi ch is seen by 
the publi c as a threatJ 62 Thus the chemical industry has a very high public profile, its 
major environmental failings are usually very visible, and a di saster or major polluti on 
incident caused by one company may well have adverse implications, including an 
adverse political and regulatory reacti on, for thc entire industry; that is, there is a 
'community of shared fate ' . Against thi s background, there is good reason to believe 
that thc Chemical Industry Club has an incentive to use its best effo11s to regu late its 
member companies to improve their environmental perfolll1ance. Both it and some of 
its most influential members recogni se that serious environmental failure could have 
very serious adverse implications for the industry as a whole. Indeed, as Bhopal 
demon strates, these implications might extend intelllationally as we ll as just within 
Thailand itself. 
Thus there is at least the potential for the Chemical Industry Club to be a powerful self-
regulatory body like INPO. But will it do so? The structure for it to do so already 
exists, as does an intelllational self-regulatory model developed by the chemi cal 
industry and capable of being applied in any indi vidual country: Responsible Care, the 
industry's self-regulatory initiative, now operates in over 40 countries. Under this 
model, the Respon sible Care National Association of each country has many 
responsibiliti es, including setting up a verification process and reporting the members' 
perfolll1ance to ICCA once a yearJ63 As a result, the Club has the power to oversee the 
environmental perfonnanee of the Thai chemical industry, and to act as a de facIo 
361 Email interview wi th Mr Bundit Pattawekongka, Senior Safety and Environmental Manager. Rayong 
Olefins , Co. Ltd. on 9 June 1999. 
362 This is the 'Community of shared fate' siruation which we have discussed above. 
36.\ Chote Geamsaku l. Re,lponsible Care Initiative, a public relations release, at 3. 
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regulator to ensure that all fundamental environmental requirements are being met by all 
participating.364 
Another body with the potential to regulate its members effectively is the Industrial 
Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT), a state enterprise which can significantly facilitate 
industrial business. Dr Somchet Tinnapong, lEA T's governor, said during my fieldwork 
interview: 
Our main task is to render services to the industrial factories doing business in our sites 
as 'one stop shop '. Such services include coordinating for pemlit granting, providing 
necessary infrastructure such as roads, electricity, waters, etc.l65 
Similarly, Ms Kasemsri Homchuen, TEAT' s director of environmental and safety 
control, disclosed that: 
they (the industry) came to us because we have provided many services such as 
application for business operation, infrastructure, etc. Furthemlore. some incentives 
such as tax reduction, exemption from import duty are also available for manufacturers 
whose plants are located in our sites.Jb6 
However, apart from helping participants in their business operations, the lEAT also has 
the power to regulate them. For example, IEAT has recently applied for an ISO 14000 
certificate, thc approval of which is expected by late 1999. As described earlier, ISO 
14000 presupposes self-regulation. Given that the relationship between TEAT and 
industrial plants within its sites is like that of an industry association, it is thcrefore 
likely that the plants will be required to have self-regulation in place to meet the ISO 
14000 requirements. To ensure that the scheme yields satisfactory results, IEAT must 
act as the self-regulatory body and could potentially do so . 
However, there are considerable political and cultural constraints on its successfully 
taking thi s se lf-regulatory responsibility. In particular, as previously discussed, the 
lEAT has a double role to play: promoting industrial investment on the one hand, and 
enforcing environmental regulations over the plants in the estates on the other; thi s 
164 Danen Sincla ir, 'Self-Regu lation Versus Command and Control') Beyond False Dichotomies' , 
atS37. 
365 The interview rook place on 26 December 1996 
366 The interview was conducted on 26 December 1996 
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would be a major challenge for the agency to discipline industrial finns on issues of 
pollution control lest such action might discourage investment. Perhaps the Mab Ta 
Phut air pollution case described in Chapter 3, in which the TEAT allowed the pollution 
problem to exist for about two years without taking any action despite the public 
outcry;'6) provides a good lesson that it would be naive to rely on the agency 
successfully, conducting self-regulation. 
At present, it is not known whether either Responsible Care or the IEAT scheme will 
indeed succeed, and it is far too early to judge this empirically. Tn essence, the genuine 
success of the latter scheme, which is closely linked to the success ofISO 14000, is in 
the hands of IEAT, as to how seriously it chooses to oversee the plants for which it is 
responsible and ensures that they comply with the scheme's codes of conduct. 
3. Third Party Oversight 
A further factor which is likely to be crucial to the success or failure of self-regulation is 
the extent to which the self-regulatory scheme is transparent and susceptible to 
community oversight. How do we know that company's claims about its self-audited 
and self-regulated environmental perfonnance are accurate? It is apparent that third 
paJiy oversight and transparency in monitoring the effectiveness of an environmental 
management system are indispensable in gaining community trust and legitimacy. J6S 
The independent professional audit, one step beyond the reciprocal audits contemplated 
in AlbeJia, is the most obvious fonn of third-party oversight. J69 It not only guarantees 
the efficiency of an audit, but reduces anxiety about transparency. At present many 
fil111S require each supplier to have independent auditors audit its environmental 
policy. 370 
J6) Interview with Mr Yutthana Putchong, a Mab Ta Phut community leader, on 6 February 1998. 
J68 Neil Gunningham, . 'Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective', at 396-400. 
)69 Panithan Yamwinij , Environl11enlal Auditing System, A Paper Presented to the Workshop. New 
Dimension in Envirolllllental Management and Relevant Regulation, jointly organised by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and Center for Environmental Law and Development, Faculty 
of Law, Chulalongkom Uni versity, 29 November - I December 1995, at 12. See also Neil Gumlingham, 
FI'OI11 Adversarialisl11to Parll1ers/lljJ?: 1S0 14000 and Regulation, at 19. 
370 Neil Gunningham. 'Proactive Enviromnental Management: Business and Regulatory Strategies' , 
at 123. 
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In Thailand too, there is a precedent for this approach: govemment requires that a third-
party auditor audit the environmental perfOlmance of the finns which have applied for a 
Green Label celiificate. Ms Prima Wangwongwiroj, of the Ministry ofIndustry said: 
To be granted Green Label certificate, an applicant must show that their manufacturing 
process is environmentally friendly. In tlus case, we require the applicant to have a third 
pa11y audit if such claim is true.m 
A question arises: who pays for the independent third-party audit? As the audit provides 
infonnation for an enterprise on how it perfonns in relation to environmental 
management, it is appropriate that the enterpllse bears the cost for such an audit. 172 
However, having the enterprise pay for the audit could cut both ways. While it satisfies 
the polluter pays principle on the one hand, on the other it risks capture of the third-
p3liy auditor by the enterprise which pays the auditing fees. In Thai culture this is a 
serious problem as capture often occurs as a result of the 'gratitude culture' discussed in 
the previous chapters.173 
As the public is the major stakeholder in environmental issues, it is also clear that little 
wi ll be achieved in the absence of public involvement. Infonnation regarding audit 
results must be disclosed to the public to assure them that the standard is genuinely 
implemented374 Strategically, the disclosure of audit results helps provide transparency 
and also hamesses the power of the public, which anned with infonnation about the 
poor perfollnance of certain facilities , may bring pressure upon them directly or through 
the political process. This transparency creates pressure on the independent 
professional auditors to do their job seriously and honestly without giving any favours 
to their client firms Moreover, such disclosure of audit results coincides with the 
fundamental requirements of Responsible Care and its maxim 'don't trust us, track us' 
where public involvement is required. JJ5 
371 The interview took place on 20 FeblUaty 1998. 
372 See Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regu/mion:Designing Environmental Policy, at 
199-200. The auUlOrs argue that having the enterprise pay for the audit it is consistent with the polluter-
pays principle. 
173 See Chapter 4 for funher details. 
JJ4 Neil Gunningham, From Adversarialisl11to Partnership ?: [SO 14000 and Regulation, at 21. 
JJ5 Neil Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemicallndustty Assessing Responsible 
Care' , at 57-95. 
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4. Government II/volvement: The Need.for Co-regulation 
' I f sel f-regulation worked, Moses would have come down from the Mountain 
with the Ten Guidelines ' . 
Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite quoting a regu/ato/y official. 376 
The above statement bluntly shows scepticism about the effectiveness of self-regulation 
from the regulators ' point of view.377 Such scepticism has a point because there is 
evidencc that many ti11l1S do succumb to the pursuit of short-ten11 profit in 
circumstances whcre this is contrary to the public interest,378 and the Mab Ta Phut air 
pollution case demonstrates the limits of pure sclf-regulation without tUliher controls. 
Fmihen11ore, even where there is a strong industry association and credible third-party 
oversight, these mechanisms, while important, are not without their shortcomings. And 
in some circumstances, credible third parties with an interest in scrutinising industry and 
keeping it honest, may simply not exist or be too weak to fulfil this role. Accordingly, 
it would be naive to expect pure self-regu lation to succeed in the absence of credible 
third party alld govel1lment oversight. 
But will such government intervention ruin the spirit of self-regulation, the tenet of 
which is to allow firms to regulate themselves in exchange for a commitment to sound 
environmental performance? To provide a 'win-win ' solution, scholars suggest the 
intervention should be undertaken in thc form of 'co-regulation'. 379 Under this 
approach, govel1lment regulators do not directly police industry perfon11ance (which 
would defeat any real measure of rcgulatory flexibility) but rather ' regulate at a 
distance ' by conducti ng periodic reviews of the reports made by third-party audits. 3so 
This will serve to mitigate industries' opposition to govel1lment involvement in their 
376 See Peler Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gell/le: Enforcement Strategies of Australian 
Bf{s;nes.Y Regll/O(0I:1' Agelldes, 1986, at 184. 
m .101m Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, 'Self-Regulation and th e Control of Corporate Crime', in Clifford 
Shearing and Philip Stenning (eds.) . Private PoliCing, 1987, at 242. 
m See Theodore Panayotoll et al., DifferentialindustrF Response to Formal and informal Em'ironillental 
Regulations in Ne\\h' industrializing Economies. A Case Study for the Hmvard Institute for Intemational 
Development (HIID) 1997 As ia Environmental Economics Policy Seminar, at 2-3 
379 Ian Ayres and .Iohn Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, 1992, at 103. The authors describe co-
regu lat ion as industry-association sel f-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by govemment. 
.180 Neil Gunningham. 'Environment. Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible 
Care'. at 88. 
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affairs and the perception that government regulation is a rigid, unnecessarily costly and 
ineptly administered mechanism which hampers the growth of their businesses. 381 
Nevertheless, the need for government involvement raises many of the same difficulties 
(corruption, lack of competence, lack of resources, lack of political will) which beset 
command and control regulation and are addressed in the next section. To the extent 
that these problems prove intractable, then co-regulation will also have serious 
limitations, though under the latter, there is less reliance on the effectiveness of 
govenunent regulation than in the case of command and control. 
5. Foreign Investment ji-Olll Transnational Corporations 
As in many other developing countlies, Thailand 's economic development is heavily 
dependent on foreign investment. .l 82 Studies show that most transnational corporations 
(TNCs) investing in developing countries have their headquarters located in well 
developed countries. In the case of Thailand, statistics reveal that TNCs doing business 
in the country include those from Japan, the United States, Australia, Taiwan, United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands. l8 ] These TNCs are by definition large finns which have 
an intemational reputation to protect. They are therefore concerned about their image in 
regard to environmental perfonnance. For this reason, TNCs which operate in 
environmentally sensitive industries where their vulnerability to environmental risk 
could result in serious reputational damage, are usually equipped with relatively 
advanced teclmologies of environmental management384 According to studies 
conducted by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), these advanced 
environmental technologies result not only in better environmental perfollnance but also 
in cost-effective production . .l 85 Indeed in some cases TNCs have been in the vanguard 
of those finns which recognise that environmental improvement can not only enhance 
the firnl's reputation but also provide substantial direct and indirect financial benefits 
(,win-win' solutions) . 
. 181 Tbid, at 87. 
382 United Nations, TransnaTional Corporation and Environmental Management in Selected Asian and 
Pacific Developing Countries, ESCAP/UNTCT Publication Series B, No. 13 , Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, at 289. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid, at 317. 
385 Ibid, at 330. 
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Finns in this category are usually very familiar with self-regulation because it is already 
incorporated in the environmental management policies of some of the advanced 
industrialised countries in which they operate, such as the United States, Canada, and 
Australia. For these companies, extending self-regulation to their facilities in 
developing countries is not a major problem and is something which they commonly do 
for reasons of self-interest. It is for example, more efficient to have the same standard 
operating procedures in all facilities in all countries, paIiiculariy when a common 
environmental management system has also been adopted. From here it is a logical step 
for these TNCs to argue that since they are already ready willing and able to self.· 
regulate, and indeed are demonstrably already doing so, they should be left relatively 
free of intrusive and cost-ineffective government regulation. 
What does the host country get from allowing TNCs to regulate themselves in 
environmental management? Studies show that the availability of self-regulation helps 
to attract TNCs given their relative teclmological advantages. As far as foreign 
investment is concerned, the more TNCs do business in a host country, the more 
investment is generated. Moreover, the teclmologies TNCs bring with them can be 
either transferred to host countries or used as a good model for local firms to follow. 
And the TNCs themselves will be more attracted to entering a country and establishing 
facilities there if the host government refrains from imposing U1mecessary layers of 
regulation. 
To the extent that TNCs do adopt effective self-regulatory programs this may have 
another very considerable advantage for the environment. A major challenge for 
environmental regulation is controlling the behaviour of small and medium enterplises . 
Usually there are so many such enterprises, their levels of environmental performance 
are so weak, and their profit margins so low, that curbing their environmental excesses 
is almost impossible for very poorly resourced and weak regulatory agencies. It is in 
this context that the concept of product stewardship becomes critically impOliant, 
because many local firms are suppliers to TNCs. Those TNCs, in order to protect their 
own reputation, must be concerned about the environmental credential s of those with 
whom they deal , for a disaster involving the latter could readily also tarnish the 
reputation of the TNC itself. Out of this enlightened self-interest has arisen an 
increasing interest in product stewardship and an insistence on the part of TNCs that 
their smaller trading partners also meet minimum environmental standards. Since it is 
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the TNC that has both the skills and the motivation to ensure that such standards are 
actually being complied with, the environmental behaviour of SMEs can be 
substantially improved even in the absence of direct govenunent regulation. For 
example, Ou Pont, a US based TNC doing business in Thailand, has established the 
same high levels of EH&S perfOnllanCe for its Thai operations as those which it meets 
under its home country's corporate cu lture. ]86 
Importantly, however. not every TNC adheres to the relatively high EH&S standard 
used in its home country. A report submitted to the Intelllational Labour Organisation 
(ILO) conducted by TORI suggested that in a situation where law enforcement is weak, 
as in many developing countries including Thailand, manufacturing plants tend to 
exploit this ' local accommodation' in host countties by neglecting the safety and 
welfarc of local workers. The report also referred to a survey of 27 chemical plants in 
Thailand to support its argument. The survey revealed that the handling of hazardous 
substances in most chemical factories was not properly undertaken. Also importantly, 
many plants had neither an accident record system nor an emergency plan. J87 
Take the case of Occidental Chemical, another U.S. corporation. The company was not 
required by the Thai govemment to comply with its home country's higher standards 
and Occidental itself never attempted to replicate these standards. Rather, its business 
strategy was driven by a joint venture agreement, which required it to make incremental 
on-site improvements in EH&S systems at its previously owned and initially 
substandard clu'ome processing facility in Thailand. After acquiring the Thai facility, 
Occidental's EH&S perfonnance gradually declined. 388 
The experience of the US -based Xerox corporation in India has been simi larly 
disappointing. To ensure that Xerox's proposed photocopier assembly facility would 
confonn to its core development objectives such as equitable regional growth and the 
prevention of concentrated economic power, the Ind ian govelllment ordered Xerox to 
locate in a remote area, and placed a cei ling on its domestic production, while insisting 
386 Ibid. 
387 Thailand Development Research Institute. Narional Strategl' for Major Accident Prevention in rhe 
Chell/ical IndusliT. a final report submilled to the lntemational Labour Organisation , .Ianuruy 1986. See 
also United Nations, TransnaTional CO/parolion and Environmental Ivlanagemenl ill Selected Asiall and 
Pacific Developing Countries, ESCAPIUNTCT Publication Seri es B, No. 13, Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and th e Pacific, Bangkok, at 308. 
m Jeffery Himmelberger and Halina Brown. 'G lobal Corporate Environmentalism: Theoretical 
Expectations and Empirical Experience ', Business Srrategl' and the Environment, VolA, 1995 , at 196-7. 
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on both extensive technology transfer and extensive local procurements. These demands 
resulted in a scaled-down and less cost-effective facility, approximately one-third the 
size of Xerox's smallest similar facility. Xerox's response was to reduce investment in 
environmental health and safety by replacing its sophisticated dust-control system with 
personal protective devices (disposable dust masks) and monitOling of ambient dust 
concentrations . .l89 
For this reason, it cannot be assumed that all TNCs will voluntarily achieve high 
standards of environmental perfOlll1anCe although some may do so. Accordingly, the 
challenge is both to encourage and rcward (by regulatory flexibility) those which will 
voluntarily improve standards and self-regulate, while al so ensuring that these are 
systems to monitor and identity, and take appropriate other action against, those who do 
not. ' Appropriate action' includes both the third party oversight and transparency 
mechanisms identified earlier and the use of the other environmcntal strategies 
examined below. 
Conclusion 
In sum, self-regulation has a strong potcntial to act as an effective policy tool, at least 
in some circumstances in the Thai context. These circumstances include the existence of 
a community of shared fate, an underpinning of government regulation (co-regulation), 
and third party oversight. Although those most likely to support self-regulation are 
largc reputationally sensitive companies and transnational corporations in paliicular, 
small and medium enterplises may also be influenced and their environmental 
performance improvcd through the principle of product stewardship. 
Al so, the cultural and political context of Thailand is relevant to the success or 
othcrwi se of self-regulation. As the Thai do not like to be forced , even by law, self-
regulation may be more acceptable than command and control regulation; and since the 
state has less involvcment in self-regulation, the problems of state corruption and 
regulatory capture arc to this extent mitigated. Moreover, since self-regulation relies 
substantially on shaming and public emb3lTassment, while most Thais are concemed 
about face values, these factors are consistent with the Thai context. 
389 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, the culture of compromise, of gratitude, of indi vidualism, and of 
accepting things as they are which is related to some aspects of Buddhism (especially 
the law of karma) , are all cultural attributes which make self-regulation more difficult to 
implcment success fully in Thailand. However, these attributes inhibit the success of 
most other poli cy mechani sms as well. To lessen their effect, third parties, and 
environmental NGOs in patiicular, must be given access to the infonnation (e.g. 
through community right-to-know laws), and the power (e.g. through the right to 
cha ll enge company actions) to act as an effective ' third fo rce'. This is to compensate 
for the limitations of both self-regulation and govelllment regulati on, as well as the 
cultural forces which inhibit the success of both these mechanisms. 
Finally, as with other regulatory mechani sms, self-regu lation works bctter in some 
contcxts than in others. For example, where there is no community of shared fate, it will 
be much harder to create the right incentives for firm s to comply, and to the extent that 
there is no trustworthy industry association, an effective policing mechanism may be 
lacking. And where a finn, even a large one, has no public reputation to protect, there 
may be no effective incentives to patiicipate in and be bound by self-regu lation. Once 
again, we find a patiicular instrument which, while va luabl e, is no panacea, and which 
will work best in combination with other instruments and in complement ing them where 
they are unlikely by themselves to be fully effective. 
V. Command and Control Regulation 
A. Command and control and the role of sanctions 
The mainstay of environmental policy, across a diverse range of countries and cultures, 
is command and control govelllment regulation. Thi s is a top-down policy instrument 
under which govelllment establi shes standards according to an environmenlallarget (the 
command), whil e enforcing those standards through a relevant regulatory agency (the 
control)39o In the case of air and water pollution, command and control have been a 
dominant policy in industrialised countries since the early 1970s and remain so today. J9' 
Indced, as recent World Bank studi es have demonstrated, throughout the world, 
390 Nei l GUIUlingham. ' Beyond Compliance: Management of Envirollmental Risk ', in Ben Boer, Robby 
Fowler and Neil Gunningham (eds.), Environlllenral Oliliook: Law and Policy, 1994, at 256. 
391 Nei l Gu nningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulafion: Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, at 
38-50. 
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counllies still maintain a central role for this type of environmental regulation despite 
the presence of a plethora of other policy options. 
The very essence of command and control as a policy instrument lies in its deterrence 
capability, through its capacity to impose serious punishment. But while this is widely 
regarded as its greatest strength, it is accompanied by considerable potential weakness: 
the risk of inadequate enforcement and the actual failure to impose such sanctions. 
Regulated entities are far less responsive to regulatory requirements when they are 
confident either that they will not be caught, or that if they are caught, the sanctions will 
be trivial. To tackle this problem, sanctions must be applied to recalcitrants after 
persuasive measures fail to deliver392 In other words. if a carrot is ignored, big sticks 
must be applied. 
But what f0I111S of sanctions will be most appropriate? It has been generally recognised 
that there are three separate f0n11s of sanctions under command and control regulation: 
criminal penalties, civil liability, and administrative measures. We have already 
discussed civil liability earlier in the scction of economic instruments. Accordingly, the 
discussion below is limited to criminal penalties, and administrative measures. 
1. Criminal penalties 
This f0n11 of sanction usually involves imprisonment and fincs 393 The use of criminal 
penalties as sanctions in environmental offences is pcrvasive in many countries 
including the United States, Australia, and Japan. 394 In the United States, most major 
environmental regulations including those dealing with the issues of air and water 
pollution such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriations Act (widely known as the 'Refuse Act'), and the Safe Drinking Water 
Act contain climinal penalties395 Morc importantly, when these laws are enforced, the 
criminal penalties stipulated therein serve as big sticks. 
J92 See John Braithwaite. To Punish or Persuade. 1985, at 118. 
39) Songpol Pollayiem. 'Criminal Sanctions and Problems of Pollution from Industrial Plants'. Dullapaha. 
1996. a t 132-5. 
394 Mark Cohen. 'Criminal Penalties'. in T.ll. Tientenberg (ed.). Inno\'{/tion in Environmental PolicL 
1992. at 75-105. See also. Zada Lipman and Lachlan Roots . 'Protecting the Environment through 
Criminal Sanctions: The Environmental Offences and Penalites Act 1989 (NSW)', Environmental and 
Planning LeI\\' Journal , 1995, at 16-9: and Songpol Pollayiem, Dul/apaha, 1996. at 131-8. 
19S Jason Lemkin. 'DetelTing Environmental Crime through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for the New 
Organizational EnvirolUllental Sentencing Guidelines'. California Le/l\' Review 1996, at 310-11. 
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Perhaps the classic cxample in this regard can be drawn froJll the Exxon Valdez case. 
Exxo n leamed the hard way how criminal penalties can bc used as a big stick. On 
March 23, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, 
Alaska, and as a result, produced the largest oil spill in U.S. hi story. According to the 
casc settlement, Exxon paid a fine of US $ 125 million as criminal penalties under the 
Clean Water Act, the Refilse Act, and the Federal Migrator)1 Bird Act. 396 
Tuming to Asia, studies show that Jll any countries in thi s region also have their 
environmental regul ations equipped with criminal sanctions. These include Japan, the 
Philippines, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Thailand. 397 In Japan, for example, 
laws related to the control of air and water pollution contain criminal penalties. The 
penalti es will be app li ed to offenders who fail to meet technology based standards, or 
speci fied standards of environmental perfonnance398 
As for Thailand, it is necessary to note that most of the Thai environmental regulations 
are equipped with criminal penalties. For example, a provision in the 1992 Enhancement 
Act states that the owncr or possessor of a point sourcc of pollution who failed to send 
wastcwater generated by his activities to the central wastewater treatment plant within 
the pollution control area or in that locality for treatment shall face both impri somncnt 
and fincs399 The 1992 Fac!OIY Act also contains criminal penalti es. These include a 
provi sion stating that the person who does not comply with an instruction with regard to 
suspension, or correction, or improvements of a plant' s operation issued by the authority 
after it is found that the plant with which he or she is worki ng has violated this Act, or 
the plant's operation has a potential to cause hazard, di saster, or nui sance to any person 
or assets within or nearby the plant, shall be liable to both imprisonment and fines 4 00 
The use of criminal penalties as a sanction plays an active role among the Thai 
authoriti es in dealing with environmental offences. 
J06 Ibid. no te I at 307. For those who are interes ted in criminal sanctions under the U.S. Clean Water Act 
in particular, see Christine Wellach. 'Mens Rea and the ' Heightened Criminal Liability' Imposed on 
Violators of the Clean Water Act ' . Stand/orc! Environmental LaH' Joumat, 1996. at 381-2. 
397 Andrea Zavadszky, ' Balancing the Legal Sca les'. Asian Sustainable Development Reports, June-
August 1994. at 19-29. 
398 Songpo l Pollayiem, Dullapaha, 1996, at 132. 
399 Chatchom Akapin, 'Law Enforcement: An Issue to Be Improved for the Thai Environmental 
Protection', Dullapaha, 1996, at 84-5. See also the 1992 Enhancemen t Act, Section 104. 
400 Chatchom Akapin , Dullapalw. at 80- 1. See also the 1992 Factory Act. Section 37, 57. 
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2. Administrative measures 
Administrative measures invol ve proceedings by the government to have a case settled 
without going to the coul1. Certain government officials are empowered to issue 
administrative notices, which have the force of law, although they may be challenged 
and appealed against in a cO Ul1 or tribunal by the person upon whom they are imposed. 
Thcse measures can take many f0I111 s, which include having the offenders clean up 
contaminated sites, suspending an operator's licence, shutting down the plant, and 
withdrawing the offenders ' business licences401 
Increasingly, administrative measures have become popular among government 
agencies as they are cheaper and less time-consuming than court proceedings in either 
criminal or civil cases:02 Currently, these measures have been widely used in many 
countries. Exampl es include the USEPA which often handles the cases through thi s 
kind of sanction403 Indonesia is another example: administrative measures are included 
in a number of environmental regulati ons along wi th civi l and criminal sanctions404 
Thailand has al so introd uced admini strati ve measures in a myriad environmental 
regulations reformed in 1992. For instance, the 1992 FaclolY Act allows the authority 
to suspend the plant' s operation, or instruct the plant to rectify the problem, or shut 
down the plant405 The 1992 Maintenance Act also allows the authority to order the 
offender to clean up the contaminated site. 
However, has Thailand actually impl emented the majority of the administrative 
measures which exist on the statute books? Certainly records show that these measures 
have been applied to recalcitrants in Thailand in at least some instances. Take the case 
of Phoenix Pulp and Paper Co Ltd (hereinafter Phoenix). Phoenix is located near the 
Nam Phong liver in KJ10n Kaen, one of the largest provinces in the nOl1heast of 
Thail and. In mid- 1998, Phoenix 's wastewater treatment system fai led, resulting in a 
flux of wastewater kept in the company's ponds in to the Nam Phong river. As a 
401 Ibid, at87. 
402 See Kalhleen Segerson and Tom Tietenberg, ' Defining Effi cient Sanctions', in T.H. Tietenberg (ed.). 
[llnovalion in Environmental Policl', 1992. al 54-5. 
40) Ibid. . 
404 Paulus Effendie Lotutung, ' Indonesian Envi rolUll ental Future ' . A paper presented atlhe Workshops of 
Ihe Assemb ly, in ASEAN Law Association, The Seventh General Assemblv and Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1995, at 3-4. 
405 See the 1992 Facton' Act, Secti ons 37, 39. 
191 
consequence, the Ministry ofIndustry issued an order to shut down Phoenix 's polluting 
plants for 180 days to improve its wastewater treatment facility.406 According to 
Yuthana Priwan el aI., the plant closure was the beginning of the Ministry of Industry's 
strict measures against polluting industries. Also importantly, such measures were 
endorsed by the Prime Minister407 
Another example is the Klity mine case. After receiving complaints from villagers 
dwclling downstream of the Huay Klity stream that the Klity mine dumped toxic waste 
into the stream, a Mineral Resources provincial officer investigated the incident. He 
then found that the mine's tailings pond, wh ich was used for storing toxic sediments, 
had broken, resulting in the discharge of overflows into the stream. As a consequence, 
the mine was ordered to suspend its operations. The plant could not be reopened unless 
its wastewater pond was improved to meet the safety standards408 
But while examples such as these illustrate the potential of administrative measures, 
such cases are the exception rather than the rule. A major reason for this is that 
administrative measures that threaten serious disruption to a finn 's activities, such as 
having its licence suspended or withdrawn, have severe consequences not only for the 
continuity of finns , but also for the country's economy as a whole. This is especially 
the case for developing countties which give priotity to economic growth rather than 
environmental protection. For this reason, govemments are often reluctant to impose 
this kind of sanction on offenders. In Indonesia, research has found that the industry is 
usually in a strong position to bargain with the government because of its key role in 
generating a great deal of income in the fonn of taxes and foreign exchange. As a 
result, only lenient administrative measures such as fines and warnings are currently 
imposed on environmental offenders in Indonesia.409 
406 'Phoenix Paper mill to be closed'. The Nation. 21 July 1998. 
407 The authors quoted the prime minister as saying 'envirorU11ental laws must be obeyed'. See Yuthana 
Priwan, Kanittha Inchukul and Yuwadee Tunyasiri , 'Waming to dirty industry· , Bangkok Post, 22 July 
1998 for more details. 
408 Vasana Chinvarakol11 and Atiya Achakulwisut , ' Lead mine shut down', Bangkok Post, 24 April 1998. 
409 Riyatno, Environmental Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia, LL.M. thesis, the Australian 
Nat ional Universiry. a140. 
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B. Stt'engths and weaknesses of command and control regulation 
As we have seen from the above discussion, sanctions associated with command and 
control regulation serve as big sticks that can be used to punish pragmatic polluters 
whose environmental perfonnance fails to meet regulatory requirements, and who will 
continue to pollute provided it is cheaper to do so than to protect the environment.4lo 
Pragmatic polluters (or ' rational actors' as economists would call them) are inclined to 
be responsive to regulation for fear that the stick will be used against them: they are 
cooperative with legal requirements not because they are altruistic but because the 
penalties tip the balance so that it becomes more costly to pollute than to pay for 
pollution prevention. As John Braithwaite wrote in To Punish or Persuade: 
One is inclined to listen to the persuasive overtones of an inspector if the consequences 
of not listening is his replacing the velvet glove with the iron fist. 4lI 
However, for penalties to work against the pragmatic polluter, the chances of being 
caught, coupled with the anticipated penalty if this occurs, must exceed the costs of 
pollution prevention. 
Another advantage of the regulatory sanction is its apparent celiainty: once the 
regulated do not meet the regulatory requirements , regulators can simply exercise the 
sanctions. At the same time, command and control regulation provides regulated fimls 
with a clear insight as to their regulatory obligations, which in tum helps them perceive 
what the consequences will be if regulatory requirements are not met.4 " Of course, this 
theoretical celiainty may not be apparent in practice, where enforcement may be 
sporadic or weak, and many breaches may go undetected. 
Command and control regulation has other shOlicomings, not least of which is that it is 
expensive and time-consuming 41 3 First, it relies heavily on government oversight, thus 
410 See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, 1992, al 39-41. 
411 John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade, 1985. at 118. 
412 Rena Steinzor, 'Reinveming Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to 
Self-Control', The Hwvard Environmental Law Review. Vol 22. No I, 1998. at 104. 
41l Shakeb Afsah. Benoit Laplame and David Wheeler, Controlling industrial Pollution: A Nell' 
Paradigm, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 1996, at 3. 
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demanding a number of factors, including expertise and experience among regulators, 
sufficient regulators, and relevant equipment. However, given that governments usually 
face the problem of budget insufficiency, which in tum brings about a number of 
problems such as shortage of manpower and necessary equipment414 , the success of this 
scheme is unlikely unless certain strategies are simultaneously used. Details of such 
strategies will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Another drawback of command and control is that this scheme is vulnerable to political 
manipulation415 Lack of political will is among the causes of regulatory failure. More 
importantly, this situation has been aggravated as studies also show that many 
incumbent politicians often manipulate regulatory policy to serve the interest of 
themselves or their peer groups. For example, the Reagan and Bush administrations 
paid little attention to environmental regulation for macroeconomic purposes and 
environmental regulation was pruned by the fonner Vice President Quayle's Council on 
Competitiveness to achieve the goal of economic growth. 416 
Command and control regulation also makes regulators extremely powerful. This could 
be conducive to 'rent-seeking,' the situation where regulators take advantage of their 
strict regulation to build themselves up in their own interest. 4I ) 
Tn Thailand, most rent-seeking cases operate in a similar fashion: regulators use tough 
regulation as a way to seek advantage for themselves. In doing so, they tum a blind eye 
to a regulatee's wrongdoing in exchange for benefits provided to them. Such benefits 
can be in various fOllns , including overseas tours as discussed above in the Mab Ta Phut 
case.418 Importantly, it is usually difficult to find concrete evidence of rent-seeking. 
However, its pervasiveness, as well as its adverse effect on the success of environmental 
regulation, can be seen rr01l1 the cabinet resolution, on 'measures to prevent officials 
from engaging in COlTupt deals with factories' adopted on 4 January 2000.419 
414 See Chapter 4 for more details. 
415 Nei l Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, at 38-50. 
416 See Eric Orts, ' Reflexive Regulation' , at 1237. 
417 Cass Sunstein, 'Constitutionalism after the New Deal', Han;ard Law Review, 1987, at 448-51. See 
also Scott Christensen, et al., The Lessons of East Asia, A World Bank Publication , 1993, at 20. 
418 See Chapter 3. 
419 These measures include urging the MinistlY of Education to improve enviromnental cUlTiculum on 
environmental awareness and protection, and mandating the Department of Industrial Work to allow 
NGOs to have do more role in monitoring plants ' environmental performance. For more details see 
'Graft clamp approved on dirty deals' , Bangkok Post, 5 Janu31Y 2000. 
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Alongside the rent-seeking phenomenon. command and control can lead to regulatory 
capture. This si tuation occurs because regulators are aware that if they are cxtrcmely 
hard on regul ated firms, the finns , especially those who are not financiall y capable of 
complying with the standards stipulated under the command and control regime, may 
not be able to survive. Thi s would probabl y cause a political backlash against the 
regul ators, whose jobs might be at risk420 A more common version of regulatory 
caphlre occurs when regulators , who spend considerable amounts of time with regulated 
finl1 s, comc to see the world more through the perspecti ve of the regulated . Morover, 
they may be inclined to maintain a good relationship with industry because they wish to 
nurture thc possibility joining one of the regulated firms in the future (the ' revolving 
door ' syndromes). For these reasons, regulators are prone to end up accommodating the 
interests of the regulated industry42I 
Scholars also argue that the command and control system is too static 422, because 
regulati on is normally enacted at a particular time, and for particular purposcs; it is 
therefore not responsive to rapidly changing circumstances. Experience with automobi le 
emissions control under the U.S . Clean Air Act during the past two decades servcs as a 
good example. Although emission control s for new cars improved dramatically with 
strict technology-forcing legislation, vehicle miles travelled (YMT) doubled owing to a 
number of rapid social changes including the constant increase of suburbanisation, 
commuting habits, and the number of cars on the road. Essentially, while the strict 
regulation on new cars prevented the current air pollution from getting worse, it fai led to 
take into consideration the factor of social change. As a result, although the ambi ent air 
quality improved in some places, it remains in violation of federal standards in many 
urban areas such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angcles423 
Command and control is likely to produce a very large volume of regulation if the 
govell1ment wants to keep pace with rapid social change. For thi s reason, a dilcmma 
occurs, as this could bring about difficulty fo r both regulators and regulated entities to 
420 Neil Gunningham. 'NegOliated Non-Compliance: A Case Study of Regulatory Failure'. Len\' & Polin, 
1987.at 85. 
'" Peter Yeager, The Limits of La\l': The Public Regulatioll of PriI'Ctle PoliUlioll, 1991 , at 38. For more 
detai ls of the capture problem. wh ich is one of the causes o f environmental regulatory failure. see 
Chapter 4. 
~n Eric Orts, at 1238. 
m Ibid, at 1238-9. 
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keep up with all regulations (regulatory overJoad). 424 In developing countries like 
Thailand, where foreign investment is seen as crucial for economic growth, this 
situation may di scourage the prospective investors, thereby resulting in loss of 
development 0ppoltunity. 
C. Making command and contl'ol work in Thailand 
The above discussion demonstrates that command and control can and should continue 
to be important in curbing environmental pollution, but that its effectiveness will 
depend upon the imposition of effective sanctions when enterprises break the law. For 
this reason, Thailand should maintain this scheme as one of its regulatory policies. 
However, given its existing weaknesses , it is essential to identifY how to make 
command and control work best in the particular economi c, political and cultural 
context of Thailand. The discussion below offers alternatives to help achieve such a 
goal. 
1. The Enforcement Pyramid Paradigm 
There are many different kinds of polluters who bend the rules. Some are inclined to 
comply with regulation voluntarily, others after they get only one warning letter, while 
still others will resist unless they are forced into compl iance by tough sanctions. 
Recognising this, Fiona Haines says that smart regulators must be able to manoeuvre a 
wide range of measures which dovetail with each situation 425 This implies the use of 
the sort of enforcement pyramid advocated by John Braithwaite: 
My contention is that compliance is most likely when the regulatory agency displays an 
explicit enforcement pyramid ... Most regulatory action occurs at the base of the pyramid 
where initially attempts are made to coax compliance by persuasion. The next phase of 
enforcement escalation is a warning letter; if this fails to secure compliance, civil 
monetary penalties are imposed; if this fails, criminal prosecution ensues; if this fails, 
the plant is shut down or a licence to operate is suspended; iftbis fails, the licence to do 
business is revoked ... the form (emphasis in original) of the enforcement pyramid is the 
subject of the theolY, not the content of the pal1icular pyramid 42 6 
424 See Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, at? Notably, the authors describe this si tuation as 
counterproductive regulatory overload. 
m Fiona Haines, Corporate Regulation, at 222. 
m Ibid. at 218-9. 
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Essentially, regulators must ensure that they will rise up the pyramid of enforcement if 
the measures at the bottom layer of the pyramid are ignored. The way regulators start 
their enforcement with measures at the bottom, and then move up to the top of the 
pyramid is consistent with the 'canot and stick ' approach which suggests that regulators 
start their enforcement with soft measures , but if polluters disobey, tough measures 
should be applied. 427 
The canot and stick approach has also been adopted in some Asian countries. In 
Singapore, the Mini stry of Environment provides environmental education to both the 
publ ic and industry, and the government awards grants. Yet despite these canot 
measures, the government of Singapore does not hesitate to enforce the law seriously if 
non-compliance is uncovered 428 We refer subsequentl y to a number of other initiatives 
in Asian countlies involving an increase in penalties and enforcement. 
In Thailand, the imp0l1ance of the carrot and stick approach has been increasingly 
recogn ised by relevant authorities. My interv iews with senior officials confinned thi s, 
as did my discussions with regulatory officials. For example, Mr Pornthep 
Teichapaiboon, Deputy Minister, the Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment, suggested that: 
To revitalise environmental regulation, the strategy of carrot and stick be adopted, i.e., 
to be tough when circumstances require.m 
Thai regulators have similarly adopted the can'ot and stick approach while undertaking 
their enforcement tasks. Mr Supaporn Pukasemwarangkul of the Harbour Department 
said: 
Although people think that I am a stringent law enforcement officer, I have in fact 
adopted the carrot and stick style. I usually look at the intention of polluters. In so 
doing, when a non-compliance is detected, we issue a warning notice to give them an 
427 See John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade, at 118. 
428 Susan de Silva, 'Enforcement and Compliance Priorities ' in American Bar Association, Proceedings 
ofEnvironmen((l/ Priorilies in Southeast AS'ian Nations, 1997, at 132-3. 
429 The interview was conducted on II March 1998. 
197 
0pp0l1un it y to improve the situation first (although the warning is not requ ired by law). 
If they do not comply with our warning, I will then enforce the Jaw seriouslym . 
As a result of the stick approach that Mr Supaporn and other enforcement officers of the 
Harbour DepaJ1ment had taken, thc defcndants in many water pollution cases have had 
jail and fine sentences imposed. Examples include the case of Samutprakarn Provincial 
District Prosecutor versus the Thai Paper Development Co. Ltd. (the first defendant) 
and Mr Surachai Cheewapansri (the second defendant). The plainti ff accused the 
defendants of di schargi ng wastewater containing chemicals, oil , waste, and fat into the 
Chao Plu-aya river, which is a public waterway. The Samutprakarn District Court found 
that thc defendants to imprisonment wcre guilty as charged, and then rendered a verdict 
ordcring the first defendant to pay the fine of 30, 000 baht, and sentencing the second 
defendant to impri sonment for 3 months. Also, the defendants had to pay 500,000 baht 
as compensation to the Harbour Department for the restoration of water quality of the 
damaged river. 
As in many other cases, the defendants appealed to the CO Ul1 of Appeals, justifying 
their appeal for the reduction of penalties by using a cu ltu ral tactic. In doing so, they 
mentioned that their business helped boost Thailand's economy, as well as creating 
jobs for people. The defendants also argued that they themselves always cooperated 
with the government in any activities related to the benefits of the public. These 
included donations made to goverrullenl agencies. 
The Co urt of Appeals upheld the lower cOUl1 's judgement. Its reasoning in doing so is 
paI1icularly interesting. The Court pointed out that most of the benefits gained from the 
defendants' business went to the defendants themselves, whi le the country gained only a 
littl e; that the peoplc who worked with the defendants were few when compared to 
those who suffered from the defendants ' wrongdoings; and that the assets the 
defendants donated to the govemment had little value compared to the damage that 
resu lted from their actions. 
What is pal1icularly striking is the Court of Appeals's comments on the impact of the 
Thai culture of gratitude on regulatory enforcement. It suggested that the govemment 
has a duty to allocate suffi cient fund s to regulatory agencies. Otherwise, if the agencies 
430 The interview took place on 16 March 1998. 
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do not have enough funds and resort to rccei vi ng donati ons from the regulated entities, 
they will succumb to the culture of gratitude, thus bcing reluctant to do their job 
straightforwardl y when the donors break the laws43 !: what the Western literature calls 
rcgul atory capture. 
The use of the catTot and stick approach in Thailand is also evident in the case of air 
pollution. Take for example, an important case handled by the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Adm ini stration (BMA). Before Thailand underwent the financial crisis which started in 
1997, the country's economic growth had been in full swing. Not surprisi ngly, what 
came with such growth was a great deal of infrastructurc development, which included 
the construction of buildings in Bangkok and many major cities. However, many of the 
constructions were undertaken without proper measurcs for dust prevention, thereby 
causing a serious air pollution problem in these cities, especially in Bangkok. Dr Pichit 
Rattakul, the Bangkok Governor, initi ally warned the fiI1l1S to cover the construction 
si tes with canvas, as well as to spray water around the sites to prevent the spreading of 
dust. However, a number of construction operators were not cooperat ive, so BMA took 
lega l action against these reca1citrants.m These tough measures, when app li ed, yielded 
successful results. Evidcnce shows that dust in Bangkok in 1997 was 40 per cent less 
than it was two years earlier433 
Importantly, while the above discussion reveals that Thailand has al ready adopted the 
pyram id-of-enforcement paradigm in regu latory enforcement, a central question arises: 
how can one be sure that Thai regulators will always rcsort to the measures at the top of 
the enforcement pyram id when those at the bottom layer are ignored? As shown in 
Chapter 4, Thai regulators are vulnerable to many factors which have the potential to 
undermine the application of the enforcement pyramid . These includc lack of political 
will , lack of agency leadership, corruption, and the cu lture of compromise. As Mr 
Somjai Nil sittanukroh. an adviser to the Bangkok Governor put it: 
Thai culture requires people to be understanding and sympathetic. This concept is good 
but problems arise when strict enforcement is required. Regulators are a lways reluctant 
to get tough on polluters who cannot afford environmentally friendly technologies·'4 
4J1 Jud gement of the Court of Appeals, Regional 2, black case no . 23 11 /2536 (231 1/ 1993), red case no. 
89/2537 (89/1994). 
432 Chaklu"it Rithmontri , 'Construction Finns Face Tough Action ', Bangkok Posl, 17 May 1997. 
4JJ 'Tough action reduces dust in Bangkok', Bangkok Posl, 4 December 1997 . 
434 The interview was conducted on 9 Januaty 1997. 
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In these circumstances, other measures such as severe penalties, tripartism, and 
publicity of the prosecution outcome are simultaneously needed to make sure that the 
goals of command and control regulation will be achieved. Details are discussed below. 
2. Tough penalties (Big Sticks) 
To make the canot and st ick approach possible, there must be penalties at the top of the 
enforcement pyramid to serve as sticks which regulators can use against the 
recalcitrants. What kind of sticks are needed in this regard? As lllany argue, if one 
considers that the cost of being puni shed outweighs that of compliance, one is more 
likely to compl y with the law.435 For this reason, it is essential to increase the size of 
sticks: to have severe penalties to signal to recalcitrants what they will face if non-
compliance is found 4 36 
Studies show that lllany countries increase the penalties to make the punishment more 
expensive so that it becomes no longer economically rational to break the law. In the 
United States, stricter penalties are being used as a meant of ensuring environmental 
protection. Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (hereinafter Commission), upon 
the suggestion of its Advisory Group on EnvirolUllental Sanction, has proposed a new 
guideline on environmental crime to the Congress. The Commission has suggested the 
imposition of very stringent conditions on polluters. If the regulated industries cannot 
meet the requirements, they will face harsh fines with extremely limited mitigation 
opportunities.43 7 
Australia is another example. In 1981, the maximum fines under the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Waler Act (NSW) were increased fourfold from those in the past. Further, in 
1989. the then New South Wales Environment Minister, Tim Moore, announced the 
415 Antonio Oposa. 'Legal Marketing of Enviromnental Law', Duke Journal of Comparative & 
IlIternational La\\,. 1996, at 276. 
416 See Neil Gunningham and Richard Johnstone, Regulating Workplace Safety: Sl"Siem and Sanctions. 
1999. at 255-266. 
m Jason Lemkins, ' DetelTing Enviroml1ental Crime through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for the New 
Organizational Enviromnental Sentencing Guidelines'. Universit" of California Law Review. 1996. at 
308-9. 
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'gctting tough on polluters ' policy and subsequently introduced the Environmental 
Offellce and Penalties Act. Interestingly, this Act brought about a dramatic increase in 
penalties for environmental offenccs. The maximum penalty is $ I million for a 
corporate offender and $ 150, 000 or seven years impri sonment, or both for individual 
offcnders found guilty of selious offences.-I38 Also, scholars point out that thc increase of 
penalty has been vcry impOIiant in providing incenti ves to industry to improve its 
environmental perfonnance439 
In the Asian region, a number of countries have also increased penalties to curb 
environmental pollution. Taiwan, with growing pollution problems, has recently 
incrcased penalties fo r non-compliance from US $ 2,400 to US $ 24,000 per day.44o 
Singapore, too , has increased the fine for illegal dumping and contamination of a site 
from Singapore $ 2,000 to $ 10,000 and/or impri sonment. Moreover, such a jail 
sentence is mandatory if an offender is convicted for the second time.-I41 
Unlike the countries above, Thailand did not rely on the increase of penalties despite the 
1992 enviromnental law ref0ll11. Rather, the country focused on introducing a number 
of innovative measurcs such as the polluter payss principl e, and stri ct civil liability to 
help improve the environmental situation 442 As a result, many regulations still contain 
penalties which are not suitable for the present situation. 
For cxample, the 1992 Maintenan ce a/Public Cleanlilless Act has only fines but no jail 
sentence443, despite an opportunity for Thai legislators to include such an option when 
the regulation was enacted to supersede the now-defunct Act whi ch had been in use 
since 1960. Another example is the Maintenance of Canals Act 1903 wh ich is still in 
operation. With respect to an offence related to water pollution, this Act stipul ates that 
whocver dumps wastes into the canal will be subject to a fine up to 20 baht, which is 
418 Jennifer Norberry. 'Aus lralian Pollution Law: Offences. Pena lli es, and RegulalOlY Agencies', a paper 
delivered 10 AlC/ACEL Conference Crime and Environment, Hobart, aI 20- 1. 
419 lacla Lipman and Lachlan Roots, ' Protec ting the Environm ent through Criminal Sanctions: The 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)', Environmental and Planning Lall' Journal. 
February 1995, at 30-3. 
4<0 Andrea Zavadsz!..)" ' Balancing the Lega l Scales'. Asian Sustainable Development Report, June-August 
1994. at 28-9 . 
441 Susan de Silva, ' Enforcement and Compliance Priorities', at 132-3. 
442 See more details in Chapter 2. 
44J Chatchom Akapin, ' Law Enforcement: An Issue to Be Improved for the Protec tion of the Thai 
Environment', Dulapaha , 1996, at 91. 
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less than A $ 1.00, or implisonment for up to one month, or both fine and 
impri sonment.444 
Under these circumstances, it is suggested that Thailand should increase the penalties 
related to environmental offences:45 Although harsh penalties per se are not sufficient 
to ensure regulatory success, especially in countries where enforcement is weak such as 
Thailand, nevelihel ess they are a prerequisite to successful deten'ence and enforcement, 
providing the big sticks without which enforcement cannot be successful446, and 
enabling the coutiS to punish offenders more heavily. This is paJiicularly important 
because there has been a remarkable movement by many judges in Thailand to impose 
heavicr penalties on the politicians sucd in defamation cases. The judges justified the 
tougher penalties on the basis that they wi ll force the politicians to be more careful and 
responsib le for what they say about others in public as it can affect society as a 
whole. 447 Significantly, although such a movement is not directly involved with 
enviromnental issues, it does show an attempt from the judiciary to use the law for the 
sake of civic societ/48 which in the future mi ght well extend to environmental issues. 
If so, then one might anticipate the imposition of tougher penalties for enviromnental 
offences in the future. Therefore, penalties stipul ated in environmental regulation must 
be increased to provide law enforcement officers and judges in particular with detelTents 
for the recalcitrants who have ignored less stJingent measures at the lower layers of the 
pyram id of enforcement. 
But how can one be sure that the court will have an Oppoliunity to impose heavy 
penalties on polluters? [n other words, what measures can be taken to urge regulatory 
officials to bring the case to court? As we have seen earli er, Thai regulatory officials' 
performance is often paralysed by lack of political will, corruption, regulatory capture, 
and the culture of compromise. Thus measures must be taken to galvanise government 
444 Ibid. 
445 See Kasem Snidvongs, 'Thailand's EnvirolUl1 ental Priorities', in American Bar Association , 
Proceedings a/Environmental Priorities in SOl/rheast Asian Nations, 1997, at 117. More specifically, the 
late Dhira Phantumvanit advocated that a fine, which is one of the criminal penalties, must be severe 
enough to act as a deterrent and promote compliance. See Dhira Phantumvanit, ' lnfi'astructure 
Development and Pollution Prevention Priori ties', in American Bar Association, Proceedings of 
Environmental Priorities in Southeast Asian Nations, 1997, at 92. 
446 See John Braithwaite. To Punish or Persuade, at note 30. 
447 Suebpong Unarat, 'Judges lose patience over loose cannons' , Bangkok Post, 30 August 1999. 
448 Thailand introduced its current Constitution in 1997. Importantly, the purposes of the Constitution 
include creating a civil soc iety. For fUl1her details. see Chapter 7. 
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enforcers into doing their jobs vigorously. The power of the public can be hall1essed to 
fulfil this role. 
3. TripartislII 
Traditionally, regulation has been seen as a bipartite activity involving the interaction 
between regulators and regulated fillllS By introducing an additional player, the public 
interest group (PIG), regulatory policy becomes a tripartite activity. According to Ian 
Ayres and John Braithwaite, the public can be involved as a third party in this regard in 
three ways: by allowing the PIG access to all the infollllation available to regulators; by 
providing an opportunity for the PIG to take part in the negotiation between fillllS and 
rclcvant agencies; and by granting the PIG the same standing to prosecute the offenders 
as the regulators.-l-l9 
Why should the third party be added to the above traditional interaction under command 
and contro l regime') As previously discussed, command and control regulation is mainly 
dependent on govell1ment oversight, which is susceptib le to many factors leading to 
regulatory failure such as capture and cOITuption.45o Therefore, inclusion of third parties 
in the regulatory process is seen as a viable method which could help enhance the 
efficiency of command and control regulation, because the third party creates more 
transparency and accountability, which could minimise opportunities for capture and 
corruption45I In Victoria, as shown by occupational health and safety research, business 
cultures were improvcd towards safety after the relevant third parties, namely health and 
safcty committees and unions, were included 452 
In Asia, studies show that Japanese environmental regulation allows citizen 
organisations to get involved with local govell1ment and polluters in settling disputes 
pcrtaining to pollution. This reduces the workload of the govell1ment in litigation453 
449 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, at 57-8. See also Fiona Haines . at 225. 
450 See Chapter 4 for further delails. 
45 1 See Peter Grabosky. 'Public Participation and Co-operation in Crime Prevention Activities', UNAFEi 
(United Nations Asia and Far East institllte /01' the Prevel1lion 0/ Crime and the Treatl1lel1l of Offenders) 
Resollrce Material Series No 48. March 1996. at 33. 
m Fiona Haines. at 225. . 
453 Andrea Zavactszky, Asian Sustainable Development Reports. June-August 1994. at 25. 
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Indeed, the success of using tripal1ism in Japan cou ld serve as a good model for 
Thailand to follow. Dr Pitsamai Eamsakulrat, manager of the Industrial Envirol1I11ental 
Management Office, the Federal of Thai Industries, suggested: 
Thailand should take Japan as a good example. A few decades ago, the country was 
striving hard to recover its economy after they lost in World War]] by means of 
extensive industrialisation. As a result, there was pollution all over Japan. Subsequently, 
tripartism consisting of govemmcnt, industry. and people was established and they 
could manage to solve pollution problems satisfactorily4s. 
Is tripartism appropriate for the circumstances of Thailand? Given the cultural , 
economic and social differences between Australia, Japan, and Thailand and different 
degrees of accessib ility to environmental infonnation, it would be wrong to assume that 
what has been achieved in the first two countries can be replicated in Thailand. Thus, in 
the discussion below we explore in more detail whether, or to what extent, tripartism is 
appropriate for Thailand. 
We have already found that capture and corruption are among the main causes of 
regulatory failure in that country. These problems generally result from close 
cooperat ion between government regulators and finns; in these circumstances, 
integrating a third pat1y into the regulatory area has considerable potential to attack 
Thailand's pervasive capture and cOITuption problems4 55 Mr Chingchai 
Laohawatanakul, president of c.P. Aquaculture Business Group, an affiliate of C.P. 
group, a Thai-national multinational company, suggested: 
One way to prevent corruption is to allow the public to participate more. This public 
pal1icipation will provide the check and balance method 456 
What would be the most appropriate third party to make the concept of tripartism 
successful? Scholars suggest that tripartism works best when those affected by finns' 
actions such as trade unions in the case of health and safety, and environmental groups 
in the case of pollution from industry, are empowercd as the third-party in the 
454 The interview lOok place on 25 December 1996. 
455 See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, at 55-6. 
456 The interview was conducted on 8 JanualY 1997. 
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regulatory process. 45 7 A central question then arises: does this prescription apply to the 
case of Thailand? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to note that the concept of tripartism was 
introduced in the 1992 Enhancement ACI by involving individuals and NGOs in the 
regulatory process. Such involvement includes allowing an individual to file a 
complaint to the relevant officials, accusing anyone of committing any environmental 
offences; and allowing any registered NGOs to represent those who have been injured 
by pollution in any legal claim they make. 458 
Docs empowering both cnvironmental NGOs and individuals to act as a third party 
guarantee the success of tliparti sm? We start our investigation by exploring the 
potential of individuals. Who are supposed to be the indi vidual s actively involved in 
environmental regulation in Thailand? As far as the problem of air and water pollution 
from industry is concerned, there are two groups of people with the potential to act as 
viable third pal1ies : employees and those li ving in the vicinity of polluting plants, 
because these people are directly affected by the harmful activities of industry. 
However, research has found that relying on these two groups falls far short of success 
because of the nature of Thai culture, details of which are discussed below. 
As for the polluting plants' employees, we have already found in previous chapters that 
regulatory failure in Thailand is attributable to a number of causes, including the 
culture. It is unlikely that the employees of polluting plants would want to be involved 
as a third pal1y in monitoring the environmental perfOl1l1anCe of their employers' plants. 
FUl1her, even though employees are recogn ised as a third-paI1y, there is reason to be 
sceptical about the efficiency of their perfOl1l1anCe in this role. Because the culture of 
gratitude has long been deeply rooted in Thai society, most employees feel indebted to 
their employers who gave them a job. To express thi s gratitude, they tend not to cause 
trouble to those employers. 459 
,;) Ian Ayres and John Brailhwaile, at 57. See also Fiona Haines, a1225. 
458 See the 1992 Enhancemenl Ael. Sections 6,7,and 8. See also Chapter 2 for greater details. 
459 Douglas Tookey, 'Southeas t Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroad: Learning Lessons from 
Thailand's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law ancl Policy', The Georgerown [nlemaliona! 
Environmental Law Review, 1999. at 328-9. 
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Tuming to the people living near the polluting plants, studies show that Thai culture is a 
'culture of compromise' and that the Thais prefer to live in harmony, especially in their 
neighbourhood. As a result, they nonnally seek to avoid conflicts with their neighbours. 
They even put up with their neighbours' wrongdoings which cause harmful effects to 
their health and the envirorunent, rather than repOli incidents to the relevant 
authorities460 
Moreover, self-centred behaviour also inhibits those living near the point source of air 
and water pollution from behaving as an effective third party in protecting the 
environment. It is evident that many Thai either expect to get jobs from the plants in 
their neighbourhood or have relatives who work in the plants. As a consequence, they 
realise that causing trouble to the plants, such as reporting envirorunental infringements 
to regulators, could result in the loss of opportunity to get the jobs or cause their 
relatives to lose their jobs 461 This assetiion is confinned by the interview statement 
made by Ms Krittayapom Tappatat and Mr Titi Jantaengpol, the Industrial Estate 
Authority of Thailand (TEAT)'s scientists: 
We do believe that vigorous and constant participation from the public will playa 
significant role in helping improve the state of the environment in Thailand. However. it 
appears that there are many different kinds of people who participate in this 
matter. .. Some have complained because they were disappointed that the plants neither 
bought their land nor recruited labourers in the local community462 
This chapter now tums its investigation to environmental NGOs. Although NGOs in 
Thailand are gaining popularity, problems of air and water pollution in the country 
remain at an unsatisfactory level 463 What impedes these NGOs' achievements? 
Research has found that the Thai environmental NGOs have adopted Thai cultural 
characteristics in doing their jobs; these characteristics include avoidance of 
confrontation 4 64 Accordingly, in contrast to their counterparts in Westem countries who 
460 Ibid. 
46 1 Sunee Malikamarl. ' AnOlher Option in Remedying those Affected from Pollution Problems', 
Dullapaha, 1996, at 103. 
462 The interview was conducted on 21 January 1998. 
463 Douglas Tookey, 'Southeast Asian Environmentalism at its Crossroad: Leaming Lessons from 
Thailand 's Eclectic Approach to Environmental Law and Policy ', at 309-10. 
464 Eugene Clark and Suwit Laohasiriwong, 'Thailand's Quest for Sustainable Development'. The 
Australian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, 1996, at 77-8. 
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debate environmental issues bluntly, most Thai NGOs have focused on research , public 
education, and provision of consultation to those whose well-being is affected by any 
activities harmful to health and the environment4 65 They have not done much to 
challenge directly the enviromnentally destructive practices of parts of Thai industry or 
the inadequate perfonnance of government regulatory officials. 
Consistent with this cultural situation, the relationship between some of the foremost 
NGOs and the Thai government is that of partnership. As Philippa England argues, 
some environmental NGOs have from time to time been assigned by government 
agencies to conduct research for them as well as to collaborate in govermnent-funded 
projects. For example, TEL has produced many reports specifically designed for 
implementation by govermnent agencies466 CUlTently, this leading enviromnental NGO 
is cooperating with the Ministry of Education and the National Energy Bureau in the 
Dawn Project previously discussed in the section of enviromnental education.467 
Another factor facilitates a partnership between the Thai NGOs and government: the 
selection process of NGO representatives as members on the National Enviromnental 
Board (NEB). The 1992 Enhancement Act allows the inclusion of representatives from 
the private sector, including NGOs as members on the NEB. Currently, there are four 
NGO representatives appointed as members. It is however notable that, apart from the 
members who are representatives from environmental NGOs, the NEB members are 
drawn from eleven incumbent politicians, four pennanent government officials, and 
four representatives from the private sector other than environmental NGOS.468 
Astonishingly, the four representatives from environmental NGOs are arbitrarily 
selected by the govermnent, rather than nominated by NGOs themselves469 Given the 
Thai cultural attributes described earlier, it can be anticipated that the NGO 
representatives who have been selected as the NEB members will be grateful to the 
government and would be unlikely to be critical of government policy, but rather will 
take a compromising and conciliatory approach. 
465 Philippa England, 'Friend of Foe? Environmental Advocacy and the Role of Law in Thailand and 
Malaysia', The Australian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Polic\', 1998 , at 6, 12-3. 
406 Ibid. 
467 See the Enviromnental Education and Training section in this chapter. 
468 See the 1992 Enhancement Act, Section 12. 
469 Sunee Malikamarl, at 73-4. 
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It is also conceivable that many NGOs have adopted a cooperative approach towards 
government agencies due to the lack of clear legislative support for their taking a 
stronger or more confrontational attitude. As Chapter 4 suggests, the inclusion of the 
word 'may' in the 1992 Enhancement Act's provisions on the right to know any 
infonnation regarding environmental issues, and on the assistance which the registered 
NGOs can receive from the government, has made these provisions ambiguous, thereby 
becoming a cause of regulatory failure 4 70 In sum, many NGOs take an accommodative 
approach not merely because of the importance of compromise in Thai culture, but also 
because they realise that liaison with the government is the best strategy to obtain 
infonnation from govenunent agencies in the absence of supporting legislation4 71 
Making tripal,tism work in Thailand 
What should be done to make tripartism work best in Thailand? First, the word 'may' 
should be deleted from Sections 6, and 8 of the 1992 Enhancement Act to overcome the 
problem of ambiguity, which forces NGOs to take a compromising approach472 
Second, more emphasis should be given to education and infonnation so that all the 
people concerned, the plants' employees, people living near polluting plants, and the 
general public, are fully aware that the consequences of air and water pollution are too 
hannful to put up with, and that they have the right to be involved in the regulatory 
process. It is hoped that people will be aroused to stand up for their rights to live or 
work in a clean environment. 
Third, incentives must be introduced to attract the public to take part in the regulatory 
process as a third party. Indeed, rewards for infonnation leading to the identification 
and arrest of offenders have long been used, especially in Western societies.473 Tn the 
United States, a State of Alabama statute allows individuals who provide infonnation 
conducive to prosecution of dmg offenders to receive a percentage of the value of any 
470 See Chapter 4 for more details. 
471 See Philippa England, note 29, at 13. 
m As for stakeholders' demands for the deletion of the word 'may' from Sections 6, and 8 of the 1992 
Enhancement Act. see Chapter 4 for more details. 
473 Peter Grabosky. UNAFEI (United Nations Asia and Far East institlile jor the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment ofOjJenders) Resource Materia! Series No 48, March 1996, at 36. 
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propel1y recovered if the prosecution is successful 474 Another is the crimestoppers 
program cUlTently existing in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the 
United States, in which television and radio stations donate free time to broadcast 
infonnation on unsolved crimes. Members of the public are encouraged to call with 
information on the identity or whereabouts of the suspect. To make this program work, 
rewards are offered with anonymity guaranteed for any infonnation leading to a 
conviction.475 
Thailand, too, established a reward system under the 'big bang ' environmental law 
refoml in 1992 to enhance the efficiency of command and control regulation. The 
system is included in the 1992 Maintenance of Public Cleanliness Act (hereinafter the 
Maintenance Act) by allowing a person who has witnessed any action criminalised 
under this legislation to report to the govemment authority. In the event that the 
offender is ordered to pay a fine, the person who has made the report will be awarded 
half the amount of the fine 476 However, the problems of air and water pollution in 
Thailand remain despite such incentives. 
To find out why the incentive approach indicated in the preceding paragraph has not 
helped to improve the environmental situation in Thailand, it is necessary to note that 
such an approach was included in the 1992 Maintenance Act only, while there are a 
number of laws related to the environment which were refonned in the same year. 
These include the 1992 Enhancement Act; the 1992 Factory Act, and the 1992 Public 
Health Act. Also, it appears that the 1992 Maintenance Act calTies the lightest penalties 
among all the environmental regulations refonned in the same year. The maximum fine 
under this Act is only ten thousand baht (around A $ 400). 
It is interesting, in regard to incentives, that an infolTl1ant will be rewarded only if the 
case is jointly settled by cel1ain authorities, the local officer and police investigator, and 
the offender also agrees to pay a fine to have the case settled. If the offender does not 
agree to pay a fine, the case will be passed to the public prosecutor. If the prosecutor 
decides to file a suit, the case will then be passed to the court. Astonishingly, even if the 
474 Ibid. 
475 Denni s Rosenbaum, Arthur Lurigio, and Paul Lavrakas, 'Enhancing Citizen Pal1icipation and Solving 
Serious Crime: a National Evaluation of Crime Stoppers Programs' , Crime and Delinquency, 1989, at 
401-20. 
476 See Sections 48 , and 51 of the 1992 Maintenance of Public Cleanliness Act. See also Sunee 
Mallikamarl, Environmental Law Enforcement, 1998, at 77. 
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court eventually finds the defendant guilty and convicts him or her and imposes a fine 
(there is no jail sentence under the 1992 Maintenance Act), the infonnant will not be 
rewarded 4 77 
Considering the small amount of the rewards, as well as the slim chance of receiving 
them in exchange for being an infonnant under the 1992 Maintenance Act, it is not 
surprising that this incentive provision does not successfully encourage the public to 
provide sufficient infonnation to the government regulators as a third party. 
The mechanism for the provision of rewards should be improved. The infonnant should 
get the reward regardless of how the case is finalised, by either the out-of-court 
settlement, or the court verdict. A more sceptical view would be that the application of 
tripartism through the reward approach is so far of symbolic value only, and that it is no 
coincidence that it is limited to the 1992 Maintenance ACI. To make tripartism work 
effectively in Thailand, it would be necessary to have such rewards available in other 
laws related to environmental protection such as the 1992 Enhancement Act, the 1992 
FactDlY Act, and the 1992 Public Health Act as well. 
4. Publicity of Prosecution Outcome 
Loss of reputation through adverse publicity has become a grave concern for enterprises 
as it could result in a loss of customers.478 More specifically to the enviromllental issue, 
extensive research has found that the market is continually moving towards 
environmentally friendly products. For this reason, finns whose products are considered 
detJimental to the environment are likely to lose their market share. 
In view of this, the outcome of prosecution should be made publicly available. Indeed, 
publicity for the prosecution outcome is one step forward from the disclosure of 
environmental information discussed earlier in this chapter: the publicity we are now 
discussing has its focus on dissemination of the prosecution outcome. Studies show that 
publicity has been suggested by many as an effective method of regulatory sanction479 
477 See the Maintenance of Public Cleanliness Act 1992, Section 48. 
478 See Brent Fisse and John Braihwaite, The Impoci of Public in' on Corporate Offenders, 1983. 
479 Ibid. 
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Scholars suggest that publicity should be made a part of all kinds of sanctions, including 
conviction, fines, community service orders, and corporate probation480 In 
environmental cases, publicity in this regard occurs in many countries, including the 
United States. Recently, a judge in Cincilmati ordered a corporate executive whose 
company contaminated the groundwater with carcinogenic chemicals to write letters of 
apology, and to have such letters as well as the prosecution outcome published in the 
newspaper. 481 
Singapore is another example. The country is committed to a clean environment, thus 
emphasising the anti-social behaviour of litterers. The government has begun a 
campaign with the slogan 'do not litter, people look at you differently ' . To provide 
'teeth' for this campaign, Singapore has introduced the corrective work orders (CWO) 
scheme as one of vaIious penalties provided under the Anti-littering law. A person 
convicted of littering could undergo a penalty of community service such as cleaning 
housing estates. In doing this, the convicted litterer must wear a big yellow sign saying 
'CWO'. Then the press publishes their photographs. So far, this approach works so 
successfully that Singapore has long been renowned as a very clean country482 
Will publicity and other 'shaming' devices work to improve environmental outcomes in 
Thailand? Like many other Asians, the Thai consider the loss of face as the most 
unbearable sanction483 Similarly, Prayut Payutto, a Buddhist monk, postulates that 
many Thai prefer to show others that they are doing well; thus they tend to spend 
money on extravagant items such as luxurious cars, expensive ornaments, and 
importedly brand-named gannents. They will feel that they lose face if they do not have 
such items while others do. 484 These people are even willing to be in debt just to avoid 
losing face in society. 
These cultural attributes of the Thai can be turned into an opportunity to improve the 
efficiency of command and control regulation by using prosecution publicity as a potent 
sanction in its own right; for the Thai realise that they will lose face if they appear in the 
480 Neil Gunningham and Richard Johnstone, Rethinking Occupational Health and Salety Regulation, at 
333-4. 
481 Dan Kahan and Eric Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Refoml of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines', The Journal ol La\V & Economics, April 1999, at 367. 
482 Susan de Silva, at 133. 
483 Antonio Oposa Jr, ' Legal Marketing of Environmental Law', Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law, 1996, at 277. 
484 See Prayut Payutto, Buddhist Economics, 1994, at 12-13. 
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news as criminals, and the fear of this may be a particularly powerful incentive to 
comply with their environmental obligations under the law. 
But are the Thai govenunent agencies capable of developing and imposing an adverse 
publicity sanctions policy, and do they have sufficient resources to make such a policy 
effective? Cun'ently, some agencies provide a regular update to the public on 
environmental matters. For example, the Office of the Environmental Policy and 
Planning produces a yearly report on the state of Thailand 's environment. The numbers 
of such official repot1S are however usually proportional to the government budgets, 
which are very limited, as shown earlier485 This limitation jeopardises the situation as 
the reports are available to the organisations interested in environmental issues only, 
instead of the general public. To overcome this problem, the publicity should be made 
through the public media in addition to government reports, to ensure that lay people 
know about the offenders ' environmentally wrongful behaviour. Essentially, such 
publicity must contain names of the offenders, details of their acts, and the 
consequences of the wrongdoing. So far , the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
(BMA) has used this tactic as one of many ways to tackle polluters. As discussed in the 
section on environmental information disclosure, the media disclosed all the details 
mentioned above in the light of BMA's disclosure. 486 
Of course, expenses must be incuned by the public media such as newspapers. Given 
the government budget limitation, it is suggested that the convicted defendant should 
pay for publicity expenses. One may argue that the above suggestion is not pragmatic as 
at present there is no applicable law in Thailand requiring the defendant in 
environmental cases to pay for publicity about conviction. However, there is a provision 
under the Criminal Code allowing the judge in a defamation case to publish the 
judgement in a local newspaper at the expense of the convicted defendant.487 Hence, 
this provision serves as a precedent for the Thai policy-makers to consider equipping 
the existing environmental regulation with the same kind of provision. 
D. Command and control in the Thai cultural and political context 
485 Budget limitation brings a number of problems such as manpower shortage, and lack of sophisticated 
equipment necessary for improvements to the environmental situation. See Chapter 4 for details. 
486 Poona Antaseeda, 'C ity to act against plants dumping waste into canals ' . Bangkok Post, 17 June 1997. 
487 See the 1992 Penal Code of Thailand , Section 332. 
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This section has shown that the command and control system, like most other policy 
instillments, has both strengths and weaknesses. Strategically, it is imperative to build 
on the strengths while as far as possible compensating for, or reducing, the weaknesses. 
Unfortunately, the weaknesses of command and control are particularly distinct in the 
Thai political and social context. First, there is usually a considerable lack of political 
will, not only to enact appropriate and effective command and control regulation, but 
also to enforce it. As we have found when examining the variability of the sanctions 
provided under Thai pollution law, while some statutes are equipped with potentially 
tough punislunents, including imprisonment or the power to shut down a facility, others 
contain only the very weakest of penalties. Although the explanation for this is 
complex, one aspect of it at least is the reluctance of Thai legislators to enact severe 
penalties against powerful business people to whom they owe various obligations. 
However, more important and more insidious than the failure to enact tough 
environmental laws, is the failure to enforce them. We saw in Part I (and through 
specific examples in this chapter) how conuption, bribes, rent-seeking, reciprocal 
obligations, compromise and regulatory capture have seriously undennined the capacity 
of regulatory agencies to enforce the law. We have seen that some severe sanctions, 
such as the power to close down a business, make regulators even more reluctant to use 
them. Furthell110re, when this is coupled with inadequate regulatory budgets, quiet a 
COlllinon phenomenon in Thailand, the enforcement capacity of the regulators is 
inevitably undennined. 
This section argued that a pyramidal enforcement policy, using both the carrot and the 
stick, was likely to be the IllOst appropriate in Thailand, although it recognised that the 
difficulties identified in the preceding paragraph were likely to make it harder to use 
punitive measures when necessary. Even so, this section was able to cite cases and 
circumstances where such measures were actually used. This led the section to conclude 
that, notwithstanding the considerable limitations on the use of command and control in 
Thailand, it is still an essential policy instillment, on which regulators can rely, at least 
in some circumstances, despite the pressures upon them to compromise and weaken 
their enforcement efforts. 
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We saw how the Court of Appeals has, in a number of contexts, been willing to impose 
severe penalties on politically powerful individuals and organisations. Again, this 
suggests that despite the pervasiveness of the culture of gratitude and of conllption, 
there are circumstances were command and control and the imposition of penalties at 
the top of the enforcement pyramid are credible and will be implemented effectively. 
Finally, this section has emphasised the importance of tripartism as the mechanism 
having a strong potential to compensate the vulnerabilities of Thai regulators to 
capture, compromise and corruption. Although it was found that in Thailand trade 
unions and workers were unlikely to operate as effective third parties because as they 
recognise a strong allegiance to their employer according to the culture of gratitude, we 
also found that environmental NGOs can and already to some extent do, play an 
impOl1ant role in both challenging the polluting behaviour of industry, and galvanising 
some regulatory agencies to take appropriate action against such behaviour. But despite 
this, the Thai cultural characteristic of compromise makes it difficult and even unlikely 
that NGOs will take the sOli of 'direct action' that environmental groups such as 
Greenpeace have taken in Europe. 
However, looking to the positive side of this cultural charactel1stic, the chances of 
constructive partnerships between enviromnental NGOs and business or government are 
very high. There is reason to believe that these partnerships will bring about the most 
positive initiatives in the future. We also made a number of specific recommendations 
on how to make tripartism work best in Thailand, which include how publicity and 
transparency could best be used to make regulation more effective. This last strategy is 
pat1icularly promising given the importance in Thai culture of avoiding ' losing face ' . 
Conclusion 
At first glance, the continuing influence of command and control regulation might seem 
surprising, given a variety of alternative policy instruments that have been developed 
and implemented over the last two decades. But no single policy instrument used in 
isolation can be successful in addressing all environmental problems, or in changing 
the behaviour of all polluters. Accordingly, although many innovative measures have 
been introduced (ranging from a persuasive approach such as education, to a quasi-
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coercive approach such as self-reg ulation) it is unlikely that anyone of them will 
provide a complete solution. 
Moreover, none of these 'new generation' policy instruments can be relied upon 
exclusively for satisfactory environmental outcomes. For example, many of the policy 
innovations are essentially voluntaristic, and lack sanctions that are powerful enough to 
change the behaviour of recalcitrants. Many unscrupulous polluters want to reap as 
much profit as they can, regardless of the hannful impact of their activities, and will 
ignore infonnation, education and exh01iations to improve their environmental 
perfonnance so long as it is cheaper to pollute than to comply with their environmental 
responsibilities.488 Examples include free-riders and dishonest audits. 
Given that command and control regulation does carry with it not only environmental 
responsibilities, but a range of sanctions if these are breached, it continues to playa 
vital role. Finns usually respond to environmental regulations, particularly if they have 
experienced monitoring and inspection, and even more so if they have been fined or 
sanctioned489 In the case of recalcitrants, the possibility of selious punishment serves 
as the threat which could influence them to comply with their legal obligations4 9o . This 
is why command and control regulation, which usually contains powerful penalties as 
regulatory sanctions, has a strong potential to address environmental problems, 
provided cel1ain political and cultural constraints can be overcome. 
However, this is not to say that the goal of environmental protection can be only 
achieved when command and control is applied. Rather, this chapter has pointed out 
some serious limitations of command and control regulation in the Thai cultural and 
political context, and suggested that command and control is a clllcial but flawed policy 
instrument which is likely to achieve only partial success in Thailand. 
488 According to Antonio Oposa, if a person considers that the cost of being punished outweighs the cost 
of compliance, he or she will choose to comply with the law. For more details, see Antonio Oposa, 'Legal 
Marketing of Environmental Law', Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 1996, at 276. 
489 Theodore Panayotou, Todd Schatzki and Qwanruedee Limvorapitak, 'Differential Industry Response 
to Fonnal and InfOlmal Environmental Regulations in Newly Industrializing Economies: The Case of 
Thailand'. 
490 David Hanrahan, 'Persuasion & Incentives: New Ways to Achieve a Cleaner World', in the World 
Bank Group, Environment Mailers, Winter Spring 1997, printed from the Tntell1et on www. 
NIPR.org.envimatlindex.htm, at 4. Similarly, Antonio Oposa suggests that the law must contain an aspect 
of punishment in order to modify human behaviour and serve as a deterrent. See Antonio Oposa. 'Legal 
Marketing of Environmental Law', at 276 for more details. 
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It has also been argued that relatively innovative methods such as economic instruments 
and self-regulation which nonnally require only loose monitoring from the govell1ment, 
can yield effective results providing they are backed with the tough sanctions which can 
only be embedded in command and control regulation. This confilms with the saying 
'walk softly but carry a big stick' ~9 1. 
The policy mix described in this chapter can be reinforced and complemented by a 
va ri ety of additional strategies and instruments with an international dimension. Details 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
491 Anl on io Oposa, 'Lega l Marketing of Environmental Law' in Duke Journal (j( Comparative & 
Interl1ational Law, 1996, a t 276. 
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Chapter 7 
International Dimensions of Thai Environmental Regulation 
Introdu ctio n 
So ra[', this thesis has focused mainly on dOlllestic events: events influenced by loca l 
circumstances within Thailand. It has described the strengths, and Illore impol1antly, the 
weaknesses, of the cxisting environmental law and its cnforccment. Also, it has 
idcnti1icd the main causes of thi s regulatory failure, including lack of political will, 
in ability of many small and mcdium firm s to af'lo rd enlironmental technology, and 
CO[Tuption. The thesis has also examined a number of possible refollll s at domestic le"el 
and how these might be achieved. 
Howevcr, Thailand's response to en vironmental degradation is influenced not just by 
politics, culturc, economics and broader social forces within the country but also by 
intelllational events and pressures. Accordingly, to gain a profound insight into the 
possible forces for regulatory refollll, it is as important to examine influences eXlemo! 
to Thai land as it is to consider internal forces. 
To fulfil that task , this chapter explores impol1ant ways in which the international 
communi ty, or international companies, ei ther through treaties, international trade, 
international organisations, or other less obvious, but no less important mechani sms, 
can galvani se Thailand into improving its environmental perfonnance generally or its 
en vironmental regulation specifically. 
The chapter foeuses particularly upon those instruments \\'hich are likel y to be most 
successful in achieving change in the two environmental issues which arc the subject of 
this thesi s: air and water pollution. SOl11cwhat Icss attention is paid to internat iona l 
treati es, bccause only a lil11ited number of such treaties deal with these issues directly 
(unless one treats these issues as includin g ozone protection and greenhouse gas 
el11issions), and bccause the literature on such issues is large, the argul11ents are well 
rehearsed, and there is little new which can be added. 
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In addition, there is much of interest to be sa id about other sources of international 
cnvironmental regulation, which includcs so-ca lled 'sot( la\\" (including Agenda 21); 
the fast-increasing role of international institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank: the GATT and international trade; and the emerging significance of the ISO 
14000 series of international environ111ental management standards. ['or these reasons, 
the chapter begins with a brief and largely descri pti ve account of the importance of 
variolls international trcaties, before examining in more detail, and 1110re criticall y, the 
wider range of instruments identified above. 
I. International Environmental Law: Sources and Character 
The traditional concept of territorial sovereignty within states has served to justify their 
pursuit of their own national development policies free fi'om broader international 
concerns including that of cnvironmcntal degradation.' In recognition of the short-
sighted and damaging effect of this approach, there have been numerous attempts to 
balance it with broader considerations of environmental protection at the global Ic\ el. 
These include the introduction of international environmental law, the purpose of which 
is to persuade al l countries to play by the same international rules. 
\Vhat kind of law or regulation is acceptable to an intemational community which 
consists of states with very different interests? Ideally, intcmational law must be 
designed to protect the global environment for the benefit of all countries rather than 
one particular country. The first successful f0ll11ulation of an intemational 
environmental regulatory framework designed to achieve sllch a goal took place at the 
United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. The 
framelVork, which is better known as the Stockholm Dcclaration, was based on the 
principle that states on the one hand have rights to exploit their own natural resources, 
but on the other hand also have responsibilities to ensure that any activities undertaken 
within their jurisdiction will not cause damage to the environment of other states.' 
' Alan E. Boy le, 'Environment and Development'. Third lVorld Legal Stlld,es. 1993, at 95. 
, Principle 2 1 of the Stockholm Declaration: states that ' States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principle of intemational law, the sovereign rights to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their OWll envinllU11ental poli cies. and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within theIr jurisdictioll and control do not cause damages to the environment of other states or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdic ti on', Report on the U.N. Conference on the Human EI1\·ironmen t. 
~t()ckho lm . 1972, U.N. !)oc. A CONI' '4R ·14 iRiv. 1. cited, ibid, 96-7. 
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Sincc the Stockholm Declaration, international environmental law has continued to 
dc\ 'elop. seeking to become an effective means to impro\'e the environment both of 
indi vidual states and of the world . With regard to the agreements dealing wi th air and 
water pollution . there has so far been only very limited acti vity, at least at the level of 
international treaties, This is explicable in tel111S of the limited trans-border and 
international implications of these fOl1ns of pollu tion compared to other rclated 
problems of a transparentl y global nature. In the latter category fall such agreements as 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which was subsequently 
Improved by the Montreal Protoco l on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and 
the Londo n Amcndments; and the United Nations Framcwork Convention on Cli mate 
Change.' While these agreements will be referred to below in order to provide insights 
into Thailand's general approach to adoption and implementation of international 
treaties, gl'eater attention will be paid to those aspects of the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21 whi ch do have direct implications for air and watcr pollution. 
A: Sources of International Environmental Law 
Beforc investigat ing the roles of international environmental law in the progress of Thai 
environmental regul at ion, it is necessary to indicate briefly what intemational 
environmental law is, how it develops, and what character it has. Traditional sources of 
intemational law are treati es, intcrnati onal custom, princi pl es of intemational law, and 
the writing of jurists' Arguably, as thc Intemational Law Commission has proposed, 
resolutions of intemational organ isa ti ons and dceisions of the Intcmati onal Court of 
Justice and of intcrnational tribunal s should bc regarded as additional sourccs of 
international law 5 In the specifi c analysis of international environmcntal law, scholars 
howcvcr arguc that trcaties and intcmational custom are thc primary sourccs of this kind 
of law.' 
, Alllhony D'Amato and Kirslcn tngel (eds.), Inlernaliollal EllvimnlllCllwl Lall ' Al1lftologr, 1996, 
at 3-5. 
4 Sec AI1ic ie 38 (I) of Ihe Slatule of Ihe Intemaliona l Co uri of Juslice. 
) Philip Sa nds, Principles of In tenwlional Environmental Lo\\' Frwnell'orks, Standards and 
IIIl"lel1lelllflliull, 1995, 31 103, 
(, .lames Cameron, 'Future Direc ti ons In Intelllational Environ mental Law', The Dalhousie LOH' journal, 
1997, al t24, See also, Alexander S, T imo,henko , ' InlcrnJl ional EIl\ Ironmenlal Law: Fundame!1lal 
;\spccts', Rel'i,' IIIJnl'idica UA7'R, t990. at 061 
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Treaties arc by and large more explicit and morc readily identitlable than international 
custom. 7 1\ question which arises here is: what makes international custom become 
another imponant source of international environmental law along with treaties? Gi ven 
that treaties arc made on a basis of agreements usually between multiple states, it is 
diffIcult to include within them, suftlcient detail to resolve the tensions between and 
satisfy all the parties coneerncd.' Many treaties therefore are couched in broad terms, 
providing flexibility and ambiguity sufficient to achieve a compromise between various 
contending interests. Thcir broad and general nature also enables them to be readily 
adaptcd according to futurc contingency. Bcsides, trcaty-making is a time-consuming 
process which cannot kecp pace with the environmental problems caused by any state's 
actions. I\s a result, international custom serves to fill the legal vacuum created by the 
non-specifIc nature of many treaties. increasingly, international custom plays a leading 
role in cstablishing fundamcntal principles of international cnvironmental regulation.o 
110\\ has international custom evolved? It docs not originate from a f0l111al legislati ve 
process; rather, it delives from other sources, including state practice. What kind of state 
practice is a key facilit ator in developing intemational custom? James Cameron 
suggests that a state practice must be the actual conduct of states which indicates a 
rcpeated application of a particular custom. Such conduct includes participation in treaty 
negotiation and ratification. lmpol1antly, if a state does not persi stently object to a 
practice of other states, binding obligations may be created in light of evidence of such a 
practiee. 'o In the Trail Smelter case between the U.S. and Canada, the arbitration 
imposed liability for environmental hanTI between states. This was subsequently 
developed to the widely recognised customary rule and articulated in Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration , and has been further incorporated in a number of treaties." 
B, Charactel" of Intel'national Envjr'onmcntal Law: A Hard Law-Soft Law Debate 
International environmental obligations are, no matter from what sources they 
originated, contemporarily found in the fonn of both hard and soft law. Hard law 
consists of principles, whether found in treaties or customary international law, which 
7 Alexander S. Tim oshenko , 'lnlernalional Environmental Law: Fundamenlal Aspec ls' , Revista Juridica 
UPR, 1990, al 662. 
S Abram Chayes and Anlonia Chayes, The Nell· Sovereign!v, 1995, al 10. 
" Ibid, 661-2. 
10 James Cameron . 124-5. 
" Ibid. 01 125 
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create binding obligations for states and which are enforceable under intelllational law. 
In contrast, soft law is not legally binding in itself. It neve11heless is important in 
making intelllational environmental law by creating political commitments among 
countries concellled." 
Soft law can bc found in many pieces of international environmental regulation. As 
scholars suggest, soft law can take many fOllllS, which include declarations, statements 
of principle, codes of conduct, recommendations and resolutions of international 
organisations, and draft proposals elaborated by groups of experts. 13 Extensive research 
has found that the development of soft law nonns in respect of the environment began 
immediately after the emergence of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972. 14 Regarding air 
and water pollution, imp0I1ant soft law includes the Rio Declaration 1992 and the 
Agenda 21. 
II. International law as it affects Thailand's domestic environmental 
responsibilities 
A. International law that has 'direct' effects on Thailand's air and water pollution 
laws 
Issues of air and water pollution, are dealt with by international environmental law in 
the form of soft laws. These include the Stockholm Declaration; the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development; and Agenda 21. 
1. The Stockholm Declaration 
The event which provided a breakthrough in global environmental law and regulation 
was the Stockholm Declaration, which established that environment was a matter of 
international concern which should be regulated through intelllational action. Most 
significantly, it attempted to reconcile sovereign rights and intelllational obligations. 
Principle 21 of the Declaration attempts to balance the right of a state to control all 
" Amhony D'AmalO and Kirsten Engel (eds). Il7lemclIional Environmental Law Anthology, at 56. 
13 Peter Drahos. ' Thinking strategicall y about intellectual property rights' , Telecommunications Policv, 
1997. at 205-6. See also Anthony D'Amato and Kirsten Engel (eds), inlernclIional Environmental Law 
Al7lhologl' at 56. 
14 Amhony D' Amato and Kirsten Engel (eds), at 55. 
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matters within it s territory with a respon sibilit y to cnsurc that what is undcl1aken within 
one sta te docs not cause damaging effects to others." 
Howcver, the existence of a law does not neccssa ril y mcan that it will be successfully 
implemented . ", Undoubtedly. the establishment o f an institution authoriscd to 
coordinate with mcmber countries is a nccessa ry, but not sufficient step towards 
successful implcmentation , and for thi s reason, the United Nation s Environment 
Programm e (UNE P) was cstablished by the General Assembly of the Unit ed Nations 
following thc Stock holm Convention in 1972." UNE P has so far played a key role as 
an international organisation responsible for dealing with cnvironmcntal issues at thc 
global levcl. " 
Stockholm Declaration and its Effect on Thailand 
The effect of th e Stockho lm Declarati on upon Thai domestic law is direct. Only three 
years after the Declaration. Thailand promulgated the now-defunct 1975 En!7011cement 
Act as its fir st piecc of comprehensive environmental regulation. Both the National 
Environmcntal Board and the Office of the Nat ional Committee on the Environment 
wcre established by thi s Act. Thesc developments were precipitated by the Stockholm 
Confercnce, with the govell1mcnt authorities in Thailand addressing environmental 
issues for thc first time. 19 
FurthenTIore, when Thailand conducted the ' big bang' reforn1 of environmental 
regulation in 1992, the country was again influenced by some imp0l1ant concepts wh ich 
15 Louis 11 . Sohn, 'The Stockholm Declaration on the lI uman Environment', !-lallY/I'd International Lenl' 
JOlln",/, Vol. t4. 1973, at 445. 
1(, I\s discussed in Chapter 4, th e ultimate goa l of a regulatory scheme is not achieved at th e completion 
or lcgi~lati\'c prollwigation (Peter Yeager, Th e Limit,." of LOH': Th e Pllblic Regula/ion qf Private Pol/ution, 
199 1. at 29). For more discussion. see Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite. Responsive Reglilation. 
Tmllscelldillg the Deregllialioll Debate, 1992, at 125; and "Cheryl Wassennan, 'The Princip le of 
I::nvironmental Enforcement and Beyond: Building Inst itutional Capaci ty.' a paper delivered in the Third 
I nternational Conference on Em'irnnmental Enforcement , 1994, at 16. 
" Sce Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 1972, at 29. U.N. Doc. 
A CON F.48/ 14/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No. E. 73 II. A. 14 (1972), citcd in Daniel C.K. Chow, 'Recognizing 
the Env ironmen ta l Costs of the Recognition Prob lem: The I\dvantages of Taiwan 's Direc t Participation in 
Intemationall: nvironmental Law Treaties', Stanford Environmental LUH'Journal, 1995. al 259 
" I\ mornpot Kullawijit, 'En\'i ronmental Problem: Depl et ion of the Ozone Layer'. DIII/"I"dw, at 150-1 
I') SUIlCC Mallikamarl. Enl'irol1l11ental Law i:'nforcemenr, 1997. at 9. 
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were initially incorporated in the Stockholm Declaration. The concepts ineludc 
establishment or a planning institution. control ling the cnvironment at thc nationa l Icvcl, 
the usc of public part ic ipati on, and incentive measures which include an environmental 
fund. 20 These wcre contained in the 1992 EII/wllcemellt !lct some twenty years after the 
Stockholm Declaration. 
2. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is the agreement of intention 
jointly made by countries attending the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). It is better known as the Rio Declaration. Since the Rio 
Declaration, Agenda 21 and the Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 
(described above) which arc investigated in thi s chapter, emanated from the samc 
internationa l conference, UNCED, it is usefu l to begin with a brief d iscussion on 
UNCED. 
The conference was initiated by the United Nations Genera l Assembly in 1989 and held 
ai Rio de Janeiro during 3-1 4 June 1992." What is the purpose of UNCED? According 
to the Un ited Nations General Assembly resolution 441228 , the mandate of UNCED 
incl uded to elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the effects of 
environmental degradation in the context of in creased national and international efforts 
to promote sustainable and environmentally sound development in all countries. It also 
recogni sed that the promotion of economic growth in developing countries is essential 
to address problems of environmental degradation.'2 
UNCED was attended by approximately 20,000 people from 178 countries, many of 
whom were heads of states and government leaders. From of Thailand , Princess 
Chulapomwalailaksa attended the conference as both the representative of the King of 
Thailand and the leader of Thai delegates. Records show that it was the first 
international conference ever attended by so many heads of states. Also, it was the first 
20 See Stockholm Declaration. Principles 17, 19, and 12, and the 1992 Enhancement Act. Sections 12,6-
8, a nd 22-23. Scc also Chaptcr 2 for l110re details. 
II Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (1996), C0I1\'CI1f1011 all Biological /)i\'C/'sitl': 711il1k 
Glo",,''' ' ""d "erf{mll N"tional/I'. at 119 
II Sec /\ gcnda 2 1, Chapter 38,38.1 
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time many NCOs, as well as media from many different countries pm1icipated in a 
world conference. As a result, UNCED has also been dubbed the "Earth Summit". '; 
UNCED gencrated ti\c intell1ational instruments." However, as this thesis has its !<lCUS 
on the issues of air and water pollution, only the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Dcvelopmcnt and Agenda 21 are discussed here. What is contained in the Rio 
Declaration') Notably, it rcvisits and reiterates Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration by eonfi nning the rights of states to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their environmental and developmental policies as long as the states bear a 
responsibility to ensure that activities conducted within their jurisdiction do not cause 
dam aging consequences to the environmcnt of other states or of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, '; 
Furthermore, the Rio Declaration introduces a number of central tenets for the concept 
of sustainable development: integration of environmental protection in the development 
process to achieve a goal of sustainable development"; facilitation and encouragement 
of public awareness and pm1icipation by making infonnation available"; application of 
the precautionary approach"; and environmental impact assessment'"' 
The Rio Declaration and its Effect on Thailand 
Although the Rio Declaration, as soft law, lacks legal binding status, it has created 
political commitmcnt among the countries which attended and ratified the conference. 
In the case of Thailand, extensive research has found that the country is generally keen 
to enhance its image at thc international level. JO Initially, Thailand showed its support 
2) Officc of Em ironmental Policy and PlannUlg. at 119. 130-1, 
" 13en Boer, 'E nvironmental Law and the South Pacific: Law of the Sea Issues', cited in Ben Boer, 'The 
Globalisalion of Environmental Law: the Role of the United Nations'. Melbol/rne Universitl' Lall' Reviell", 
1995. at 103. 
2S See the Rio Declaration. Principte 2. Notabty, Peter Malanczuk observes that the plu'ase 'and 
developmental' was added to the original words in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, He 
however suggests that while the addition seems to emphasise the sovereignty of developing countries 
with respect to th eir development policics, it is in fact necessary for it is to be understood that the use of 
resources is rOJ" development purposes. f or n)Qre detail) see Peter Malanczuk, 'Sustainable Development: 
Some Critical -I houghts in the Li ght of the Rio Conference', in Komad Ginther et aI., eds, SlIslOil/(lble 
D(>\'(!/opmenl alld Good Governance, at 30. 
'6 See the Rio Declaration, Principle 4. 
" Ibid , Principle 10, 
2R Ibid , PrincljJic IS. 
'9 Ibid. Principle 17. 
~o Office of En\ iron lll cntal Policy and Planning. at 132 . See also the interview statement of Dr Suvit 
Yodmancc. DIrec tor and Representative of UNE P in Asia and Pacific Region, yupra . 
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by ratifying thi ,; picce of international regulation . Such ratifi ca tion has become a driving 
force tllr thc Thai government to adopt many of the principles and recommendations of 
the Rio Dcclaration, which wil l, in turn , help improve the environmental silUati on in 
Thailand . For cxample, the concept of susta inable development introduced in the Rio 
Declaration has been integrated into Thailand 's Eighth National Economic and Socia l 
Developmcnt Plan which is effective for the period 1997-2001 31 , and its Policy and 
Prospecti ve Plan for Enhanecment and Co nscrvation of National Environmental 
Quality, 1997-20 16. '2 
3. Agellda 21 
Agenda 21 is arguably the most impol1ant document to cmcrgc from the Rio proccss, 
and it is ill1p0l1ant to bcgin by emphasising its legal status. Agcnda 2 1 is not an 
international trea ty which is legally binding upon thc membcr countrics. Rather, it has a 
"soft law" sta tus as it is merely madc up of a number of suggest ions and 
recommendations, many of which are written in tCll11 S of what nations "should" rathcr 
than "shall " d033 Agenda 21 neverthelcss serves as a comprehensive framcwork of an 
action plan to whi ch all nations attcnding UNCED havc committed themselves34 Its 
main obj ecti ve is to encourage global actions for achieving the goal of susta inable 
developmcnt. '; 
What docs the Agenda 21 contain? Significantly, it has many mechanism s to make thc 
action plan viablc. These include instrumcnts and enforcement mechanism s at every 
level of government, improving or restructuring the dccision-making proccss in order 
that the socio-economic and environmental issucs are fully integrated. '6 FLII1hcr, it also 
deal s with international institutional alTangcments, as well as reinforcemcnt of thc ro le 
of UNEP, cspccia ll y in providing techni cal, lega l and instilUtional advice to 
govcrnmcnts to cstablish and enhance national legal and institutional framcwork s. It 
also promotcs thc strcngthening of the roles of major groups, including NGOs, busincss 
~! Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. ' Foreword ' . in T/wi/ond's /lefion/or S'lislainohle DC\'{-/OPJl1l!l1f. 
\2 Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, Thailcll1d's Poli(y and Pro.\jJective Plan (or 
Enhancemellt and Conservation ofN(tfional Enl1ironmenla/ QualifY. 1997-2016. 1997 . 
. 11 Ben Bocr. Rob Fowlcr. and Neil Gunningham, Agenda 2 I. The Legal Implications. 1992. at 4. 
14 Ibid. 
1S UNCFD, Earth Sum mil: Agenda 2 1. Th c Uniled Nalions Programme of Acti on from Rio (1993), c ilcd 
in Bcn Boer, al 105-6. 
)6 See Age nda 21. Chapler 8. 
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and industry, women, chi ldren and yo uth. " Agenda 2 1 also addresses the issues of 
climate change, ozone depletion , and transboundary pollution. " 
One might argue that these last provi sions are repetitive of the Framework Convention 
on C limate Changc, Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 
protocols, and thc Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastcs and Their Di sposal. Howcver, as indicated earlier, th ere arc 
difticulti es in ncgotiating international treaties, which relate to the challenge of 
obtaining consensus, the difficulties of incorporating detai led provision and the timc-
consuming proccss of making all the panics eonccllled agree to even one single 
provision in thc treaty. 
Agenda 2 1, as a soft law, transcends thc above difficulties. A good example is the 
FramclVo rk Convention on C limate Changc, which focuses primarily on energy policy, 
Agenda 2 1 has much broadcr provi sions than are included in the Convention, such as 
the dcvelopmcnt of cfficient, less-polluting transpoi1 technologies, and land-usc and 
rcsource policies that wi ll reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.'" 
Incrcasingly, Agenda 21 has been recognised in many countries as a plan for sustainable 
development. As Ben Boer argues, for example, development plans in Australia, at both 
federal and state level , as well as in the Pacific Island region, have adopted Agenda 21 
as a guide for environmental strategy-making.'o Simi larly, Singapore has incorporated 
many principles of Agenda 21 in its development and environment plans. These are set 
out in the Singapore Green Pl an - Action Programmes, covering six plincipal areas: 
environmental education; environmenta l technology; resource conscrvation; clean 
technologies; natu re conservation; and noise" China has also showed its positive 
responsc to Agenda 21 by producing the white paper titled "China 's Agenda 2 1 n." The 
17 See Agenda 2 1, Chapters 24, 25, 27, and 30. 
]X Sec Agenda 21, Chapter 9. 
I') flen Boer, Rob Fowler and Neil Gunningham. Agenda 21. The Legal Implications, at 17-H. 
40 Ben Boer, 'The Global isa tion of Environmental Law: the Role of the United Nations', at 107. 
41 Foo Kim Boon. ' i\SEAN's En vironmental Future: The Singapore Perspecti ve', a paper presented at the 
Seventh Ge neral Assembl y and Conference Workshop, ASEAN Law Associa tion, 1995. 
4:! Chatchom Akapin. Coordination between Economic Development and Environmental Protection in 
Chi na, i\ pOpel' submitted in the cou rse Comparative Law Seminar: Use of Legality to Transfol111 Chinese 
Soc iety. 1994, at 21 
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paper establishcd policies to compl y with recom11lendations pet1aining to sustainable 
development. " 
Why has Agcnda 2 1 gained tremcndous recognition from the world despite its status as 
soli, rather than hard law') Many scholars suggest that, even as soft law, Agenda 21 
generates a number of lega l implications. These include an important poli cy statcment 
which will be the foundation for future negotiations on environmental issues at both 
national and international levels. Also, Agenda 21 puts pressure on governments to 
adopt policies as well as to take actions cons istent with the recommendations set out in 
the internat ional inst rument." 
In additi on to the legal perspective, Agenda 21 represents a global consensus agreed 
upon at UNCED, thus generating a political commitm ent for its signatories to comply 
with it . As the former Australian ell vironment minister, Roz Kelly, put it , "its 
recommendations (h ave) the force of a political commitment at the hi ghest possible 
level"." 
Agcnda 21 and its Effect on Thailand 
Gi ven that Thailand ratified Agenda 2 1, the country is politicall y bound to comply with 
it regardlcss of its soft- law status. What actions has Thailand takcn to conform to 
Agenda 2 1? So far, the country has integrated the concept of sustainable development, 
the ultimate goal of Agenda 21 's action plan,46 into its Eighth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan for 1997-2001 47 . Furthennore, the current Policy and 
Prospecti ve Plan for Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality 
1997-2016 has also aimed at achieving the goa l of sustainable development". 
For present purposes, it is important to emphasise those aspects of Agenda 21 which 
contain recommendations relating directl y to air and water pollution. The most 
41 William Alford and Yuanyuan Shen. 'LimilS of Law in Addressing China 's Environmenlal Dilemma', 
Stanford l~'nvi"olll1/en{((1 /.al\' Journal, 1997, at 135. 
44 8 ~n 130er. Rob Fowler and Neil Gunningham , Agenda 2 J: Fhc Legaiimplicariolls, al 17-R. 
45 Ibid , 5-6 
46 See Note 39. 
47 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, ' Foreword ', in Thailal1d·.~· AClionfor Sllstainahle DCl'(!l0pl1leJ1l. 
-lS Such a policy is si m ila r to that of Singapore's G reen Plan-Actions Programme mentioned ea rli er: it 
co ntains poil cy on natural resources; po llution prevention and eradication: natural and cultura l 
environmen ts: commullIty env ironment: envl ro llmental education and promo tion: and en\ lJ"onmcntCli 
techno logy. Sec note 30 for more details 
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important of these arc in Chapters 9, 18, and 2 1. While Chapter 9 includ es the issue of 
transboundary pollution, Chapters 18 and 21 address the issue of freshwater resources, 
including wate r po llution. These last two provisions suggest that all nations should 
establish appropriate institutional structures, Icgal instruments , and efficient water-usc 
program s by the year 200049 
Thailand has accordingly responded to sueh recommendations. For example, the 1992 
Enhancement Act encompasses a number of provisions dealing with air and water 
polluti on issues."] In p3I1ieular, the provi sions on environmental information 
availability. and recognition and promotion of the roles o f NGOs incorporated in the 
re folll1 ed ell\ 'ironmental regulation, encapsulate cent ral tenets of Agenda 2151 
MOI·eover. in the contex t of promoting the ro le of business and industry in protect ing the 
environment (also in cluded in Agenda 21) th e Thailand Business Counc il for 
Sustainable Development (TBCSD) was also estab lished, consi sting of many business 
entrepreneurs. In Jun e 1994, an implementation pl an was introduced for members to 
establish corporate envi ronmental activi ti es. implement intelllal audits and publish 
environmental repoI1s." 
B. International agreements that have ' indirect' effects on Thailand 's air and 
watel' pollution law: Ozone Depletion, Hazardous Wastes and Climate Change 
Thailand has also taken seriously its obligations under a number of intell1ational 
agreements relating to the environment. None of these, however, relates to air and water 
4'1 Ben 1 0er. Rob Fowler, and Neil Gunningham, al 17-9.27-8.32. 
50 These include requirements that the owner or possessor of the air pollution 's point source mu st instal or 
prov ide an on-s ite fa c ility for the control, di sposa l, reduct ion of air polluti on; that the owner or possessor 
of the water pollution's point source must construct. instal , or provide an on-sl te facility for th e 
wastewater treatmen t or waste di sposal. See the 1992 Enhoncemel1l Act, Secti ons 64-77 for greater detail. 
51 These include the rights granted to an indi vidu al 10 have access to infonnation re lated to promotion and 
maintenance of environmental quality from the government agencies concerned ; potential enti tlement of 
assistance rrol11 the govcl11menl to the registered NGOs in many ways including public relations and 
dissemination of infoI1113lion to create a CQITcet awareness of environmenrai protection and conservation 
or natural resources. For more detaiL see the 1992 Enhancement Act, Sectio ns 6-8. 
51 Anand P3nyarac hul1. <Merging Business and the cl1\'i ronmenl: Three Steps to Leadership'. 
TI:'I Quo"'''1'/1' Dmrollll1enlill Journal , January-March 1995. at 4-5. 
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pol lu tion dircetly. " Howevcr. bricf refercnce is madc hcrc to the way Thailand has 
responded in three relatcd areas in which it has s igned intelllational agreemcnts on 
ozone. c lim ate change and hazardous waste. to provide broader insights as to how 
Thailand is influenced by its intclllational obligations and responds to them. 
I. Vielllla COl/vel/tiol/ al/d Jl10lltreal Protocol 
From 1971 to 1987, many scicntists found that ozone in the world's atmosphere was 
decrcasing, resulting in degradation of the environment and natural rcsourccs. Their 
rcsearch also found that the ozone depletion was attributed to somc chcmicals uscd in 
the manufacturing process of industry: these included chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and 
Halon. UNEP subscquently held a convention with rcgard to this issue at Vienna in 
1985." 
The outcomc was the Vienna Convcntion , to which Thailand was a signatory;S Thc 
Convcntion was subsequently developcd by a number of protocols. Among thesc, the 
instrum cnt which most affects Thailand is thc Montrcal Protocol 1987 56 The 
substantial provi sions of the protocol included rccognition that CFCs, along with some 
othcr chcmicals including Halon, could cause depletion of the ozone laycr; and 
cstablishment of a plan to reduce and abandon such chemicals. Thailand signcd the 
protocol in September 1988 and ratificd it in July 1989. 57 
As a signatory to the Vienna convention and the Montreal Protocol , Thailand is 
committed to rcduce and then abandon the CFCs in production, use and import. 
Although Thailand, along with other dcveloping countries whose annual calculated 
levcl of consumption of the controlled substances did not exceed 0.3 kilograms per 
capita, had a grace period of ten ycars to comply with the treatiS, it was evident that the 
country vigorous ly complied with the obl igation set fOIth in the protocol , and bccame 
5) In a broader sense, ozone depletion and climate change have a relationship with air pollution, and 
hazardous wasle has a re lalionship wilh waler pollulion. All Ihree of Ihese issues however, are major 
research topics in their own right and, as indicated in the introduction, arc beyond the direct scope or this 
thesis . 
54 Amornpol Kullawijil. 'Environmenlal Problem : Dep lelion ofihe Ozone Layer' ,al t5 0-1. 
ss Ibid. See also Riehard Elliol Benedick, Ozone Dip/ol/wev, 1991 , al 44-5. 
\(, Thailand ralified Ihe Monlreal Protocol in the Second Meeling of Lhe Panies 10 Ihe Montreal Pro locol 
on Subs lances Ihal Deplele Ihe Ozone La yer held in Londo n during 27 -29 June t990. For mo re delails . 
see tbid , al t53-94 . 
57 Ri chard tlcnedick, Ooone Dljl/oll1({cr. al 269. 
" See Monlreal Proloco l on Subslances Ihal Dep le le Ihe Ozone Layer In7. ArtIcle 5. 
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the first count ry in the Asia-Pacific region which abandoned the importation of 
rcti'igerators using CFCs 5 <J 
2. Basel CO ll velltioll Oil the COll trol ol TrallsbOllllllal), Movemellts of lIazardous 
Wastes alld Their Di.'posal 
Increasingly, theee have been major international developments to control the import 
and export of hazardous wastes. Many developing countries have long received 
hazardous wastes sent from developed countries. The motives for shipping such wastes 
from deve l\lped to developi ng countries include the re-use of the wastes as other kinds 
of materiaL the lower costs of disposal in developing countries; and illegal shipping to 
victim countries f ,() Many developing countries in Latin America and Atl-ica. as well as 
environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, have opposed such waste shipping."1 Yet 
such activities continued on a large scale. This caused various forms of protest and 
direct action. such as the Guinea government's forcing a ship loaded with waste 
disposa l ash from Philadelphia, USA, to return to the country of origin." 
As thi s problem increased, UNEP managed to persuade many developed and 
deve loping countries to reach an international agreement on this issue. The Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Di sposal (hereafter Basel Convention) was signed in 1989 by many countries at 
Basel, Switzerland . Thai land signed the treaty in March 199263 , and ratified it in late 
1997-"' 
50 Inlen'iew \\ IIh Dr Suvil Yodmanee. Ihe Director and Representative of UNEP in Asia and Pacific 
region on 9 December, 1996. 
"" Thailand had been a victim of Singapore in Ihis regard. In April 1989 , the loxic acid generated from 
toxic wastes leaked from their containers kept al port warehouses. The toxic wastes had been imported 
from Singapore by Thai imponers immedialely beCore Ih ei r expiry dates. More importanlly , it was found 
from Ihe Invest iga lion conducted by the Thai authority Ihatlhe local imponers never claimed the goods. It 
was evidcnl Ih al Ihere was a conspiracy between the Singapore exporters and Thai local importers. For 
more delail, sec Kobchai Charoenvimolkul, 'Problemat ic Impasse for Thailand Relating to Marine 
Pollulion ', Thonnnasal LUll' JOllrnal, 1991 , al 221. 
61 Office of bl\'ironmellial Policy and Planning. A Hepar! 017 Environmental Qllalit1, Siwa/ion 1995- 1996, 
al ISS. 
" Narumol KanJ"napongse, 'Basel Convenlion: lnternalio nal Measu re on the COllirol of 'I ransboundalY 
Movemenl of Il a;ardous Waste', Thamllwsar La", Journal, 1991, at 209- 10. 
6 \ Office of 1'il\'ironmenlal Policy and Planning, al ISS . 
M Inlen le\\' WHh Ms \V<:tnna Tanullchaiwatana on 12 January 1998. 
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The Basel Convention h3s had a number of effects on Thailand. First, the Thai 
government has an obligation to enact necessa ry regulations and measures to apply to 
entrepreneurs whose businesses are related to chemicals and hazardous wastes. These 
measures include monitoring the entrepreneur's behaviour, and the imposition of 
punishment where necessary to ensure compliance."; In response, Thailand enacted the 
Hazardo lis SlibSIClI1CeS Acl in 1992, which was the same year that Thailand signed the 
Basel Convention. The treaty at the same time crea ted awareness among entrepreneurs 
whose buslllesses arc involved with chemicals as well as hazardous wastes that the 
safety agenda must be incorporated in their operation as a top priority despite an 
increase in ex pense. 
Enforcemcnt against businesses which conduct their operations in ways inconsi stent 
with the Convcntion obligations, is uueial to the Convention's success. While the 
empirical picture is unclear, there is at least some evidence of appropriate enfor-cement 
action on the part of the Thai govcrnment. In the Klity Mine water pollution case 
discussed in Chapter 3, the mine was shut down as a result of discharging lead-
contaminated water into the public stream M 
3. The Ullited Natiol1s Framework 011 Climate Chal1ge 
The third international agreement with crucia l environmental implicati ons (relating 
tangentially to air pollution, conventionally defined), is the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Scientific research has found that the incessant increase of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere is responsible for global wanning. To tackle this problem, 
UNEP in cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC) in 1988. After extensive 
research, IPCC concluded that the increase of greenhouse gases was precipitated by 
human activities, including emissions of carbon dioxide and deforestation 6 7 
In May 1992, many countries signed the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change; Thailand was one of them. Just one month later, 155 countries ratified 
65 Office of Environmental Policy and Planning. at 155 . 
6& Sec Chapter 3 for more details. 
67 Thailand Environment Institute, ExecHfiv(! Slimm{ll~r. The Pro/eet for national SIUlZl' (llld iIlVl'111011 ' on 
the ljllllJ1!i(I ' (~fgr(!('nhofls(! gas emissions \,'hich are 110t COl1!rol/ed unric:'1' A10ntreal Protocol, submitted 10 
the Office of 1-11\ ironmcntal Policy and PlannUlg. June 1997, at 1-5 
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the r-ramework Convention at UNCED held in Rio de .i,mairo. Thailand ratitiecl the 
treaty in December 1994.'" 
The ultimate objective of the treaty was that the parties shou ld limit their greenhouse 
gas emissions to a level where they would not cause hamlful effects to hum ans."'! 
[mportantl y, such a limit must be completed within the time frame stipulated under the 
treaty. The parties also have to make available the national inventory of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and remo vals by sinks or all greenhouse gases not controlled by 
th e Montrea[ Protocol. and communicate with the Conference of the Parties through the 
Secreta riat. 7<, 
However, it must be remembered that Thailand, along with other developing countries, 
has no commitment under the Framework Convention to reduce greenhouse gases, 
despite being a member of the Climate Change Convention. So far, no developing 
countries have been set any target for greenhouse gas reduction. They have justi fied 
their denial by pointing out that devel oped countries arc the main po[luters who have to 
take the lead in reducing the greenhouse gas, because they have been polluting the 
environment since the era of the Industrial Revolution two hundred years ago. 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change has been strengthened by several 
protocols held by the Conference of the Parties (COP) of which Thailand is a member. 
The protocol whi ch affects Thailand and other developing country members is the 
Berlin Mandate, which was adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention. 
It provided that the following protocols must not introduce new commitments to parties 
which arc developing countries." A question arises: why did Thailand enter into the 
Framework Convention whil e the country had no commitment to reduce greenhouse 
gases? During my fieldwork study, Ms Wanna Tanunehaiwatana, Chief of [ntemational 
Cooperation, Office of Environmenta[ Policy and Planning, an officer-in-charge who 
was involved in the negotiations on several environmental treaties, said: 
6S Ibid, al 5. 
(,9 See the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Al1icle 2 
70 Ibid. Article 12. I (a) 
" ThIS was re\ealed by Dr Supawil Piempongsan. the Inspector-General , Ministry of Science, 
T echnology and Environment, at the Conference 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC): The Solullon from COP-3 (Kyoto Protocol),. organised by the Office of 
Environlllental Policy and Planning. Ministry of SCience. Technology and Environment, on 2 FebnJ <:lI)1 
199R. 
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Although Thailand is not a ma in pol luter when cO l11pa red to lllany other countrics, wc 
have cntered into thc framcwork Convention on Clltnate Change because we rcal ise 
that this is a global issue in which global pal1icipation is requ ired ... The other reason 
why Thailand has becol11e a pany to the treaty is bccause being a pany enables us to 
becomc a member in thc 'Confercnce of the 1>;1I1ies' (COP). As a consequence, we ca n 
protect our benefits tlu'ough not on ly treat y but monitoring the framcwork Convent ion 
as one of the COP members as we i!." 
Despite having no responsibility to reduce greenhouse gases as di scussed above, 
Thailand is ncvcrtheless committed to producing an inventory of greenhouse gases not 
contro lled by the Montrcal Protocol, according to thc Framcwork Convcnti on on 
Climatc Changc." How does thi s commitmcnt contribute to an improvcmcnt of Thai 
cnvironmcnta l regu lation? Obviously, pmducing thc national invcntory of grcenhouse 
gases to the Conference of the Parties is a way Thailand has been mandated to reveal its 
levcl of grecnhouse gas emissions internati onally. In doing so, Thailand has to ensu re 
that it cnforccs relcvant laws so properl y that there arc continual impro vemcnts with 
respect to the amount of greenhouse gas cmi ssions. 
The national inventory itself can be ind ispensable in enabling Thailand to keep track of 
the detail s concerning the greenhouse gases it emits, such as the sources and amounts of 
emissions. Such infonnation wi ll help Thail and enforce environmental regu lati on more 
conveniently and eftectively. Simultaneously the Thai government has been 
encouraging the Thai to change their lifestyle towards better environmcntal practi ces. 
Examples in clude several projects such as energy savings; and a switch in the usc of 
fuel to natural gases." 
The above discussion shows that , as a party to the international agrecments on ozone 
depiction, hazardous wastes, and climate change, Thailand has so far rcsponded to the 
agreements positi vely at the domestic level. Examples include the fact that Thail and has 
enacted a regu lation mandating the newly produced appliances to be free from CFCs 
sincc 1998, whil e all the existing products using CFCs will be completcly superseded 
by non-CFC products by the year 20 I 0 as a response to the agreement rcgarding ozone 
dcpl cti on. 
72 The inlerview was conducted on 12 January 1998. 
7J Sce United Nations Framework Convention on C ilinate Change 1992. Artic le 4. See also. Thailand 
En vironment Ins litutc, at 3. 
74 Ib id , al 66 
0" 
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We also found that Thailand has been rcsponsivc to the Bascl Convention. As parti cs to 
thc agrccmcnt wcre required to enact the neccssary rcgulations and mcasures to 
implemcnt it at thc domcstic level , Thailand promptly enacted the regulations which are 
ITsponsivc and applicablc to such requiremcnt s in 199275 In addition to regulatory 
enactment, Thailand has also respondcd to the international agreement by means of 
enforcing such regulations domestically, as in the case of Klity Mine. 
Thailand's obligation to produce an inventory of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol is a subtle way in which Thailand has been bound undcr the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change to ensure both that Thailand genuinely 
fulfils its obligations, and that its level of greenhouse gas emissions improves 
constantly. The fact that Thailand has undertaken several projects such as a change in 
the use of fucl to natural gascs indicatcs its attempt to fulfIl its task of domcstic 
regulation. 
ilL The Role of International Institutions 
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, international soft law and international treati es 
are not the only intemational initiatives capable of influencing domestic environmental 
policy and regulation within Thailand. On the contrary, in the area of air and water 
pollution in pm1icular, other approaches can have a substantial effect on Thai domcstie 
regulation, or directly influence the environmental behaviour of Thai business. Some of 
these approaches have the potential to achieve far more than the existing treaties and 
soft law regimes w ith regard to issues of air and water pollution. 
Although some of such measures were not initially designed for the purpose of 
environmental stewardship, their operation can indirectly make environmental 
regulation work. Such measures can be found in the provisions of some international 
agreements involving international institutions. These inelude the agreement on 
financial assistance undertaken between international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the assistance-receiving 
75 lI owever, Tha iland ratilled the Basel Convention in 1997. 
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countries"' ; and the internatio nal trade agreements. 
A. Agl'ec lllcnt bctwccn thc VI/orld Bank and assista ncc-receivi ng countries 
Currentl y, the World Bank (hereafter the Bank) is influential in improving the 
envi ro nmenta l situat ion o f borrowing co untries." Ibrahi m Shi hata argues that the Bank 
in fac t took into accou nt "some" aspects of cnvironmenta l concerns in the project s it 
fi nanced as long ago as the 1950s." However, the Bank's interest in envirOIlmental 
issues only graduall y evol ved and lVas fir st f0ll11 al ly and clearly stated in a speech by 
Mr Robert McNamara, the Bank 's then president. whcn addressing thc United Na ti o ns 
Economics and Social Council in 1970. In that spccch he sa id: 
The probl em Cacing development finance insti tut ions. including the World Bank, is 
whether and how we can help the developing count ries to avoid or mitigate sOl11e of the 
damage economic development can do to the environment, without at the same timc 
slowing dO\\'i1 the pace of economic progress. It is clear that the costs resul ling from 
adverse environmental change can be tremendous. It is equally clea r that, in many 
cases, a sma ll investmcnt in prevention would be wOl1h many times over what would 
have to be expended later to repair the damage. In the Bank, therefore, we recently have 
establi shed a small unit to foresee, to the extent possible, the environmental 
consequences of development projects proposed to us for financing. Even more 
impol1ant , we want to work toward concepts that will enable us and other deve lopment 
fi nancing agenc ies to consider the environmental factors of development proj ects in 
some kind of cost-benefi t framework 79 
Notwithstanding this. and indeed later declarations of environmental commitment. 
many cnvironmcntal groups and others have been high ly critical of the bank 's actual 
cnviron m ental practices, which in their view, often invol ve support for large economi c 
76 It is widely beli eved that financial institutions have an inOucntial role to play in imposing cnvironmen l -
related instrume nts such as 'green loan' conditions, and e nvironm ent- related policies as part of fin anCIal 
agreements. Fo r more detail, see Charles Di Leva , ' lntcmational Environmental Law and Deve lopment' , 
Th c Georgetow/1 Inlenwlional Environmental Lmv Review, Vol. 10:50 I. at 50 I. 
n Caner Brando n and Ramesh Ramankutty, Toward an En vironmental Slralegl'/or Asia, 1993. a t 159-
61 
" Ibrahim Shihala, The 1I'0rid Bank ill a Changing World , 1993, al 137. Mr Shihata was V ice Pres ide nt 
and General Counsel o r the World Ba nk at Ihe lime or his wriling. 
79 Ibid . 
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dcvclopmcnts with sca nt rcgard to the advcrse cnvironmental consequcnccs. According 
to it s critics, the Bank usua ll y prioriti scs econom ic growth and therefore ignores thc 
env ironmcntal issucs 111 a number of development projects , especially those in 
developing countries. As a result , most of the projects suppol1ed by the Bank have 
caused adverse effects to the borrowing countries in one way or another, including the 
cnvironment. RII 
Thailand has received tinaneial assistance from the Bank since 1964 for its 
development projects. As in many other Bank projects in developing countries, the most 
recent project , Pak Moon Dam (the fifth major dam project in Thailand) , during three 
years has been the subject of nationwide protests from NGOs. They assel1 that the dam 
construction has brought about deforestation and local people's displacement 81 
FUlihermorc, Professor Saneh Chamarik. chairman of the Bangkok People's Forum, a 
leading environmental NGO, bluntly criticised the World Bank and IMF on the basis 
that "these agencies must stop thinking only about economic growth numbers because 
these numbcrs have destroyed people's li ves, as well as the environment,,82 
The quest ion that arises here is: if the World Bank has integrated environmental issues 
in its financing processes as it claims, then why has a Bank-suppOl1cd projcct like Pak 
Moon Dam caused such adverse effects on the environment? 
The answer is instructive, and critically important to future environmental strategy and 
policy-making. During my fieldwork interview, Dr Manida Unkulvasapaul, 
Environmental Specialist and Programming Officer of the World Bank, Thailand Office 
sa id: 
The l3ank's main objcctives are to help the poor in developing countries. However, a 
borrower of each project must provide a substantial proof that such project will not 
cause adverse effect s to the environmcnt. 
80 Bruce Ri ch. Mortgaging the Eor,h The World Bank. Environmentallmpoverishmenl, and the Crisis 0/ 
Developmenl. 1994.3172. 
'I Ibid. at 9. 
" Ibid. at 20. 
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Sincc 1990, our consideration on any loan app li cation has been based on sustaInable 
developmcnt. Wc always look at three main fi1ctors o r the project. namely: englnccring: 
economics: and environment (3 Es). These three Es must be wel l integrated and at the 
same time be a good balance between development and environment. We can be that 
se lective because we do not focu s on lend ing moncy in order to carn intcrest like 
cOlllmercial banks ... 11' it is found later that the borrower docs not comply with thc 
conditions agrced upon, we will suspcnd thc 10an ... At prcsent, the Thai governmcnt 
does not want a 103n from us. That is why we cannot have it follow our advice. What 
Thailand is recciving from us now is only technical assistance, not financial." 
Wh y did the Thai government not want to borrow money from the World Bank for the 
country's development projects? Although a formal answer is not available, it is 
apparent that the Thai government did not borrow from the Bank for fear th at it would 
have to "listen" to the Bank by considering environmental issues in its development 
projects. Thi s analysis supports the findin gs in Chapter 4 that the Thai govemment 
always gives preference to economic growth, rather than environmental protection. 
Thi s prioriti sing of economy over environment becomes even more pronounccd when 
thc economy of a developing country meets a crisis. The economy of many Asian 
countries' collapsed in 1997. In Thailand, the crisis was attributed to many causes. 
These include a large current account deficit, especially in the [oml of a great deal of 
foreign debt incurred by private sectors because of interest rates lower than those 
charged by Thai financial institutions; and approvals of loans by many Thai financial 
institutions without sufficient securities being provided by the borrowers. In the lattcr 
case, a great deal of money lent to the domesti c bon'owers, most of whom were property 
developers , derived from the money that the Thai financial fimls had bon-owed from 
overseas because of relativel y low interest84 In addition, the EconomiST economic 
Journal argues that the worst factor responsible for the cri sis is the fact that the va lue of 
the Thai baht was set daily by the central bank . It was pegged to the dollar at the 
approximate rate of 25 baht to I US dollar before the devaluation of the Thai baht. The 
devaluation brought tragic consequences because the country could not find enough 
I'n The interview look place 011 6 January 1997. 
X4 Narong Pctchprasen, ' Editorial notes', .Jot/nUll 0/ Political Ea)l1()I1/\", 1997, at 6-9. 
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weak Thai baht to buy the US dollars to pay the foreign debts. At one stage. the 
exchange rate was approximately 50 baht to I US dollar, in January 1995.x, 
The " 'orld Bank and its effect on Thailand's air and water pollution law 
For present purposes of environmental policy and regulation (broadly defined), the 
crucial question becomes: how can an economic crisis be tumed into an opportunity for 
environmental protection and refonn? Notwithstanding the financial crisis identified 
above, Thailand , a developing country, sti ll has many projects to undertake for it s 
national development. Given such a crisis, it is clear that foreign loans arc inevitable. As 
the World Bank now makes its loans conditional upon meeting specified environmental 
conditions, there is hope that the Bank 's loan will provide a good 0PPoliunity to achieve 
the goal of sustainab le development, as Thai politicians will have to 'listen' to the Bank 
regarding integration of environmental issues in the country's development projects 
financed by th e Bank. While the Bank has put the green policy into its loan conditions, 
the Thai government must ensure that environmental issues will be integrated into the 
projects for which it borrows money from the Bank. if it needs the development projects 
to continue in the future. 
But to what extent can the Bank be relied upon as a vehicle for environmental 
protection, given its earlier disappointing perform ance with regard to the environment? 
The encouraging answer is that in the 1990s there is some evidence of a genuine 
"greening" of World Bank policy, and of the environmental agenda being genuinely 
integrated in the development projects financed by the Bank. Increasingly, the Bank 
pays special attention to projects related to environmental issues such as in industry, 
agliculture, transport , and energy86 It takes into consideration the measures needed to 
avoid or at least mitigate environmental risks as much as possible and accordingly 
imposes these as obligations in the loan agreements with which the bOlTower must 
comply." 
S5 'The baht spill s over', The Ecol1omist, 24-30 May 1997 , al 81-2. 
86 The Vo.'orld Bangk, Greening Industry: NeH' Roles(or Communilies, }\IIarkefs. and Government , 2000, at 
14 8-50. 
87 Bruce Rich, at 14 8. An ea rl y (and poss ibly at that tim e atypical) example is the Botswana-S hashe 
project undertaken in 1971 Under the loan agreemcnt, the bOITower. the govemment of Botswana, was 
requ ired to take all action, including the enactment of pollution con trol legislat ion, to ensure that the 
mining project operations \\·ere not hallnful to public hca lth , as well as the environment. 
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However, while the usc of the Bank's green loan ha s considerable potential, particularly 
in cco nomic ci rcumstances in which Thailand is economically dependent upon such 
loans, it must be rcmembered that this is merel y 0 11 (' of various alternative measures to 
improve the effectiveness of the Thai environmental regulation. Other measures 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis, and particul arly in thc remainder of this chapter, still 
have ro les to play si multaneously. 
B. Agrccment betwecn the [MF and assistancc-receiving countdcs 
Unlikc the World Bank , lMF 's main objective is to render assistance to countrics 
suffering li'om balanee-of-payment problems, so they can stabilise economic criscs. It is 
not limited to financial assistance; it also providcs consultation, technical assistancc, 
and the developmcnt of standards for data disscmination. The consultation tasks have 
created rcsponsib ility for 1MF to oversee mcmber-country policies 88 
With respect to financial assistance, IMF 's policy is to provide a long-term solution 
rather than Just to give money to countries facing financial crisis. Therefore, thc IMF 
usually sets out many conditions to ensure that thc cconomy of the borrowing countries 
will improve in a sustainable way over time. The cond itions include the economic 
aspect of governance; financial institutional rcfom1 ; refonn of market mechanisms; 
banking laws; and regulation improvements.'9 
Good Governance: a vehicle for transpal'ency 
CUITently, the IMF is placing particular emphasis on the need for good governance. This 
can be secn in part icul ar in the Declaration of Partnership for Sustainable Growth 
adopted by the IMF's interim committee, whi ch is concerned with "promoting good 
governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of law, improving thc 
eftlciency and accountability ofthc public sector, and tackling con-uption,,90 
8R George KopilS and Jon Craig, TransparC!l1cy in Government Opermions. 1998 ) at II . 
89 IntcrnationallVlonetalY Fund. News Brief No. 97115, August 4,1997 
9{) Ibid. 
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What docs 'good governance' mean? Indeed, it s preci se meaning has not been defined 
by the 1M F or any other maj or inst itution in a fo 1111 a I way, though the World Bank 
detines the wo rd 'govemance ' as the manner in which power is exercised in the 
managem ent of a country's social and economic resources for development. '" 
Nevertheless, much guidance on the appropriat e interpretation of the teml can be gained 
from a 1995 paper approved by the Board of Directors of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) : COl'cn/allce: Sound Developmellt Mallagemellt. The paper spells out the 
commitment of ADB to assist developing countries in enhancing their capabilities in 
development. The paper described good governance as consisting of four basic 
clemcnts: accountability. transparency, prcdi ctabili ty, and public pm1ieipation9 ' 
It is apparent that the IMF has adopted thc good governance issue from ADB as one of 
its guidelines to improve the situation of member countries seeking financ ial 
assistance. '" Subsequently, the member countries, especially those in the developing 
world like Thailand which bonow money frolll the IMF, are usuall y required to 
implem ent the good govemance issue. The importance of thi s strategy is now widely 
recogni sed. Kofi Annan, the United Nati ons secretary-general, recentl y stated: 
There are global forces at play that we cannot control, so we must seek to conceive 
global mechanisms and structures to manage their effects ... ! believe that the challenge 
of good govelllanee is now a global challenge."' 
As we will see, the IMF's underl ying policies, including the insistence on good 
governance, havc a particular potential to improve the environmental situation of 
countries such as Thailand, where cOITUption is pcrvasive. 
The IMF's innuence in Thailand, or indeed other developing countries, is likely to be 
greatest in timcs of economic crisi s, such as Thailand has recently been experiencing. 
91 Shoji Nishimoto, 'The l3ank 's GoveIl1anee Poli cy', Opening Remarks, A record oflhe proceedings 0/ 
(he .'!eminfli" Oil Governa l1 ce: Promoting SOllnd Developm enf Management in Fukuoka, Japan 011 10 May 
1997, at 9. See also Anand Panyarachun, 'Good Govern ance and the Future of Thailand' , a keynote 
speech given on 25 March 1998, at the Facu lty of Po litica l Science, Chulalongkorn Universi ty, published 
in Malic"oll , 2(, March 1998; and Ibrahim Sh ihata, 'Democracy and Development', Inlernoliona/ 
COlllpal"ativf! Lmll Quarter!.,·, June 1997. at 640. 
'" Shoji Nishimoto. 'The l3ank 's Governance Policy', a t 9. 
<)1 Whil e ADl3 had approved a paper, 'Govemance: Sou nd Development Management,' introduc in g good 
goveillance and its four basic elements in August 1995, IMF adopted the issue of good governance in the 
Dec laration o f Partnership for Sustainab le Growth by its Interim Com mitte on 29 September 1996. For 
more deta il , SeC Shoji Nlshllnoto, at 9 and in tclllationa l Monetary Fund, at I 
')..\ Suchada Kulawa! , 'Securing globa l remcdies to a v.:orldwidc cu rse'. Bangkok POSl, 18 Dccember 1997. 
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As a result or thc crisis, thc country has rcccived assistancc from scveral sourccs, 
including thc IMF, to improve its ailing situation.'" Significantly, the loans thcmsc lves 
comc with a number of conditions with which Thai land must comply; these includ e the 
good governancc rcquircment. 
How does good governance help achicve the goal of rcgulatory success in Thailand? 
Recently, Mr Anand Panyarachun, former primc mini stcr, and tonner chai'l)erson of the 
Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) which wrote the CUITent constitution, advocated 
thc implemcntation of good governancc as nccessary for Thai society becausc its basic 
c1cmcnts, accountability. transparcncy, predictability, and public pal1icipation, meet th e 
needs of the country. particularly givcn its history of corruption and rel ated problems, 
describcd earl ier. 96 
Mr Anand al so cmphasiscd that thc concept of public participation, onc of good 
govcrnance's clem cnts, is in hannony with thc newl y-cn acted Thai Constitution which 
proposes public panic ipation as its main objective9 ' The new Constitution also 
recogniscs that unsophisticatcd political systems, poor govcll1ment administration, and 
most of all , cOITuption have increased constantly, and accordingly encompasses the 
issue of transparcncy. Examples include a provision allowing any individual to have 
acccss to information or public news wh ich is in the possession of govell1ment agencies , 
state enterprises or local govell1ment agencies98 
As regards the environmental issue in particular, the constitution also allows any person 
to obtain infonnation , explanation and reasons from the govell1ment agencies, statc 
entcqJli scs, or local government agencies before pennission is given for any project or 
activi ty which may harm environmental quality, health. or any important interest of that 
person, or local commun ity9" This issue is related to good governance which, as we 
have sccn, also has the conccpt of transparency as onc of its elements. 
0, Ibid. 
96 Mr Anand also ad vocates that good governance should be implemented in a broader way. He suggests 
three more el ements to added to th e four original clements: the availability of a legal sys tem which 
provides justice to both society and indi viduals; law implementors who are really just ; and an independent 
and responsible mass media. See Anand Pan yaraehun , 'Good Govemance and the Future of Thail and', a 
Keynote Speech, the NatiollS, 26 March 1998 for more details. 
97 Ibid . 
'!, See Thai Constitution 1997. Section 58. 
00 Ibid , Section 59. 
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To demonstriltc how th e implementation o f good governance fit s into Thailand's 
si tuati on lell" the purpose o f regul atory success (including, but not limited to , the area of 
enviro nment) , take th e corruption scandal in the Ministry of Publi c Hea lth . Recently, a 
number of doctors in rural areas rcvea led that many hospital s in the provi nces had been 
forced to buy medical supplies at highl y inflated prices."I(' The 'whi stleblowers' also 
allcged that Mr Rakkiat Sukthana, the then Health Mini ster, cancelled the standard 
prices of the medical suppli es in order to force state hospital s to buy drugs at the higher 
prices. As a ['esult of this ilTegularity, hundreds of doctors, as well as the public, 
demanded the res ignat ion of Mr Rakkiat , hi s two deputi es, and some sen ior official s 
in vo lved in th e scandal.")) A fi er the demand had been ignored, academ ics and NGOs 
both in I3angkok and many provinces Jointly sought signatures o r 50,000 eligible vo ters 
to meet the requirements stipulated in the constitution which could result in dismi ssal of 
a politician. The unprecedented public pressu re resulted in the resignation of Mr 
Rakkiat and hi s two deputies although NGOs had collected only about 30,000 
signatures at the tim e."" 
The above case may prompt the question: why is good governance necessary for 
Thail and ifits constitution already brings about regulatory success? Here it is necessary 
to note that the resignation of the politi cians did not stem from the constitution ; rather, it 
was the result of publi c pressure. Although the constitution allows for 50,000 voters to 
petition to oust a poli ti cian, the constitution itself cannot be effective for it serves as a 
broad legal framework . In fact, eleven impl ementing regul ations, including the one 
dealing with the corruption problem, are required to make the constitution work . It is 
however disappointing that although the implementing regulations regarding corruption 
had to be passed within two yea rs from 11 October 1997, which was the day the eUlTent 
const itution took effec t '"" little has been done to enact such a regulation at the time of 
\ \11i ti ng. 104 
The remarkabl e success in ous ting the all egedly eOlTupt politicians in the absence of 
applicable law suggests that public pal1icipati on, one of the good governance 's 
clements, is influential in translating laws in to action. Nevertheless, another question 
100 ' Hea lth/People's Pressure Mounts for Ousler of Mini sler', Bangkok Pas! , 12 September 1998 . 
101 'Corruption, Pressure Builds on Rakkiat' , Bangkok Pas!, 15 September 1998. 
IU) Su pawadec Susanpoolthong, 'NGOs hunt s ignatu re 10 oust Mr' , Bangkok Pas/. II OClobcr 1998. If" See the Thai Consll tution 1997, Sect ion 329. 
1()4 'Anand bares dislOl1ion in organic Jaws', The ' .... 'alion, 12 OClob(: r 1998 See also Supawadee 
Susa npoo ltil ong. 'NGOs cal l for passage oC new laws'. Bangkok POS!. 12 October 1998 . 
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arises: is good govemance still necessary after the implementing laws are passed? 
Significantly, it is a ronner prime minister, Mr Anand Panyaraehun, who strongly 
supports the concept of good govemance although he was directly involved in writing 
the current constitution as the chairperson of the Constitution Drafting Assembly 
(COAl. This is clear evidence that good governance is indispensable to Thailand despite 
the existence of the constitution, as far as regulatory success is concerned. Accordingly, 
a requirement for good governance which has been imported and mandated by an 
international obligation, and in I'espect of loans upon which Thailand is heavily reliant, 
can be expected to be particulady intluential on future Thai poli cy. 
Good Governa nce a nd its effect on T hai ail' and water pollution laws 
The role of tile IMF in environmental protection is potentially two-side. The danger is 
that the recent economic crisis will lead to environmental concerns being treated as less 
imp0l1ant. In such a situation. whcre desperation is increasing. economic survival may 
well be seen as more imp0l1ant than environmental protection. Accordingly, the signals 
which IMF sends to developing countries about the significance with which it treats 
issues such as good government and environment, as distinct from short tern1 economic 
improvement at any cost, will be crucially important in detel1l1ining whether it becomes 
an instrument for environmental protection or environmental destruction. 
So far, the signals have been far stronger in relation to economic policy than in relation 
to environment. As pm1 of [MF austerity measures, and as a condition of its loan, 
Thai land has been required to follow IMF's instructions regarding financial policy as a 
paJ1 of its overall program of structural adjustment. 105 These included cutting 
govcrnment spending considerably, as well as closure of 56 financial institutions which 
had lent money to their customers without sufficicnt collateral and then bccame 
overwhelmed with bad debts. Millions of people have lost their jobs as a result of the 
1M F's au sterity program. Thi s has inevitably caused enOl1l10US pressures on many 
Thai s. 
What kind of environmental degradation is a possible result of economic pressures? [n 
the past, Thailand established itself at tile forefront of Asian economic development at 
the expense of natural resources and the environment, as we found in early chapters. 
,,)< Ki woo, 'Vicw Points: Syslem Mclldown'I', The Nalioll, 17 August 1997. 
243 
With this precedent , it is likely that the environment may again be sacrificed for the 
bencllts of economic growth if the IMF 's austerity program is to be st rictl y compli ed 
with. In thi s case, IMF may unwittingly become a cause of environmental degradation if 
all regulations and measures designed to promote sustainable development are not 
properly implemented. 
On the other hand, thc focus of IMF on good governance may make a very positive 
contributi on to environmental protection. Good governance is essential to 
environmental regulation. As we found earlicr, lack of regulation was not the reason for 
the problem of environm ental regula tory failure in Th ailand. Rather, the problem occurs 
from a breakdown in implcmentation and enforccmcnt for a number of rcasons such as 
cOITuption and lack of political will. It is at the Icvcl of implementation and enforcement 
that good govcrnancc can make the great cst contribution to the improvement of 
cnvironmcntal regulation in Thailand. 
In thc case of thc Mac Moh scrubbcr purchasc discussed in Chapter 5, we found that 
environmcntal regul ation had been violated as a result of inefficient environmcntal 
protcction cquipment installed at the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT)'s plants. Wc also found that Mae Moh rcsidents alleged that itTegularities wcre 
involved in the purchase of such equipmcnt, since EGAT bought used cquipment from 
China. 106 
From thi s, and a number of other examples of implementation and enforcement failure 
cited in earlier chaptcrs, it is clear that if the conccpt of good governance is incorporated 
at every stage of environmental issues, including purchase of any equipment concerning 
environmental protcction by the agencies concerned, and monitoring and enforcement 
by regulators, then the chances of environmental regulatory failure will be much 
reduced. 
IMF has the potential to bring about improvements in environmental policy and the 
implementation of regu lations, even though it does not render loans for dcvelopment 
projects as docs the World Bank , because IMF always attaches conditions to financial 
ass istance; borrowing countries must strictly comply with these conditions in the 
process of improving their financial situation. The conditions with respect to good 
If)(, 'EGAT dellies fau lty components are used Items from China'. Ballgkok Post. 15 October 1998. 
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governance in particular, could if seriously applied, considerably mitigate some o f 
Thailand 's worst political problems. This in turn would facilitate far more success ful 
environmcntal initiativcs than in thc past. 
C. Intemational Trade Agreements 
Frcc tradc bctwccn nations is the fundamcntal principle underpinning a number of 
crucially important international trade agreements. Both the World Trade Organi zation 
(WTO) and the General Agreement on Trade and T3Iiffs (GATT) were establi shed in 
furtherance of this principle. GATT was set up to guarantee that trade between 
countries flow s without barriers. 11 17 Under thc GATT, the action required is international 
cooperation in the pursuit of trade liberali sati on."JS The WTO is responsibl e for 
ensuring that a commodity from one country can be expol1ed and sold on the domestic 
market of another country without facing unfair restriction, thereby ensuring that 
consumers can select the products at their prcference, regardless of the products ' 
country of origin. Many countries al so have bilateral or multilateral trade pacts at the 
regional level. These include thc North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA), 
the Caribbean Common Market (CAR ICOM) and the Mercado Commun del Sur 
(MERCOSUR) .'09 
Impol1antly, the principle of fair treatment which underlies the free trade regime 
includes measures concerning the way the raw material of the products was acquired, 
and how the products were manufactured , as well as effects stemming from the 
consumption of products. If any measure considered an impediment to free and fair 
trade has been appl ied to any product , it can cause a ban on the product from the 
impol1ing country as a sanction. Trade sanctions can be applied not only to maintain 
the frce trade flow , but also to ach ieve other goal s, which include protection of the 
environment and the fight against cOlTuption. 
"" Da vid Parks , 'GATT and lhe En vironmel1l: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies wilh En vironmental 
Prcservalion ' .. UClA Journal a/EnvironmenTall,o\\', 1996/97 , al 153-4. 
"" Danlcl C. [ Sly and Damien Geradin , ' Mark el Access, Compelili veness . and llallll onizalion: 
ln vlronmental Pro tecti on in Regional Trade Agreement s'. /larvard Em';ronmenlal Law Rel'ieH', at 265-6. 
III') IbId , al 266, 
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As indicated earlier. man-made activities can calise externalities, with the result that the 
full costs of production of a good or service arc not relleeted in its market price. "" As 
regard s internat ional trade, an externalities-related problem is that products 
manufactured under lax environmental regulation in one country (as a result of which 
thc environmenta l damage caused in their production is not reflected in the price) are 
sold in ano ther country where regulation is more stringent. Products can usuall y be 
manufactured more cheaply where there are lax environmental controls, giving these 
products an unfair competitive advantage ovcr products made in countries where 
environmental regulation is more stringent. In other words, countries tend to ga in a 
comparative advantage under a free trade regime if their domest ic environmental 
regulat ion is lax. III 
Thi s is unfa ir and likely to reward environmentally damaging products, and has caused 
serious concern, leading to the inclusion of provis ions for environmental protection in a 
number of international trade agreem ents sueh as WTO; and the NOIih Ameri can Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Under WTO, the environmental provi sion allows member 
countries to adopt any measures which th ey think necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant Ii fe or health or that related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. I " 
However, because there was a concern that sueh an environmental-related statement 
might be manipulated so as to serve as a di sguised restriction of the free trade regime, 
WTO specified that the word "necessary" stated earlier must not be interpreted so as to 
facilitate arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries. III 
Similarly in respect of NAFTA, a side agreement specifics that provisions rel ated to 
environmental protection are always to be written to ensure that a paJiy does not ga in 
advantage over other parties by less stringent environmental regulation. '1< Analytically, 
scho lars point out that the side agreement was designed for Mexico to upgrade its 
environmental standards in exchange for convenient access to the U.S. and Canad ian 
markets 'll . In other words, the U.S. and Canada would not sign the NAFTA w ithout the 
110 Kriangsak Killi chai saree, 'Using Trade Sactions and Subsidi es to Achieve Environmen tal Objectives 
in the Pacific Rim ', Colorado Journal of Infernaliolla/ Environmenwl Law and Polier, 1993, at 298. 
III David Parks. 'GA n and the Envi·ronment: Reconciling Liberal Trade Poli cie; with Environmental 
Prese rva ti on'. a t 171 . 
'" Ibid, at t 56-7; see also GAIT, arti cle XX . 
111 GA rr, article XX . 
114 Dia ne Pitts et at., ' Environmentat Provision of NAFTA: 111 Joseph J. Norton and Tho mas L. 
Bloodworth. cds, NIIFTII (lnd Bemnd, 1995. a t 472-3. 
liS John I3ralthwaite and Peter O;-ahos, Global Busi ness Regulation, forthcoming published, at 8. 
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side agreement i()r fear that Me.,ieo would have been able to sell its products at lower 
prices than those in their domestic markets because of its lower environmental costs. 
Thailand's experience in trade-related environmental cases 
Turning to the environmental impli cat ions for Thailand of international trade 
agreements , the country has so far been involved with two incidents concerning 
environmental issues under WTO. In th e lirst case, Thailand (itself a member of the 
WTO) banned the impol1ation of US cigarettes in 1989, on the grounds that cigarettes 
caused harmful effects to human health. The U.S. contended that while Thailand banned 
the cigarettes from the US, it did not ban the sa le of domestic cigarettes within the 
country. The GATT panel decided in favour of the US It justified its deci sion by 
arguing that Thailand did not perceive the health issue of cigarette smoking as impoliant 
because otherwise the country would not have allowed domestic cigarettes to be sold in 
its markel. '" Apparently, Thailand was seen by the panel as attempting to use 
environmental protection under WTO as a disguised trade restriction. 
In the second case, the U.S. government imposed a ban on more than Ii fty shrimp 
exporting countries, including Thailand . It claimed that shrimp fanning techniques in 
the banned countries were a threat to the dwindling sea turtle population. Such 
techniques were illegal under the U.S. law, the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA). "7 Thailand and three other Asian countries, Malaysia, Indi a, and Paki stan, 
brought the case to WTO, claiming that the U.S. government had rai sed the 
environmental issue in banning their exported shrimps as a disguised trade barrier. 
WTO subsequently made its decision in fa vour of Thai land and the three other 
countri es.'I> However, the case continued as the U.S. appealed to the WTO for its linal 
and binding deci sion. Most recently , the WTO panel has rejected the U.S. appeal 
against its earlier ruling that the U.S. erred in banning export shrimps merely because 
the exporting countries did not meet its requiremcnt to improve measures to protect the 
endangered sea-turtle. "9 
116 Chalchom Akapin. 'Thailand raised environlllcllIal issue 10 ban Ihe U.S. cigarellc import' , Journal of 
Stale AIIOIW'L 1994. See Kriangsak Killi cha isaree, al 304. 
117 'Thailand 10 I,y 10 gel US shrimp ban relaxed '. Bangkok Post, 2 1 June 1996. 
"' 'Thailand has won on sh rimp ballle ', Ballgkok POSI, t5 Ju ly 1998. 
119 \Vasant I ccha".:ongtham, '\Vhat's good enough for importers'. CommentalY, Bangkok POSl , In 
OClober t99R. 
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What do we learn from these two eases') It would be ullwi se to regard the results of the 
cascs as precedent s for international trade. However, at the very least, the two cases 
show that envi ronmcnt is constantly and increasingly interrelated to international trade. 
Significantly, despite the defeat in the second case above, some U.S. environmental 
gmups have threatened to push the American govelllment to ban impOlis fi·om countries 
where shrimp farm ing has destroyed mangrove forests. This threat shows that more 
innovative attempts will be made to usc trade sanctions as a way to deal with 
environmental issues. I f this attempt is successful. Thai shrimp expol1s will be banned 
because it has long been evident that shrimp fal1l1ing has destroyed much of the Thai 
mangrove forests. 120 Given that many indust rial businesses in Thailand arc expolied-
oriented, the relentless attempt to raise environmental issues as a cause of trade 
sanctions should prompt Thai exporters (and government authorities) to make greater 
efforts to ensure that expol1ed products are not harmful to the environment. 
ASEAN and ClIvil·onmentai protection 
At the regional level, Thailand is a standing member of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations, widely known as ASEAN. The objectives of ASEAN are manifold. 
These inc lude promotion of regional cooperation to accelerate economic growth. social 
progress and cultural development, peace and stabi lity, and free trade. I" In January 
1992, the meeting of ASEAN heads of government decided to establish the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFT A) within the next 15 years Ill, that is, by the year 2007. 
The specific issue of the environment was rai sed in the ASEAN Ministerial meeting on 
the Envi ronment held in Singapore in February 1992.'" The meeting adopted the 
Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development which spelled out many 
120 Ibid. See also, 'Environmental problem and shrimp falllllllg' , Charoen Pokphan NewslellN, January-
June 1992. In fact, sh rimp fanners have been trying to move their fanll locations from mangrove areas lO 
inland 10 avoid accusations Ihat they have destroyed th e mangroves. However, their attempls have been 
strongly oppo:-lcd by the government, which asserts that inland shrimp farming will cause env ironmental 
degradation where the farms are located, as weil as in thell" vicinity. See 'PM finn on shrimp fann ban' 
The Nations. 13 .July 1998. 
III ASF AN Secretariat. ASEAN StrategiC Plan of Action on Ihe Environmenl, 1994 , at 17. 
In Ibid , at 23. 
12.1 The organisational s truclure for ASEAN cooperation on the environment consists of the I-leads of 
Govemment, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeling on Ihe bwironment (AMME), the ASEAN Senior 
Officials on Ihe Environment (ASOEN), the six ASOEN Working Groups and the ASEAN Secrelarial. 
The Il eads o f GO\ emment of member countries are Ihe highest authority in the ASEAN structure. With 
regard to env ironmental issues. they provide poli cy and gU idance for the plans of ac tion to AMML and 
ASOEN. They meet fonnally every three years. 
248 
policies and strategies that each ASCAN meillber must pursue in order to improve 
regional cooperat ion for sustainable development. The policies the ASEAN Common 
stand on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)'" 
and the Agenda 21 programme area related to ASEAN. The meeting also adopted 
directions fo r environmental protection in relation to AFTA. '" It is evident that the 
meeting was not only aware of trade and environment issues, but also prepared to take 
action on them once AFTA came into effect. 
Ilow did ASEAN perceive the issue of environmental stewardship before the 
inauguration of A FTA? Would environm ental protection be on ASEAN's agenda in the 
absence of AFTA? In fact, the environmental issue is not new for ASEAN . 
Cooperation on the environment among ASEAN members began two decades ago. The 
ASEAN Sub-Regional Environmental Programme I (ASEP) was drafted with suppo t1 
from the United Nations Environment Programm e (UNEP) in 1977. To strengthen this 
task, the ASEAN Senior Officials on Environment (ASOEN) was established in 1989. 
The committee comprises high-ranking officials at the level of pellllanent secretary of 
each member country and acts as a working group to seek a common policy regarding 
environmental issues among ASEAN countries. 
When it was realised that goveillment officials alone had limitations in dealing with 
environmental issues. a regional committee at the mini stetial level was established in 
1990: the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Environment (AMME). Objectives of AMME 
AMME's task is to ensure that the decis ions of the I leads of Government relatin g to environment are 
ca!Tied out; it meets regularly every three years. ASOEN's fun ctions and responsibil iti es include 
recolllmending policy guidelines and providing impetus towards the implementation of the principles of 
sustainab le developmen t to ASEAN governments as well as relevant com mittees; and promoting ASEAN 
cooperation on reg ional environmen tal matters, focusing on ASEAN's C01111110n seas and resources. land 
resources and land-based pollution, tropical forest, air quality, urban and rural pollution. ASOEN meets 
once a year. 
The six ASOEN Working Groups are divided into the follow1l1g areas: seas and marine environ1l1ent; 
environmental economics ; nature conservation; cnvironmcntal management; transbolilldalY pollutIon; and 
environmental information, public awarencss and education. They meet annually. The ASEAN 
Secretariat was established for greater efficiency in coordinating the implementation of policies, proJcc ts 
and activities of the various J\SEAN bod ies. Issues of the environment comc under the purviev .. of the 
Functional Cooperation Bureau. one of the four bureaux under the ASEAN Secretariat's structural 
organ isation ( Ibid. at 17- 19). 
'24 According to the ASEAN common stand on UNCED. member cou ntries were ca lled on for various 
act ions, including adopting urgent measures to comba t climate change~ immediate implementatlon of the 
Montreal Protocol Interim Multilateral Fund, and protection of the ecosystems of oceans and seas from 
pollution (Ibid, at 24). 
,,, Dato' J\jit Singh, Secreta ry General o r ASEAN, Foreword, Ibid. 
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includc cfforts to cnhancc environmcntal managcment including formulation of an 
ASEAN stratcgy and action plan for sustai nabl c dcvclopmcnt. "6 
Currently, thc ASEAN Stratcgic Plan of Action on thc Environment is a documcntcd 
ccntrepiecc of coopcration among ASEAN mcmbers with respect to environmcntal 
issucs. Thc objcctives of the plan of action include to respond to spcci fic 
rccommendations of Agcnda 21 rcquiring priority action in ASEAN; to introducc policy 
mcasures and promote institutional devclopment that encourages thc integration of 
cnvironmcntal factors in all developmental processcs both at the national and regional 
levels: and to cstablish long-tellll goals on cnvironmental quality and work toward s 
halllloniscd environmental quality stand ards for the ASEAN region. 12' 
Impl emcntation of the action plan has begun and has progrcssed. AMME has so far sct 
up a number of expert groups to jointly so lve m8rine pollution, as well as air pollution 
stemming from bushtjres in Indonesia. '" As AMME is a committee at thc mini stcrial 
level, I intervicwed Mr Pornthep Teiehapaiboon, Dcputy Minister of Scicncc, 
Technology and Environment, to obtain first-hand infOlmation with regard to 
cooperation undcr AMME. He emphasiscd the level of cooperation in infoIlllation 
sharing, the impoliance of the internct centre at Kalimantan, Indonesia, and thc dcgrce 
of mutual cooperation and assistance, as exemplifjed by the response to the Indoncsian 
bush fires in 1997.' 19 
As the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment has created a serics of 
obligations on signatories to the agreemcnt, improvement is expected in the 
environmental s ituation at domestic level of all member countries, including Thailand. 
In Thailand in paliieular, regional cooperation under the action plan will help tackle 
somc of the causcs of envirorullental regulato ry failure, including lack of political will. 
The obligations undcr this international agrecmcnt creatc pressure for Thailand not only 
126 Ibid. In fa ct, ASOEN and AMME are in separable in dealing with envirOlmlenlal problems in the 
region. Allhough the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment was initiated by AMME, it 
was agreed to by ASOEN in ilS fifth meeting during 20-22 April 1994 and by AMME during 25-26 
April 1994 wilh supports provided by UNEP and ESCAAT. 
'" ASEAN secretariat , at 2. 
128 Interviev.,1 wilh M s \Vanna Tanumchaiwatana on 16 January 1998 .. 
!2() The interview was conducted on 12 March 1998. 
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inc lud c environillental protection in its national poli cy, but also to implcmcnt such 
policy domestical ly. and in ways whi ch relate directl y to issues of corruption and 
political will. 
Combating corruption in international tradc : a promising strategy to address 
environmcntal problems in Thailand 
As shown in Chapter 5. corruption has become a global problem. In international trade, 
transnati ona l bribery gives the bribe-payer an unfair competitive advantage over 
others. "" Thi s is espccia ll y the case when eXJlorting or contracting companics in 
developed countries arc awarded major contracts in exchange for bribing the senior 
decision-makers.'11 ror example, there arc many allegations that American companies 
or their loca l representatives have been in vo lved in bribery in forei gn markets. I " 
Undoubted ly, thi s phenomenon is conducive to regul ato ry failure. which in turn , results 
in unfairness within the free trade regime. 
[n rcsponse to a long history of transnational bribery the U.S. government enacted the 
Foreign Cormpt Practice Act (FCPA) in 1977; the legislation was later amended in 
1988. It was principall y designed to criminalise transnational blibery comm itted by 
American c itizens or residents. III However, because the U.S. relies heavily on 
international cooperation in fighting transnational blibery, since the problem of 
corruption must be addressed at the international level ,'34 it has also become a member 
of the Organi zation of American States (OA S), a treaty which consists of over thiliy 
countries in NOlih and South America, each committed under the treaty to criminali sing 
blibery of foreign officiaIs. 1l5 Although both legal instruments are applicable to deal 
with American citizens or residents who are involved in transnational bribery, the OAS 
treaty contemplates coordination from forei gn countries while the FCPA does not. 
1\0 Philip M. Nichols, 'Co rruption in the World Tradc Organizalion: Discemmg the Limits of thc World 
Trade O rgan iza ti on's Authority', Nell' York JOllmal of Intemational LOll ' and Politics. 1996, at 757 -60. 
111 Hen ry Bosh, 'Growing threat o f intcmatio nal cOJ'Jllption', The Jarkata Post , 30 September 1997. 
'" See 1'01' example ' Ramos Orders Probe into GovcJl1ment Computer Deal' , Japan Economics 
News letter. 17 May 1996, ci ted in Steven R. Salbu , 'Bribery in Globa l Market: A Critica l Analysis of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practice Ac t' , H'ashington&Lee Lml' Rel'ieH ", 1997, at 232. 
1.\.\ Philip M . Nichols, 'CoJ'Jllpti on in the World Trade Organization: Di sceJl1ing the Limits of the World 
Trade Organization 's Au thori ty', at 762. 
1\4 Daniel Kadlac, 'Corruption' The Facts'. Foreign Polin, 1997. at 114. 
m Philip ~ t. Nicho ls at. 763-4. 
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What particular forms of inteillational action arc likcly to be most appropriate and 
effective. particularl y in addressing thc problem of cOITuption in rcgard to the 
cnvironmcnt? It sccms clear that intcrnational trade and transnational bribcry are 
inscparable; accordingly, Philip Nichols advocatcs that thc World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which is thc most extensive intcrnational trade body, should encompass the 
corruption issuc within its jurisdiction. In so doing, hc suggests that WTO should urgc 
its mcmbcr countries to adopt either the Foreigll Corrupt Practice Act or thc Trcaty of 
the Organization of Amcrican States as guidelincs towards cradicating the problcm of 
corrupti on, particularly transnational bribery. 1\6 
Thc idca of intcgrating the corruption issuc within WTO is not new. According to 
Stcven Salbu. WTO has planned to cmbark on ncgotiation with regard to the issues of 
transparency, openness, and due process in govcrnment procurement practiccs among 
WTO mcmbcrs'''. This could readily bc applicd to thc particular area of environmcnt, 
for examplc, air and waler. Unfoliunately at thc time of writing, the plan remains in 
draft form and is not publicly available. Nevclih c\css. it is clear that through it , thc 
corruption issuc will be incorporated in the WTO agcnda in the future. 
Corruption has al so been thc subject of reccnt di scussion among OECD countrics; a 
convention on the subj ect took place in early 1998. Twenty-nine representatives of 
OECD countries and fivc others attended the convention which agreed that bribing any 
foreign official should be treated as a crime, rathcr than as business as usual. 138 Thc 
implementation of the convention will require the thirty-four signatories to adopt the 
provisions of the convention in their domestic laws l39 with enforcement provisions 
including criminal prosecution and thc imposition of heavy pcnalties on both 
corporations and individuals guilty of a violation. 
"6 Ib id, at 759. 
m Steven R. Salbu, 'Bribcry in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign CUlTent COiTUpt 
Prac tice Act', at 235. 
'" Michae l I lershma n, 'A blow against bribery ', The Financial Times (US Edition) , 23 FebIUary 1998, 
al 14. See a lso Suchada Kulawa t, 'Securing global remedies to a worldwide curse', Bangkok 1'0.11 , 18 
Decembcr 1997. 
119 Stephen Silber. QC, 'New defi nitions 10 root out cOiTUption'. The Tillles. 3 March 1998. 
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Comhating corruption in international trade: its effect on Thai air and wate.· 
pollution law 
Considering its status as a member of WTO, as well as its usual responsiveness to 
internationa l cooperation as previously di scussed, it is likely that the Thai government 
will be willing to criminali se transnational bribery if pressure to do so is imposed under 
the international trade regime. As for OECD, it may be argued that as Thailand is not a 
member, the OEC D initi atives will have less direct effect on Thailand. 
However, Thailand depend s heavi ly on international trade, including trade with OECD 
countries. Thus, Tha il and has to ensure that there is no cOiTUption invo lved in its trade 
with the countries bound by the OECD convention. As Chapter 5 has shown, cOITupti on 
is one of the fa cto rs leading to regulatory failure in the environmental area. 140 It can be 
anticipated that such an OECD-supported convention will bring about more compliance 
with environmental regulation in Thail and because of the heavy dependence on 
international trade. 
External pressure on Thailand through the WTO could in the future become an 
important too l of environmental policy, providing one means of penal ising corruption 
and reducing opportunities for corrupt enterprises to ignore their environmental 
obligations. Once criminalisation of corruption becomes an international obligation with 
which Thailand has to comply, it will ensure that the free trade policy will not be 
undermined by transnational corruption in which Thai authorities or private sectors are 
involved. Such an obligation will create pressure for the Thai authorities to impl ement 
the law in a transparent manner to maintain its credibility among the global community. 
This can help address the problem of lack of politi cal will and eon"Uption whi ch are 
conducive to environmental degradation. 
140 Exam ples are the Mab Ta Ph ut and Mac Moh a ir po llutio n cases discussed in Chapter 5. 
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D. International Organization for Standal'disation (ISO) 
History and context 
As discussed above, the environment has come to be regarded as an important 
component of a trade regime, and therefore is included in a number of internation al 
trade agreements. However, although the inclusion of environmental provi sions in 
international treaties can make an important contribution to environmental protecti on at 
thc national level. it is far from being a complete so lution . On the contrary, although 
international treaties create obligations among state parties, the discuss ion in Chapter 4 
demonstrates that the government alone (parti cul arly in developing or newly developed 
countries) is not t'e liabl e in implementing and enforcing environmental regul ations. 
As policy-makers increasingly recognise the limits of govelllmcnt-dependent st rategies 
(including command and control regulation) , they have begun to search for other 
mech ani sms to complement or supplement government effOlis. In paliicular, increasing 
attent ion is being given to means of protecting the environment by paliies other than 
government, including business itself. Business is now being targeted not only as one of 
the main causes of pollution and environmental degradation '4I, but also as the paliy best 
able to find a solution. Agenda 21 in particular places great emphasis on the 
constructive contribution of business to pollution prevention and control , and urges 
business and indu stry to take much greater responsibility in helping solve the 
environmental problems they cause .'" 
What roles can business and industry play in helping protect the envirorullent, and what 
mechani sms and stra tegies are most suited to enable them to play these rol es? As the 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) stated during the 1992 UNCED 
in Rio de Janeiro: ' business and industry need tools to help measure environmental 
performance and develop environmental management techniques,.t43 One such too l of 
paramount potential and impol1ance is environmental management systems (EMS). 
Such systems provide a structure for planning, implementation, reviewing and revising 
'41 Rob in l1idwe lJ , 'Bus iness and the Environment: A Changing Agenda', TEl Quarlcrll' Envirollll1clII 
journ"l, 1995. at 28-9. 
'" See Agenda 21. 
'41 Bruce Kca n Am, ' ISO 14000 Regulatio n. Trade and EnVIronment 'Dangers and Weaknesses," a 
paper prcsented in thc co nference ISO 14000: Regu lation, Trade and En virOlUllcnt, organised by 
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a program to address those pal1 s of an enterprise's operations that can affect the 
cnvironment. A good EMS allows an entcrpri se to understand and track its 
cnvironmental performance and providcs a framework for implcmenting improvements. 
I f successfu l, an EMS \Viii both enhancc and continuously improve compliancc with 
environmental la\Vs and also the broadcr company policies relating to the environment 
and environmental outcomes. 
Such systems have been developed in an ad hoc fashion since the early 1990s. There 
were various moves towards standardisation at national and regional level , the most 
impol1ant being the British Standard BS7750, and the European Eco-Management and 
Audit Schemc, EMAS. In rcsponsc to the BCSD's demand described above, and as a 
means of providing a truly international standard {or EMS, the International 
Organisation lor Standardisation (ISO) \Vas urged to develop what subscquently became 
the ISO 14000 scries of standards. Its mission was 
to produce an international standard which would pro\·ide a common (global) approach 
to environmental management and the measurement of environmental perf0l111anCe, 
thereby facilitating intcrnational trade and reducing the costs of enterprises operating 
globally. In so doing. it offered companies a standardised approach to better 
envirol1l11entalmanagement, and in turn, to better environmental performance.144 
Why was ISO asked to take on this mission? Before answering this question, it is 
necessary to explorc the background of the International Standards Organisation itsel f. 
Based in Geneva, Switzcrland, the ISO was founded in 1947 to facilitate the exchange 
of goods and serviccs through standardisation. '45 While ISO is a non-governmental 
organ isation (NGO), it holds such a high reputation that the standards issued by the 
Organisation have become intemationally acccptable. Also, although membership of 
ISO is voluntary, the organisation is recognised and respected throughout the world. At 
Australian Cenlre [or Environmental Law-Australian National University. on 2 July 1996 in CanbclTa, at 
I . 
144 Neil Gunningham and Daren Sinclair, 'Environmental Management Systems, Regulation and the Pulp 
and Paper Industry: ISO 14000 in Practice'. Environll/ental and Planning Lall' Journal, Vol. 16. No. I. 
FcbrualY 1999, at 5-23. 
I I ; David Nelson and Todd Maidcn, The III/plications alld ej!ect.1 of the ISO 14000 [nternational 
F:I/\ ',"ronmclIlOl Slane/ard ollnrilfslries in Thailand, 1995, at 5. 
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present, over 100 countrics have bccome members of this pri vatc organisation ""; these 
inc lude Thail and. 
ISO dea ls lIith a number of sets of standards. In 1987, it published ISO 9000, the 
standard which dealt with product quality. Not surprisingly, the ultimate goal of the 
standard was to facilitate international trade. I" ISO 9000 gained popularity very 
quickly. One of many factors enhancing its popularity was that the standards were 
applicable to a wide range of industries and services. Certification to the ISO 9000 
series has become a prerequisite for doing business in many parts of the world. I" 
The success of ISO 9000 encouraged the intelllational community to entrust to ISO the 
issue of an international cnvironmental standard to respond to Agenda 21 's exhortation 
to business to take responsib ility for improving its own environmental perfoIll1ancc. l40 
In so doing. thc ISO formcd the Strategic Advisory Group on the Environment (SAGE) 
to determine the nced for standardisation of environmental management practices to 
promote sustainable industrial development. SAGE in its first meeting in September 
1991 established seven subgroups to address the issue. They are environmental 
management systems; environmental auditing; labelling; standards for environmental 
perfoll11anee evaluation ; life cycle analysis; environmental aspects in product standards ; 
and industry mobili sation planning. I'o 
Of central importance was the development of an environmental management system, 
and SAGE stressed this issue in its October 1992 meeting. It recommended that ISO 
should establish a Technical Committee to deal specifically with the ncw standards for 
cnvironmental management systems. Accordingly, ISO fonned the Technical 
Committee 207 (widely known as TC 207) in June 1993 to carryon the responsibility of 
developing the unifonn international standards which now have become known as ISO 
14(, Ibid . 
147 Naomi Roht-AITia za, 'Shifting the Point of Regulation: The Intell1ational Organization for 
Standardization and Global I"awmaking on Trade and the Environment', Ecoiogl' Law Qllorlniy, Vol. 22, 
No.3, at 499. 
14S David Nelson and rodd Maiden. The implications and effects of t/w ISO 14000 Internationai 
EI1ViroI1I11CIl/(f/ Slal1dard of Indllstries in Thailalld, at 6. 
140 Apparently, environmental issues had drawn interest from ISO even before ISO 14000 was fomlally 
introduced. As Naomi Ro ht-AITiaza points out, while the explicit goal of ISO 9000 was to harmonise 
quality assurance requirements to facilitate international trade, several provisions thereof directed the way 
lowards more specific environmental management standards. See Naomi Roht-AlTiaza , at 499. 
150 Naomi Roht-Arri aza, 'Shifting the Point of Regulation : The intem3liona i Organization for 
Standardization and Global La\\'making on Trade and the Environment'at 502. 
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14000.' '1 TC 207 has been divided into a numbcr of subcommittees. These includc 
Subcommittce I. the task of which has been to dcvclop thc cnvironmcntal managcmcnt 
system containcd in ISO 14001 and ISO 14004.'" Subseq uently, [SO issued [SO 14001 
and ISO 14004 in Scptcmber [996. 15' This chaptcr focuscs on [SO 1400 I, which deals 
with thc speei lication of the environmcntal management system. For present purposes, 
ISO 14004, which serves as a supplement to ISO 14001 by providing guidance on how 
an EMS should be implemented, is oflcss importance.,s4 
[SO 14001 and its functions 
[SO 14001 is i:I private vo luntary standard that providcs a framcwork to ass ist 
organisations In identifying and managing thci r environmcntal obligations 
systcmatically. It aims at directing the usc of organisational resources to yicld thc most 
benign cnvironmental effccts through reliable management processes, along with wcll 
educatcd employces who are committed to environmental improvcments by their 
organisation. 155 ISO 1400 I does not require fillllS to mect any performance 
spccifications such as spccific limits on pollution cmissions. Rather, it attcmpts to ass ist 
firms to dcvclop their own EMS within their busi ncss operations on a voluntary basis 
and thus is proccss-based. "6 Joseph Cascio, Chair of the U.S. Technical Advisory 
Group to ISO Tcchnical Committee 207 said: 
ISO 14000 isn't about compliance, it's about management.lt will make no statemcnt 
regarding what is desirable for the environment. Neither will it layout environmental 
goa ls, perfollllancc levels or technology specifications. lS ) 
IS' Christina C. Benson, 'ISO 14000 Environmental S13ndards'. NC.J. Jnl'i L. & COlli. Reg., Vol. 22, 
1996. at 318. 
"2 Ibid, at 319. 
IS] Donald A. Call' and William L. Thomas , 'Devising a Compliance Strategy under the ISO 14000 
Intclllational Environmental Management Standards', Pace EI1I!lronmenral Law RevieH', Vol. I S, No.1, 
Winter 1997, note 149 at 147. 
154 Prima Wan g\Vongwiroj. ISO 14000: El7virol1l11 enwl Management Standard, an infonnation paper, 
1997.at 10- 12. 
IS' Christophe, L. 13ell , 'Bench Test', The Environmental FOntlll, NovemberfDecember 1997, at 26. Sec 
also Joseph Casc io, ' Im plications of ISO 14001 for Regulatory Compliance', Na/ional EI7\ 'l ronlllenral 
En(orcemen/ Journal, June 1996, at 35-6. 
1S6 Dona ld /\. Carr and William L. Thomas, at 151. 
IS' G. lI ouse (1995). ' Raising the Green Standard'. Industry Week, cited in Neil Gunningham. 'From 
Adversarialislll to Partnership" ISO 14000 and Regu lation,' a paper delivered at the conference, ISO 
14000: Regu lation. I rade and Environment , 2 July 1996, Canberra 
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Indeed , the fact that ISO 14001 lacks performance specificati ons was controversial at 
the initial stage. Not surprisingly, many countries wanted ISO to adopt intcmational 
perfomlanee standards in order to ensure fair trade among various nations. They argued 
that as far as fair trade was concerned, it mu st be developing countries' responsibility to 
achieve standards the same as those used by their trading partners in developed 
co untries. Apart li·om the international trade area, environmentalists were also 
concem ed about how effective ISO 14000 could be in the absence of environmental 
performance speci fications 15S 
On the other hand , many scholars suggest that hav ing a single set of internationally 
recognised perform ance standards would inevitably create burdens for developing 
countri es whose environ111 enta l compliance standards were less sophisticated than those 
ofdeveloped countries' ''. Besides, such relati vely high standards could be seen from the 
developing countries' perspective as a trade barrier contrary to the philosophy ofWTO. 
After a series of gruelling debates, ISO in sisted that perfonnance specifi cations be 
omitted from thc new standards. It justified its decision on the basis that a "one fits all" 
performance standal·d would be inconsistent with WTO requirements, the ultim ate goal 
of which is to enhance free trade.'60 Also, ISO realised that there was inadequate 
participation by many developing countries in the standard-negotiation process: for 
example at the pl enary session of the TC 207 committee meeting only six out of twenty-
six delegations were from developing eountries.' 61 Such a small participation posed a 
eoncem that the developing countries would be unwilling to abide by standards, wh ich 
they did not fully participate in making. Thi s became another reason for ISO to omit the 
proposal of perfollllanee speei fieations. 
Since the introduction of ISO 1400 I in late 1996, there has been a steady, and in some 
countries, rapidl y growing, interest in obtaining certification under it. Up to January 
1998, approximately 2,800 organisations throughout the world have been awarded ISO 
1400 I certi fications.' 62 In creas ingly, having an [SO 1400 I certificate is considered an 
important factor in the conduct of business in both domestic and international 
'SS ChriSiina C. Benso n . ' ISO 14000 Environmental Standards' , at 320. 
1S9 Ibid . 
'60 Ibid. 
10' These six counlries were Brazil , China, Korea , Malaysia , South Africa , and Thailand. For more detail , 
sce Naomi Roht-Aniaza. at 526 
'62 Chrislorher Bell. ·Bench resl',The EI1I'Ir(J/1/1lellwi Fort/Illat. November December, 1997, a124. 
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transactions. Why is ISO 14001 so essential that busincss entrepreneurs arc increasingly 
seek ing eel1ifi eatio n under it') What will happen if they do not') 
As discussed earlier, adoption of ISO 1400 I is not mandatory. However, any businesses 
which do not adopt th e standard may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage.'6' 
Thi s is especially the case for developing countries whose economy depends heavily on 
expolis. At present, many multinational corporations such as Matsushita, Sony, Canon, 
Shell , Esso, and Motorola arc moving towards adoption of ISO 1400 I. Al so, some 
multinational companies slich as IBM are contcmplating giving priority (in awarding 
contracts) to Sllppliers who have received ISO 14001 eCl1ificates. 
for these reason s an increasing number of finn s are seeking ISO 14001 celiificates as 
they view celii fication as a means of gaining competitiveness not only within a 
particular country, but among foreign countries as well. Indeed, Christina Benson 
suggests that an lSOl4001 certificate will become a 'global passport' for doing business 
internationally. '''' 
Owing to their expon-based economies, a number of countries in Asia have responded 
positively to ISO 14001. 165 Recently , the government of China, one of the most 
polluted countries in the region, has required all government agencies to seek ISO 
14001 registrat ion . 1(,0 Other expOli-oriented countries such as Malaysia and South Korea 
have also taken steps towards ISO 14001 eertification. '01 Adoption of ISO 14001 in Asia 
is not only limited to developing countries. Japan, a developed country, has also shown 
considerable interest in thi s international standard. A survey conducted in 1996 by 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. a multi-industry trade association, reveals that half of Japancse 
compan ies have contemplated registering with ISO 14001. '68 
1(,1 See Subhash Puri. Slepping "I' 10 ISO 14000, 1996 , al 22 . 
'64 Christina Benson" ' ISO 14000 En vironmental Standards', at 341. 
165 The World Bank, Greening Indusuy New Roles for Communiti es, Markets, and Govell1ments, 2000, 
at 90. 
166 Carl frankel, a t 24 . 
161 Christina Benson. ' ISO 14000 En vironmental Standards', at 362 . See also Robere & Assoc iates, 
' Introduction to ISO 14000 Environmental Management System.' a paper presented to the Industrial 
Estate Authorit y of Thailand . 
168 1b,d . 
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ISO 14001 in Thailand 
ISO 14001 was not the Ilrst experience Thailand has had with environmental 
management systems The country had previous experience of such systems through 
several projects including the Ind ustria l Environmental Management Program (IEM), 
supp0I1ed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) duri ng 
1990-1995. Thi s project was implemented by the Federation of Thai Indu stries, with the 
principal obj ecti ve of increas ing the institut ional capacity of indust ri es in environmental 
management. Activ iti es under this project emphasised the promotion of cleaner 
tcchnology, bctter housekeeping practi ces, and better resource utili sati on. '69 
Another project aimcd at promoting environmental management which is still 
cont inuing at the time of writing is the Environmental Advisory Ass istance for the 
Industry: Thai -Gellllan Technical Co-operation Programme. This project receives 
financial support from Deutsche Gcse ll schaft fur Techni sche Zusamillenarbeit (GTZ), 
while the impl ementing agency is the Bu reau of Industri al cnvironmental Technology, 
Department of Industtial Works. The duration of the proj ect is from 1994 to 200 I. The 
project focu ses on demonst ration and evaluation of cleaner production methods. "u 
Most recently, Thailand received financial support from the Danish Cooperation for 
Environment and Development (DANCED) to conduct the Project on Promotion of 
C leaner Technology in Thai Industry during 1996- 1998 . Implementing agencies of thi s 
project are the Federation of Thai Industries and Thailand Environmenta l Management. 
Target groups of the project are the small and mediulll tinns which are major 
polluters. '71 In the interview with Ms Peerapolll Pal ap leewan no ted earlier, this 
infOllllant also pointed out that: 
The philosophy of the proj ect is absolutely opposite to the command and control 
strategy. At the outset the project is voluntary performance. Further, it focuses on how 
16') Thailand Environmenllnsl ilule, Cleaner Techno/ag.· in Thai/and. 1997. a14. 
"" Ibid, a18 . 
'" Ibid , al 14. 
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to prc\'ent pollution by means of managcment. Thc proJcct looks at thc rccl'uitment of 
personnel involved in the entire manufacturing process; the use of raw material , 
machinery, etc ... We have convinced thc participating Ilnns that the most efficient 
output is the rea l prollts. 
The project docs not need high cost. Instead, it looks at management of the finns, which 
in fact means behaviour of people responsible for managing the firms ... Aftcr join ing the 
project, around 90 pCI' cent of Ilrills in the pilot phasc havc morc understanding in the 
concept of c1cancr technology and recognise that thc tcchnology can playa key role in 
helping the Ilnns dcal with environ mental problem without impcding the fimls ' 
growth. 
In these circumstances of a number of ongoing experiments with ell vironmental 
management systems in Thailand , it was perhaps to be expected that the introduction of 
ISO 1400 I would be both readily recogn ised and welcomed within both industry and 
government in Thailand. This is indeed the case, with both pl'ivate and public sectors in 
Thailand giving very considerable attention to ISO 1400 1 and the number of ISO 
cert i fied enterprises increasing steadil y. 
Th ailand adopted ISO 14000 in December 1996, only three months after the 
international standard had come into operation, '" Indeed , Thailand's attenti on to thi s 
series of international standards had been manifest even before ISO 14000 was issued, 
As long ago as May 1994, the Thai government sent its delegations to attend the 
meeting of the plenary session of the TC 207 committee held in Australia. Notably, 
Thailand was one among six non-OECD countries which attended the meeting, while 
the other twenty pal1icipants came from OECD countries. III Although ISO is itself a 
non-governmental organisat ion, the entity which represents Thailand in thi s regard is 
the Thai Industrial Standard Institute (TIS!) , a government agency under direct 
supervision of the Mini stry of Industry,'74 This is another indicati on of Thailand's 
government interest in this issue, 
'" Ibid . 
17\ Naomi Roth-An'iaza, 'Shifting the Po int o f Regulation : The Inte rnatio nal Organization for 
Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment ', at 526. 
174 David Nelson and Todd Maiden, Th e IlI1pl;ca l;ons and eifecis of Ihr ISO 14()()() Inlernal;Ol7ol 
El1vironmeJ1tal Slandard (~( ll1dlls lri('s in Thai/and. a t 32 . 
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Thailand was also early in developing appropriate accreditation sys tems for the 
purposes of ISO 1400 I. It is, of eomse, industria l lirms themselves which have to 
develop their own management systems and then apply for ISO 14000 certification. But 
who is authori sed to grant certification ') As to domesti c agencies, TI S I and Thailand 
En vironment Institute (TEl) have been empowered to eertity under ISO 14001 whi le 
some foreign firm s arc also invol ved. 1l; or course, the certificate issuers themselves 
mu st have approved qualifications and performance aeercditation. To achieve this , the 
Thai goveITlment set up the National Accreditation Counci l (NAC) as a ncutra l bod y to 
carry ou t thc accreditation tasks. The NAC compri ses a number of hi gh pro fil e persons 
who are involved in environmcntal issues, chaired by thc Mini ster of Industry.l76 Thi s 
rcn ects Thailand 's attcmpt to cnsul"C that the certification process under ISO 14000 is a 
reli ab le one. 
ISO 14000 gained favour with some major businesses in Thailand not long after its 
debut. Records show that local firm s havc an incrcasi ng interest in ISO 1400 1 with the 
number of industrial businesses adopting the standards cont inuing to grow substantia lly. 
To date, there have been approximately 45 fiITll S awarded ISO 14001 eeliification, most 
of thesc being large fil1l1 S which, far more than small and medium fiITll s, can afford the 
substantial immediate costs of devcloping a management system and obtaining 
certifi cation . Other registrations are immincnt. Moreover, as we have seen, a number of 
pi lot projects introducing environmental management systems have been launched, and 
the Thai government has itself embraced ISO 14001. 
Why have a signi ficant nlllnber of large players already adopted [SO 1400 I and why is 
thi s number steadil y increasing? And how do we assess the potential contribution of 
ISO 1400 I more genera ll y? There arc many debates concerning the advantages and 
di sadvantages of adopting and implementing ISO 1400 I. Howevcr, as thi s thesi s 
focuscs on air and watcr pollution , di scuss ion will be limited to the potcntial effects of 
[SO 1400 I on these types of pollution in Thailand. Central questions arc: how can [SO 
1400 I , which works on a voluntary bas is, improve the environmental situation? Will 
175 I lHerv iew with Ms Prima Wangwongwatana. 
17(, O lher members of NAC are the Pennanenl SecrelalY for Sc ience, Technology and Environment, 
Perma nent Sec retalY for Public Health, Director-General of the Office of the Consumer Protection Board, 
Chainnan of the Federati on of Thai Industries or representati ve, Chainnan of the Board of Trade of 
Thai land . See Mini stry o r Industry, NOlional Accreditation Council, a public relati on pamph let. 1996, for 
morc (!cwd 
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ISO 1400 I also improve cnvironmental regulation in Thai land'! And arc there any other 
incentives for industl·y to adopt the international standard? 
Pot ential benefits of ISO 14001 
A grcat deal of research shows that system-bascd stratcgies, appropriately implcmcnted, 
can be vita l in cnhaneing fill11s ' productivity, despite somc costs at the initial stagc.177 
Thi s is incrcasingly bcing recognised among some scctors of Thai business. 
The evidcnce also suggcsts that a systcm-based approach, applied by thc individual 
enterprise, can delivcr a substantial rcduction in environmcnt impact and in the risks of 
an cnvironmental di saster. Scholars suggcst that 80-90 pcr ccnt of failures stcm from the 
managcment or organisational system, while operational crror or equipment failures 
account for only 10-20 per cent of major technological disastcrs. Those with a 
succcssfully implementcd cnvironmental management system are at substantially lowcr 
risk of cnvironmental di saster. 17s 
Apart from the bencfits of implementing ISO 14001 in producti vity benefits and 
mitigation of risk, therc arc other compelling reasons for Thai companics to adopt the 
ISO sta ndard. These were summarised in my interview with Ms Prima Wangwongwiroj , 
a director of the Thai Industrial Standard Institute (TISI) . She pointed OUl: 
There are two purposes of ISO 14000's application in Thailand. One is aimed at export 
capability in the global market, the other is to use the standard for domestic 
industry .. 179 
Regarding the first issue, as in many other developing countries, Thailand's economy 
depcnds heavily on an expoli-oriented manufacturing industry. The country supplies 
manufactured products for both local and Thailand-based transnational customers. In 
this context, there are two rcasons why ISO 1400 I is seen as having the potential to 
boost export business. First, many large expoliing fimls believe that they can gain a 
market advantage through ISO 14001 cert ifi cation because this will ensure they are seen 
177 Neil Gunningham, 'From Adversarialism to PaI1nership?: ISO 14000 and Regualtion', a paper 
presenled in the seminar ISO 14000: Regulation, Trade and Environment, 2 July 1996. in Canberra, 
at 9- 10. 
'" Ibid. 
170 The interv iew was conducted on 20 February 1998. 
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as having the right environmental crcdcntial s to compete In increasingly 
environmenta ll y conscious markets. Sccond, supplicrs to larger organisations may also 
fee l compell ed to obtain ISO 1400 I ccrtification to satisfy the requirements of thosc 
whom they su ppl y. As di scussed earlier, some multinational companies such as IBM are 
givi ng priority to those who have received ISO 14001 certificates as their supplicrs. '''' 
This demand wi ll push many fillll S to reach the intcl11ational standard to maintain their 
status as supp li ers to large conglomcrates upon whom they are heavil y dependent for 
their econom ic survival. 
Regarding both large expOliing firms and suppli ers, it appears that intelllational 
pressure on expoliing firm s to adopt ISO 1400 I has been growing constantly, and in the 
view of many, Thai industry has no alternative but to respond to this pressure by 
obtaining ISO 1400 1 celiification as the "global passport" for access to foreign 
markets. IS' This is evident by the above interview statement made by Ms Prima 
Wangwongwiroj who also said that the Thai govelllmcnt aims to use ISO 1400 I 
ccrtification to enhance global export capability. Similarly, thc late Dr Dhira 
Panthun1Vanich , former Director of Thailand Enviromllent Institutc, also supPol1cd the 
usc of thi s global standard as a mcans to press Thai industry to improve its 
environmental perfonnance. In his view: 
International standards such as ISO 14000 also havc potential to encourage all 
businesses to improve their standards of cnvironmental management to mcet those of 
the intcillational community.'Sl 
Take the case of the rubber industry. Thailand is the world's biggest rubber exporter 
with approximately 30 per cent of the intelllational market. In 1998 the Ministry of 
Agriculture announccd that it would apply ISO 1400 I cel1ification to all rubber 
products. What makes the govelllment agency insist on the standard despite Thailand's 
having such a large share in the global rubber market? According to Mr Suthipolll 
Chirapanda, deputy permanent secretary of the agency, overseas buyers have 
increasingly madc inquirics about the origin and manufacturing process of rubber 
products. Moreover, major customers including the Japanese have adopted a policy of 
I~(J See note 140 supra 
'SI Chnstina Benson , ' ISO 14000 Environmental Standards', at 34 t. 
"1 The interview took place on 7 December 1996. 
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not buying wood products and by-products unlcss they are ccrtified as coming li'om 
forests that arc managed in a best practice manner. 
For similal' reasons, Malaysia, another main rubber exporter, has also recently adopted 
ISO 1400 I for rubber products. 's; This example demonstrates that not only customer 
demand, but also the perfonllance of business competitors, can force Thai enterprises to 
adopt ISO 1400 I to maintain their international competitiveness, 
These examples also illustrate the considerable power of "green consumers", On issues 
such as forest and rubber certification, there is considerable evidenee that environmcntal 
accreditation schemes (including but not limited to ISO 14001) will be the single most 
powerful driver of improved environmental performance in forest industries, at least for 
the next few years. IS. However, consumer power is by no means limited to 'green' as 
distinct ti'om 'brown' issues. When I interviewed Mr Siritan Pairojboriboon, the director 
of the Pollution Control Department, he was equally emphatic about the power of 
consumers in the area of pollution contro\: 
I would like to say that ISO 14000 is a kind of consumer power because consumers can 
force the business through this standard.,sl 
We turn next to the benefits of ISO 1400 I for domestic industry, and for government 
(regarding regulatory redesign), Chapter 4 showed that stringent regulation is far from 
being a panaeea for pollution control. On the eontrary, regulation often fails , for reasons 
ranging from reluctance among regulators to enforce, to strong resistance from 
regulated entities . 
How then might regulation be redesigned in order to become more efficient and 
effective? In recent times, many regulatory strategists have begun to explore the scope 
for regulatory flexibility. In relation to ISO 1400 I in particular, there have been a 
number of attempts throughout the world to link adoption of the standard with greater 
flexibility both in regulation and in its enforcement. Almost all these initiatives are 
based on the premise that if !InTIS can be persuaded to introduce environmental 
".1 Uamdao Noikol11, ' ISO 14000 Series to be Applied: New Standard of rann Products', Bangkok Post , 
25 i\ ugust 1998. 
,>4 Ibid. 
'ss The intcn ie\\ took place on 19 January 1998. 
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management systems slich as ISO 1400 I , perhaps togethcr with other requirements such 
as co mmunity oversight , thi s will lock thcm into a cycle of continual improvcment and 
cultural change, and lean them towards environmental bes t practice. If thi s is indeed the 
case th en such fillll S ca n be largel y len alone by regulators, who wi ll be eontid ent in the 
finll S' ability to regul ate th emselves through their management systems and related 
aud its . Accordingly they can offer EMS -based fin11S various regul atory concessions 
such as less frequent (or no) regular inspections , miti gation of penalti es in the event of 
breach , and public relations benefit s (such as a logo for EMS-based fillll S) . The 
attracti on for the regu lato r is the ability to save regul atory resources which can then be 
redeployed towards the worst (by implication non-EMS-based) enterpri ses. The 
att racti on for the firm is that, in addition to any producti vity-based or expol1 market-
based advantages of ISO certificati on. thcy ga in greater freedom from govelllment 
interventi on. 
Examp les of the initi ati ves for regul atory flexibility in relation to ISO 14001 are the 
Project of Excellence and Leadership (Project XL), and the Environmenta l Leadersh ip 
Program (ELP) introduced by USEPA as di scussed in Chapter 6. 
Similar ISO-related regul atory flex ibi lity initiatives are also happening in Asia. In 
Japan, many large and powerful compan ies are asking the government to reduce 
regul atory rigidity in exchange for m aking ISO cel1ifieation compul sory. IS" In contrast, 
in Thailand it is the government which has invited industry to trade off adoption of the 
standard with more regulatory flexibilit y. Under the Thai approach, it appears that those 
who are awarded ISO 1400 I certification wi ll receive benefits, in addition to improved 
business competitiveness, in the fo rm of less scrutiny from the government. Thi s is 
evident from my interview with Ms Prima Wangwongwiroj, a director of TISI, who 
said: 
IS6 Neil G unningham, 'From Adversariali sm 10 Partnership·l: ISO 14000 and Regua ltion '. at 13-4 . 
However, S iLC of fil111S is not always a detcnn illant for adoption of environmental s tandards. Research has 
found that the rim" s dec ision-makers playa crucia l ro le in adoplin g and implementing the standards. Sec 
Naom i Roht-AITiaza, at 532 for more dc tail. Thi s a rgumen t is supported by Ms Peeraporn Pa lapleewan's 
statement: 
Th ere are sO lll e mediulll and small finn s whi ch have joined our (cleaner lechno logy) projects. 
have found that only the fil111 S whose decision-makers have environmental awarencss ... want to put the 
cleaner Icc hnology in their agenda. 
260 
.... 
(the benefit or) the standard for domestic industry (is that) those who have recei ved 
ISO 14000 certili cates will not be inspected seriously by l~lctory inspectors.'S" 
Dr Prascrt Tapanccyangkul , Technical Adviscr, thc DCpat1ment of Industria l Work, 
s imilarl y pointed out that: 
GovelllJ1lcnt agcncics also suppo li the plants which have adopted ISO 1400 I. We have 
instructed our plant inspectors to bc flcxible towards these plants. 
Thc favour given to firms holding [SO 14001 cCliificationmay well in future go beyond 
th e inspection stage. For example, there havc been many suggestions that having the 
ISO standard in place should also bc rcgarded as a mitigating factor at thc prosecutorial 
and sentencing levels. l 88 Most recently, Donald Carr and William Thomas have 
suggcstcd that finn s which adopt ISO 1400 I shou ld receive prosecutorial leniency, 
provided that such a program refl ec ts til e unique st ructure of the organisation; shows 
promise that it will help the firm s establ ish a pattern of continual improvcment; and at 
the same time demonstrates its effectiveness to outsiders. ls9 
The necd for regul atory flexibility rclying on ISO cetiification as an altemative to 
convcntional regulation is patiicularly com pelling in the Thai situation where inspectors 
are overwhelmed by the nlllnber of enteqJli ses they must inspecL
'
9{J However, while 
industry may benefit from less govemment monitoring and inspection in the light of 
ISO 1400 I cetii fication , from an environmental perspective a set of quest ions arises: 
how can one be sure that ISO 1400 I will improve environmental perfonnance in the 
absence of close monitoring and inspections; and can ISO 1400 I supersede regulation? 
187 The in terview was conducted on 20 Febll.l ary 1998. 
ISS Sec Joseph Cascio, ' Impli cat ions of ISO 1400 1 for Regu latory Compliance', at 38. 
'" Donald Carr and William Thomas, at 23 1. In fa ct, EPA had introdu ced the idea of counting a li nn's 
'good environmental behav ior' as a mitiga ting factor to receive prosecutorial and sentcncing leniency 
from the govemment long before ISO 1400 I emerged. EPA and the Department of Justice (DOl) issued 
gu idance for the exercise of di scretion in in vestigat ion and prosecution. Under Lhis scheme, the facts thai 
a Ii I'm cou ld demo nstrate that it had a comprehensive self-evaluation program, voluntar il y revealed any 
vio lation, and promptly remed ied any faults would be considered as mitigating factors , resulting in 
EPA 's exerc ise of in ves tigative discretion . Sec Eri c Orts, ' Renex ive Environm ental Law', Northwestern 
Unil 'el'.litl Lu\\' Rel'ie", Vol. 89, 1277( 1995), at 1275-8. 
190 In Chapter 4 , Dr Prakit Kirawanich , fo mler Direc tor of the Po llution Control Department was cited as 
giving the lack of manpov .. 'cr as one reason why the environmental problem in Th ai land has not improved. 
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Potential Drawhacks of ISO 14001 
As has been noted, ISO 1400 I is a processed-based, not an outcomc-based standard."" 
One Ihercfore cannot rcly on ISO 1400 I alone because implementation of the standard 
in it sc lf will not guarantee results as good as or better than those required by 
, regulations. A quality management standard could ensure the manufacture of concrete 
life vests of constant quality but that in itself could not prevent their users from 
drowning' 
In Thailand and other Asian countries, policy-makers arc already acutely aware that the 
mere cxislence or a system (for managcment or treatment of waste) docs not guaranlec 
it s successful implementation or desirable cnvironmental consequences. Thus, Thailand 
has fi'cqucnrly experienced non-compli ance from firms which were equipped with 
pollution treatment systems. Mr Vira Mavichak, Deputy Director-General of the 
Department of Induslrial Work, stated during my fieldwork: 
Some big firms still discharged wastewater or polluted air to the public despite good 
treatment systems.'9' 
C learly, having systems established by no means guarantees that firm s will operate the 
systems appropriately or reduce their environmental damage. 
Probably some f0l111 of regulation must remain to ensure that the finns ' environmental 
perfonnanee achieves a particular level despite the existence of ISO 14001 
certification.'9] According to Ed Shoener, a member of the U.S. Technical Advisory 
Group to ISO, environmental regulations and standards arc always needed despite ISO 
1400 I celiification."" Robert Stephens, chair of the Multi-State Working Group on ISO 
14000, also suggests that govel11ment must be involved in ensuring that the ISO 14001 
cCI1ified firms actually implement the standard. 'os However, the nature of the regulation 
required is likely to be that of a performance standard rather than that of a specific 
"JI Neil Gunningham, 'I'rom Adversarialismlo Partnership '!: ISO 14000 and Reguallioll', al 18. 
")2 The iI1lerview was conducted on 26 December 1996. 
'9] Chrislina Benson, at 3 19. See also Neil Gun ningham, ' From Adversarialism to Partnership?: ISO 
14000 and Regualti on', at 11. 
'94 Ed Shoener, 'No Subst itute For Legal Safeguards', The £i1l'lrOl1l11el1{(l/ Forum , November/December 
1997, al 27. 
'95 Robert Stephens, 'Govenunent Has No Choice l3ut 10 Get Involved' , Th e El1virol1l11ellra/ FOrulll, 
November/December 1997, al 30-1. 
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cnvironm cn tal tcchnology, thercby Icaving industry ti·cc as to how it rcaches (pcrhaps 
through its managcmcnt system) a particular environmental goal. 
ISO 14001 and its effect on Thai pollution law 
As discusscd abovc. ISO 1400 I is gaining popularity exponentially in many countries. 
Since Thailand depends heavi ly on exports, it must makc surc that it mects this 
intcrnat ional standard and as such, supply chain pressure, at least for exporting lirms, 
wh ich wi ll persuade them to certify under ISO 14001 . 
At thc samc timc. therc is potential to usc ISO 14001 intcmall y, as an aitelllativc to 
convcntional rcgulation. Howcvcr, bccause ISO 1400 I IS process not outcome-based, 
regulations will still be necessary as a performance-based underpinning to such an 
environm ental managemcnt standard. 
Against these background, regul atory flexibility has the considerable attraction of 
relieving much of the rcgulatory burden on rcgulators, pass ing much of this back to the 
fillll to regulatc itself, but overseen by govcrnment, by extelllal auditors and by third 
paliy NGOs. Thc model of self- regulation, or rather co-regulation described in Chaptcr 
6 should provide a means of ach ieving bettcr environmental outcomes undcr this 
approach . Sel f- regulation provides a 'win-win' solution as it allows fillllS to be flexib le 
in managing their environmental perfonnancc according to their resource availability, as 
long as they can mcet the polluti on control requirements. From the govclllment's 
perspective, self-regulation also helps reduce regulators' work load. In sum, ISO 14001 
can be impoliant in coercing Thailand companies to properly implement and cnforce 
domestic environmental law. l96 
IV . Implementing intemational environmental regulations 
As Peter Yeager postu lates, the goal of a rcgulatory scheme is not achieved at the 
completi on of legis lative promul gat ion.,n Many scholars suggest that after regulation is 
enacted , it must be implemented effecti vely to trans late what is stipulated in the law into 
,9(, For furrhel dClails about se1f-regu 1alion, see Chapter 6. 
'')' PCler Yeager. The Limils or Low: the PII/)Iic Regillatioll or Private Pollillion, 1991, al 29. 
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action. I'" A qucstion which arises here is: holV can international environmental 
regulation be implemcnted effectivcly at the domestic level, especially given thc 
existence of national sovereignty'7 
Most inteillational cnvironmental agrecments, no matter in what 1'01111, hard or soft laws, 
I'equire signatorics to take appropriate actions to implemcnt and enforce the 
international agrccments in their domestic settings. For example, there is an expectation 
that signatories to such an agreemcnt will enact legi s lation related to environmental 
protection consistcnt with thc agreemcnt, as wcll as devclop national law regarding 
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and concerning other 
environmental damage I')"; adopt appropriatc legislative or administrative mcasures; and 
cooperate in hamlonising appropriate policies to implement intemational law .'oo To give 
a specific example. the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Di sposa l 1989 mandates each pat1y to take appropriate 
legal, administrative and other measurcs to implement and entorcc the provisions in the 
Con vention. ,o1 
WllO makes intern at iona l environmental regulation work domestically? Given that it is 
the government of each signatory which enters into agreements, it is undeniable that thc 
task of making intcrnational law work at the domesti c Icvel belongs to the government. 
However, the findings in Chapter 4 showed that some factors responsible for regulatory 
failure are related to the government in one way or another. These include lack of 
political will , and cOlTuption. So how far can one rely on government alone to comply 
with international commitments? Valuable support may be given by non-government 
organisations. 
I'J< Ian Ayres and John I3rait hwaite. Respoll.li,'(' Regulalion: 7i'allscelldillg Ihe Regulalion Debale, 1986 , 
at 125. See also Cheryl Wassellllan, Th e PrinCljJle of Environmenlal En/orcemelll alld Berolld: Building 
Insliluliollal CapacilY, 1994. at 16. 
199 See the United Nalions Conference on Environment and Developmcnt, Plineiples II and 13. 
' "'' See Vienna Con ve nti on/or the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985. Anicles 2 (2) b. 
' UI See Basel Convention on the Conlrol of Transboundary Movements of Iiazardolis Wasles and Their 
i)isposal 1989, Arrielc 4 (4) . 
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A. Thc rol e of non-governm ental organisations (NGOs) in implemcnting 
international cnvironm ental regu lation at th e domcstic leve l 
In vo lvement of NG Os at the g lobal level is not new. Th e yea r 1945 saw the NGOs' lirst 
participation in an international forum, at which they were granted by the United 
Nations th e status of consultants. 202 More recently, as environmental degradation has 
become a g loba l concern, the involvement of NGOs has gained momentum 
ex ponentiall y .'O\ What makes NGOs so widely recogni sed? How has the NGOs' 
involvement become entrenched in implementing environmental regu lation? Research 
has shown that the diverse ex pel1i se and experi ence of the people in NGOs have created 
trust in their commitment and ability to protect the environment. 204 
Increasing recognition of the vital role of NGOs is also evident from the fact that this 
role has been included in a number of intemational regulations. The Rio Declaration 
states that "environm enta l issues are best handl ed with the paliieipation of all concerned 
citizens at the relevant lever ', while Chapter 27 of Agenda 21 states that NGOs can play 
a key role in program delivery and design, community education and social cohes ion 
which is significant for community involvement. 2o ; 
NGOs have many roles in this regard, including infonnation collection, anal ysis and 
exchange; identification of issues; partic ipation as observers in international 
organisations as well as treaty negotiation . More specifically to the issue of 
implementation, they also monitor compliance with the provisions of intemational 
agreements. 20& 
The strengths of NGOs enumerated above spontaneously create pressure on 
govemments to implement environmental law. In the United States, the Environmental 
Defence Fund (EDF), one of the leading NGOs, has had a highly qualified staff. 
202 tbid , at 133 . 
20\ James Cameron, ' Future Directions in IrHcl11ationai Environmental Law: Precaution, Integration and 
Non-sta te AClors', The Dalhollsie Law JOllrnal, Spring t 996, at 133. 
204 Kae\vsun Atibodhi, 'Public Pal1icipation Priorit ies' , a proceeding of Environmental Priorilies in 
SOlllheasl Asian Narions, 1997, at72. 
20j See Ben Boer, Rob Fowler. and Neil Gunn ingham, Agenda 21 : Th e l.egalllJlpliclIliolls, at 36. 
JO() James Cameron . al 134 . 
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Inc luded in it s mand ate is a commitment to work with the pri vate sector to reduce 
po llution. For exampl e, EDF has been very successful in cooperating wit h McDonald's 
to develop a program whi ch has I'educcd the company's solid wastes by over 80 per 
cent. In Indones ia. an NGO by the name of Pelangi has been invo lved in a series of 
tech ni ca l exchanges between the U.S. and Germany and Indonesia's nationa l electric 
power utili ty to improve energy eftie iency. Th e cooperative activity has yielded positive 
results .'07 
Ano ther important ro le of NGOs with regard to law implementat ion is to push 
goveillments to enact "com munity right-to-know" legis lation, aimed at releasing 
infollll ation related to any substances or activities possibly hallllful to the environment 
and the publi c. In Australia. foll ow ing the successful example of the Toxic Release 
Inventory in the United States, right-to-know draft legis lation is on the verge of being 
introduced in th e Federal Pariiament208 The right-to-know issue has drawn attention 
from those concerned even at the vo luntary level. Currcnt ly, the chemical industry's 
Respons ibl e Care program has included a codc of practice on comm unity ri ght to 
know.'09 
Significan tly, NGOs arc indi spensable in the process by which international 
environmental soft law may be implemented successfull y. Despite its weakness in 
implementation and enforcement as discussed earl ier, some scholars suggest that soft 
law can evolve into hard law, which in tUIll wi ll strengthen its ability to be implemented 
as well as enforced. "o Notably, the manner in which the soft law is transfornl cd into 
hard law is through repetition. This includcs transmission of basically the same 
message; cross-references from one instituti on to another; and recurrent invocation of 
the same rules fOl1l1ul ated in a va riety of ways.'" The more often inteillational 
environmental soft law is refelTed to, the more opportunity it has to evolve into hard 
law . Research has found that NGOs can pl ay a sign ifi cant ro le in ensuring this 
repetiti on. An example is the plinciple of information and consultation which has been 
207 Peter J. lll ig, ' Publ ic Participation Priorit ies', a proceed ing of Em'irunmental Priorilies il1 Southeast 
Asian Nations, 1997. at 68. 
108 Ne il Gunningham and Darren Si nc la ir. 'Environmental Management Sys tems, Regu lation and the Pulp 
and Paper Industry: ISO 14000 in Prac tice'. at 5-23. 
,()9 See Ben Boer, Rob Fowler, and Ne il Gu nningham , Agenda 21: The Legal Implicotions, at 37. 
"0 See Pe ter Drahos, 'Thinki ng strategica ll y about intellectual propel1y rights' , at 205-6. Such 
suggesti ons however draw an argument that transfonllation of soft law to hard law shou ld be considered 
o n a case-by-case basis. See Anthony D'Amato and Ki rs ten (cds). at 57 for more detail. 
' " Anthony D'Amato and Kirs ten Engel (eds). at 55-6. 
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preva lent in international environmental agreements. Thi s obligation to share 
information has been repeatedly addressed in reeolllmendations and resolutions for 
many years by many NGOs, including the Inst itut ion of International Law (ilL) which 
wrote the same principle in its resolut ions of 1961 , 1979, and 198 1, and the 
International Law Association (ILA) which did the same in its resolutions of 1966 and 
1982. '" 
B. NGOs and implementation of in ternational environmental regulation in 
T hail and 
As briefly discussed in Chaptcr 2, environmental NGOs have emergcd in Thailand 
a long with the degradation of natural resources and cnvironment stcmming from 
unplanned and poorly managed industrialisation. Their activities however did not 
receive cooperative responses ti'om the govemment; on the contrary, there were many 
disagreements between governments and NGOs. The reasons include the government's 
concern to boost economic gro\\·th regardless of the devastation of natural resources and 
environment which was ant itheti cal to the eoncems of environmental NGOs. 2Il 
However, NGO participation has gradually become more acceptable as evidenced by its 
inclusion in the 'big bang' refonns. For example, the 1992 Enhancement Act allows a 
registered NGO certain privileges, including the right to recei ve assistance and support 
on some activities from the goverrunent214 These entitlements have attracted many 
NGOs to register with the govemment. According to the Office of Environmental 
Policy and Planning, 65 NGOs have been registered throughout Thailand. There are 
also about 100 NGOs which have not been registered because they do not meet the 
'juristic person' qualification. Despite an absence of regi stration, these NGOs have been 
active in creating and expanding the network of people committed to safeguarding the 
environment and natural resourees.lIS 
'" ApaJ"l from NGOs, many supranational instilutions also did the same. Examples include UNEP Draft 
Pnnciples of Conduct on Shared Natural Resources of 1978; and OECD Council rccommendations on 
Transfrontier Pollut ion and the Impl ementation of a Regime of Equal Ri ght of Access and Non-
discrimination in rela tion to Transfrontier Poll ution (See Anthony D'Amato and Kirsten Engel (eds) at 
56) 
'" Sunce Mallikamarl. EIII'irol7l11el7w/ Lall' Enforcemenl, 1997, at 64. 
21' Sce Chapter 2 for morc details. 
'" Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, Reporl 017 EIlVirOl7l11enw/ Silllalion dllring /995 /996. 
1997.at239 
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I low could NGOs manage to gain support f'rom the governmcnt despite the conflicts 
described above') Thai land is very sensiti ve to international pressure and for thi s reason 
willing to cooperate with international policies. In 1992 there was another NGO success 
in that both the Rio Decl ara tion and UNCED included the provision that each member 
state shall promote public participation, which of' coursc includes NGO activities.'''' 
With in this broader intcrnat ional context of increasing NGO participation, it is 
undcrstandablc that this participation should be included in thc reformed environmental 
law in spite of any rescrvations of the Thai govelllment. 
To date, Thailand has experienced a numbcr of cases in which NGOs have been 
involved in law implementation. An example is the case of' that Khunying Chodchoy 
Soponpanich, the pres ident of the Thai Environmental and Community Developmcnt 
Association, an NGO which challenged the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
(BMA) to reveal infonnation regarding cnvironmental cffects which in that case 
resulted li·om an alleviated train project di scussed in Chapter 3. Although Scction 6 of' 
the 1992 Enhancement Act a llo\\'s the publi c to have access to infollllation, the Bangkok 
Govelllor at the time ignored that requirement. Not until Khunying Chodchoy brough t 
the case to coul1 did the Bangkok Govelllor agree to release thc infollllation. 
In anothcr case, the Toxic Smoke Prevention Foundation, anothcr NGO, had great 
success in promoting its candidate to high political office. As a result of a vigorous and 
consistent campaign to improve air quality in Bangkok for many years, Dr Pichit 
Rattaku l, presidcnt of the NGO, had a landslide victory in the election for Bangkok 
Govelllor in May 1996. 
Does bcing an NGO member enable Dr Pichit to work cfficiently as the Bangkok 
Govelllor') It is undeniable that the expertise and experience he has gaincd from hi s 
NGO activities have helped him in many aspects, for example, hi s capacity to identi fy 
the two main sources of air pollution in Bangkok: building construction, and the trucks 
? 16 Agenda 21 declares: The organization of United Nations system and other intergovernmental 
organizat ions w ill need to provide increased financial and administrative su pp011 for non-govcmmen tal 
organizations and their self-organised networks, in particular those based in developing countries, 
contributing to the monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 21 programmes. and provide training for 11011-
govcmmental organizations ... lo enhance their partnership role in programme design and implementations 
(UN Doc.A/CONF. t5 t126 (1992) al 27/ 12) 
Principte 10 of Ihe Rio Declaration reads: SlalCs shall facilitale and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making informal ion widely available. Effeclive access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings. including redress and remedy. shall be provided (James Cameron, at t 35). 
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which transport construct ion matcrial to the sites. After issuing warnings to the people 
conceilled to comply with the la\\', he was severe on the recalcitrant violators. 
Numerou s construction operators have had legal action taken against them as a result of 
their non-compliance. '" 
A final example is the victory of an environmental act ivist in an election to become a 
legislator. In late 1996, Mr Panat Tasneeyanond, the director of the Environmental Law 
Centre, an act ive environmental NGO, was elected a member of the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly (CDA), representing Take province, which was his bit1hplace and 
const ituency. 
How did Mr Panat manage to win the election in Take despite spending most of his time 
working in Bangkok'? Wllat did he contribute to the eun'ent constitution? Not 
surprising ly, it was hi s hi gh reputat ion in the environmental area in which he had been 
in volved for many years, along with hi s role as a main drafter of the current 
Enha ll cell1elli ACI 1992 which led to his election. Mr Panat was a lead ing architect of the 
current constitution in regards to environmental protection. as is evident £i'om the 
unprecedented environment-related provisions introduced in the constitution . For 
example, it states that any project or activity whose operation may cause severe effects 
on the environment shall not be allowed to operate, unless the environmental impact is 
reviewed and assessed by a private agency, which consists of representatives from 
environmental NGOs, and academic institutions.1I8 The current constitution also 
requires the goveillment to promote and encourage public participation in preservation, 
maintenance, and protection of the quality of the environment based on the principle of 
sustainable development. Also , the government is to control and eliminate pollution 
affecting public health , sanitation, welfare, and quality oflife219 
It is clear that the inclusion of such environment-related provisions in the constitution 
will improve Thai environmental regulations, which at the same time will help 
implement international environmental regulations to which Thailand has been 
committed. 
117 Chakkrit Rithmontri, 'Construction firms Face Touch Action'. Bangkok Post , 17 May 1997. 
l iS Sec Thai Constitution, Section 56 , para 2. 
"'I Ibid . Sect ion 79 
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It is not certain that the three cases given above dcmonstrate the success of internation al 
environmental regulation in increasing the ro le of NGOs in impl cmenting the law at the 
domestic level. As di scussed in the previous chapters, pass ing a new law or having the 
existing law refo rmed in Thailand does not necessaril y guarantee that the law w ill be 
implem cntcd. This situat ion applies to the case of NGO activities in Thailand although 
their ro les have been endorsed by th e law. At present , disagreements between 
government and NGOs onen occur. Exten sive research has found that NGOs are st ill 
seen by the government and many business entrepreneurs as ' trouble makers' whose 
act ivit ies are lik ely to impede the progress of the nation 220 Thi s usually makes the 
govell1ment and business sectors re lu ctant to render full cooperation to NGOs. Schol ars 
also point out other causes which seriou sly inhibit the NGOs' capability. These include 
lack of continuity in NGOs' movements" '; and lack of fu nding. '" 
The above discuss ion shows that NGOs playa key role in translating intell1ational 
environmental regulation into domestic impl ementation . However, on ly limited success 
has so far been aehieved. Thus, it is important for Thailand not to be eompl aeent simply 
because provisions are ineluded in the 'b ig bang' re fonTIs to empower NGOs, because 
thi s is o nl y a first step . Many other things must be done to ensure that these provisions 
are implemented effecti vely. NGOs must work hard under the banner of 'sustainable 
development' to convince all the paliies concell1ed that their movements do not impede 
economic growth but rather, wi ll help to strengthen national development in the long 
run. A lso, the govell1ment and businesses must attune themsel ves to a global poli cy 
whi ch has been open for public pali icipation. FurtheIl110re, the rules goveming funding 
support must be relaxed . Only then wi ll NGOs be capable of generating sufficient 
fun ding to perform their activiti es continuously. 
22" Phai ch itr Uathavikul, 'Managing the Environment', THAILAND: Killg 8hlll1libol Adlll\adej, Th e 
Golden Jllbilee 1946-1996, 1997, at 221-2. 
'" Ib id. Phaichitr Ua thavikul also cOlllm ents tha t NGOs' protests are usually organised on an ad hoc 
baSiS. Once the imill ediate problem is resolved. many NGOs wane. 
212 Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, at 244-5. 
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V. Co nclusion: Will international environmcntal regulation be morc success ful in 
the future? 
T hailand has been qui te active in entering intelllational environmental agreements; 
however, no hard- law international agrcements in which Thailand is involved dea l 
dircctly with air and wa ter pollution. Ncvel1hel ess, the nation has comm itted itself to 
threc so ft-law intcrnational obli ga ti ons which impinge directly on air and watcr 
pollu tion: Stockholm Declaration ; Rio Declaration ; and Agenda 21. Although soft 
intcrnationa l law is not Icgally b inding, Thailand has respondcd actively to these soft -
law internat ional obligations: it adoptcd many principles gcncrated fi'om thc so ft laws in 
thc "big bang" rcform, such as inccnt ive measurcs, recogni tion of thc rolc of publi c 
participat ion and rccognition of the ro le ofNGOs. 
As cnvironmental issues gain momentum, thcy are also bccoming more integrated 
within thc agendas of many other intcrnational institutions whose dircct rcsponsibilitics 
are not rclated to environmental protcction ; these incl ude the World Bank, IM F, WTO, 
OECD. and ASEAN. The result has bcen considerable extem al pressurc on Thailand, 
to reduce con'uption and to put cnvironmental issues highcr on its own political agenda, 
mindful of the development and tradc implications of not doing so. 
Also, intemat ional obligations could force Thailand to focus morc on the issue of 
transparency. Luckily, Thailand has just adopted a concept of good govemance 
mandatcd by the IM F, thereby comm itting itself to the principles of transparency, 
prcdictabi lity, accountabi lity, and publ ic participation. There is ground for optimism 
that good governance, along with othcr intemationa l environmental obligations, in 
conjunction with active and effective participation by NGOs, wi ll help Thailand 
grad uall y overcome many problems causing regul atory failure such as corruption, lack 
of po liti ca l will and rcgulatory capturc. 
Simul tancously, thc growing popul arity of ISO 1400 I co uld ga lvanise Thai industries to 
mcct the standard if they want to survivc in the export market. In conjunction with 
regul atory fl exibility incenti ves, . ISO 1400 1 co uld also be used as a form of co-
regulation , pushing fil1l1 S to bettcr environmental perforn1ance whi le relieving scarce 
inspection reso urces wh ich could then be redeployed elsewhere. 
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However. it cannot be concluded that the goal of ellvironmental regulation will be 
achieved mcrely because of Thailand's implementation of international obligations, or 
through the growing adoption of ISO 1400 I. For example, while thi s chapter shows that 
Thailand takes international obligations seriously, Chapter 3 shows that Thai 
environmental regulation is still failing to deliver satisfactory results, despite the "big 
bang" ref 01111. A large pan of the reason is that regulatory implementation and 
enforcement in Thailand arc weak, and have become a cause of failure . There is also a 
serious possibility that, in an attempt to recover from the economic crisis of 1997, the 
environment may be sacrificed for the sake of economic growth. 
To prevent this situation, public p3l1iei pation, especially through NGOs, has a strong 
potential to help ensure that environmental regulation is implemented and enforced. As 
previously di scussed, the 'big bang' empowers NGOs to be involved in the regulatory 
process such as by allowing an indi vidual to file a complailll to the relevant officials, 
accusing anyone of committing an environmental offence.22J In this way, national and 
international NGOs can oversee both regulation and self-regulation and bring pressure 
for law implementation more generally. This combination of international and, in many 
respects , infollnal pressure points may bling about long-tellll environmental change, 
and directly influence domestic environmental regulation. 
m See the 1992 Enhancement Act. Sections 6.7.and 8. See also Chapter 2 for more details. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
Against the background of increasing, and potentially overwhelming environmental 
problems in Thailand, this thesis has argued that a new strategy for environmental 
protection is required, and in particular, a new approach to environmental regulation, 
broadly defined. But what type of regulation is best suited to Thailand's unique 
circumstances? 
Focusing on air and water pollution (two of Thailand's most serious problems) the thesis 
sought to answer this question in stages. It began with an analysis of Thailand's existing 
regulatory approach, and an examination of the particular cultural and political 
circumstances which account for the very disappointing lack of progress so far. It 
followed with an exploration of potential national , and then international , regulatory 
strategies designed to achieve far more than the regulatory status quo. Throughout, it 
sought to argue that it is inappropriate to simply take 'off the shelf theories and 
solutions which may have worked in developed countries such as the USA, Canada, the 
UK or Australia. While these theories may provide some insights and some may indeed 
prove useful in Thailand, nevertheless Thai culture, society and politics, are quite 
distinctive. It will only be by designing solutions appropriate to the Thai context, that 
effective regulation and positive environmental outcomes are likely to be achieved. 
Parts Two and Three of the thesis sought to design such solutions. 
In Part One, the thesis traced the history of how the law has dealt with environmental 
problems relating to air and water pollution. It began its investigation by examining 
Thailand 's early environmental law up until 1992. Although laws and regulations 
involving environmental protection have existed in Thailand for over a century, it was 
not until the 1970s that the country introduced the first comprehensive law dealing 
directly with environmental issues: the now-defunct 1975 Enhancement Act. 
However, although this Act was the product of quite substantial domestic and 
international pressure, through internal NGOs and the external influence of the 
Stockholm Declaration, nevertheless, it was not effective in curbing widespread 
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environmental degradation. A fatal flood in the southern part of Thailand caused by 
extensive deforestation was cited as one among many examples of such ineffectiveness. 
But this flood had another consequence, which was to provide a focus, and a rallying 
point, for pressure for further environmental regulation. The result was the refOlms to 
environmental law of 1992, including the 1992 Enhancement Act, the 1992 FactOlY Act, 
the 1992 Public Health Act, and the 1992 Maintenance of Public Cleanliness Act, 
known collectively as the 'big bang' refonns. These were undoubtedly a significant 
step forward for revitalising Thai environmental regulation. 
What measures did the 'big bang' introduce? First, a number of reorganisations of the 
institutions involved in environmental issues, including the establishment of the 
Pollution Control Department, and the promotion of the National Environment Board 
(NEB) to sub-cabinet status, chaired by the Prime Minister were conducted. We also 
found that the 1992 Enhancement Act provides the NEB with significant power, 
including the power to prescribe environmental quality standards, to approve 
environmental quality management plans, and to announce pollution control areas. 
Another important aspect of the Enhancement Act was, for the first time, to give fonnal 
recognition and powers to NGOs. The Act entitles a registered NGO to assistance and 
support from the government on particular activities, including study or research with 
respect to environmental protection or natural resources conservation. To enhance NGO 
involvement, the 1992 Enhancement Act introduced the right to know about 
envirorunental infOlmation, and allows the public to have access to any infonnation 
related to any activity which has a potential to cause environmental degradation from 
the government. 
The polluter pays principle also made its debut in the 1992 Enhancement Act, as did 
strict civil liability. With regard to the latter, the Enhancement Act makes the defendant 
liable for all injuries caused by his or her action, even without showing negligence. The 
'big bang' refonns also adopted the idea of incentive measures from the Stockholm 
Declaration, including the establishment of an environmental fund which could grant 
loans to support the installation of technologies for pollution abatement. Finally, the 
refonns attempt to allocate power with regard to envirorunental planning to local 
authorities. In doing so, the 1992 Enhancement Act mandates the Provincial Governor 
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whose locality is designated as a pollution control area to fonnulate an action plan for 
environmental quality management, and submit the plan to the NEB for approval. 
But has air and water pollution in Thai land improved substantially as a result of the ' big 
bang'? To answer this question the thesis drew on not only the very limited literature 
which exists, but more importantly, on my fieldwork interviews with a wide range of 
stakeholders and decision-makers within Thailand's political, regulatory and 
environmental community. The thesis also provided some case studies, investigating 
Mab Ta Phut and Mae Moh for air pollution, and Phoenix Pulp and Paper and Klity 
Mine for water pollution. 
Disappointingly, the infonnation received from the above sources indicated that the 
problems of air and water pollution are still critical despite the ' big bang' refonns. For 
example, Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, is still ranked in the top fifteen most 
polluted cities in the world; and the very severe problems of both air and water 
pollution in Thailand continue to result in widespread damage to the environment and 
to human health. 
The thesis then asked a set of broader questions: why did the ' big bang' refonns achieve 
relatively little, and what deeper factors in Thailand's political system and culture 
threaten to undennine not just the 1992 refonns but also future efforts to develop 
effective environmental regulation in Thailand? From on both the existing literature and 
our empirical work, we were able to identify a number of factors responsible for the 
failure of the ' big bang' refon11S. The most serious of these relate to aspects of 
Thailand's political culture, social culture, and corruption. 
As for political culture, the thesis argued that the vagueness of many provisions in the 
'big bang ' legislation were substantially responsible for regulatory failure, because it 
made some sections of the Act unenforceable. It provided two examples of such 
ambiguity, one of which is the inclusion of the word 'may' in the 1992 Enhancement 
Act, Section 6. Study of the case between Khunying Chodchoy Soponpanich e/ al., 
plaintiffs, and the Bangkok Governor, defendant, showed that this vague provision 
created uncertainty and brought about a controversial argument if the government had to 
disclose environmental infonnation to the public. In effect, the very enforceability of 
the Act was put in doubt. The precise causes of such ambiguity may never be resolved 
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beyond doubt, the relevant decisions having taken place behind closed doors. 
Nevertheless, interviews with key decision-makers involved in the decision-making 
process suggested at least the strong possibility that the ambiguity was caused by 
political factors and a deliberate attempt to weaken the legislation, rather than 
incompetence. 
Lack of sufficient financial suppOli was another factor identified as crucial 111 
undennining the success of the 'big bang'. This factor reduced the efficiency of 
regulatory agencies in many aspects, and in particular deprived them of the resources 
necessary for monitOling and inspection. For example, the IEAT did not have the 
sophisticated devices necessary to detect the source of airborne pollution: this resulted 
in slow action in tackling the air pollution problem in Mab Ta Phut. Closely related to 
this was a more general lack of political will, which contributed in a variety of ways to 
the ' big bang ' refonns' failure. Examples include the fact that although the 1992 
Enhancement Act stipulates that the prime minister is Chairperson of the National 
Environment Board (NEB), some Prime Ministers never attended the NEB meetings at 
all. 
We found that regulatory capture also undennined the refonns; this could result from 
the close relationship between regulators and regulated finns. As records show, the 
more fi'equently the regulators interact with finns, the more chance there is that a 
sympathetic attitude toward the finns develops. Such a close relationship commonly 
brought about regulatory capture in Thailand. For example, as my empirical work 
revealed, the Department ofIndustrial Work's regulators are reluctant to enforce the law 
against non-compliant plants with which they have a very close relationship. The Thai 
culture of gratitude also contributes to the risk of regulatory capture: many Thai 
regulators are reluctant to enforce the law against factories which provide financial or 
other fonns of suppOli to their agencies. The support includes donation of office 
facilities such as air-conditioners and fax machines to remote and small govenunent 
agencies whose budget allocation is often insufficient. 
Turning to social culture, the thesis suggested that many aspects of Thai culture have 
become obstacles to the success of the 'big bang' refonns. For example, Thailand was a 
country with authoritarian rule from 1237 to 1932, and the 'power-Oliented trait' which 
derives fi'om this history still influences many Thai to obey and respect those who have 
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authority. This undoubtedly inhibits public participation and so the rights bestowed 
upon NGOs by the 'big bang' refonns (which encourage people to express their opinion 
straightforwardly, even against the govenunent) are unlikely to be used to the full. 
Another example of Thai culture we found responsible for the failure of Thai 
environmental regulation is the 'culture of compromise', which the Thai adopted from 
the middle path precept under Buddhism. As a result, the Thai prefer to avoid conflict 
and confrontation and are most reluctant to stand up for their rights. As far as air and 
water pollution are concerned, we found that many environmental cases in Thailand 
such as the Mab Ta Phut and Mae Moh cases ended up with a fOlm of compromise 
which was insufficient to protect the envirorunent. Also, we found in the Klity Mine 
case that it took the villagers who suffered from contaminated water caused by the mine 
30 years to bring this case to the authorities. 
The 'culture of gratitude' also impeded the success of the ' big bang' refonns. We 
leamed that gratitude often makes the Thai forgo principle and prioritise personal 
obligation. For example, in the case of quarrying in SarabUli, although a number of 
students and teachers in the schools near quarry plants had silicosis, a lung disease 
caused by accumulation of small particles of dust stelmning from the quarrying 
operation, they were reluctant to bring the case to the authorities because the plant 
owners often donate teaching equipment to the schools. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis paid particular attention to corruption, which is pervasive in 
Thailand. But how does corruption affect regulation, especially that related to 
envirorunental protection? It showed that corruption has a strong potential to disrupt the 
goal of regulation and to weaken enforcement and that (as regards air and water 
pollution) it takes place at two stages: goverrunent discretion, and opportunities arising 
from development projects. 
In Thailand, where cOlmnand and control regulation is still a mainstay of regulatory 
policy, discretion among govemment officials involved in implementing and enforcing 
regulation is inevitable. In a regulatory culture where corruption is entrenched, it was 
found that regulators tum a blind eye to finns' wrongdoing in exchange for personal 
interest. Using the Mab Ta Phut air pollution as a case study, this thesis argued that 
conllption was involved in this case, although, as is usual with corruption, finding 
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clearly documented evidence is extremely difficult. Its argument was based on the fact 
that the disaster had continued for over a year without any action being taken by 
relevant authorities to address the problems; and on suggestions that the factories 
involved were prepared to take relevant officials and media abroad in order to buy their 
acquiescence. 
As for cotTUption associated with development projects, we identified, through a series 
of case studies, circumstances where this situation existed in Thailand. A good example 
was the Mae Moh scrubber purchase case, in which Mae Moh residents alleged that the 
EGAT bought used scrubbers from China instead of new ones. This resulted in 
excessive air pollution generated by its plants which led to a fatal incident. 
In view of these substantial political and cultural impediments to the success of 
environmental regulation in Thailand, the thesis asked how it might be possible to 
design a regulatory system (broadly defined) capable of overcoming, or at least 
sidestepping, the major political and cultural obstacles described above, and capable of 
delivering effective and efficient environmental outcomes. 
Again, the thesis drew on the limited literature available which relates to regulation in 
developing countries, on the much broader (but less relevant) literature on regulation in 
developed countries, and on our fieldwork interviews. The argument is in two stages: 
Part Two deals with domestic, and Part Three international dimensions. In Part Two 
(Chapter 6), five alternative measures: environmental education and training, 
environmental infonnation, economic instruments, self-regulation, and command and 
control regulation were suggested. These are suited to addressing Thailand's air and 
water pollution problems though some of these instruments will be far more valuable 
than others. The thesis also argued that no single policy instrument can be used in 
isolation to provide a total solution as all instruments have limitations and some are 
better suited than others to certain situations. 
The thesis began its recommendations with environmental education and training as 
there is good reason to believe that almost all other policy instruments work better if the 
public, public interest groups and those who are being asked to change their behaviour 
(including industry), have sufficient insight into why a sound environment is necessary 
and how it could be achieved. It was found that Thailand has included environmental 
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education in its National Policy and Planning on Enhancement and Conservation of the 
Environment 1997-2016. The thesis also identified a number of enviromnental 
education initiatives both on and off campus. 
However, it was found that there are too few educational initiatives and that the funding 
for even such initiatives as exist is insufficient. Many of relevant projects have been 
financed from those outside the education field: for example, the Dawn Project which 
targets 600 schools in Thailand is funded by the 'blue fund ', administered by the 
National Energy Bureau. Further enviromnental education initiatives would represent 
very good value for money. They are non-intrusive, do not require legislation, are non-
coercive and therefore are neither politically or culturally offensive in the Thai context. 
Yet they could do a great deal to render more effective almost all the other 
environmental policy instruments described below. Not least, they could counter the 
aspects of Thai culture which in the past made enviromnental progress more difficult. 
A related but distinct instrument is the disclosure of environmental infornlation, which 
can be used to empower the public and to facilitate greater public participation in 
enviromllental decision-making. The thesis began with the 'community right to know' 
as a measure to help the public obtain information from the government. It is also 
necessary that the public receive environmental infonnation from industry directly, and 
that corporate enviromnental reporting could play an important role. 
The general conclusion is that corporate enviromnental reporting benefits not only the 
public, who will be able to know more about finns' enviromnental perfonnance, but 
also some firms themselves, because if their environmental performance is sound, they 
are likely to gain trust from both regulators and the public. In this way, corporate 
enviromnental reporting could provide rewards and incentives to environmentally 
positive finns , while penalising (through public shaming, a useful tactic in Thai culture) 
those whose enviromnental performance is poor. However, neither community right to 
know nor corporate environmental reporting is likely to flourish as a purely voluntary 
initiative, and there is a role for govenunent (possibly on the Indonesian model) in 
directing and facilitating such initiatives. It is no coincidence that recent World Bank 
studies, regard government mandated provision of enviromnental regulation as a 
particularly powerful policy tool in developing countries. 
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The third recommendation is economic instruments. The thesis began by discussing 
those instruments having potential to help reduce air and water pollution: pollution 
charges and tax systems, property rights, tradable pennits, subsidies, financial 
assistance, civil liability, and perfonnance bonds. Although economic instruments 
generally provide flexibility, cost-effectiveness and efficiency, some economic 
instruments yield better results than others and some are more suited than others to the 
particular political and cultural context of Thailand. For instance, while tradable pennits 
purport to deal efficiently with a limited number of readily quantifiable pollutants, the 
problems of corruption, limited technical skills and other failings of regulators including 
regulatory capture, make their use problematic. 
The thesis argued that despite the increasing trend towards the use of economic 
instruments, as shown by the introduction of the polluter pays principle in the 1992 
refonns, many complex issues are still to be resolved. For example, Thailand still needs 
to develop the expertise to properly fonnulate and administer these instruments. Take 
pollution taxes. What industries are to be taxed, and at what levels? Many of these 
technical problems have not been satisfactorily solved in developed countries which 
have long experience in the use of these instruments. So it would be naive to expect 
clear answers to the above questions soon in the case of Thailand. The introduction of 
many new economic instruments could also confuse and overburden the regulatory 
system, as well as the regulated parties. Therefore, Thailand should presently focus on 
selected instruments such as the 'polluter payss principle' , which has already been 
established in the 1992 refonns, and implement that to the fullest extent before 
progressing to many others. 
The thesis then examined self-regulation as another alternative policy tool. It argued 
that self-regulation has considerable potential in Thailand because it is consistent with 
key attributes of Thai culture. As the Thai do not like to be forced, even by law, self-
regulation may be a more acceptable option than command and control regulation as it 
provides flexibility for finns to meet envirorunental goals by their own means. 
Moreover, self-regulation relies substantially on shaming and public embarrassment, 
which in Thailand are potent tools, given the importance of not losing face. These 
factors too, are well suited to the Thai context. Moreover, since goverrunent funding for 
equipment and enough regulators is lacking in Thailand, self - regulation may have the 
additional virtue of reducing the goverrunent's workload. 
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However, how can one be sure that self-regulated firms will always comply with self 
regulation? The history of self-regulation in the developed world suggests that it is open 
to serious abuse, and that on some occasions at least, it will degenerate into a symbolic 
sham unless there is government monitoring. Mindful of the limitations of self-
regulation, the thesis argued that it is only in some circumstances that self-regulation is 
likely to work in Thailand. These circumstances include the existence of a ' community 
of shared fate ', an underpinning of govenunent regulation (i.e. co-regulation), and third 
party oversight. 
The final policy tool suggested in the thesis for the domestic dimension is command and 
control regulation. Command and control contains powerful penalties as regulatory 
sanctions, so it has a strong potential to address environmental problems because these 
penalties could serve as big sticks if other alternatives (carrots) did not work. Also, 
finns particularly respond to environmental regulations if they have expelienced 
monitoring and inspection, and even more so if they have been fined or sanctioned. 
However, the weaknesses of conunand and control are particularly distinct in the Thai 
political and social context. For example, it relies heavily on govenunent oversight. 
Considering the common problem of inadequate regulatory funds in Thailand, which 
could lead to a lack of sophisticated equipment, and of sufficient regulators for 
enforcement, the capacity of the regulators is inevitably undennined. We also found that 
command and control is vulnerable to many other problems such as corruption, the 
culture of compromise and regulatory capture. For instance, 'rent-seeking', is pervasive 
in Thailand, and operates by regulators turning a blind eye to a regulatee ' s wrongdoing 
in exchange for benefits provided to them .. 
How can command and control be made to work, given the many weaknesses if faces in 
Thailand? The thesis suggested the strategy of the enforcement pyramid paradigm 
(,carrot and stick'), and argued that smart regulators must be able to manoeuvre a wide 
range of measures which dovetail with each situation. After a less persuasive measure 
such as a warning letter is ignored, regulators must rise up the pyramid of enforcement, 
that is , resort to more stringent measures such as fines or closure of plants, or they must 
bring the case to court. Despite the problems, the use of severe regulatory measures is 
still possible in Thailand, as we found in the case of Samutprakarn Provincial District 
Prosecutor versus the Thai Paper Development Co. Ltd. el al when the Samutprakarn 
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District COUl1 sentenced the first defendant to a fine of 30,000 baht, and the second 
defendant to three months in prison. 
Realising that government regulation is usually limited to interaction between regulators 
and regulated finns, we also suggested that public interest groups should be added to 
create more transparency and accountability within the regulatory system. Tripartism is 
particularly appropriate for Thailand where the problems of cOITUption and regulatory 
capture are mainly facilitated by the close relationship between government regulators 
and finns. The thesis also made a number of specific recommendations on how to make 
tripartism work best in Thailand, which include how publicity and transparency could 
best be used to make regulation more effective. This last strategy is particularly 
promising given the importance in Thai culture of not 'losing face' . 
In Pat1 Three (Chapter 7), a number of international factors that have the potential to 
help revitalise Thai environmental regulation were identified. These factors include 
international agreements , international institutions, international trade, and ISO 14001. 
Although traditional accounts of international factors often focus on the role of treaties , 
we found that none of the hard-law international agreements in which Thailand is 
involved deals directly with air and water pollution issues. Of more interest are the 
three soft-law international obligations: Stockholm Declaration, Rio Declaration, and 
Agenda 21 , into which Thailand has entered. Although soft international law is not 
binding, Thailand responds to such instruments actively; for example, it has adopted a 
number of principles initiated by the soft laws in the ' big bang ' refonns. These include 
the polluter pays principle, incentive measures, and recognition of the role of public 
pat1icipation and especially NGOs. 
The thesis also argued that environmental issues have been increasingly taken into 
consideration by many other international institutions whose responsibilities are not 
directly involved with environmental protection. These include the World Bank, IMF, 
WTO, OECD, and ASEAN. Thailand, and many other countries involved with these 
institutions, must incorporate environmental issues in their development and trade 
policies, or face adverse reactions from institutions upon whom they are commonly 
dependent. Thus these institutions can often have a positive influence on environmental 
matters should they choose to do so. 
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Of course, such institutions have not always played such a role. As we have seen the 
World Bank, for example, has in the past played a very negative role but the ' greening' 
of the Bank, in more recent years, has meant a substantial turnaround. While Thailand is 
not directly dependent on World Bank finance at present, it way well be in the future, 
and the environmental strings that will be attached to such loans can be substantial. 
The lMF has also played a very mixed role in the past. However, a concept of good 
governance mandated by the IMF in recent times, can help create transparency in 
Thailand, as good governance focuses on the issues of transparency, predictability, 
accountability, and public participation; and it can reduce corruption. Since the IMF 
requires good governance as a loan condition, there is reason to believe that Thailand, 
which has borrowed money from the IMF to improve its financial situation from the 
crisis in 1997, must now put far greater emphasis on the principles of transparency, 
predictability, accountability, and public participation. This will help Thailand gradually 
overcome many problems causing regulatory failure such as lack of political will , 
regulatory capture, and corruption. 
As we found , the growing popularity of ISO 14001 could be another element forcing 
Thai industries to meet the standard if they want to continue their export businesses. But 
how can we ensure that when finns obtain ISO 14001 certification, they also implement 
the system in accordance with the applicable regulations? To prevent this problem, the 
thesis suggested regulatory flexibility be introduced as a strategy to help compensate for 
regulatory weakness in the Thai context. One promising way to provide such flexibility 
is to introduce self-regulation (discussed in PaJ1 Two) in finns ' environmental 
management, but complemented by independent third-party audits, and a regulatory 
safety net. 
Finally, the thesis argued that it would be unwise to rely on the various international 
obligations discussed above as a magic wand to help improve Thailand's environmental 
status quo. As we found earlier, regulatory implementation and enforcement m 
Thailand are weak, and have become a cause of failure; furthennore, Thailand is 
currently struggling to recover from the economic crisis in 1997. There is a serious risk 
that the government might mainly focus on the recovery, and neglect the issue of 
environment protection and its obligations, whether under soft law, World Bank loans, 
or its commitment to good governance provided to the IMF in return for its support. 
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Against these background, the thesis suggested that public participation, especially by 
NGOs which are empowered by the 'big bang' refonns, will be vitally important. Such 
NGOs can now get involved directly in the regulatory process and help ensure that 
environmental regulation is implemented and enforced, and can shame those regulators 
or companies which fail to meet their obligations. By doing this, national and 
international NGOs will be able to oversee both regulation and self-regulation and bring 
pressure for law implementation more generally. 
To summarise, despite the 'big bang' refonns, very serious environmental problems, 
including those related to air and water pollution, still exist in Thailand. These 
problems will not be solved simply by adopting a series of 'off the peg' instruments 
taken from the policy agendas of developed countries. On the contrary, the particular 
cultural, social and political circumstances of Thailand make it imperative that a 
regulatory strategy is designed for the particular Thai context. 
This thesis engages in that task. It offers alternative policy tools to help address air and 
water pollution problems in Thailand, designed to fit within and appropriate to the Thai 
political, social, and cultural contexts. The suggested policy instruments have both 
domestic and international dimensions. However, no single policy instrument can be 
used in isolation to provide a total solution as all instruments have limitations and some 
are better suited than others to certain situations. For this reason the thesis has argued, 
above all, for combinations of regulatory instruments and policy actors. 
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